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IntroductIon
Ideas in Motion 
Making Sense of Identity Politics  
and the New Genetics1
Katharina Schramm, David Skinner and Richard Rottenburg
contemporary politics of identity are often marked by a high level of emotional and political commitment on the part of the actors involved, and they remain a site of 
continuous contestation. not only are they influenced by various historical ‘presences’, 
to borrow a phrase from Stuart Hall (1990), or by their respective social, economic or 
religious intersections, they are also inspired by developments in the life sciences. The 
sequencing of the human genome has been a decisive step in this direction, propelling 
old nature/nurture debates into a new terrain. How genetic, environmental and social 
factors interact in the production of life, in people’s susceptibility to certain diseases or, 
in a more general sense, in the making of persons and relations has increasingly become 
an issue of debate. neither genetic determinism nor social constructivism alone can 
sufficiently address such questions (cf. duster 2003a; Hacking 2005; Hartigan, Jr. 
2008; Pálsson 2007). In biological science, authors such as richard Lewontin (1983) 
or Susan oyama (2000) have for quite some time argued against the limitations 
of a dichotomized understanding of nature against nurture and have consequently 
favoured a more encompassing understanding of developmental systems instead. In 
oyama’s words: ‘Inheritance can be identified with “nature” only if it embraces all 
contributors to that nature, and nature does not reside in genes or anywhere else until 
it emerges in the phenotype-in-transition. nature is thus not properly contrasted with 
nurture in the first place; it is the product of a continual process of nurture’ (2000: 
71–72). This understanding of processuality and mutuality has also been reflected in 
recent social science research on the life sciences and the construction of knowledge 
therein (see Bauer and Wahlberg 2009; Franklin 2007; Lock 2005; Lock and nguyen 
2010). Epigenetics, that is, the study of the complex and variable conditions for gene-
expression and trait-inheritance (see Jablonka and Lamb 2005), has been a recent 
buzzword that has also been associated with the possibility of fruitful exchanges and 
cooperation between the life sciences, social sciences and humanities (see Weigel 
2002), a promise that has not yet been fully explored in practice.2
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nevertheless, a transdisciplinary awareness is important. The new genetics is 
part of changes that have a direct bearing on the notions of self and relatedness as 
well as on the conceptualization of risk and responsibility. on another level, genetic 
knowledge is closely interlinked with group taxonomies and the establishment as well 
as extension of boundaries. It may therefore have profound (and perhaps unexpected) 
impacts on existing categories of belonging and difference – pushing identity politics 
towards the ‘nano-level’ (Gilroy 2000). With regard to the highly charged concepts 
of race, ethnicity and national belonging, this has two dimensions. on the one hand, 
genetic knowledge has been evoked in order to refute the biological basis of social 
categories. Genetics, so it was widely claimed after the sequencing of the human 
genome, may serve as definitive proof that diversity within any chosen group was at 
least as important as variations between groups (see AAA online project: ‘race: are 
we so different?’, http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html).3 Hence, it seems 
that racial science and racisms rooted in scientific or pseudoscientific biological 
determinism have finally been worn out. And yet race talk as well as ethnicity talk 
have gone through a remarkable renaissance in the past few years – be it in the field 
of medicine (with the design of ‘race-specific’ pharmaceutical products), forensics 
(with racialized genetic profiling), population genetics (equating groups, territory 
and dnA markers) or the recent developments in popular genealogies, where genetic 
ancestry testing has become fashionable. Some of the theoretical assumptions as well 
as of the practical applications of the new genetics (and of dnA-testing in particular) 
thus reinstate racial science, albeit on a different scale, as the equation of phenotype 
and character has given way to the analysis of ‘junk-dnA’, single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SnPs) and haplogroups, which are not necessarily connected to 
specific genes (see Abu El-Haj 2004, 2007).
In the wake of these developments, our book explores new social and conceptual 
spaces unfolding between genetic research and technologies on the one hand, and the 
social and political construction of identities on the other across a range of different 
settings. It considers how in a genomic age, science and the politics of race, ethnicity 
and nation facilitate (or at times contradict) each other. In doing so, it suggests the 
limits of thinking in terms either of science influencing politics or politics influencing 
science, but rather points to the coproduction of both (Jasanoff 2004; Latour 1987). 
In this we can chart the emergence of a novel and diverse ‘biopolitics’ that has 
global, national and local dimensions; genetics becomes part of a discussion about 
globalization and change in specific localized regimes of race-thinking.
consequently, we ask about the ways in which existing social categories are 
both maintained as well as transformed at the interface of science and politics. our 
approach recognizes that any contemporary exploration of genetics and race, ethnicity 
and national identity must extend to their diversified and variable expressions in 
the idioms of kinship and/or citizenship (see the contributions by nash, Schramm, 
Vaisman and Wade to this volume). to explore change we must locate genetics 
alongside adjacent contemporary trends, most notably the preoccupation with 
origins and personal discovery (see especially the contributions by nash, Palmié, 
Schramm and Sommer), but also the ongoing use of racial and ethnic categories in 
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social policy (see the contributions by Skinner and Vaisman) and medical research 
(see the contribution by Smart et al.). In order to examine the nuances of these 
processes, we take an actor-centred approach, looking at various scenarios where 
genetics becomes the stuff of identity and identity politics. The concept of identity 
politics is thereby not taken for granted, but is rather unpacked on various levels, i.e., 
the formation of classifications (Skinner, Smart et al. and Wade) and gene/alogical 
knowledge (nash, Palmié), the transformations of race/kinship congruity (Wade), 
the application and negotiation of social categories in forensics (Skinner, Vaisman), 
the historical formation of political and cultural identities and their re/location in the 
realm of the biological (Sommer), the congruence of popular culture, consumption 
and new genetic technologies (nash, Schramm and Sommer) as well as the implicit 
and explicit gendering of gene/alogies (nash, Schramm).
In doing this, however, we acknowledge that, whatever the importance of 
‘identity’ as a category of practice used by actors, the term has become stretched and 
overworked to such an extent that some theorists suggest it has little analytical worth 
(Anthias 2002; Brubaker and cooper 2000; comaroff and comaroff 2009; Handler 
1994). certainly, the concept of identity allows us to talk of different dimensions of 
sameness and difference, individuality, community and solidarity all at once, but, 
in doing so, it can obscure the variety of processes grouped under the one umbrella 
term: these include external categorizations, subjective experiences and accounts of 
social location.
new genetics clearly connects with a growing preoccupation with ethnicity as a 
personalized process of active identification and a growing interest in the complexity 
of origins and ancestry, but this is only part of the story. dnA analysis, often 
perceived as a straightforward and infallible means of identification, may not only 
confirm but may also contradict an individual’s previous self-ascription (see Vaisman, 
this volume). In some cases, this can lead to crisis, while in other cases, the dnA-
based ‘evidence’ may be ignored and other means of determining belonging may be 
privileged (cf. Prainsack and Hashiloni-dolev 2009; see also Schramm, this volume). 
Whatever the case may be, these processes never occur outside the political realm, 
but are rather deeply implicated in it. This becomes more evident if we consider that 
dnA identification is not just about the self, but always encompasses the external 
observation and organization of people in groups. A discussion about identity also 
quickly becomes one about the practices of categorizing people and categorizing genes. 
official, standardized systems of racial classification and data collection are integral to 
public life in many locales. As the contributions by Palmié, Skinner and Wade to this 
volume demonstrate, the new genetics connects with and feeds off this in a number of 
significant ways. Moreover, categorizations can often be contested and contradictory 
(see especially nash, Schramm and Sommer, this volume). The attempt to reduce 
race and ethnicity to statistically constructed genetic markers not only ignores the 
diversified histories of racial formation in various local settings but also erases other 
differences between group members such as class position and gender.
Thus, recent changes involve both a retooled politics of racialized identity and 
a reconfigured politics of racializing knowledge. This requires an appreciation of 
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the changing conditions of production and consumption of expertise about race, 
ethnicity and racism. We must ask how, when and why issues are discussed in terms 
of racial and ethnic differences, and who claims expertise on race and ethnicity. An 
analysis of the changing methods and technologies for the management of racialized 
data is also important.
discussion of race and the new genetics has tended to focus on the ways in 
which biological accounts of sameness and difference may or may not trump social 
accounts. But, as the chapters in this book illustrate, biological accounts now and in 
the future will interact with but not necessarily overwhelm other ways of making sense 
of difference and similarity. to set the biological against the social may downplay 
the novelty of the current situation. The molecular gaze has enabled the pursuit of 
new paths for the (re)formation of boundaries and the classification of groups and 
individuals. This is not, however, the institutional, intellectual or political triumph of 
biological determinism or even of biological essentialism. Genetic classifications have 
an ambivalent position in contemporary processes of political institutionalization 
and subject-making. conceptions of racial and ethnic divisions have always involved 
equivocations around determinism/plasticity, difference/sameness and nature/
culture. Yet these dualisms and the moves between them take on a distinctive form 
and particular importance in a postgenomic world. one element is the shifting 
combinations of biology/society or nature/culture at play. But there are also signs 
that the distinction between the biological and the social is beginning to lose its 
analytical stability and political force in discussions of race, ethnicity and racism.
*
We would like to illustrate these dynamics (and the complications arising out of 
them) by taking a closer look at a setting where racial classifications have always 
played an important, though highly ambivalent, role in public life. Brazil is one of 
the most unequal societies in Latin America. It is also often claimed that it has more 
people of African ancestry than any other country outside of Africa. The Brazilian 
population is largely descended from African slaves (slavery was only abolished in 
1888), indigenous Amerindians, European colonizers and later European and Asian 
migrants. Brazil has a national story (for both internal and external consumption) that 
celebrates admixture in its population as well as its cultural makeup. There is a history 
of racial classification in Brazil – both folk and official – based on variations in skin 
tone. But between branco and negro lie a complex set of self-referencing categories 
to encompass admixture. classification into these categories varies by region and 
situation. In contrast to, for example, the u.S.A., where studies suggest that a 
significant number of self-identified ‘whites’ actually have African heritage, ‘whites’ 
in Brazil celebrate their own and the nation’s mixed heritage (see, for example, Santos 
2009). However, the portrayal of Brazil as a harmonious ‘racial democracy’ has 
been challenged by academics, politicians and campaigners highlighting the impact 
of racism and understanding inequalities in racialized terms. These actors do not 
view the celebration of ‘mixture’ as an adequate counter to racism in Brazil, instead 
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arguing that the first step to address race inequality is to recognize the reality of race 
difference (see the contributions in Hanchard 1999).
The reforming populist Lula government that ruled Brazil from 2002 to 2010 
was associated with a newly assurgent Black Movement. It established a Special 
Secretariat for Policies for the Promotion racial Equality and set out to address racism 
and racial disadvantage via affirmative action – notably by encouraging universities 
to reserve quota places for black students. This strategy was dependent on a biracial 
approach in which, at points, people not normally deemed branco or negro were 
either ignored or subsumed into black and white categories. This political and policy 
shift has prompted what Peter Fry (2009b) terms a ‘taxonomic war’, with both social 
and natural scientists participating in a debate about the legitimacy of the categories 
and systems of categorization on which schemes for affirmative action depend. Social 
scientists are amongst both the most fervent supporters as well as the most impassioned 
opponents of the use of racial categories in this process. Significantly, those concerned 
about the fairness, practicality and unintended negative consequences of racial quotas 
have also utilized evidence from population genetics that highlights the admixture 
of the Brazilian population and suggests that skin colour in a country such as Brazil 
is a weak indicator of genetic ancestry.4 Here, genetics is mobilized, as one vocal 
opponent of racial quotas in university entrance (Manolo Florentino, Head of the 
Social History department at the Federal university of rio de Janeiro) puts it, to 
‘show race is a failed concept in Brazil’ (Salek 2007).
The reliability and validity of racial categories and the processes used to place 
people into quota categories have also become a pressure point in Brazilian debates over 
affirmative action. controversially, the university of Brasilia appointed a commission 
made up of a sociologist, an anthropologist, a student and representatives of the 
Black Movement to judge who should benefit from quotas using photographs and 
(where necessary) other ‘cultural’ evidence (Santos and Maio 2004).5 More typically, 
however, ‘self-identification’ has been utilized as the key basis of categorization. 
opponents focus on the potential inconsistencies and, tellingly, on occasion utilize 
genetic evidence as part of this critique. Early in the process, in 2003 José roberto 
Pinto de Góes, Professor of History at the university of the State of rio de Janeiro 
(uErJ), encouraged all university applicants to self-identify as black or brown:
If you are applying for uErJ’s next entrance examination, say you are black 
or brown … You won’t be lying. You might not know, but you are half 
African too. We are all Africa’s breed, whatever the colour of our skin. only 
those people who do not know or do not accept our history ignore this fact. 
Say you are black; say you are brown, for they want to steal your soul … 
(Quoted in tavolaro 2008: 150)
Supporters of quotas argue that genetics should not be used to undermine 
antidiscrimination policies: it is social divisions, not genetic similarities that are the 
key. david dos Santos, a priest who coordinates a scheme to prepare poor Afro-
Brazilians for higher education, is quoted by the BBc as saying: ‘I’ve never seen a 
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policeman asking for a genetic Id before stopping someone. In Brazil, discrimination 
is based on appearance, not on genes …’ (Salek 2007).
For opponents, racial quotas depend on forms of rigid, exclusive race 
categorization inappropriately transplanted from north to South America. This is 
in some ways a continuation of an older argument put forcibly by Pierre Bourdieu 
and Loïc Wacquant (1999), who characterized the imposition of u.S. categories into 
Brazilian society as cultural imperialism.6 But what is striking is the way in which this 
current debate has two registers: one focusing on variations between the Brazilian 
and u.S. social and political settings, and the other on variations in the genetic 
composition of the two populations. This is evident in an ‘open Letter Against 
race Laws’ published in 2008 and signed by 113 left-wing academics, teachers, 
lawyers, writers, artists and trade unionists, which argued: ‘dnA research allows us 
to conclude that, in 2000, there were around 28 million Afrodescendants among the 
90.6 million Brazilians who declare themselves as “white” and that, amongst the 76.4 
million who declare themselves “pardo” or “black”, 20% had no African ancestrality 
whatsoever’ (Brazilian Black Socialist Movement 2008).
This position, however, is not without its own contradictions. It is worth 
considering how and why opponents of quotas should choose to utilize genetics 
alongside legal, political and sociological arguments. Lilla tavolaro’s (2008) analysis 
of the implementation of affirmative action at the State universities of rio de Janeiro 
and the Federal university of Brasilia is useful here. tovolaro shows that while 
the notion that affirmative action and its associated ‘race assertive’ politics simply 
discloses and challenges pre-existing race divisions in Brazil is dubious, the same is 
true of the alternative position that dismisses them as an alien import ‘imposed from 
abroad, but also incompatible with the Brazilian symbolic order and system of racial 
classification’ (2008: 146). As tavolaro points out, this second position holds to a 
static view of national and social identity (see Hanchard 2003).7
We can extend this argument when considering the rhetorical use of genetics: for 
all its claims to problematize ‘race’, science is ultimately used to support an essentialist 
view of Brazil and Brazilians. From this standpoint Brazil is not just fundamentally 
different from the u.S.A. in its history and culture but also in its population genetics; 
in particular, ‘white’ Brazilians are not like ‘white’ people in the u.S.A. (Pena 2009). 
In other words, ‘science’ reproduces, microbiologically, the very terms around which 
national racial ideologies revolve, thereby affirming or contesting – but not actually 
transforming – those terms (Palmié 2007).
our Brazilian example shows some of the diverse and sometimes surprising ways 
in which the new genetics is implicated in the contemporary politics of race and 
racism and of national identity. How can we develop a fuller appreciation and a more 
general examination of these developments? While complex and varied, there are 
patterns here. In the sections that follow we make sense of change in terms of ideas 
in motion. Ideas (and practices) about race, ethnicity, racism and identity – in other 
words, about belonging and exclusion – travel across time, between locations, between 
institutional settings, between spheres of expertise, and between experts and the lay 
public. In transit, these ideas do not remain the same, but are rather reinterpreted 
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and remade – a process we seek to follow and better understand through our various 
contributions.
In writing of travelling ideas, we recognize that, strictly speaking, ideas cannot 
travel on their own but need to be inscribed into objects that can be moved from 
one context to another without completely changing character. These mobile objects 
might include written text, a pictorical representation, a technological artefact, a 
model or a procedure for doing things. nevertheless, since all objects hold meaning, 
are attributed with meaning and shape processes of sense-making, we can speak of 
travelling ideas as a useful shorthand for the processes of transmission, translation 
and transformation of both identity and genetics that we follow in this book. As the 
collection of chapters that follow will show, a full exploration of the movement of 
ideas involves an appreciation of both their immutability and their plasticity, and of 
both their capacity to change and to be changed by particular contexts (czarniawska 
and Joerges 1996; rottenburg 2009).
Ideas Travelling through Time
The politics of race and (genetic) science are rarely ever just about the present. The 
past and the future both loom large, be it in the projections of ‘promising genomics’ 
(Fortun 2008) that underlie the large dnA-databases that have been set up for medical 
and legalistic purposes (see Skinner, this volume) or in the ‘backwards-orientedness’ 
of genetic narratives that seek to deduce ancestral connections and movements from 
dnA samples (see the contributions by nash, Schramm and Sommer, this volume). 
As Sarah E. chinn has argued, in visions of a geneticized future:
dnA is envisaged as answering a welter of knotted questions about ontology 
(Who are we?), etiology (Where did we come from?), taxonomy (Where in 
nature do we fit?), epistemology (How can we know the world?), teleology 
(What is our purpose?) and broadly speaking eschatology (What will happen 
to us?). These are heavy burdens for a set of molecules so tiny. (chinn 2000: 
144)
In the decade since chinn wrote these comments, the discussion of the social and 
political implications of the new genetics has grown considerably and perhaps has 
also grown up. It is notable, however, how the sequencing of the human genome 
prompted both dystopian fears of a future triumph of biological deterministic racial 
science, through what has previously been termed ‘geneticization’ (Lippman 1991), 
and utopian hopes that new knowledge would finally end racism. The ensuing 
discussion of race and science was and is Janus-faced, looking backwards as well as 
forwards; dystopians fear the return of previously repressed scientific racism (e.g., 
AG gegen rassismus in den Lebenswissenschaften 2009; duster 2003b), whereas 
utopians in science (notably the founder of celera Genomics craig Venter, who 
co-announced the mapping of the human genome in 2000 – see, for example, The 
Guardian, 12 February 2001: 6) and social science (Gilroy 2000) seem nostalgic for a 
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postwar model predicated on the hope or expectation that racism could be ended by 
expert reason trumping lay ignorance:
It is impossible to deny that we are living through a profound transformation 
in the way that the idea of ‘race’ is understood and acted upon. underlying 
it there is another, possibly deeper problem that arises from the changing 
mechanisms that govern how racial differences are seen, how they appear 
to us and prompt specific identities. together these historic conditions have 
disrupted the observance of ‘race’ and created a crisis of raciology, the lore 
that brings the virtual realities of ‘race’ to dismal and destructive life. (Gilroy 
2000: 11)
In many ways Gilroy’s predictions still ring true, but there is little sign of the new 
genomic knowledge contributing to the building of a postracial world (or what Gilroy 
terms ‘planetary humanism’). While genomics contains both messages of human 
similarity and human difference, the past decade has seen a growing preoccupation 
with difference, i.e., genetic variations between people who are grouped in populations 
alongside historically loaded and contested categories of race and/or ethnicity 
(Koenig, Lee and richardson 2008: Introduction). These developments have made 
both the dystopian and utopian positions less plausible, revealing the weaknesses in 
their assumptions about the thrust of scientific work and the relationships between 
that work and the public sphere (Skinner 2006). nevertheless, something new and 
significant is happening, something that cannot be fully grasped only by referring 
back to the history of racism and anti-racism (even though we agree that it remains 
important to acknowledge the past careers of the terms that we are dealing with).
There are three dimensions to the novelty of the current situation. First, 
genomics is part of shifts in understandings of what it means to be human: a 
number of commentators have shown how genomics raises new questions about self, 
difference and belonging, the distinction between humans and animals, male and 
female, and the meanings of ‘natural ties’ (Franklin 2007; Haraway 1997; Karkazis 
2008; Lindee, Goodman and Heath 2003; Marks 2002; Valentine 2007). new 
genetic technologies change kinship constellations, ‘cultures of relatedness’ and the 
genealogical imagination (carsten 2000; Finkler 2000; Franklin and McKinnon 
2001; rapp 2000; Strathern 1992; Wade 2007). The second dimension of change 
is the way in which biology – as an institutional and epistemic practice as well as in 
terms of the objects and products of that science – takes on a particular prominence 
in contemporary public life. Biology (and the life sciences in general) increasingly 
becomes an object of ethical debate, economics and political dispute to the extent 
that these are reframed as bioethics (Almond and Parker 2003; Brodwin 2005; Lösch 
2001), biocapital (Fortun 2001; Sunder rajan 2006), biosociality (rabinow 1999; 
Gibbon and novas 2008) and biological or genetic citizenship (Heath, rapp and 
taussig 2004; Kerr 2003; rose and novas 2005; taussig 2009). Last but by no 
means least, genomics is a key element of what Franklin terms ‘the denaturalisation 
of biology from within’ (2001: 303). Science becomes about remaking or creating 
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life, requiring a rethinking of what biology is and defamiliarizing ‘the biological’ 
(ibid.; cf. Franklin and Lock 2003).
These broader developments are the context in which discussions of race, 
ethnicity, citizenship and genetics should be placed. The tropes of race and ethnicity 
represent a familiar organizing principle by which new biological data can be 
classified and thereby made sense of. But there is much here to make us reconsider 
old certainties about race, racism, ethnicity and identity politics in a wider sense. As 
charted, for example, in the contributions by nash, Palmié, Schramm and Sommer 
in this volume, biological knowledge is increasingly presented as providing answers 
to questions of origins and ancestry through genetic ancestry testing and population 
genetics. consumers can purchase a range of tests that pretend to explore connections 
via ‘genetic ancestry’, such as the the native American test, the cohanim Modal 
Haplotype test, the Hindu test and the Genghis Khan test (Greely 2008). This 
information is also provided as an add-on to commercial health testing services such 
as 23andMe or decodEme (cf. Lee 2006).
The notion that genetic testing is a ‘truth machine’ (cf. Lynch et al. 2009) that 
shortcuts the complexity of ancestry and origins is now a familiar element of popular 
history and genealogy. The interface between biology and history in new genealogies 
and hence in the determination or contestation of racial and/or ethnic belonging is 
significant (see Parfitt and Egorova 2006; Sommer 2008). It raises new questions 
about the mythologizations of biological origins and their relationship with previous 
forms of identity construction around notions of autochthony, cultural authenticity 
and heritage – questions that are addressed in this volume by nash, Palmié, Schramm 
and Sommer.8 As the chapters by Vaisman and also to some extent Wade show, this 
entanglement of biology and history can also affect relationships of belonging on the 
more intimate scale of the family and its intrinsic connections to national ideas of 
community, kinship and relatedness.
The commercial services that provide testing for ancestry are closely intertwined 
with scientific programmes that seek to map (and consequently market) the 
genetic heritage or genetic diversity of particular locales and groups. The Human 
Genome diversity Project, national Geographic and IBM’s Genographic Project, 
the HapMap project or, most recently, the Human Heredity and Health in Africa 
Project (H3 Africa) all explore and valorize genetic differences as part of a global 
account of humanity and an emerging global market in what Sunder rajan (2006) 
calls surplus health transformable into biocapital or what Palmié (this volume) terms 
‘identity goods’. As John and Jean comaroff (2009) have recently argued in this 
realm, ethnicity (and, for that matter, race) gets ‘incorporated’ in a dual manner: 
as an existential ontological entity (situated in the body) as well as a commercial 
enterprise (firmly placed in the neoliberal framework of the market economy).
racialized dnA has also become integral to the practices of the state and 
other key institutions, and through this has become part of our lives as citizens, 
patients, litigants, etc. Genetic evidence (notably in forensics and paternity testing) 
is a common feature of the legal system, criminal justice and immigration control 
(Lazer 2004). dnA is used to profile the ethnicity of crime suspects (see Skinner, 
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this volume) and by courts to substantiate social relationships (see Vaisman, this 
volume).9 Genetic medicine is also racialized in a number of key ways. This has 
prompted the latest twist in a longstanding set of debates regarding if, when and how 
to address racial and ethnic differences in health. cause celebres such as the licensing 
of the ‘ethnic drug’ Bidil in the u.S.A. exclusively for African-Americans remain the 
exception rather than the rule. Jonathan Kahn (2004, 2008) and others are, however, 
right to alert us to the commercial imperatives driving these developments and the 
synergies between those imperatives and contemporary identity politics.
taken together, genetic genealogy, population genetics, the focus on human 
genetic diversity, racialized biomedicine, pharmacogenetics and forensics point to a 
new context in which genetic knowledge and practice are part of (but do not shape 
on their own) novel forms of politics around race, ethnicity and racism. Biological 
knowledge and biological material become the stuff of identity formation and an 
object of struggle, as well as a resource in public debate in ways which can confound 
previous assumptions and faultlines. In the politics of identification, biological 
knowledge is both resisted and taken up, accepted and not accepted. However, such 
acceptance or rejection does not happen in a vacuum but needs to be authorized to 
‘stick’. Authorization (or successful mobilization) is the last step in a translation process 
where a novel idea is taken up in a particular context and translated into a new, after 
a while institutionalized practice that eventually appears to be the common-sense 
way of doing things (callon 1986). Each context is characterized by power relations, 
unequal distributions of economic resources, material infrastructures, normative 
frames and webs of beliefs which all together shape the process of mobilizing actors 
for the new practice, i.e., they shape the authorization process. As we have indicated 
in this section, there are continuities as well as disruptions in the ways in which 
these authorizations work over time. In the following section, we consider how these 
mechanisms might vary according to different locations.
Ideas Travelling between Locations
As the Brazilian case illustrates, the new biopolitics has global (and globalizing) features 
but plays out differently in different locations. The notion of travelling ideas helps 
us to appreciate the uneven but interconnected spatial impact of new developments; 
these currents are by no means uniform or flow in a singular direction. With case 
studies covering Latin America (Wade, Vaisman), Africa (Schramm), Europe, i.e., 
Ireland (nash), the u.K. (Skinner, Wade) and Switzerland (Sommer), as well as 
the u.S.A. (Palmié, Schramm) and the global scientific community (Smart et al.), 
our book covers a wide regional scope and has a strong comparative dimension. The 
various chapters show the importance of placing the practices of science, policy and 
identity in different social settings and they also indicate how in those settings we can 
see the interplay of local, national and global dynamics.
Significant here are variations at regional (the distinction between north and 
South America highlighted above is an obvious example) as well as national levels. 
These variations are both in terms of narratives of national belonging and of policy 
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conventions of classification. They are not just discursive or organizational but pertain 
to the ways in which racism operates and race and ethnicity are lived across social 
and historical settings. A recurring preoccupation of the chapters in this book is with 
the ways in which genetic practice comes up against, challenges or is influenced by 
national regimes of truth about identity and belonging, and state-level processes of 
official classifications of difference. crucial here are questions about the relationship 
between classification, power and governance, which are not only important to the 
development of racism and oppositional consciousness but also to ideas about the 
national body in its institutional and ideological form.
An appreciation of differential contextual valuation of genomic data leads us 
to refine any simplistic assumptions about the ‘impacts’ of the new life sciences. 
This is not merely a celebration of the complexity of change but also reminds us 
of the relationship between different levels of analysis. The developments that we 
observe in the field of the new genetics are not just about (changing) relationships 
between people (and other species and things) but also about changing relationships 
between places. These are often due to an unequal circulation of scientific knowledge 
and models of governmentality as well as to the particulars of local translations of 
circulating ideas.
Given the global influence of u.S. natural and social science and the u.S.A.’s 
profile as a thoroughly racialized social formation (see omi and Winant 1994), it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the north American experience has become a focus for 
discussion of the processes whereby race and genomics combine. This has potential 
drawbacks: for all the merits of work such as that collected in Koenig, Lee and 
richardson (2008), it focuses almost exclusively on the u.S.A. in isolation from 
other settings. The u.S.A. has a distinctive history and politics of racialized identities 
that cannot be assumed as universal or typical. The approach typified by Koenig, 
Lee and richardson not only precludes the analysis of territorial variations but also 
of the intellectual, commercial and policy influence of the u.S.A. (and the limits of 
that influence) on other parts of the world. We are not the first to make this point; 
rose (2007) and others argue that a preoccupation with u.S.-based case studies and 
concerns distorts global discussion of race and genomics. But, as the contributions by 
Wade, Skinner and Sommer in this volume indicate, the non-transferability of the 
u.S. model should not lead to the smug assumption that race is an American hang-
up or that racism is an exclusively American problem.
Instead, our book explores the complex entanglements of local, national and 
global histories, and we analyse the manifold connections between these levels, as 
they have shaped specific interfaces of genetics and identity politics. Michael Jackson 
(2002) rightfully points out that the new genetic technologies do not enter the global 
scene unmarked, but are rather implicated in existing global patterns of inequality 
and injustice. not all people occupy an equal position in the emerging ‘imagined 
genetic communities’ (Simpson 2000; see also rotimi 2003), and their involvement 
in the global ‘risk society’ (Beck 1986) differs accordingly. drawing on the case of 
the new Zealand Maori’s perception of (and reaction to) technologies of genetic 
modification (GM), Jackson demonstrates how epistemological concerns that take 
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their root in culturally specific understandings of life and genealogy (whakapapa) 
are deeply ingrained in ongoing political struggles.10 Through discussions of the 
Human Genome diversity Project (HGdP), other authors have considered how the 
relationship between the West and the rest is played out in the framing of the issue 
of genetic variation and conflicting claims to know and control bodies and histories 
(see cross 2001; Marks 2001; reardon 2005; tutton 2004).
The transnational character of genetic practice can be analysed along two lines. 
First, science and capital are not confined to national borders but operate globally. 
Moreover, dnA- and tissue-samples are also collected on a worldwide scale and 
populations are designed (and affected!) accordingly (cf. Lock 2001; M’charek 
2005; Sharp 2000). Secondly, information about genetic technologies circulates 
globally, be it through the internet or other media sources. In addition, some of the 
commercial services associated with the new genetics (ancestry testing in particular) 
operate solely through the internet, connecting groups and people in new ways (see 
nash and Schramm, this volume).
Global circulations of dnA technologies are one of the ways in which new 
genetics and with it new forms of race thinking spread around the world. Arguably, 
this implies a flattening out of differences in the many ways in which race is conceived 
in different locations and different contexts. certainly, there are renewed attempts 
to standardize across temporal and spatial contexts – albeit in ways that are often 
actually confounded by local circumstances: as the case of biomedicine illustrates 
particularly well, the use of race categories in research is a dynamic compromise 
between local, national and transnational factors. resilient though they are, local/
national systems of classification are changing and the practices of genetics and the 
controversies that accompany them are part of that change. out of the tensions new 
typologies and methods of categorization may well emerge.
Ideas Travelling between Institutional Settings
A full explanation of the connections and disjunctions between different settings 
in which dnA is collected, stored and interpreted must also appreciate that ‘race’ 
and dnA are considered together in a variety of different kinds of institutional 
arrangements and under different systems of governance. take, for example, ‘the 
genetic test’. understandably, much attention has been paid to the testing and storage 
of genetic material in health and associated medical research. Health is, however, 
only one route through which the genetic test enters the popular imagination and 
everyday life. testing for paternity and testing for ancestry (as part of a genealogical 
project) and forensic testing have also become increasingly commonplace (see the 
contributions by nash, Schramm, Skinner, Sommer and Vaisman, this volume). As 
Greely (2008) remarks, a single genetic ancestry test can have multiple objectives, 
including presuming geographic and ethnic origins, finding relatives on the database, 
checking for links between two people both submitting samples, etc.
There is a technical connection between different tests (they use the same 
techniques and sometimes the same laboratories). There is another connection in 
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that the prevalence and status in some spheres (providing very precise information 
on criminal guilt, paternal ties or, in the case of monogenetic disorders, disease 
susceptibility) gives credibility to genetic practice in other spheres (such as genetic 
ancestry testing or ethnic profiling of crime suspects). Yet these are settings where 
experiences, reality assumptions, epistemologies and the associated identity politics 
can be quite different and partly contradictory. In some spheres genetic testing has 
achieved technical stability and scientific status, and has accordingly been blackboxed 
in routine applications. In other cases genetic testing is carried out at the margins of 
institutionalized science and still has limited professional or public credibility.
Genetic tests for risks of ill health, to prove rights of settlement and citizenship 
in migration cases, to confirm family ties and obligations, for retelling a narrative 
of roots, and to determine criminal guilt or innocence not only differ in terms of 
scientific validity but also differ in the kind of issues of relatedness and belonging 
they emphasize. They also take place under different conditions, have different kinds 
of consequences and rest on different relationships between tester and testee. one 
key variation is the degree of compulsion (legal, moral or familial) underlying the 
circumstances of testing. As the chapters by Vaisman and Skinner show, the subject 
position held by an individual in a given situation where genetic testing is employed 
may also lead to varying understandings of compulsion. Another axis of variation 
is the degree to which (and the way in which) the test is subject to professional 
and legal regulation. Also significant is the extent to which (and the way in which) 
results are interpreted with differing notions of the relative balance of professional 
expertise versus lay understanding and autonomy (cf. Gibbon 2007; Leach, Scoones 
and Wynn 2005; tutton 2007).
Ideas Travelling between Fields of Expertise
As the discussion of testing above suggests, genomics requires or allows new kinds 
of expertise and expert practice in identity and identification. There are variations 
and connections to be considered between different realms of expertise (for example, 
between biomedicine – forensics – legislation – public policy and administration). A 
particularly important connection/disjunction (well explored in the contribution by 
Smart et al.) is that between social science and natural science.
A frequent concern raised by social scientists writing on race and genomics is that 
their disciplines risk marginalization in the face of the challenge of a reductionist life 
sciences intent on establishing a pre-eminent expert position on race and ethnicity. 
But if we consider the (changing) patterns of influence, tension and interplay 
between the natural and social sciences expressed in recent times, a complex picture 
emerges. We also find transdisciplinary efforts at establishing a common ground. 
A striking example for such a shared concern among social scientists and biologists 
about the use (and possible abuse) of racial categories in human genetics is the 
open Letter that appeared in the journal Genome Biology in 2008 and was authored 
by a group of faculty from the humanities, social sciences, life sciences, law and 
medicine at Stanford university. The letter asks for the establishment of an ‘ethics 
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of characterizing difference’ (Lee et al. 2008), warns against a careless application 
of ethnic and/or racial labels in biomedical research and, above all, calls for more 
dialogue between the different fields (for a similar initiative, cf. caulfield et al. 2009).
However, such multidisciplinary endeavours are the exception rather than the 
rule. More conventionally, both social scientists and natural scientists frequently 
seek to deal with conceptual and political dilemmas about race, ethnicity and 
racism by delegating and deferring to each other. Social scientists often tend to cite 
natural science as evidence to problematize the race concept and the ideology of 
racism (Skinner 2007). natural scientists, on the other hand, have regularly sought 
to contract out the practical and ethical work of constructing legitimate categories 
for research to social scientists. Exemplary for this strategy is the so-called ELSI 
agenda that was founded as a subprogramme of the Human Genome Project and 
was assigned to investigate the ethical, legal and social issues associated with it (cf. 
Macilwain 2009: 841).
This is not to say that social and natural scientists necessarily approach problems 
of race, ethnicity and racism in the same way. Instead, they often operate in two 
distinct epistemic communities with different rules of dialogue and evidence. Both 
the natural sciences and the social sciences have ‘community standards’, but these 
standards can conflict. For example, natural scientists are likely to worry about the 
reliability of systems of classification that are too amenable to the variations across 
time and space, whereas social scientists worry about the validity of delocalized, 
standardized systems. of course, we do not intend to ‘naturalize’ the differences 
between social and natural sciences, but rather we refer to a few general trends that we 
have observed in the discussions of race and genomics in the respective fields. Instead 
of assuming an incommensurability or struggle between the two fields of expertise, 
we should therefore ask how, when and why they do or do not work together.
underlying exchanges across the natural and social sciences are ongoing concerns 
about the distinction between race and ethnicity as ‘social’ or ‘biological’. Much social 
science is troubled by the implicit willingness of racialized genomics to consider that 
there is a biological reality to race, be it in terms of ancestral-cum-regional-cum-racial 
markers or in terms of the validity of racial self-ascriptions as a basis for categorization 
in biomedical research. By worrying in this way, they return to a touchstone of their 
academic tradition. The clear distinction between (false) biological differences and 
(real) social differences has underpinned much social science work on race and 
racism since the middle of the twentieth century (Skinner 2007), but in practice 
this apparently clear distinction has been hard to sustain, and recent developments 
suggest that a more differentiated analysis is needed.
While if we look hard enough we can find examples of writers who see the 
new genetics as confirming the proposition that race is biology and ultimately linked 
to destiny, these are not cutting-edge researchers (see, for example, Leroi 2005; 
Sarich and Miele 2004). More representative are the so-called ‘race-realists’ such 
as risch et al. (2002) who hold on to the validity of racial self-categorizations in 
biomedical research. In this type of research, the politically overloaded notion of 
race oftentimes gives way to the idea of population. The latter is thought to be a 
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more neutral term, as it is associated with gene-frequencies instead of traits and, at 
least in theory, acknowledges the clinal nature of such frequencies and the fluidity of 
boundaries between populations. However, critics of the ‘race-realists’ have argued 
that they ‘repeat the mistakes of scientific racism by the selectiveness of their attention. 
Genetic claims are consistently and almost singularly made about black people, 
striving to posit something that makes them qualitatively or quantitatively distinct’ 
(richard cooper et al., quoted in Hartigan 2009: 81, original emphasis). obviously, 
the distinction between ‘race’ and ‘population’ is a thin line to tread, and authors 
such as the research team around Paul Martin, richard tutton and Andrew Smart 
have shown that these fine divisions are often blurred in scientific practice (see their 
contribution to this volume, Smart et al.).
nevertheless, the point remains that the social and the biological are often hard 
to disentangle. For some researchers the aggregation of the social and the genetic 
is the best way to consider varying patterns of sickness and morbidity between 
different groups of people. It enables them to view the complexity and ambiguity 
of race/ethnicity as an asset – standing for bundles of bio/social factors that cannot 
and should not be disaggregated (Jackson 2001; royal 2006). According to such 
a perspective, the high percentage of hypertension cases among African Americans 
is not simply due to the ‘genetic bottleneck’ of the Middle Passage but is rather 
the result of a combination of factors that have a lot to do with racism, including 
stress, class position, etc. unless these are considered in medical research, the ‘racial 
ascription’ does not hold (cf. duster 2003b).
Thus, the key issues here relate not to a battle between social and natural science 
or between biological and social accounts of race, but to the institutional, intellectual 
and political ‘back and forths’ between positions (Fullwiley 2007).
Ideas Travelling between Experts and the Public
It is worth at this point highlighting one aspect of the Brazilian case study that we took 
up earlier in this introductory discussion. The Brazilian debate was shot through with 
assumptions about the impact of expert knowledge and practice on everyday experience 
and identity. opponents of racial quotas worried about the spread of rigid, u.S.-style 
forms of race thinking to Brazil with resultant social and political polarization, the fear 
being that social policy categories would remake racial identities in their image (see, 
for example, Fry 2009a, 2009b). Equally, as we have seen, supporters put their faith in 
other kinds of expertise (apart from genetics) to win the political argument. However, 
both sides in the controversy perhaps overestimate the ability of experts to shape public 
debate and popular understandings. detailed qualitative studies suggest, for example, 
that Brazilians seem to be able to operate with official systems of categorization and 
continue to understand themselves in terms of mixture.
As the Brazilian case shows, ‘the public’ often preoccupies the experts as a 
generalized other who is watching, must be kept in mind and, most frequently, 
might misunderstand or misuse racialized categories and data (this general tendency 
is typified by the arguments in Kahn 2004). In contemporary settings, laypeople have 
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a complex, active relationship with the new forms of expert knowledge (collins and 
Evans 2002; Jasanoff 2006) – a situation that has been acknowledged in the broad 
research on newly emergent ‘biosocialities’ (rabinow 1996, 1999), especially with 
critical regard to patient activism (cf. Gibbon and novas 2008; rabeharisoa and 
callon 2002) and the new reproductive technologies (Strathern 1992), and is also 
well illustrated by the chapters on genetic ancestry testing by nash, Schramm and 
Sommer in this volume.
understanding the changing significance genetics holds for laypeople requires 
exploration of three related but distinct phenomena: the direct engagement between 
social actors with new biological knowledge and practice; the mediated engagement 
between public and representations of and debates around these developments in the 
press, on television and on the internet; as well as the changing place of science in 
public discourse and policy making (collins 1988; Hilgartner 2000; Jasanoff 1994; 
Prainsack et al. 2008). Given that it underlies all contributions to this volume, a 
heightened awareness of these different levels of interaction will help us to understand 
the concrete translation processes that facilitate the travelling of dnA technologies 
between various contexts with very different levels of expertise and heterogeneous 
motives.
This perspective enables us to consider the role that the biological plays in 
everyday accounts and experiences of similarity and difference (as well as to better 
understand where and why biological factors might be ignored or discounted – see 
Johnston 2003). It also facilitates a thorough analysis of the performative dimension 
of identity politics, which is particularly relevant in the field of dnA testing and is as 
yet under-represented in academic debate.
The many ways in which natural and social scientists as experts of race and 
ethnicity come up against or work with laypeople are crucial to understanding the 
novelty of the current situation. Practical and political factors relating to both the 
conduct of research and the dissemination of findings draw genetic researchers into 
engagement with lay actors and policy categories. on a rather mundane level, ideally 
researchers have to consult communities, to enrol subjects into their research and to 
communicate findings in ways that are meaningful in the public domain.11 At a more 
fundamental level, categories can only function as tools of research and policy if they 
gel with lay common sense, and this pushes them into a concern with categories that 
‘make sense’ in the public domain (cf. Grundmann 2001; for the general argument, 
see daston and Galison 2007). This explains the apparently contradictory trend of 
genetic researchers using self-categorization and official, nationally specific systems of 
racial and ethnic categories to make sense of biological processes.
The Contributions
As our discussion so far suggests, we are sympathetic to approaches that discuss new 
emerging forms of ‘biosociality’ and ‘biological citizenship’. But although useful, 
these concepts can, if not carefully used, flatten out these differences in terms of the 
degree and form of regulation, the relationship between lay and expert knowledge, 
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and, indeed, in the relative significance of different developments. As Margarete 
Lock has cautioned in her work on Alzheimer’s disease (e.g., Lock 2008), the role of 
genetics in the organization of (new) socialities around disease and disease risk – the 
field in which the idea of biosocialities has been mostly employed – is sometimes 
over-estimated, leading unintentionally into the very trap of reductionism associated 
with the gene hype. In accordance with Gibbon and novas (2008), Lock argues 
for a ‘distributed bio-sociality’ (2008: 65) that takes into consideration the wider 
‘political economy of genomic knowledge and technology’ (Gibbon and novas 
2008, Introduction: 7).
We take up this challenge, which we think is also vital to an understanding of 
the impact of dnA (or rather the knowledge and expertise associated with it) beyond 
the health sector. With our detailed analysis of the circulation of dnA technologies 
between different contexts, we propose a methodological approach that reaches down 
to where biosocialities are made in the first place. rather than assuming what the 
outcome of the entanglements between new genetics, new forms of subject formation 
and governmentality, and identity politics are, we suggest first looking into the 
trajectories of dnA technologies, their preconditions, modalities and consequences. 
We start from the assumption formulated in the principle of symmetry of translation 
theory (Bloor 1976) that any token – in our case dnA technology, or the ‘gene’ 
for that matter (cf. oyama 2000: 118) – does not only and primarily circulate and 
spread due to an intrinsic energy or power (such as its truthfulness, utility, moral 
superiority and beauty). In order to travel, a token must rather be picked up by 
diverse actors and integrated into their repertoires and actions, and they do this for 
very different reasons that are only partly related to the token and its characteristics. 
during this process of translation neither the token, nor the actors, nor the receiving 
and the sending contexts and the boundaries between these remain the same (cf. 
Latour 1986). All of this is changing due to ongoing translations and new links that 
are created in interstitial spaces between entities that were previously separate.
The authors who are assembled in this volume all share a concern with the 
complexities underlying contemporary identity politics in the wake of the new 
genetics, yet they employ a variety of means to achieve this goal. This is partly due to 
their different disciplinary backgrounds (in anthropology, sociology, geography, the 
history of science, science and technology studies, and medical research) and partly 
due to their specific questions and the settings in which these are examined: from 
scientific practice (Smart et al.), through the field of forensics and the constitution 
of national subjects (Skinner, Vaisman) to new kinship practices via biomedical and 
bureaucratic technologies (Wade) and the growing sector of commercial ancestry 
testing (nash, Palmié, Schramm and Sommer). Although varied in terms of 
background and topic, our authors combine a focus on biology and the politics of 
race, ethnicity and racism with analyses of the interplay of the local, national and 
global dynamics of practices of science, policy and identity. They do so in a variety of 
ways by looking at representations (in various media – from the internet to scientific 
journals and databases), performances (in different actors’ terms) and discourses 
(within and between the spheres of popular culture, law, science and politics).
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The volume starts off with a contribution by Andrew Smart, richard tutton, Paul 
Martin and George t.H. Ellison, who draw on evidence from a three-year project 
that has explored the use of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in genetic and biomedical science. 
Their chapter engages with conceptual debates about social constructivism and explores 
what biomedical scientists mean when using expressions such as ‘social construct’, 
‘social construction’ or ‘socially constructed’ in discussions about race and ethnicity. 
While genetic researchers are often portrayed as seeking to displace social accounts 
of group difference with biological alternatives, as Smart et al. show, contemporary 
scientists on the contrary are often willing and able to work with the definitions of 
social policy makers and lay actors. The notion that race ‘is a social construct’ is a 
useful way for scientists to manage the entanglements between identities and dnA 
thrown up by developments in genetics. The chapter centres around a Special Issue, 
entitled Genetics for the Human Race, that appeared in the renowned journal Nature 
Genetics and focused on the use of racial and ethnic categories in biomedical research. 
Smart et al. argue that there are differing and potentially inconsistent understandings 
amongst researchers about what is meant by ‘socially constructed’ when they talk about 
‘race’ and/or ‘ethnicity’. The notion that ‘race’ is a social construction is part of a set 
of multiple and overlapping categorizations of human populations that seem likely to 
remain ambiguous, and subject to disagreement and blurring. As Smart et al. argue, 
while there thus remains room for fluidity, flexibility and novelty in the identity politics 
surrounding ‘race’ and genetics, this should not detract from the power or importance 
of the notion of ‘race’ in particular as it relates to historical and contemporary processes 
of racialization and racism.
Similar themes run through chapter 2 where david Skinner locates analysis of 
the emerging biopolitics of race, genetics and identity within a wider account of the 
varied and changing use of official systems of racial and ethnic categorization. As such, 
he explores the multiple connections between the apparent biologization of racial and 
ethnic difference and the (often nation-specific) sociopolitical conditions under which 
racialization occurs. He also reminds us of the potential for surveillance, control and 
discrimination in the new genetic technologies. Skinner uses the case of forensic dnA 
databases (in particular, the British national Police dnA database) to reveal a complex 
politics of knowledge centred on the construction and use of racialized data. In the 
British case a disproportionate number of young black men have dnA records stored 
on state databases. The ethnicity of each person included in the database is recorded 
alongside genetic data. The purpose of racializing each dnA record in this fashion is 
contested and ambiguous: is this a sinister precursor of ‘ethnic profiling’ or a means 
of monitoring the fairness of the system? As Skinner shows, discussion of the validity, 
reliability and legitimacy of ethnic categories and processes of categorization is endemic 
to the operation of the British forensic database. A continuing politics of categorization 
takes place in conditions that defy easy distinctions between the social and the biological 
or between (apparently plastic) self-identifications and (apparently fixed) official or 
scientific definitions of group difference. As Skinner argues, however, the continual 
consideration of category issues has often been a way of postponing discussion of the 
role of genetic science in an institutionally racist criminal justice system.
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Peter Wade is also concerned with the changing dynamics of racial classification(s), 
in particular with regard to the notion of ‘race-kinship-congruity’. In chapter 3 he 
argues that kinship and race (and ethnicity and nationality) are linked through ideas 
about relatedness and the transmission of substances, including genetic material but 
also less concrete substances such as ‘blood’. discussing examples from Latin America 
and Europe, Wade examines how that link works and has changed over time. Based 
on Banton’s ideas of ‘race as lineage’ and ‘race as type’, he outlines a basic race-kinship 
intersection in cognatic Western kinship systems, in which parents are expected to 
give birth to offspring who are recognizably linked to either/both of their parents; 
the criteria of recognizability include racialized appearance. Wade then explores the 
shift towards ‘cultural racism’ and argues that despite the apparent abandoning of 
genealogical and physical criteria for race, these still play a key role precisely through 
the link between race and kinship and the role of ideas about race in bridging 
Western concepts of nature and culture. The chapter looks at technologies of kinship 
– assisted conception and transnational adoption – to see if recent changes in ways of 
understanding kinship have altered the way race and kinship intersect. Wade argues 
that there seem to be ways in which these new modes of kinship reckoning simply 
serve as arenas in which existing ideas about race are not only reiterated but are also 
renaturalized, and in which existing ideas about race shape and constrain kinship 
connections. But there also seem to be ways in which existing ideas about race are 
challenged, destabilized and even denaturalized, and in which ideas about kinship 
are also reshaped.
noa Vaisman’s contribution (chapter 4) is also concerned with the complexities 
of kinship, adoption and identification, yet not in a transnational framework but 
rather in one highly politicized national context. Among the many human rights 
violations committed by the military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–83) was the 
abduction of around 500 infants whose parents were ‘the disappeared’ – political 
opponents secretly killed by the regime. Separated from their biological parents, these 
children were assigned new identities and new state documents, and in most cases they 
were given away to be raised by the perpetrators of the crime and their accomplices. 
to this day the majority of these individuals, now in their early thirties, are unaware 
of their real genetic origins. As part of their struggle, a number of human rights 
organizations, principally among them the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, have 
been searching for these individuals, increasingly by means of genetic technologies of 
identification. The chapter traces both the historical circumstances that gave rise to 
the use of dnA in the search for the ‘living disappeared’ and the implications of its 
current use in shaping Argentine notions of identity. Vaisman shows how the dnA 
tests used in the identification of these individuals have raised questions about the 
complex relations between biological matter, social ties and identity.
In chapter 5 Marianne Sommer takes us along the historical dimension 
of identity politics and its link to biology before and after dnA. Her chapter is 
mainly concerned with the application of a biologically founded and scientifically 
reconstructed history, and the ways in which geneticists of the twenty-first century 
are challenging the historian’s position as provider of identity-forming origin 
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narratives. Looking at iGEnEA, a provider of genetic ancestry tracing services based 
in Switzerland, the chapter examines how commercial genetic ancestry tracing services 
provide new kinds of raw material through which to build personal, family and 
national histories. Sommer analyses the public discourses surrounding the company 
and explores the specificity of such an enterprise in Switzerland, and more generally 
in German-speaking Europe. As she shows, services such as iGEnA raise significant 
questions: how is this history and genealogy on a genetic basis produced, sold and 
consumed? What needs does it satisfy/foster? And how does it differ from other kinds 
of historical reconstruction that occupy the same public-economic niche? Specifically, 
Sommer considers how in this case commercialized science deals with historically and 
culturally complex ‘brands’ such as Heimat, Urvolk and Ursprungsland (‘homeland’, 
‘aboriginal folk’ and ‘country of origin’).
obviously, there are connections and variations between the use and 
understanding of genetic ancestry testing in different contexts. A different case of 
ancestry testing is discussed by catherine nash in chapter 6. Her analysis of ‘Irish 
dnA’ and the making of connections and distinctions in Y-chromosome surname 
studies brings the gendered meaning of genetic technologies to the foreground. 
drawing on the online culture of genetic clan ancestry, nash’s chapter explores 
the ways in which ideas of shared origins and relatedness are being reconfigured 
through new genetic surname projects and the ways in which concepts of ethnicity 
and nationality figure in the complicated work of making new forms of meaning 
from test results. Though these projects may be informed by a desire to have a single 
ethnic affiliation genetically confirmed and a single place of origin genetically located, 
in practice they produce new genetic distinctions within these imaginative and virtual 
communities that challenge existing assumptions of relatedness, collective identity 
and belonging. But geneticizing Irish clan ancestry in this strand of global genealogy 
is not just a matter of diasporic ethnic identifications but of understandings of 
identity and difference in Ireland and northern Ireland too. In the context of the 
long history of ethnic division and conflict in the north of Ireland, new genetic 
knowledge can both complicate and reconfirm understandings of an indigenous 
Gaelic population and of biological distinctions between native and settler groups. 
The chapter consequently considers the ways in which ideas of nationhood, ethnicity 
and relatedness are being reworked in this strand of genetic genealogy in relation to 
the politics of national and diasporic belonging.
In chapter 7 Katharina Schramm further explores the diasporic and gendered 
dimension of ancestry testing, looking at its usage, representation and interpretation 
across the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993). She examines how this practice combines 
notions of symbolic heritage and biological inheritance in unique ways. Previously 
established racial and ethnic categories, such as ‘black’, ‘African’, ‘Ghanaian’ or 
‘Asante’ that carry specific cultural and political meanings are thereby reconfigured 
and embedded in new networks of relatedness. Schramm explores this process with 
regard to other forms of (black) identity production, the politics of memory and 
the constitution of knowledge. She demonstrates how, through its combination of 
techniques of embodiment, purification and objectification, genetic ancestry testing 
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constitutes a unique location where the changing dynamics of individual and collective 
categorizations can be fruitfully explored. Her analysis of the representational 
dynamics of ancestry testing is embedded in a discussion of three interrelated aspects: 
the impact of slavery on notions of identity and belonging in diasporic settings; the 
specifics of u.S. multiculturalism and the connected ethnicization of belonging; and, 
finally, the situation in African states, such as Ghana, which are at the receiving end 
of the genealogical quest.
detailed case studies such as those by Schramm, nash and Sommer raise general 
questions about the practice, appeal and longer term impact of genetic ancestry 
testing and its underpinning assumptions about identity and science. It is therefore 
appropriate that the volume ends with an ambitious and provocative bid to reframe 
these questions. Stephan Palmié discusses the practice of ancestry testing, or personal 
genomic histories (PGHs), and the science on which it is based through the lens of the 
anthropological concept of ‘cults of affliction’. He argues that the marketing strategies 
of PGH providers and their resonance in public discourse throw intriguing light on 
the reproduction of ideologies that, in naturalizing the experience of racism, displace 
its (structural) sources downwards into the realm of the biotic in a manner revealingly 
reminiscent of the manner in which classic drums of affliction displace them upwards 
towards the divine. Beyond that, however, the chapter aims to demonstrate how 
the abductive logic (in c.S. Peirce’s sense) of both Afro-cuban divination and 
molecular biological identity arbitration works to constitute forms of sociality. The 
chapter suggests, in the spirit of a Latourean ‘symmetrical anthropology’, that if PGH 
products really serve the purposes advertised by their providers and the media, then 
we might be facing a troubling situation: one where the acquisition and inhabitation 
of genomically ‘rooted’ identities would ultimately represent little else than a practical 
response to the mobilization of enchanted technologies in the service of contextually 
rational projects of identity management – however much these contribute to the 
reproduction of the social reality of ‘race’.
Final Thoughts
Palmié’s chapter has the great merit of moving us on from repeatedly asking whether 
genetic accounts of racial, ethnic or national similarity are intrinsically true or false. 
Instead, it leads us to consider how and why such accounts might come or not come 
to be usable and useful. An appreciation of what we have called ‘travelling ideas’ 
facilitates this agenda shift. taken as a whole, the chapters in this book demonstrate 
the importance of drilling down to the complexities of and connections between 
various times, places and institutional contexts in which identity and dnA come 
together. They reveal a contemporary biopolitics that is haunted by visions of a past 
and future of scientific racism, and in which science and politics make a multiplicity 
of criss-crossing connections. Here it makes little sense to speak of a single key actor 
and to deduce the dynamics of the arena from there – instead, we need to consider 
the distributed agency (Garud and Karnøe 2003) in dnA-based knowledge and 
technologies.
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together the chapters highlight global, regional and local factors but, for all the 
universalistic claims of genetics, a recurring theme is the continued significance of the 
nation state as imagined community, policy apparatus and a key arena where political 
and scientific controversies are played out.
A model of travelling ideas also allows us to understand and manage what can 
often seem to be a frustrating lack of clarity about the message of dnA and, indeed, 
the meaning of core conceptions of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity.’ together the chapters 
in this book reveal much about the ways in which dnA technologies function as 
‘immutable mobiles’ that maintain aspects of their ontological qualities throughout 
their journey, yet at the same time acquire new and partly contradictory meanings and 
functions in different settings. A comparable analysis can also be applied to race and 
ethnicity – concepts that are strikingly resilient and resonant yet open-ended enough 
for interplay between widely distributed actors and actants operating with different 
and partly incoherent interests, intentions, reality assumptions, and epistemologies.
We believe that a strength of this collection is its range of case studies – there 
is much to be learnt by discussing dnA and racialized identity across the different 
spheres of medicine, forensics, genealogy, etc. our volume has a preponderance of 
chapters that deal with genetic ancestry testing, a feature which is, we would argue, 
a timely counterbalance to the ways in which this aspect of genetics has often been 
trivialized or dismissed elsewhere. Genetic ancestry testing is a sphere where the active 
performance of identity claims is most foregrounded, but combining discussion of 
ancestry testing in this collection with a range of different examples allows us to see 
elements of the same preoccupation with the active expression of identity in other 
areas as well. It also allows us to see the interconnection of individualized and group 
identities, and of identification by self and identification by others that is present 
across racialized genetics as whole. The active assertion, discovery or choice of identity 
by laypeople is frequently presented as a check or balance to the imposition of racial 
and ethnic labels from above, but contemporary race experts also operate on, with 
and through the idiom and practice of ‘self-identification’.
We acknowledge that this is a collection whose interdisciplinarity only extends as far 
as the borders of the social sciences. returning to the theme of our opening paragraphs, 
however, the time now seems right to replace the language of social constructivism 
with new ways of talking about race and science. We cannot take the debate ‘Is race 
biological or social?’ at face value, but instead should consider how different moves 
between the social and the biological are utilized by various actors (see Jasanoff 2005 
and the overarching argument in rheinberger 2007). We are struck by the ways in 
which our emphasis on travelling ideas reverberates with the aforementioned strand in 
current biology that objects to the gene determinism that dominated the ‘century of the 
gene’ and focuses on developmental systems instead, placing environments, organisms, 
cells, genes, etc., in a processual framework of mutual constitutedness and distributed 
agency (oyama 2000; see also oyama, Griffith and Gray 2001). This collection attests 
to a similar conceptual shift in the social sciences. We believe that it is from here that 
a new interdisciplinarity in the study of life in all its expressions and facets may evolve.
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Notes
1. The editors would like to thank Stephan Palmié, Peter Wade and the two anonymous 
reviewers of Berghahn Books for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
introduction.
2. one also needs to be aware that epigenetics might also lead to a pure affirmation of ‘the 
biological’ by locating all processuality within the body (or the cell) while ignoring the 
social dimensions of interaction between people, people and the environment, etc. This 
point was made by Geoffrey c. Bowker during a workshop on ‘Genealogical Practices’, 
which took place at the Institute for European Ethnology, Humboldt-university Berlin, 
in december 2007. Katharina Schramm would like to thank Michi Knecht for inviting 
her to participate in this workshop.
3. This was already stressed by richard Lewontin as early as 1972 (Lewontin 1972).
4. david Skinner would like to thank Sahra Gibbon and colleagues for the invitation to 
participate in the ‘Genetic Admixture and Identity in Latin America’ workshop held at 
ucL, London, 20–21 February 2009. The contributions to this workshop inform this 
discussion.
5. The underlying ‘referential ambiguity’ has already been noted by Marvin Harris in his 
analysis of racial classification in Brazil (see, for example, Harris 1970).
6. Their argumentation was built around an attack of Michael Hanchard’s (1994) analysis of 
the Brazilian Movimento Negro and his advocacy for Black political action. Their polemics 
have been criticized for their superfluous dichtomization between national settings – a 
negatively portrayed u.S. racialism on the one hand and a positively connoted Brazilian 
(and implicitly French) politics of race relations on the other, as well as their ignoring of 
transnational dimensions of racial oppression (cf. French 2000; Hanchard 2003).
7. Such a strict national (or regional) focus also ignores the importance of diasporic 
movements and the ideas travelling through and around them in a globalized space – cf. 
Schramm 2008; Thomas and clarke 2006.
8. An early inspiration for this strand of thought has been Alonso’s concept of 
‘substantialization’ (Alonso 1994), which does not yet take into account the impact of the 
new genetics, but rather focuses on blood.
9. Interestingly, in apartheid South Africa, which was a society obsessed with race and 
classification (cf. Bowker and Star 1999: 195–225), courts did not accept genetic 
‘evidence’ as a basis for their decisions regarding individual racial reclassifications; personal 
communication between Katharina Schramm and trefor Jenkins, 19 July 2010.
10. See roberts et al. (2004). Thanks to Anja Wiegner for drawing our attention to the Maori 
case.
11. compare the controversial views on the level of this public involvement in the case 
of decodE Genetics and the Icelandic genetic database, as expressed in Pálsson and 
rabinow (1999) versus Fortun (2008).
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‘Race’ as a Social 
Construction in Genetics
Andrew Smart, Richard Tutton, Paul Martin and George T.H. Ellison
There is an incongruity at the heart of postgenomic biomedical science. The sequencing of the human genome promised the elimination of racial and ethnic 
categories from biomedical science (Schwartz 2001). However, despite this, we have 
witnessed a resurgent interest in ‘race’, including challenges to the longstanding 
orthodoxy (following Lewontin 1972) that classifications of human populations by 
‘race’ are not supported by genetic data (Andreasen 2000; Risch et al. 2002; Rosenberg 
et al. 2002; Edwards 2003). While some geneticists have consigned the concept of 
‘race’ to the scrapheap, others appear to be reviving it. This work is occurring within 
a broader social and scientific landscape, one in which differences between human 
populations are invested (or reinvested) with significance. This attention to groups, 
their differences and similarities and their boundaries feeds off of, and contributes 
to, our ideas about identities and belonging. It has the potential to create, reinforce 
and/or aggravate social and ethical issues surrounding, for example, matters of self-
identification, group representation, equality, stigmatization, discrimination and 
resource distribution. The particular discussions about ‘race’ in genetics which we 
consider in this chapter will be shown to reinvigorate debates about what ‘race’ really 
is and, by extension, claims about the status of collective or individual identities that 
draw upon (and reproduce) ideas relating to racial division.
A major stimulus for this kind of work is the potential development of ‘targeted’ 
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions. Such ‘targeting’ is predicated on the search 
for significant biological differences within and between ‘populations’, which has 
led to the creation of large-scale scientific projects that map genetic variation. An 
often-cited example is the International Human Haplotype Map (HapMap) project, 
which aims to improve health by charting variations in DNA sequences between 
population groups labelled as ‘Yoruba’, ‘Han Chinese’, ‘Japanese’ and ‘Americans 
of northern and western European descent’ (International HapMap Consortium 
2003). It should be noted, however, that beyond such high-profile examples, genetics 
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researchers routinely classify samples with population labels (Ellison and Jones 2002; 
Fullwiley 2007; Smart et al. 2008b; Hunt and Megyesi 2008). Furthermore, as the 
HapMap example illustrates, we are not always confronted by the use of overtly 
‘racial’ characteristics to label population groupings, but also other classifications 
that contribute to discourses of ‘race’ such as geography, nationality, ethnicity and/
or ancestry. Indeed, genetics research often adopts classification schemes from state 
bureaucracies (Epstein 2007; Fullwiley 2007; Ellison et al. 2007; Smart et al. 2008b). 
The use of such classifications sometimes relates to the research design, although (in 
some jurisdictions) the state requires or encourages researchers to classify participants 
for reasons of monitoring policies that encourage equality and ‘inclusivity’ (Epstein 
2007; Smart et al. 2008a).
So, what is worrisome about these routine practices in genetic research which 
aim to promote ‘inclusive’ research and may lead to potentially helpful population-
specific health interventions? There is a well-documented quandary in healthcare 
policy and practice: categorization by ‘race’ and ethnicity can be simultaneously 
useful for addressing health inequalities and yet harmful because it reinforces the 
very notions that may have initially contributed to these inequalities (Witzig 1996; 
Nazroo 1998; Anand 1999; Bradby 2003). Furthermore, there are well-documented 
difficulties in operationalization and measurement (Aspinall 1997, 2001). These 
quandaries have resurfaced in recent debates about genetics, ‘race’ and medicine. 
Some questions have been asked about the validity, reliability and utility of socially-
defined population categories as well as how clinical practice and public health advice 
will deal with group differences. For example, a heated debate exists around so-called 
‘racialized prescribing’, its legitimacy, utility and social costs and benefits (Satel 2002; 
Burchard et al. 2003; Phiminster 2003; Cooper et al. 2003; Kahn 2004; Ellison 
2006). At the centre of such debates – at least for sociologists – is the question of 
whether genetic research will revive racial science and scientific racism (Martin et al. 
2007; Rose 2007). Given that this is genetic research, particular concern has centred 
on the potential for reinvigorating the notion that ‘races’ are naturally occurring, 
biologically meaningful entities (Gannett 2004; Duster 2005).
There has been a relatively stable cross-disciplinary consensus on the ontology of 
‘race’, described thus by Gannett: ‘The apparent consensus view among academics 
from diverse disciplines – the humanities, the social sciences, and the biological 
sciences – is that biological races do not exist, at least in humans. Biological race 
is a socially-constructed category’ (2004: 323). Nevertheless, as noted above, there 
have been challenges to this consensus, such that claims about the biological reality 
of ‘race’ have been resurrected (e.g., Sarich and Miele 2004). Work in genetics thus 
appears to threaten the common refrain that ‘race’ is a social construction. John 
Hartigan Jr. (2008) has produced the most developed account of this issue. While – 
as we might expect – he rebuffs the claims made about the biological basis of racial 
categories, he comes to a somewhat critical conclusion by arguing that:
Current assertions that race is socially constructed do important work 
keeping [the historical and contemporary] misuses of race in view, while 
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also challenging the evidentiary ground for making claims about linkages 
between race and genetics. The problem with this assertion, though, is that 
since it typically makes its starting point the discrediting of biological claims 
… ‘social construction’ generally offers meagre guidance in comprehending 
the cultural dynamics at work in racial matters. (2008: 185)
To repel claims about the biological reality of ‘race’ by claiming instead that it is a 
social construction is, he argues, becoming less effective (see also Hartigan 2006).
In this chapter, we look in more detail at the appearance of the notion that ‘race’ 
is a social construction in the field of genetics. Contributors to an influential genetics 
journal, Nature Genetics, used the expressions ‘socially defined construct’, ‘social 
construct’ and ‘socially constructed’ in a Special Issue entitled Genetics for the Human 
Race (further details of which are given below). The appearance of this vocabulary 
initiated a debate within our research group about whether or not the use of such 
phrases was to be expected, what the authors meant when they used these terms and 
why they were using them. In order to start answering these questions, we undertook 
a detailed analysis of the usage of constructionist terms in the Special Issue. However, 
this analysis raised new questions in our minds about what it means more broadly 
for anyone to claim that anything is a social construction. We therefore begin by 
outlining three aspects of social construction that appeared to be the most relevant 
to our interests; these will comprise our analytical framework during the subsequent 
discussion.
An Analytical Framework: What Does it Mean to Say Something is a Social 
Construction?
There is an extensive literature on social construction spanning different disciplines, 
and what follows here is certainly not a review of this broad and complex idea. To 
gain an overview, we have relied on the work of philosopher Ian Hacking (1999). We 
recognize that Hacking is not the final arbiter on ideas about social construction and 
that some of the arguments reported below are refuted by his critics. Nevertheless, 
his philosophical groundwork clarifies many of the key characteristics of social 
constructionism.
Hacking begins by explaining how claims that something is a social construction 
involve challenging a notion that something is determined by ‘the nature of things’, 
thereby emphasizing that it is not inevitable but that it ‘was brought into existence or 
shaped by social events, sources, history’ (1999: 6–7). Saying that something is a social 
construction means uncovering contingency where none was previously thought to 
have existed by attending to specific social, cultural and historical contexts. Hacking 
then proceeds to draw attention to notable characteristics and points of difference 
that exist in claims that something is a social construction, three of which proved 
particularly useful for our analysis.
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Objects, Ideas and their Interactions
Hacking (1999) explains that the sorts of things that can (and have been) described as 
socially constructed are extraordinarily wide-ranging. He notes that claims to social 
construction can be ambiguous and that ‘they have in mind several interacting items’ 
(1999: 33):
It is plain in the case of gender. What is being constructed? The idea of 
gendered human beings (an idea), and gendered human beings themselves 
(people); language; institutions; bodies. Above all, ‘the experiences of being 
female.’ (1999: 28)
His path through these ambiguities draws an analytical distinction between claims 
that have been attached to different things. Most importantly for our current purpose 
is to note his attempted division between ‘ideas’ and ‘objects’, and his argument that 
it is different to claim that an idea of something is a social construction than to claim 
that an object that is ‘in the world’ is a social construction (1999: 21). Nevertheless, 
this is a dichotomy which he acknowledges is ‘fuzzy at the edges’ (1999: 21), because 
ideas such as classifications or groupings have ‘extensions – classes, sets, and groups 
… [which] are collections in the world, and so count as “objects”’ (1999: 22).
Hacking goes on to argue that there can be interactions between these ideas 
and the objects to which they refer (e.g., between a classification [idea] and the 
people subjected to that classification [object]). For example: ‘Ways of classifying 
human beings interact with the human beings who are classified … People think of 
themselves as a kind, perhaps, reject the classification … Moreover, classifications do 
not exist only in the empty space of language but in institutions, practices, material 
interactions with things and other people’ (1999: 31). Some classifications are thus 
‘interactive’, that is, they involve ‘conscious interactions between kind and person’ 
(1999: 32). In such cases, he says, there is potential for ‘looping effects’ whereby 
awareness of the classification ‘can have consequences for the very group, for the kind 
of people that is invoked’ (1999: 34).
Scope and Commitment
Hacking (1999) argues that accepting one thing as a social construction does not 
necessitate thinking that everything else is. Thus, claims that a specific thing is a social 
construction can be regarded as ‘local’ while, in contrast, ‘universal’ constructionism 
would be the claim ‘that every object whatsoever’ is socially constructed (1999: 24). 
However, Hacking questions whether such an extreme universal position has ever 
really been advocated. He argues that the primary use of labelling something as a social 
construction is to raise consciousness about social, cultural and historical contingency 
in ways that undercut assumptions about inevitability. Consequently, he says, such 
claims are often (but not always or necessarily) seen to offer a potential for liberation 
and are accompanied by arguments about value judgments and the need for change. 
He proceeds to outline six ‘grades of commitment’ to social constructionism – these 
are labelled as historical, ironic, reformist, unmasking, rebellious and revolutionary – 
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which range from merely having a particular attitude to scholarly activity through to 
using it as the basis for a form of political activism (1999: 19).
‘Social’ versus …
Some claims about social construction are framed in oppositional terms. Certain 
things are argued to be either social constructions or ‘real’, ‘biological’ or ‘natural’. 
Much of the furore surrounding social construction can be traced back to the 
suggestion, or implication, that the things that natural scientists studied, how they 
studied them and the outcomes of their studies were not inevitable. Hacking explains 
that the ‘science wars’ debates were ‘heavily loaded with the words [objective, 
ideological, factual and real]’ (1999: 23). For him, an opposition between things that 
are real and things that are social constructs is not always necessary; certain things can 
be both (1999: 29, 101). He also argues that the under certain circumstances things 
(such as certain mental illnesses) can be both social constructions and biological or 
natural ‘kinds’ (1999: 119–24).
Our Analytical Frame and the Social Construction of ‘Race’
Hacking (1999: 16) only briefly examines ‘race’ as a social construction to illustrate 
how the function of such claims is to undercut ideas that ‘one’s race is a part of 
one’s “essence”’. He returns to the subject of ‘race’ elsewhere, when he argues for 
the continuing relevance of ‘the category of race’ because ‘races in some contexts 
are not only statistically significant but also statistically useful’ (2005: 108) and 
when he describes the quandaries that arise from contemporary genetic research 
(2006). However, our purpose here is not to review Hacking’s views on ‘race’, but 
rather to highlight aspects of his general discussion of social construction which 
we found useful for analysing the Special Issue. To recap, these were: differences 
in respect to the focus of claims, including the interactions between ‘ideas’ and 
‘objects’; differences in respect to the scope of, and commitment to, claims; and the 
(oppositional) form of some claims. For now, three initial thoughts can be noted 
about how these general ideas concerning social construction relate to ‘race’ in the 
context of genetic research.
First, to claim that ‘race’ is a social construction can hide great complexity and 
diversity (in focus, scope, commitment, etc.). This implies not just potential differences 
in usage between people, or within and across disciplines and subdisciplines, but also 
that different meanings can be implied or read into what – on the surface – seems like 
a simple statement. Secondly, ideas about ‘interactive classifications’, ‘looping effects’ 
and fuzzy boundaries between objects and ideas are all pertinent for thinking about 
‘race’ as a classification of humankind. These underline that when we talk about 
‘races’ in humanity, we engage in debates about identity politics, which frequently 
(but not exclusively) invoke a long and sometimes brutal history of discrimination 
and stigmatization. Thirdly, claims that something is a social construction rather than 
‘real’, ‘biological’ or ‘natural’ are particularly relevant to debates about ‘race’, which 
often follow this pattern. We will return to these issues in our discussion.
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Social Construction in the Special Issue of Nature Genetics
Our analysis of the appearance of the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction in 
‘genetics’ centres on the November 2004 Special Issue of Nature Genetics, titled 
Genetics for the Human Race.1 We acknowledge from the outset that this is a somewhat 
narrow ‘sample’ of perspectives from ‘genetics’ and, had our approach been different, 
we may have found additional and alternative views. Nonetheless, our aim is to be 
exploratory and discursive rather than strictly empirical. In this section we provide 
further details about the Special Issue and describe the range of positions that were 
evident in respect to the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction. We make some 
analytical comments as we reveal the position of each set of authors, but a more 
comparative analysis will follow in the section of this chapter titled Discussion.
Background: The Special Issue
Our analysis of the Special Issue Genetics for the Human Race reflects its importance 
as a landmark publication in debates about ‘race’ and genetics, a significance also 
recognized by other discussions of this field (Hacking 2005, 2006; Rose 2007; 
Hartigan 2008). It garners such attention because Nature Genetics is a high-status 
academic journal and the contributors to the Special Issue are well-recognized 
figures in the debate. The discussions that are published reveal not only the ongoing 
quandaries about ‘race’ and genetics but also the importance of the topic for leading 
scientific figures (including Francis Collins, the Director of the United States 
National Institute of Health) and the field of genetics more generally. Nevertheless, 
the Special Issue should be recognized as existing within a history of interest about 
population classifications in Nature Genetics. It pursued a number of themes raised in 
previous Nature Genetics editorials (2000, 2001 and 2004a), such as: how ‘race’ and 
ethnicity should be defined, classified and operationalized; the value of alternative 
concepts (like ancestry); and the importance of public engagement on this topic.
The Special Issue originated from a workshop, ‘Human Genome Variation and 
“Race”’, held on 15 May 2003 at the National Human Genome Center (NHGC), 
Howard University, Washington DC. Howard University has historical links to 
Black politics in the U.S.A., something which is reflected in the aims of the Centre. 
The NHGC is ‘dedicated to the engagement of African Americans and other people 
of African ancestry into the mainstream of human genome research’, which has led 
to criticism that ‘the center perpetuates race-based science and medicine’ (Royal and 
Dunston 2004: S6). The workshop brought together contemporary research on the 
relationship between ‘race’ and genetic variation, and a range of views on the social 
and ethical implications of this research. It focused on the following questions: ‘What 
does the current body of scientific information say about the connections among race, 
ethnicity, genetics and health? What remains unknown? What additional research is 
needed? How can this information be applied to benefit human health? How might 
this information be applied in non-medical settings? How can we adopt policies 
that will achieve beneficial societal outcomes?’ (Patrinos 2004: S1) The subsequent 
Special Issue comprised twelve papers: a sponsor’s foreword, written by the Director 
of Biological and Environmental Research at the United States Department of 
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Energy, an editorial, three ‘commentaries’ and seven ‘perspectives’. In the editorial 
it is stated that ‘it is time to engage everyone in this discussion’ (Nature Genetics 
Editorial 2004b: S3) and the interdisciplinarity of genomics as a field of enquiry 
was somewhat evident in the Special Issue, which included contributions from 
anthropologists, bioethicists and geneticists.
Elsewhere, we have argued that two broad strategies emerged from contributions 
to the Special Issue in respect to ‘enabling’ continuing scientific work in this area. 
These were to examine links between ‘race’ and genetic variation while awaiting the 
development of alternative ways to subdivide populations that are more relevant 
to genetics, and to investigate genetic variance in populations classified using 
alternative categories and labels, thereby avoiding the terminology of ‘race’ (Smart 
et al. 2006).
Social Construction in the Special Issue and our Initial Thinking
The term ‘construct’ (or the derivatives: ‘constructs’, ‘constructed’ or ‘construction’) 
is used in relation to ‘race’ on eleven occasions, in four articles out of a possible twelve. 
As noted earlier, the appearance of these phrases initiated a debate within our research 
group. One member argued that it was surprising that any articles published in such 
a prestigious natural science journal would have engaged at all with a notion derived 
from the social sciences. Indeed, a keyword search reveals that Nature Genetics has 
only ever published three other items in which the term ‘social construction’ appears 
(one of which was an aforementioned editorial). Another suggested, however, that he 
would have expected that more of the articles in a Special Issue adopting an explicitly 
reflective stance on the biological basis of ‘race’ would have engaged with the notion 
of social construction. Surprising or not, the appearance of these terms appeared 
to signal that the politics of ‘race’ and social science debates had infiltrated natural 
science writing.
Nevertheless, some limitations to the impact of the notion that ‘race’ is a social 
construction should be noted at the outset. The authorships in three of the four papers 
were – in some respects – overlapping. Charles Rotimi, who authored a ‘perspective’, 
and Charmaine Royal and Georgia Dunston, who coauthored a ‘commentary’, 
were all also coauthors on the ‘perspective’ by Keita et al. (2004). These authors are 
‘linked’ by their affiliation to the NHGC. This indicates that the notion was less 
widespread than would have been the case if the papers had been authored discretely. 
Furthermore, three of the four articles using the phrases, while only two of the eight 
articles that did not, were coauthored by anthropologists and/or bioethicists. This 
perhaps signals the influence of interdisciplinarity on the spread of the idea that ‘race’ 
is a social construction, but again this raises a question mark over our initial thinking 
that it is being adopted by the field of genetics.
Framing and Usage of the Terms
To begin a more detailed analysis of what the authors meant when they used 
constructionist terms, we first introduce the ways in which the notion that ‘race’ is a 
social construction was framed and used by the four sets of authors.
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In the first ‘commentary’ paper, Royal and Dunston (2004) set out an overview 
of the Special Issue and its context, and in doing so make a number of statements 
about ‘race’ as a construct. They argue that knowledge about ‘human genome 
variation is forcing a paradigm shift in thinking about the construct of “race”’ leading 
to the questioning of ‘paradigms of human identity based on “races” as biological 
constructs’ (2004: S5). They align themselves to the position of their research centre, 
the NHGC, which they describe thus: ‘Traditional “racial” designations in humans 
are not bounded, discrete categories but are fluid, socially defined constructs that 
have some poorly understood correlations with various biological elements and health 
outcomes’ (2004: S5–6). Royal and Dunston’s opening overview to the Special Issue 
thus highlights that the notion of ‘“races” as biological constructs’ feeds into the 
ways in which people form and/or express their sense of identity. They also adopt a 
position which focuses on ‘traditional “racial” designations’ – i.e., not ‘race’ per se, 
but on potentially anachronistic ‘racial’ labels and descriptions.
Keita et al. (2004), the first of three ‘perspective’ papers which use the notion 
of social construction, is described as ‘putting forward the NHGC’s position on the 
meaning and application of the term “race”’ (Royal and Dunston 2004: S6). This 
position is that ‘race’ is a ‘legitimate taxonomic concept that works for chimpanzees 
but does not apply to humans (at this time)’ (Keita et al. 2004: S19). They recommend 
that alternative population labels be used and argue that this would improve research 
designs and public policy. Nevertheless, Keita et al. (2004: S18) assert that their 
‘“no biological race” position does not exclude the idea that racism is a problem that 
needs to be addressed’. Of the four papers that use the notion of social construction, 
Keita et al. (2004) gives the most (and the most explicit) consideration to what it 
might mean. We will consider their ideas in more detail below, but at this point it 
is sufficient to note that they begin their paper thus: ‘[t]he term “race” engenders 
much discussion, with little agreement between those who claim that “races” are real 
(meaning natural) biological entities and those who maintain that they are socially 
constructed’ (2004: S17). From this we can note initially that for Keita et al. (2004), 
‘races’ are ‘entities’ rather than constructs (perhaps implying that they are things that 
exist rather than things that are simply ideas). Furthermore, they contrast socially 
constructed entities with ‘biological’ ones – the latter being seen as ‘real (meaning 
natural)’. As we will discuss later, this problematically implies that the former are 
unreal or unnatural.
Mountain and Risch (2004) offer a ‘perspective’ paper which argues that ‘racial’ 
categories remain useful to biomedical research. Like Keita et al. (2004), they use 
disagreements about the status of ‘race’ as a construction in the opening context of 
their paper. The authors discuss the revival of debates about the ‘biological or genetic 
basis of “race” or “racial” differences’ by claiming that ‘[t]he controversy stems, at 
least in part, from the possibility that attitudes are influenced by whether people 
believe “race” is a biological or social construct’ (2004: S48). For Mountain and 
Risch, whether ‘race’ is viewed as a ‘biological or social construct’ is a matter of 
belief, and it is this conceptual aspect that they claim plays a key role in determining 
people’s attitudes and practices. While this is the only appearance of construction in 
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the paper, Mountain and Risch arguably delve deeper into the notion than the other 
papers described here when they attempt to define a social category or group. We will 
consider this attempt in more detail below.
In his paper, Charles Rotimi (2004) describes the challenges surrounding 
the design of the HapMap project to illustrate the complexities and ambiguities 
associated with the use of group labels in genomic research. Rotimi (2004: S44) 
recognizes the possibility that data from the HapMap could become embroiled in 
‘emotional and volatile issues surrounding group identity’. He introduces social 
construction when quoting Morris Foster’s argument that concerns about the 
HapMap form part of wider discussions about ‘the implications of using socially 
constructed identities in genetic research’. He later goes on to reveal that scientists 
using HapMap data ‘are advised to present their data in ways that avoid … attaching 
inappropriate levels of biological importance to largely social constructs such as race’ 
(2004: S44). For Rotimi, ‘race’ is a construct, but one which is ‘largely social’ and 
in danger of being invested with ‘inappropriate levels of biological importance’. In 
his portrayal, ‘race’ manifests as a blend of social and biological criteria rather than 
one or the other – although this apparent compromise leaves a number of questions 
unanswered about the relative contribution of social and biological components, and 
their functional/causal interrelationships, which we shall return to in the Discussion 
section of this chapter.
This brief introduction to the four papers highlights a common framework 
of terminology, including notions of social construction, the ‘biological’ and the 
‘social’. There is nevertheless already evidence of differences in how these authors 
describe the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction. We will now undertake a closer 
examination to highlight some subtle variations in focus and conceptualization.
Three Subtle Variations in Meaning and their Implications
Using further extracts from the Special Issue, we can reveal that differences exist 
between authors in terms of what social construction means to them and in terms of 
what it is about ‘race’ that is socially constructed. These variations in the meaning of 
the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction are shown to have implications in terms 
of their conceptual or methodological approach.
Socially Constructed ‘Race’ as the Product of Social Negotiation
One meaning of the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction is that the membership 
of a ‘race’ category or group is the result of social decisions. This position is argued by 
Mountain and Risch (2004) in their attempt to provide a conceptual grounding for 
the ‘social’ character of groups and categories. They argue: ‘we define a social category 
or group as one determined by social factors; an individual is associated with such 
a category (or categories) based on a set of socially negotiated criteria. Given this 
definition, “race” and “ethnicity” are social categories, even when some inclusion 
criteria may be biological’ (2004: S48).
So, a group or category is social if ‘a set of socially negotiated criteria’ is used to 
make a decision about membership, even when some of the criteria involved in these 
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decisions are biological. For Mountain and Risch (2004), the key to determining 
whether a group or category is a social construct lies in whether there has been some 
social negotiation of the criteria that are used to determine whether or not people 
are part of the group or category. Thus, they argue, ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ groups and 
categories are social constructs because social negotiations have been required to 
determine the criteria that are used to judge who is associated with which groups and 
categories.
We will analyse this meaning of social construction alongside the two others 
that follow in the section of this chapter titled Discussion, but in the meantime it 
can be noted that the very processes of creating groups or categories, and negotiating 
criteria for inclusion or exclusion, is a human activity (even when this occurs under 
the auspices of ‘science’). If this argument is applied to Mountain and Risch’s (2004) 
definition, it becomes hard to think of any group or category that is not social.
Socially Constructed ‘Race’ as the Societal (Mis)Adoption of a Scientific Concept
A second meaning of the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction is apparent in 
the analytic work of Keita et al. (2004), as they attempt to disentangle ‘correct’ 
and ‘incorrect’ usages of the word ‘race’. To locate their consideration of social 
construction within the broad sweep of political history and the adoption of scientific 
‘racial’ classification schemes into social institutions, policies and practices, they 
argue that:
some of the ‘racial’ taxa of earlier European science used by law and politics 
were converted into social identities. For example, the self-defined identities 
of enslaved Africans were replaced with the singular ‘Negro’ or ‘black’, and 
Europeans became ‘Caucasian’, thus creating identities based on physical 
traits rather than on history and cultural tradition. Another example of 
social construction is seen in the laws of various countries that assigned ‘race’ 
(actually social group or position) based on the proportion of particular 
ancestries held by an individual. The entities resulting from these political 
machinations have nothing to do with the substructuring of the species by 
evolutionary mechanisms. (2004: S18)
According to this characterization, socially constructed ‘race’ can be traced back to 
artefacts such as legal and political classification schemes and the political and social 
processes by which the categories and labels within those schemes became adopted by 
people as group identities. Such an argument is a common constructionist position 
on ‘race’. What is notable, however, is their attempt to wholly dissociate these 
‘political machinations’ from scientific definitions and interests (an issue to which we 
will return in the section of this chapter titled Discussion).
This dissociation is accompanied by the designation of some uses of the term 
‘race’ as incorrect. They conclude that ‘“[r]ace” denotes socially constructed units 
as a function of the incorrect usage of the term’ and argue that ‘“Race”’ is “socially 
constructed” when the word is incorrectly used as the covering term for social or 
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demographic groups. Broadly designated groups, such as “Hispanic” or “European 
American” do not meet the classical or phylogenetic criteria for subspecies or the 
criterion for a breeding population’ (2004: S18).
Thus, for Keita et al., the term ‘race’ is either used correctly according to its 
scientific definition (as a ‘natural’ biological entity/category resulting from the 
‘substructuring of the species by evolutionary mechanisms’) or it is misused in other 
areas of social life and is, in the process, socially constructed. Furthermore, it is ‘social 
or demographic groups’ or ‘positions’ that are ‘socially constructed units’, while ‘race’ 
only becomes socially constructed when it is (in their view) misused to define these 
‘groups’, ‘positions’ or ‘units’.
Again, we will analyse this position further in the Discussion section of this 
chapter, but in the meantime it is worth noting that this is a standpoint which (like 
the previous example from Mountain and Risch) appears to ‘bracket off’ the social 
actions and interactions that constitute scientific activity.
Socially Constructed ‘Race’ as a Critique of Scientific Categorization
A third meaning for the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction was its use as a way 
of critiquing the ostensibly ‘scientific’ categories used to describe and understand 
‘races’ in humanity. This usage was apparent in Royal and Dunston’s (2004) 
‘commentary’ when they shift the focus of the construction claim to ‘traditional 
“racial” designations’. Their reference to designations draws attention away from 
‘race’ itself and towards the names, labels and descriptions associated with ‘racial’ 
groups. Furthermore, their use of the term ‘traditional’ locates these designations 
firmly as the products of human history and past classification processes. It is a little 
unclear from the paper itself, but we could speculate that Royal and Dunston (2004) 
call these designations ‘socially defined constructs’ because either they were (at least 
in part) defined using ‘social’ criteria and/or they were (at least in part) developed as 
a result of human actions and interactions.
Crucially, Royal and Dunston (2004) emphasize that ‘racial’ designations are 
‘fluid, socially defined constructs’ as opposed to ‘discrete categories’. Their adoption 
of this oppositional framing (fluid versus discrete) alludes to the problematic use of 
social entities or social processes in the production of what have sometimes been 
(and in some instances continue to be) treated as ‘objective’ and ‘natural’ scientific 
categories. Indeed, Royal and Dunston (2004: S5) call for people, including natural 
scientists, to be wary of and not be misled by such classifications when they note that 
genomics raises ‘questions about the validity of inferences made about “race” in the 
biomedical and scientific literature’.
A Consensus on ‘Race’?
Before reflecting on the differences in the usage of the notion that ‘race’ is a social 
construction, it is important to review the broader position that these four sets of 
authors adopted towards ‘race’ as a concept for understanding human health. All of 
the papers we considered from the Special Issue adopted a critical stance towards its 
validity and reliability as a proxy for health-related research. Indeed, as Royal and 
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Dunston conclude, in the Special Issue as a whole, ‘there seems to a consensus that 
“race”, whether imposed or self-identified, is a weak surrogate for various genetic and 
non-genetic factors in correlations with health status’ (2004: S7). For example, from 
the papers we have been considering, Mountain and Risch (2004: S52) report on the 
limitations of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ categories as ‘proxies for a wide range of factors, 
potentially genetic and nongenetic’, and we have just noted Royal and Dunston’s 
(2004) own reservations about the validity of inferences made about ‘race’.
However, the thorny question of whether or not ‘racial’ classifications should 
continue to be used remains contested. Rotimi (2004: S44) argues that it is time to 
move beyond ‘poorly defined social proxies of genetic relatedness like “race”’ and, as 
we have noted, Keita et al. (2004) argue for alternative population labels. In contrast, 
Mountain and Risch (2004) argue for the ongoing utility of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ 
categories in epidemiology and clinical practice. Nevertheless, they recognize their 
‘potential for furthering racism’ and assert that their continuing use is a temporary 
measure which is justified because of health disparities (2004: S52).
In this section we have provided a largely descriptive account about the positions 
of the various sets of authors. We will now explore further the important analytical 
issues to which we have alluded.
Discussion: Variations in Meaning and Interpretation
Earlier in the chapter we drew attention to three aspects of claims about social 
construction: differences in respect to the focus of claims, including the interactions 
between ‘ideas’ and ‘objects’; the scope of, and commitment to, claims; and the 
oppositional form of some claims. We will now return to these three themes and will 
use them as a broad framework for exploring what the authors in the Special Issue meant 
when they invoked the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction, and why they were 
using this. In doing this we will also consider implications for issues surrounding social 
identity. In each subsection we will compare and contrast the various contributions to 
the Special Issue and consider other academic work in the field.
Objects, Ideas and their Interaction
When a claim to social construction is made, Hacking (1999) asks ‘what’ precisely is 
it that someone is claiming to be socially constructed? In the Special Issue there was 
extensive variation in the ‘what’ that the authors claimed to be socially constructed: 
an object or idea called ‘race’ that was thought to be socially and/or biologically 
constituted; ‘race’ as it is manifested by the designations used to classify and categorize 
these objects or ideas; ‘race’ as a scientific concept that was sullied by sociopolitical 
misuse; the physical manifestations associated with the idea of ‘race’; or the social 
institutions, processes, relations, actions, experiences or meanings that might be 
‘ordered’ by the idea of ‘race’. There were specific attempts to focus attention on 
different aspects of ‘race’, for example, Royal and Dunston’s (2004) attention to the 
idea of ‘racial designations’ or Keita et al.’s (2004) attempt to disentangle legitimate 
and illegitimate uses of the concept. In contrast, Mountain and Risch’s (2004) 
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attempted conceptualization of ‘a social category or group’ does not discern between 
objects and ideas. In our attempt to discern what the authors meant when claiming 
that ‘race’ is a social construction, part of the answer is that the ‘race’ to which they 
were referring was not a consistent or ‘fixed’ thing.
There is only limited evidence in the Special Issue of the authors attending 
to the interaction between ‘race’ classifications and the people who have been 
classified. There is some attention to historical political contexts (Keita et al. 2004), 
including the notion of ‘traditional “racial” designations’ being anachronistic (Royal 
and Dunston 2004), and the issue of continuing health disparities does appear in 
every article. Of course, the interaction between ‘racial’ classifications and people is 
particularly significant as it is the basis on which ideologies of racism were founded 
and flourished. It is thus notable that while two of the papers express concerns 
about racism (Keita et al. 2004; Mountain and Risch 2004), the particular ways 
in which genetic research using ‘racial’ categories might contribute to racism is not 
meaningfully discussed.
If we turn to the implications for individual and collective identity of using ‘race’ 
in genetics research, it is the ‘looping effects’ (Hacking 1999) that are a particular area 
of concern. As we noted in the introduction, fears about genetics reinvesting ‘race’ 
with biological meaning have been prominent in the debate (Gannett 2004; Duster 
2005; Martin et al. 2007). However, some social scientists have argued that genetics 
has also been mobilized in increasingly creative ways that seek to undermine and 
disturb simplistic racial dichotomies and in ways that can be seen as both empowering 
and disempowering to specific ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ groups. Campbell (2007a: 184), for 
example, discusses ambivalence in U.K. press stories that addressed ‘race’, nation 
and genetics, claiming that ‘genetic information is used in a creative politics of 
identity’, but that it is valuable both to claims of ‘bounded lines of singularity’ and 
the ‘historical realities of intermixture’. Rose argues that the ‘molecular biopolitics of 
race’ (2007: 186) should be located in its contemporary context of ‘an age of choice 
and self-maximisation in which the body and its capacities have become central to 
technologies of selfhood’ (2007: 8). He uncompromisingly claims that ‘what is at 
stake in these arguments about human genome variations among populations is 
not the resurgence of racism, the spectre of stigmatization, a revival of biological 
reductionism, or the legitimation of discrimination: it is the changing ways in which 
we are coming to understand individual and collective human identities in the age 
of genomic medicine’ (2007: 185). Furthermore, as Fullwiley (2008) attests, the 
personal identity politics of the scientists she studied can be used to frame their work 
as being committed to inclusivity and the reduction of health disparities, rather than 
being motivated by racist ideas about human difference.
Nevertheless, it has been shown that there has been a convergence between the 
racial/ethnic categories that are used in genetics research and those employed by the 
agencies of state bureaucracy (Epstein 2007; Fullwiley 2007; Ellison et al. 2007; Smart 
et al. 2008b). This is particularly significant because science and state bureaucracy are 
recognized as exerting particular authority in processes of ‘social categorization’ and 
‘group identification’ that together contribute to identity formation (Jenkins 1996: 
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89). If the combined authority of state bureaucracy and genetic science becomes 
aligned behind a conceptualization of ‘race’ as socially constructed (see also Hartigan 
2008), then the reasons for and implications of this should be considered most 
carefully. For example, in another field of biotechnology, Campbell (2007b: 95), 
reveals the racialized aspects of ‘gamete-matching’ in assisted reproduction, whereby 
regulations state that ‘donated gametes should match the physical characteristics of 
the recipients’. The U.K., Spain and Norway, he explains, have different regulatory 
regimes, but all three, ‘explicitly, or by implication, prevent clinically assisted cross-
“racial” mixing’ (2007a: 113). Such practices, he argues, can be distinguished from 
historical racialized hierarchies, but nonetheless demonstrate ‘a tenacity of sensibilities 
over race and reproduction, and the power that “racial” mobility is deemed to hold’ 
(2007a: 116).
Scope/Commitment
As we have reported, all of the papers we have considered from the Special Issue 
adopted a critical stance towards ‘race’ as a concept for understanding human 
health. When treating the Special Issue as a whole, however, the impact of the social 
construction of ‘race’ is somewhat superficial. It mostly appeared in passing as a 
descriptor, for example, when it was used to allude to a broader unresolved debate 
about the status of the ‘race’ concept (Mountain and Risch 2004; Keita et al. 2004) 
or when it featured as part of a quotation (Rotimi 2004) or the ‘position’ of the 
NHGC (Royal and Dunston 2004). On the surface, Keita et al. (2004) appear to 
be the most committed constructionists, as they present the only overt expressions 
of the cultural, political and historical contingency of human ‘races’, reject the 
(current) existence of human ‘races’ and argue for using population labels other 
than ‘race’. We argue, however, that theirs is a shallow commitment to the idea of 
social construction.
We noted above that both Mountain and Risch (2004) and Keita et al. (2004) 
appear to ‘bracket off’ scientific activity from the realm of social construction. In 
respect to arguments about ‘race’, this could be a problematic partition to make. 
For example, a distinction between correct ‘race’ in science and erroneous socially 
constructed ‘race’ would hamper critical examination of the ‘race’ concept as 
developed and used in past and contemporary scientific attempts to understand 
human diversity. This parsing of scientific ‘race’ from ‘race’ in society also leaves room 
for the highly contentious claim that there is a natural or biological basis to human 
‘races’ situated within our evolutionary history (Ellison and Jones 2002). Indeed, 
Keita et al. (2004) qualify their commitment to the inapplicability of taxonomies 
of ‘race’ to humans with the parenthesis ‘(at this time)’. An important caveat to our 
analysis, however, is that Keita has previously argued that the ‘classical race concept’ 
is intertwined with its meanings and uses in society and has been critical of the 
idea of ‘core populations’ (Keita and Kittles 1997: 534–35). The multi-authored 
composition of the paper in the Special Issue, as a position statement from the 
NHGC, obviously signals multiple ‘voices’ and leaves open deeper questions about 
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the processes by which the consensus position was reached, and indeed the meaning 
of the potentially contentious qualification ‘at this time’.
Notwithstanding these unknowns, deliberately leaving open the possibility of 
historical (or future?) human ‘races’ has implications for thinking about intersections 
with social identity. The existence of ‘core populations’ or ‘true originals’ (Keita 
and Kittles 1997: 535–36) creates the potential for contemporary individual or 
collective identity associations to those ‘races’. Of course, we do not have to look 
too far back into history to encounter the destructive possibilities of the idea of 
historically ‘pure’ races (Kevles 1985). However, as was noted above in relation to 
fears about the revival of scientific racism, a position has been proposed which allows 
for greater flexibility in the ways in which genetic information is adopted and made 
meaningful as an aspect of social identity (Gilroy 2000). For example, Bliss (2008: 
82) argues that genomic technologies of ‘ancestry mapping’ have entered the public 
consciousness and ‘the laity has responded with new ways of conceptualizing human 
origins, personal identity and the self’, for example, media accounts that use genetic 
genealogy to construct personal narratives. Nelson’s (2008) ethnographic work with 
consumers of ancestry tests details the diverse interpretations, responses and ‘self-
fashioning’ that can accompany testing, which transform understandings of ‘race’ 
and ethnicity.
The theme of scope/commitment also draws us back to our question about 
why these sets of authors in the Special Issue used the notion that ‘race’ is a social 
construction. The pattern of the appearance of social construction in the Special Issue 
is partially explained by interdisciplinarity in genomics research and the politicization 
of ‘race’. As we have seen, a number of the authors had institutional allegiance to the 
NHGC – an interdisciplinary institution which effectively defines itself in terms of 
the politicization of ‘race’. We can nevertheless speculate a little further on why these 
authors were using this notion.
Hartigan (2008) provides an insightful, if somewhat instrumentalist, account as 
to why some geneticists who investigate ‘race’ use ideas about social construction in 
their work (including some of those discussed in this chapter). He partially attributes 
this to a reliance on the sociocultural definitions of ‘race’ that are adopted from state 
bureaucracy, but he also develops his argument into an ‘interests analysis’. He argues 
that this alignment not only allows scientists to link their activities to those outside of 
the laboratory (i.e., to policy and to healthcare), but that it also has a disarming effect 
because it ‘invokes what critics “already” know’ (2008: 183). This is acceptable, even 
preferable, for these scientists to the extent that the ‘connection to the “social” does 
not compromise the scientific status of their claims … regarding the performance of 
genes’ (2008: 172–73) or hinder their goals. What is given less attention by Hartigan 
(2008), however, is the more immediate sense of motive, including the ‘face value’ 
possibility that scientists may actually be wrestling with the notion that ‘race’ is a 
social construction because engaging with the concept may give them some analytical 
purchase on their subject matter.
While there are places in the Special Issue where the notion that ‘race’ is a social 
construction is used in a superficial manner, a positive sense of engagement was 
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evident in at least some of the papers we have considered (even if we are critical in our 
assessment of their efforts). Furthermore, all of the papers we considered adopted a 
critical stance towards ‘race’ as a concept for understanding human health. We agree 
with Hartigan (2008) that the notion of social construction offers ‘meagre guidance’; 
however, it seems to us that this makes it all the more likely that those working in the 
field will seek to understand and employ this notion. While Hartigan’s (2008) analysis 
emphasizes that the scientists do this in ways that best serve (or least damage) their 
goals and research agendas, this seems to underplay the possibility that in practice 
this is a process that may actually enhance analytical clarity. This said, however, we 
are not naïve to the potential outcomes of genetic science adopting the notion that 
‘race’ is a social construction into its toolkit of ideas or lexicon. If used in a superficial 
or uncritical manner, it could represent simply a more subtle but equally pernicious 
example of how unstable and fluid identities can be presented as if they are solid and 
fixed (if not ‘real’ and ‘natural’).
Hartigan (2008) goes on to formulate scientists’ motives as part of a contest 
between analytical domains over the right to speak about ‘race’. Indeed, Keita et 
al.’s (2004) argument in the Special Issue that the misappropriated ‘race’ of popular 
discourse is a social construction can also be interpreted using such an analysis, 
as a kind of boundary device that attempts to demarcate the legitimate scope and 
subjects of scientific enquiry (Gieryn 1983). There is rhetorical value in claiming 
that something is ‘real’/‘biological’/‘natural’ or that it is socially constructed. As such, 
when people make arguments that position ‘race’ as either socially constructed or 
‘real’/‘biological’/‘natural’ (or indeed some blend thereof), these could actually reflect 
value judgments about what is important, knowable and/or worthy of study, or could 
be viewed as attempts to establish boundaries which enable them to position their 
claims and entitle them to ‘speak’ authoritatively.
Oppositional Form
As Hacking’s (1999) analytical framing predicted, the notion that the ‘social’ exists 
in opposition to things that are ‘real’, ‘biological’ and/or ‘natural’ was somewhat 
evident in this selection of articles, particularly when social construction was 
referred to ‘superficially’ or in passing. There was, however, also some evidence of 
‘blurriness’ in these boundaries. Mountain and Risch (2004), for example, defined 
‘social’ groups in a way that appears to mark them out as naturally occurring. Rotimi 
(2004: S44) termed ‘race’ a ‘largely social construct’, although, as we have noted, this 
conceptualization leaves a number of questions unanswered. We will now further 
explore these boundary issues.
We noted above that Keita et al.’s (2004) distinction between ‘race’ as ‘real’ or 
‘race’ as ‘socially constructed’, which makes socially constructed race ‘not real’, is 
a difficult distinction to support. Sociological accounts consistently emphasize that 
‘race’ has ‘real’ consequences, in that it clearly has ‘meaning’ and ‘effects’. Nevertheless, 
there are divergences within sociology about the ontology of ‘race’, to the extent 
that some have reached the conclusion that ‘there are no races, biological or social’ 
(Mason 2000: 8). This rejection of what might be termed social ‘race’ is founded on 
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concerns about reification and the appropriate analytical focus of sociology (Solomos 
2003). Instead, attention is focused on the processes through which social relations 
are structured by ideas (or ideologies) that uphold perceptions of meaningful racial 
differences, such as racialization and/or racism (Miles 1982, 1989; Omi and Winant 
1986). In respect to our current discussion, this sociological work has at least two 
implications. First, it serves as a warning: simply claiming that ‘race’ is a social 
construction in genetics research does not mean that the work will not contribute 
to the reification of ‘race’. Secondly, uncritical adoption of the notion of ‘race’ as a 
social construction could miss the significant ways in which processes of racialization 
and/or racism are influences on the kinds of population differences that geneticists 
are interested in studying (Duster 2005). This means that the scientific concept of 
‘race’ cannot be easily partitioned from the identity politics that are associated with 
it. Furthermore, these identity politics have implications for the central concerns in 
this field of biomedical science – patterns of health and reproduction.
These are exactly the kinds of ‘looping effects’ to which Hacking (1999) draws 
our attention. It is possible to see this interaction of ‘objects’ and ‘ideas’ at the heart 
of the repeated scientific struggles to disentangle the ‘social’ and the ‘biological’ in 
the conceptualization of ‘race’. Ellison and Jones (2002) argue that these attempts 
at disentanglement are forever complicated by the fact that social processes actually 
result in the differential allocation of genetic diversity. They explain that the act of 
classification inevitably results in the disproportionate allocation of some genetic traits 
to different groups (however these are classified); yet, importantly for this discussion, 
this disproportionate allocation is exacerbated when the principal classificatory 
characteristics stem from, and have a bearing on, assortative mating. This includes 
aspects of appearance, geographical origins and/or sociocultural affiliations, which are 
the characteristics underpinning traditional and contemporary classifications of ‘race’ 
(and related concepts such as ethnicity). Hartigan (2008) reaches a similar conclusion 
after critiquing the attempts of genetic scientists (such as Risch) to delineate the realm 
of genetics in terms of ‘mating patterns’. He underscores the depth of the impact 
of ‘culture’ on ‘genetics’ by arguing that ‘there are few matters more influenced by 
cultural rules, practices and beliefs than how people decide whether or with whom 
to mate’ (2008: 184).
Indeed, the very ground on which debates about ‘race’ have traditionally been 
fought has itself been shaken by arguments about the ‘destabilization of “nature”’ 
which simultaneously unsettle the concept of ‘the social’ (e.g., Wade 2007). When 
the notion of ‘race’ is applied to humanity, there is a blurring of, and interaction 
between, things that may have once been distinguished as ‘the social world’ or 
‘the natural world’. In recent anthropological discussions of ‘race’ in transnational 
adoption, for example, it has been argued that nature and culture are interwoven 
or blurred (Marre 2007), or that there is a continuum of nature-culture (Howell 
and Melhuus 2007). If ‘race’ in popular discourses of identity and belonging blurs 
the lines between the social and the biological, and if genetic science looks likely to 
continue struggling to effectively tease them apart, we might ask what is the way 
forward?
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Ideas about ‘feedback loops and interaction effect’ between social and biological 
realms are highlighted by Duster (2005: 1050) and have been discussed in bioethics, 
sociology and epidemiology (see Fullwiley 2008: 723). For example, in reviewing 
putative racial differences in bone density, Fausto-Sterling has argued for a 
reconceptualization of the underlying nature-culture dichotomy using a model in 
which ‘the social produces the biological in a system of constant feedback between 
body and social experience’ (2008: 658). Fausto-Sterling draws particularly on the 
argument championed by Nancy Krieger that humans are both biological and social 
creatures. She quotes Krieger’s (2005: 2) argument that humans ‘literally embody – 
via processes which necessarily involve gene expression – the dynamic social, material, 
and ecological contexts into which we are born, develop, interact, and endeavor to 
live meaningful lives’ (cited in Fausto-Sterling 2008: 676). 
These notions of ‘embodiment’ have been applied to discussions about ‘race’. 
Wade (2004), for example, explains how life in racialized social environments 
inscribes ‘race’ on the body, using illustrations about hypertension and sport. In 
these examples, physical differences actually result from social settings in which 
processes of racialization structure experiences and outcomes. Moreover, the 
biological consequences of racialized social relationship become easily misconstrued 
as further evidence of the biological underpinning of racial difference. Wade (2004) 
uses theories of embodiment to explain these processes and their contribution to 
the endurance of ‘race’ in human imaginations. Nevertheless, it is also possible to 
interpret these processes using Hacking’s notion of a ‘looping effect’ between ideas 
(the categories) and objects (the categorized). We might add that in this case the 
‘looping’ changes the object in ways that make it better fit the idea. A racialized 
narrative of human biological difference can, it seems, be a self-fulfilling prophesy.
After adopting an embodiment model in her study of bone density, Fausto-
Sterling (2008) concludes that where differences in health outcomes are attributed to 
‘race’, it is necessary to begin a search for the reasons among its numerous potential 
(and intersecting) social, cultural and biological correlates, and that it should be 
incumbent upon researchers to carefully define and defend their categorizations. 
Similar conclusions have been reached previously, however, and it has been stipulated 
in high-profile biomedical science journals that whenever ‘race’ or ethnicity are 
employed as categorizations, they should be tightly defined and justified according to 
the context in hand (e.g., British Medical Journal 1996; Nature Genetics Editorial 
2000; see also Freeman 1998; Kaplan and Bennett 2003; Outram and Ellison 2006; 
Smart et al. 2008b). The extent to which such guidelines are followed, or can be 
followed, has nevertheless been held open to question (Bhopal 1997; Ellison and 
Rosato 2002; Sankar and Cho 2002). As such, it is now important to explore how (or 
if) concepts such as embodiment would help to encourage a more routinely critical 
stance towards ‘race’ in genetics and biomedical science that could be realized in 
working practice.
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Conclusion
Prior to his article on ‘race’ in medical genetics, Hartigan (2006: 8) had argued that 
it is ‘not enough’ to claim that ‘race’ is socially constructed. This is partially because 
he thinks that it leads ‘directly to claims that race is really just a “myth”, a form of 
false consciousness, or that it is entirely a function of racism’, and these ideas sit 
uncomfortably alongside what he refers to as “peoples” deeply engrained sensibility 
that race is actually very real and palpable, something that they both experience and 
can “see”’(ibid.) While the usage of the notion of social construction in the Special 
Issue may not necessarily invoke ideas that ‘race’ is a myth, false consciousness or a 
product of racism in this ‘direct’ manner, the divergent usages of the notion aptly 
illustrate the competing dynamics to which Hartigan refers.
Sociological accounts offer some insights into these dynamics by attending to the 
processes by which ‘race’ becomes socially meaningful and, as we have seen, a number 
of authors have considered the possible impacts of genetics on such processes. Cornell 
and Hartmann succinctly explain that the processes of creating ‘races’ have involved 
human choices about characteristics, categorizations, assignment of meaning and 
courses of action:
We decide that certain physical characteristics – usually skin colour but 
perhaps also hair type, stature, or other bodily features – will be primary 
markers of group boundaries. We invent categories or persons marked by 
those characteristics. The categories become socially significant to the extent 
that we use them to organise individual and collective action. In other words, 
the categories become important only when we decide they have particular 
meanings and act on those meanings. (2007: 27)
As we have shown, debates about ‘race’ and genetics certainly touch upon the 
assignment of meaning and courses of action that follow. Concerns about the potential 
for genetics to (re)invigorate racialized worldviews have been counterpointed by 
suggestions that ‘race’ and genetics interact in ways that are somewhat fluid, flexible 
and novel. Discussions of identity politics relating to ‘race’ in genetics – at least 
those reviewed in this chapter – have thus been cast as aspects of racialization/racism 
and/or as expressions of ‘consumption-oriented economies of difference, choice and 
malleable body image’ (Campbell 2007b: 101).
It is perhaps appropriate to conclude by turning to the other aspects of 
construction processes outlined by Cornell and Hartmann (2007): the characteristics 
that mark boundaries and the categorizations and persons that emerge. Gilroy (2000: 
47) has argued for recognizing the shift towards molecularized ‘race’, whereby ‘the 
boundaries of “race” have moved across the threshold of the skin. They are cellular 
and molecular, not dermal’. While genetic technologies have focused attention on 
DNA markers, this quote appears to imply that the shift to molecularized ‘race’ 
may have actually negated the previous physical markers of ‘race’. It is perhaps more 
advantageous to consider the ways that DNA can become an additional boundary-
marking characteristics of ‘race’. Indeed, in a similar vein, the kinds of categorizations 
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that are used – and persons marked by that categorization – have seen ‘race’ and 
ethnicity joined (but not replaced) by ancestry, heritage and ‘admixture’. Theories 
of ‘admixture’ may sound novel but, as Fullwiley (2008: 726) argues, these invoke a 
notion of ‘racialized genomic fractions’ because ‘new genetic technologies that link 
geography and “ancestry” do not necessarily depart from older notions of “race”’. The 
usage of the notion that ‘race’ is a social construction in the Special Issue of Nature 
Genetics can be located as part of this coexistent multiplicity. Nevertheless, such a 
coexistence should not detract from the power or importance of the notion of ‘race’ 
in particular. It is worth reiterating that racialization is not simply a ‘problematic 
outcome’ of this branch of biomedical science but also appears to play a significant 
role in shaping the very contours of the subject which scientists are struggling to 
better comprehend.
As the boundary markers and categorizations in debates about genetics and human 
populations are multiple and overlapping (and potentially socially meaningful), they 
seem likely to remain ambiguous and subject to disagreement and blurring. This 
ambiguity is readily found in consumer-facing corporate science. 23andMe, which 
sells DNA tests for health risks, tells customers that its information on, for example, 
hypertension is suitable for people of ‘European ethnicity’ (www.23andme.com). We 
are left in little doubt that differences between groups are important here and that we 
should be able to decide whether or not we belong to the group which is specified. 
However, we are still none the wiser about what the company means by ethnicity, 
where the boundaries of Europe lie and what proportion of our genome needs to 
be considered European before this potentially important information about health 
risks becomes relevant to us.
Note
1. Freely available at: http://www.nature.com/ng/journal/v36/n11s/index.html.
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Mobile Identities and  
Fixed Categories




Anumber of commentators have detected the beginnings of a ‘biopolitics’ of race, ethnicity and racism in which DNA becomes an object of value and struggle 
(Skinner 2006).1 This dynamic politics involves the interplay of experts from both the 
natural and social sciences, policy makers and the lay public in sometimes surprising 
and novel configurations. But although in some situations new genetics are part of 
changes in understandings, representations and experiences of ‘race’, science is also 
being reframed within contemporary sociopolitical and governmental settings. The 
intention of this chapter is to contribute to the analysis of this changing politics by 
considering a basic but fundamental issue: if, why, when and how can people be 
categorized into distinct racial or ethnic groupings?
As other contributions to this collection show, identity (in all its multiple and 
ambiguous meanings) is central to the new politics and practices of DNA. We should 
remember, however, that identification is not just about self-expression but is also 
about the expert observation and organization of people in groups. Discussion of 
categories brings us to the heart of many of the new practices that connect ‘race’ 
and genetics. Patients are, for example, placed into groups in order to make sense 
of patterns in DNA and differences in drug response. Population genetics, as the 
name suggests, depends on the allocation of people into subpopulations. Similarly, in 
genealogical projects, self is understood by locating the individual in a relationship to 
categories (even if this is to acknowledge admixture). Each of these forms of genetic 
practice is dependent on ‘racialized’ DNA data – that is, data recorded, managed and 
analysed using ethnic and racial categories.
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This chapter will consider a sphere of the new genetics where the collection, 
organization and use of racialized DNA data is both commonplace and contested – 
criminal justice. Taking the example of a state-run forensic database (Britain’s Police 
National DNA Database), it shows some of the complex ways in which discussions 
of race and DNA can be linked to new social and political conditions. Also, for all 
the universalistic claims of the new genetics, their articulation and interpretation 
is highly variable, both institutionally and nationally. Detailed analysis of the 
racialization of the database and the political debates it has provoked shows how 
the new genetics interacts with existing and emerging wider regimes of classification 
and identification.
This chapter begins with a discussion of categorization in general, arguing that it 
is fundamental to much policy, scientific and political practice around race, ethnicity 
and racism. For all this, it is also an area marked by disputes and ambivalence about 
the reliability, validity and ethical implications of using categories. This analysis 
informs the core of the chapter, which considers the ‘practical politics’ (to borrow 
Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star’s [1999] phrase) of racial categories and 
categorization in forensic science in Britain. The example of forensics – in particular, 
the mass-taking of DNA samples by the state, and their transformation and storage 
as computerized DNA profiles without the need for normal standards of free consent 
– reveals aspects of identification and citizenship different from those typically 
discussed in relation to, for example, health or genetic ancestry testing. The chapter 
explores political and expert debate about the use of race categories to organize 
genetic data and about the value and meaning of such racialized data. This debate 
takes place in the context of systemic racism and minority disadvantage within the 
British criminal justice system. The role of racialized data as either an indicator of 
or contributor to that disadvantage is ambiguous. Discussion of the implications 
and reliability of racialized data continues as inequalities grow; for all the energy 
put into monitoring the ethnic makeup of the database, the resulting data appears 
not to allow full consideration of how collection of DNA may itself be a driver of 
inequality.
A key point of this chapter is the uniqueness of the British case of the racialization 
of forensic DNA: the details of the debate about categories has features that belong 
firmly to one specific time, place and policy context, and as such act a counter to 
universalistic predictions of the sociotechnical impacts of new genetics. However, 
the preoccupation and dissatisfaction with categories that the chapter charts has a 
more general relevance. As the chapter illustrates, in the new biopolitics of DNA, 
three apparently contradictory trends coexist. The first of these is the promise of 
genetics to offer truths about identity and group membership. The second is the way 
that official, national standardized systems of race classification and data collection 
feature in policy making and scientific practice. The third is a growing preoccupation 
with ethnicity as a personalized process of active identification. As the chapter will 
conclude, the evident tensions between these three trends are often presented as 
problematic, but in practice they support each other and allow the racialization of 
DNA to take place.
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Race Categorization
Discussions of race and ethnicity often draw a questionable distinction between ‘real’ 
or ‘constructed’ categories (for a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Chapter 1 
in this volume). This distinction is unhelpful if ‘constructed’ is equated with ‘false’. 
One does not have to deny the reality of patterns in genetics, life chances or shared 
cultural traditions to acknowledge that categories used to make sense of them are 
constructs. The discussion of genetically-based differences in drug responses between 
groups, using DNA to decide race ancestry and, indeed, showing the association 
between race and life chances all involve turning continuous, clinial or cline-like 
distributions of people and characteristics into distinct, grouped populations and 
variables through an active process of categorization. Different methods of sampling, 
measuring, naming and sorting will hide or emphasize different population 
characteristics and also highlight or downplay similarity or difference across the 
population as a whole. But revealing the artifice and effort involved in applying racial 
and ethnic categories does not automatically imply that they are unreliable or invalid 
any more than demonstrating a connection between a population category and a 
variable shows that race is ‘real’. There is no unique way of dividing up populations, 
there are better or worse ways of doing this and that better or worse depends on why 
it is being done.
Discussions of the legitimacy of race categories are at once conceptual and 
political, implying different analyses of the problem of and solutions to racism. 
Some analysts equate the problematization of all category distinctions with anti-
racism. Others view racialized data as an instrument of anti-racist politics and policy, 
and argue that an apparently ‘colour-blind’ approach (which views categories as 
meaningless or of no consequence) merely reinforces core themes of contemporary 
racism. This latter point is well put by David Theo Goldberg (2008), who writes of 
the complexity of the connection between an ‘anti-racial conception’ and an ‘anti-
racist commitment’. We are, argues Goldberg, at a moment where the necessity and 
complexity of that connection is often lost; a moment where “the refusal of racism 
reduces to racial refusal; and racial refusal is thought to exhaust antiracism.” 
Now, what is refused in this collapse, what buried alive? What residues 
of racist arrangement and subordination – social, economic, cultural, 
psychological, legal and political – linger unaddressed and repressed in 
singularly stressing racial demise? (Goldberg 2008: 1)
One particular tension running through the discussion of racial and ethnic categories 
lies between analysing their use in general and acknowledging the great variations 
that exist between locations in significance and format. I write from an experience 
of Britain, where racial and ethnic categorization is a routine feature of public life 
in ways that may in some ways be familiar in the U.S.A. but that do not have an 
equivalent in other European countries. In France and Germany, for example, 
there is little or no official racialized data collected or used by the state. The British 
approach is unique in Europe. The debate currently taking place in France about 
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whether the state should begin to assemble such data takes place on very different 
terms (and concerns very different categories) from those familiar in Britain (Finney 
and Simpson 2009: Chapter 2).
The new biopolitics of genetics and ‘race’, as expressed in the case of forensic 
DNA, is profoundly influenced by and connected to other practices and politics of 
ethnic and racial classification. In Britain the placing of people into distinct racial or 
ethnic categories is a recurring and largely unchallenged feature of the contemporary 
setting. Racial and ethnic categories are, at one at the same time, analytical tools, 
policy instruments for knowing and managing populations, and the raw material of 
identity politics. But however well established the principle of racial categorization 
is in Britain, the process of categorization is contentious and the detail of categories 
remains fluid. The categories used in the U.K. Census provide the basis of other 
systems of categorization used across the public realm, in policy practice and (as 
Smart et al. discuss in Chapter 1 in this volume) are also frequently used by medical 
and genetic researchers. But since their first appearance in 1991 the categories (and 
the technique of categorization) have changed at each ten-year census point. The 
2011 census featured a new multiple set of questions encompassing national identity, 
racial or ethnic identity and religion. In 2011 the Scottish census for the first time 
used different race and ethnicity categories from the census for England and Wales.
While the collection and discussion of racialized data is an established feature of 
academic and public life in Britain, categories are a continued arena for dispute in the 
academic and public realms, to the extent that some academics from both the natural 
and social sciences have questioned whether they should be used at all. Within the 
social sciences, racial and ethnic categories are frequently utilized in research but have 
also been subjected to two kinds of critique. The first argues that using racialized data 
is methodologically invalid and politically reactionary because it contributes to the 
reification of racial differences, giving them a solidity and legitimacy that they do 
not deserve (see, for example, Robert Miles’ [1993] critique of the ‘sociology of race 
relations’ and also Carter 2000). The second suggests that the collection of racialized 
data may do no good because it seems a substitute for action (or an alibi for inaction) 
on inequality and racism by, for example, shifting the focus in variations between 
minorities’ ‘progress’ (examples of this argument made in the 1970s and 1980s are 
discussed in Gordon 1992; for a more recent example, see Gillborn 2008).
This social science discussion links (as we will see later in the chapter) to similar 
uncertainties and debates in the life sciences and in the wider public domain. If, 
when and how people should be placed into racial or ethnic groups, which categories 
are legitimate and what category membership means are all questions that detain not 
only academic researchers but also policy makers, policy practitioners and those who 
are categorized. A recurring feature of the discussion of categories is that developers, 
users and subjects of systems of categorization also harbour an ambivalence about 
categorization – continuing to use the categories and at one at the same time doubting 
their reliability or validity and highlighting their potential for misinterpretation and 
misuse. Laypeople will at points place themselves within standard categories for 
pragmatic or ‘strategic’ reasons (Hickman et al. 2005; Santos 2009) whilst chafing 
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at the simplifications of origins and identity involved. This familiarity with the 
procedures and labels of categorization can be accompanied by dissatisfaction with 
the categories and the processes of categorization, and mistrust and misunderstanding 
of what happens to racialized data (Skinner 2009). In parallel to the ambivalence of 
the categorized, social scientists and natural scientists use categories while holding 
methodological, practical and ethical concerns about their legitimacy.
Whatever their peculiarities, it is also useful to view official and academic racial 
and ethnic categories as one particular variation on the use of standardized systems of 
classification in the production and management of knowledge that is a ubiquitous 
feature of contemporary intellectual and institutional life. Standardized categories, in 
Bowker and Star’s memorable phrase, ‘saturate our environment’ and are a crucial 
part of information infrastructures built by the state and other key organizations. 
As such, they serve as decision-making tools and aids to the coordination of activity 
across time and space. The operation of these infrastructures, their categories and 
ever-growing datasets is in the contemporary world dependent on ever more powerful 
computer-based technologies for storing, organizing, analysing and communicating 
information.
Bowker and Star’s work is a touchstone in the analysis of the collection and 
use of racialized data. Researchers of new race biopolitics have cited Bowker and 
Star to make the point that categories embody ethical and political decisions (for 
example, Kahn 2008): ‘Each standard and each category valorises some point of 
view and silences another’ (Bowker and Star 1999: 6). Others, notably Fullwiley 
(2007), make use of Bowker and Star to support the argument that, once established, 
categories themselves come to be powerful, channelling and constraining discussion 
and experience in ways that come to shape the realities they purport only to describe.
There is, however, another dimension of Bowker and Star’s analysis that should 
be added to the discussion of racialized data. Bowker and Star show us that it is not 
only systems of ethnic and racial classification that can seem messy or contradictory. 
Systems aspire to consistent classificatory principles and mutually exclusive categories, 
and leave nothing unclassifiable (Bowker and Star 1999: 11). However, no working 
classification can meet these requirements. For all their significance and apparent 
solidity, large-scale categorization systems inevitably have a degree of variation, 
ambiguity and plasticity, and there are always deletions and anomalies. Although 
categories are inspired by ideals of objectivity, precision and standardization, 
in practice they are continually (re)constructed hybrids that encompass the 
conventional, the local and the everyday. Central to Bowker and Star’s analysis of 
systems of classification is the way in which categories act as ‘boundary objects’ 
that allow cooperation and discussion across contexts. Standardized classification 
systems develop utility and usability through what Bowker and Star term a ‘dynamic 
compromise’ (55). They must maintain some kind of coherence across time and 
space while permitting enough flexibility and customization to allow for the situated 
and distributed knowledge of the realities that they wish to encompass. As Bowker 
and Star highlight, large-scale systems of categorization have ‘recursive’ problems of 
standardization and require ongoing maintenance work. Much of the ongoing work 
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required to operate systems and the arguments, uncertainties and decision-making 
processes that shape them are ‘hidden’ or ‘deleted’ (Berg 1997; Schwartz, Nardi and 
Whittaker 1999).
This last point is important because a position frequently adopted by critics of 
systems of collection and use of racialized data is to unveil the inconsistencies in 
the operation of categories. This discussion of the operation of standard systems of 
classification in general reminds us that the inconsistencies, shifts and disputes we 
find in race categorization may be exceptional, but only by degree. However, this is 
an area where effort, uncertainty and artifice around the operation of categories is 
never fully obscured from public view.
DNA, Race and Criminal Justice in Britain
Although, they have grown to become some of the largest collections of genetic 
information in the world, police forensic databases did not initially provoke the same 
kind of media, political, legal or analytical concern as biomedical DNA databases 
(Tutton and Levitt 2009: 85). As Richard Tutton and Mairi Levitt show, despite this 
contrast, forensic databases share important features with medical biobanks. Like 
other applications of the new genetics, forensic databases are ‘promissory objects’ – 
innovations driven by claims as to their future significance more than their current 
utility (this point is also elaborated in Fortun 2008). As with biobanks, the promise 
of forensic databases is delayed: despite some high-profile successes, their overall 
impact on crime detection and conviction rates is limited.
Faith in forensics to deliver a step-change in the efficiency of criminal justice 
rests on a powerful consensus as to the reliability of DNA matching (using techniques 
pioneered in the U.K.) to potentially resolve questions of guilt or innocence:
For perhaps the only time in history, a technology has emerged with the 
epistemic authority to credibly challenge the law’s claim to being a truth-
producing institution. (Cole 2007: 98)
What is striking is that the dominant controversies about DNA technology 
now revolve around the competence of the criminal justice system rather 
than the reliability of the technology itself. (Lazer 2004: 4)
Since the publication of Cole’s and Lazer’s assertions, claims about the fallibility 
of evidence based on DNA profiling have begun to appear in the public domain, 
particularly in the U.S.A. (see, for example, Felch and Dolan 2008a, 2008b).2 
Nevertheless, the credibility of techniques to sequence and match forensic DNA 
remains very high and influences discussion of the merits of the mass construction, 
storage and manipulation of DNA records. It is useful, however, to distinguish 
between four uses of DNA in criminal forensics: first, the matching of the DNA 
of a known suspect to crime-scene DNA; secondly the verification of identity (i.e., 
is someone who they say they are?); thirdly, population surveillance via the cold 
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searching of databases of DNA in the hope of matching an as-yet-unknown suspect 
to crime-scene DNA; and, fourthly, the analysis of DNA data to gain an insight into 
patterns and causes of criminality. This distinction is important: the reliability and 
ease of matching DNA to link suspects to (or eliminate them from) crime scenes 
may be hard to question, but the desirability and utility of mass genetic surveillance 
or the assembly of DNA databases to research the genetic components of criminal 
behaviour are separate issues, even if they are often bundled together.
In Britain the Police National DNA Database (referred to as the NDNAD) 
was established in 1995. Official estimates in 2009 put the size of the database at 
5.6 million records, equivalent to eight per cent of the population. The NDNAD 
is often claimed to be the largest forensic database in the world; it is certainly (in 
terms of population coverage) the most comprehensive.3 This reflects a particularly 
pronounced preoccupation in the U.K. with the potential of DNA analysis, ‘scientific 
policing’ and sociotechnical applications of social control (Innes and Clarke 2009). 
The NDNAD is not only the largest but also the most used database, with ‘cold 
searches’ regularly conducted to match crime-scene samples to existing genetic 
records. This is in marked contrast to the U.S.A. where, as Lazer and colleagues point 
out (2004), despite considerable financial and political investment in the building of 
databases, financial constraints have limited their day-to-day use.
Although the use of ‘DNA fingerprinting’ and later faster and cheaper matching 
techniques in the detection of crime and the righting of miscarriages of justice soon 
became a staple of media coverage, in its early years the NDNAD attracted relatively 
little political or academic attention. By 2006, however, this had changed. There are 
two underlying factors to consider here. First, new campaigning groups in Britain 
were successful in lifting concerns about privacy rights up the political agenda. 
Initially these concerns focused on government proposals for a national identity 
card scheme, but broadened to critique ‘the database state’.4 Secondly, there is the 
continual, unchecked growth of the NDNAD. This growth results from the storage 
of material not just of those convicted of crimes but also (since 2001) those charged 
but later acquitted of a recordable offence, since 2003 those arrested but never 
charged with a recordable offence and since 2008 those subject to control orders 
under counterterrorism legislation. The database also contains DNA voluntarily 
donated as part of an investigation. There is currently no limit on the length of 
time these computerized records are held. Thus, the NDNAD is a probably the best 
illustration of the growing scope of forensic databases around the world, arguably 
marking what Tutton and Levitt and others view as a purposive shift from a database 
of ‘active criminals’ to a tool for policing the population as a whole.5 At the time of 
writing, the U.K. government is currently formulating its response to a European 
Court ruling requiring the deletion of the records of over 900,000 people who have 
samples stored and records on the database despite never having been convicted of a 
serious crime (Almandras 2009).
The growth of the NDNAD and the debate which it has prompted raise a 
whole range of interesting questions about surveillance and privacy and about the 
relationship between the state and its citizens. The flipside of hopes for genetics to 
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deliver a step-change in crime detection and deterrence is that investment in forensic 
databases has developed in a period when fears of crime and, debatably, attempts 
to ‘govern through crime’ have been in the foreground (Cole 2007). We can link 
the growth of forensic databases to a phenomenon that Greg Elmer and Andy Opel 
(2008) term pre-emption: the assumption that authorities can and should predict and 
manage potential risks rather than react to crimes once they have been committed. 
Thus, the retention of the DNA of those arrested, regardless of whether they are 
charged with or convicted of a crime, and the storage of the DNA of petty criminals 
are justified on the basis that they present a heightened risk of future criminal 
behaviour. Less commonly explicitly articulated is another dimension of this logic of 
pre-emption: that recording people on the database will act as a deterrent to future 
criminal activity.
While the development of the NDNAD has been driven and sustained by the 
faith in its ability to provide a technological fix to crime and to fear of crime, its 
impact on deterrence or detection is hard to quantify. Recent official figures show 
that between 2007 and 2009 (during which period the number of records on the 
database grew by a million) crime detection via NDNAD searches fell from over 
41,000 in 2007 to just under 32,000 in 2009 (written parliamentary answer 25 
November 2008, Column 1250W). We might contrast the seamless, super-efficient 
‘truth machine’ (borrowing a phrase from the title of Lynch et al. 2008) envisaged by 
utopian accounts of the future of the database technology (and also to an extent in the 
dystopian fears of its critics) with the messy day-to-day realities of the taking of DNA, 
its transformation into electronic data and the management and manipulation of that 
data in the database. It is estimated that between thirteen and fourteen per cent of all 
the records on the NDNAD are ‘replicates’ created when a genetic profile is loaded 
onto the database on more than one occasion. The National Police Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) has said that replication could occur ‘for example if the same person 
provided different names, or different versions of their name, on separate arrests, or 
because profiles are upgraded’. Meg Hillier MP told the House of Commons that 
replication rates were being reduced and that ‘much work has gone on to educate 
police forces in taking DNA samples’ (House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee 2008: 76). In July 2009 police and prison inspectors reported finding 
DNA samples next to ice cream in a West Yorkshire Police freezer. In August 2009 
an official inspection of eight Cambridgeshire police stations found DNA samples 
stored alongside amongst other things a half-eaten takeaway meal and frozen raw 
meat: ‘Fridges in most suites were full of forensic samples that had not been dealt 
with and there was widespread evidence of systematic failings in the handling, storing 
and destruction of forensic and DNA samples’ (BBC, 4 August 2009).
In January 2010 the Home Office also conceded that a substantial but 
unknown number of long-serving prisoners convicted of very serious offences did 
not have records on the NDNAD. All the above suggests the hard ongoing work of 
sociotechnical construction that the database requires.
In response to increased public and political focus on the NDNAD, there has 
been a strengthening of the governance of the database. This move has been framed 
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as ensuring continued ‘public trust’ (see, for example, House of Commons Home 
Affairs Select Committee 2008). Much of this has followed a pattern set by medical 
databases. We can see this first institutionally with the involvement of the Human 
Genetics Commission, a U.K. government body whose members’ experience and 
expertise was previously in health, and the establishment of a National DNA Database 
Strategy Board and Ethics Advisory Group (2007) with a strong representation of 
people from a biomedical background. Secondly, it follows a familiar pattern for 
the management of ‘difficult’ issues thrown up by the new genetics, in that there is 
a concerted attempt to frame problems as ‘ethical’ dilemmas and as belonging to the 
domain of the expert community of bioethicists rather than being matters of politics 
and public interest. Whatever its influence, the regulatory structure has no formal 
statutory basis (Almandras 2009: 4–5). In contrast to some other European countries 
(see Machado and Silva 2009 for discussion of the Portuguese example), Parliament 
has never formally decided or ratified the parameters and use of its national forensic 
database. A report from the Human Genetics Commission (2009) called for such a 
legislative process to take place and for the role of the Ethics Advisory Group to also 
be placed on a firmer footing.
The ‘ethnic appearance’ (a term worthy of reflection) of each person placed on 
the NDNAD is recorded (along with their age and gender) and stored with their 
genetic data. Racialized DNA allows the analysis of relative rates of representation 
on the NDNAD across different population groups. While this also holds for age 
and gender distributions (the records on the database are eighty per cent male and 
predominantly from the under thirty-five age group), other patterns are less easy to 
explore because of the lack of categorization, notably class. Critics of the database 
and/or of institutional racism in the criminal justice system have highlighted the 
unequal likelihood of members of different ethnic groups having their DNA sampled 
and stored. Calculations in 2006 suggested thirty-seven per cent of black men had 
a record of their DNA stored in the database. This compared with thirteen per cent 
of Asian men and nine per cent of white men. These estimates are more striking 
when considering the age groups most likely to have samples on the NDNAD. It 
was estimated in 2006 that seventy-seven per cent of black males aged fifteen to 
thirty-four have a police DNA record (Randerson 2006). The campaigning group 
Black Mental Health also highlighted the large proportion of black people living 
in London on the NDNAD. Official figures also suggest that nearly a quarter of 
all people never convicted of a crime but with a NDNDA record are from ethnic 
minorities.
The mass collection of the DNA of young black men should be considered, 
together with the use of ‘familial’ and ‘low stringency’ searches of DNA databases 
(Cole 2007; Greely et al. 2006). This technique investigates a suspect’s blood relatives 
(see Williams and Johnson 2005 and 2008 for discussion of its use in the U.K.). 
Family searching potentially reinforces and magnifies the inequalities between groups 
likely to be on the database by, in effect, also placing close blood relatives under 
genetic surveillance. Writing about the U.S.A., Cole plausibly speculates that in 
situations where arrest and conviction rates are high, ‘this could quickly result in 
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effectively incorporating whole neighbourhoods and ethnic communities into the 
database’ (Cole 2007: 103). The same holds true in the British context, although 
the numbers of such searches currently conducted is relatively low (National Police 
Improvement Agency 2007: 6).
As Cole’s work shows us, we can assume from other disparities in patterns of 
crime and the operation of the criminal justice system that particular minority groups 
are over-represented on the U.S. CORDIS forensic database. Henry Greely et al. 
(2006: 258) infer from conviction data that forty per cent of the records on the 
U.S. system belong to African Americans. We do not have official data to support 
this because, unlike the NDNAD, CORDIS does not classify individual records by 
race. Kahn (2009), however, describes a different way in which a forensic database 
can be racialized. In U.S. court cases forensic evidence is routinely retrospectively 
interpreted in racialized form, with the random matched probability (RMP) odds of 
someone else having the same DNA profile being reported in relation to race-specific 
population databases. As Kahn shows, this race-odds approach might have had 
some legitimacy when testing was in its infancy, but more sophisticated techniques 
now generate RMPs in the billions, whatever racial group they are compared to: 
‘With such odds, the practical utility of distinguishing RMPs by race disappears. 
Nonetheless, race has remained ingrained in the framework of the production and 
interpretation of forensic DNA evidence’ (Kahn 2009: 328).
One concern raised about the growth of forensic databases has been their potential 
for ‘profiling’ offenders – seeking patterns in offender DNA to predict criminality in 
individuals and groups. In both the U.S.A. and Britain there is also a debate about 
the use of DNA to construct racialized profiles of unknown perpetrators (for an 
early example of the work in this area, see Lowe et al. 2001). The scientist credited 
with pioneering DNA fingerprinting foresaw its use to predict the phenotypical 
features of suspects as long ago as 1993 (Jeffreys 1993). In the same year Ian Evett 
of the Home Office Forensic Science Laboratory in Birmingham claimed in the 
Journal of Forensic Science and Society that a DNA test that could distinguish between 
‘Caucasians’ and ‘Afro-Caribbeans’ (cited Duster 2004: 326). Although there are 
now some indications that the U.K. government will tighten up the governance of 
secondary use of DNA collected for forensic purposes, this had previously been seen 
as a resource ripe for commercial and scientific exploitation. The Home Office has 
in the past given permission for material from the database to be used in research 
projects investigating the feasibility of inferring a crime suspect’s ethnicity or skin 
colour from DNA, although this inference would be removed at once (i.e., linking 
location and ancestry) (GeneWatch UK 2006). The science behind the prediction 
of race/ethnic appearance from DNA is questionable: many of the practical and 
conceptual problems with linking genotype with phenotype or with region of origin 
that have been highlighted by critics of racialized medicine and ancestry testing also 
apply to this area (Bolnik 2008; Dupré 2008; Feldman and Lewontin 2008).
Discussion of ethnic profiling has not been helped by the varied lay, policy 
and scientific use of the term ‘profiling’ itself and, in particular, slippage between 
discussion of three distinct practices:
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Forensic DNA and the Politics of Racialized Data  63
1. The prediction of the ancestry and/or racial appearance of an unknown suspect 
using crime-scene DNA.
2. The isolation of specific genetic markers associated with criminal activity and the 
connection of these markers to particular ethnic/racial groups.
3. The singling out of particular population groups for extraordinary policing by 
placing members of the group under genetic surveillance.
In writing of SNP profiling of offenders as a ‘new phrenology’ (Duster 2004), Troy 
Duster and others have conflated the profiling of criminal types, the profiling of 
racial types and the special policing of particular groups. There is, however, little 
evidence that the three types of ethnic profiling are combining to any great extent 
in the ways that Duster’s formulation implies. The fears of Duster and others of 
a ‘new phrenology’ seem to miss the ways in which contemporary forensics uses 
distinct biological and social registers. This is not a simple continuation of or return 
to a eugenics discourse. While Cole (2004: 81) rightly highlights the potential for 
figures on the ethnic composition of databases to give (perhaps unintentionally) 
credibility to biologically deterministic accounts of criminality, racial profiling can 
and does take place without a direct link between genetic charactistics and criminal 
propensities. When racial markers are sought, they are in ‘junk’ DNA (Abu El-Haj 
2007). Tellingly, this same confusion between different senses of ‘profiling’ has been 
used to deflect concerns about the racialization of the NDNAD. The Home Office 
was in 2008 able to reassure a Parliamentary Select Committee that the NDNAD 
could not be used in an attempt to develop genetic profiles of those likely to offend. 
Their argument was that the record of an individual on the NDNAD consists of ten 
markers from areas of DNA which do not play an active role in determining personal 
characteristics: ‘The NDNAD therefore is not and will not be used in attempt to 
correlate particular genetic characteristics with propensity to commit crime’ (House 
of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 2008: 80–81).
While this was presented as a position on ‘profiling’, it did not preclude the 
development of techniques to divine the likely racial/ethnic origin of a crime suspect or 
indeed the use of the NDNAD for extraordinary policing of particular racial and ethnic 
populations. Both of these continue to be features of the operation of the database.
Categories, Categorization and the Politics of the DNA Database
The disproportionate numbers of black people on the database and the use of DNA 
to profile suspect ethnicity are clearly areas of interest and concern. The collection 
and storage of genetic data in racialized form is an important context to these 
developments – although the U.S. shows that forensic DNA can be racialized at 
other points than an individual database record. To understand the parameters 
of the controversy about the racialization of the NDNAD, we should, however, 
acknowledge that the classification of genetic material is only one of many different 
ways in which racial and ethnic categories operate in the British criminal justice 
system. Racialized data is routinely collected and used. To provide two examples:
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• Until recently, every police service in England had government targets for the 
recruitment of police officers from ethnic minorities.6 They regularly report 
figures of applications from, recruitment of, retention of and promotion of 
people from particular ethnic minorities. Forces engage in ‘positive action’ to 
recruit and promote people who fall within particular categories.
• Every street ‘stop and search’ and ‘stop and account’ conducted by the police 
should result in an official record. This record includes details of the stopped 
person’s ethnicity. The resulting data is used to produce service level and national 
statistics.
Recruitment targets and stop and search figures are only two examples of what 
is a much wider phenomenon: a mass of racialized data collected and reported 
relating to many different aspects of the British criminal justice system. There 
has been a long history of poor relations between the police and Britain’s black 
and Asian minorities. The 1999 Macpherson Inquiry into the botched police 
investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence argued that the police 
were ‘institutionally racist’ (Macpherson 1999). Minorities were not only victims of 
face-to-face discrimination by individual officers but suffered because of the normal 
operating assumptions of the police and other aspects of the legal system. Black 
people are over-represented at every punitive stage in the criminal justice system 
(Bowling and Phillips 2002; Riley et al. 2009). The Race Relations (Amendment) 
Act 2000 placed a requirement on all public bodies, including the police and prison 
services, to actively promote ‘race equality’ and ‘cultural diversity’. Later (following 
civil disturbances in 2001, the war on terror and the July 2007 London bombings), 
‘community cohesion’ became the focus of policy making. These issues have been 
formally linked to public sector performance measures and have become themes 
of training and professional development across the public sector. In this setting, 
the collection, collation and evaluation of racialized data has become, in the past 
decade, an increasingly important feature of the management in criminal justice 
(see, for example, Riley et al. 2009) and other areas of public service provision such 
as health, education and housing.
However, we should note that across the three examples from criminal justice – 
the DNA database, recruitment targets and stop and search – categories are important 
but also contentious and politicized. In all three cases there is a lively ethical, 
methodological and practical debate about the collection and use of racialized data 
that extends across the value of collecting the data by category, the meaningfulness of 
categories, which categories are worthy of inclusion and the reliability of techniques 
of day-to-day classification on which they depend.
It is worth considering the connections and disjunctions, the similarities and 
differences between the politics of ‘biological’ and ‘social’ in these conditions. To 
what extent is racial categorization deemed a different issue when it is linked to 
genetic data rather than social circumstance? It is notable that different interests 
support the collection of some kinds of racialized data and not others. Many within 
the police see the recording and reporting of racialized data on stop and search or 
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recruitment, retention and promotion as unnecessary and/or unreliable. There is 
a concerted campaign against the recording of data on stop and search as turning 
police work into overly bureaucratic ‘form filling’. A different group of campaigners 
raise concerns about the collection and use of racialized genetic data. Often these 
politicians (for example, the Liberal Democrats), race relations professionals (for 
example, the Commission for Racial Equality and its successor organization, the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission) and campaigning groups (for example, 
Black Mental Health) will be supportive of the collection of racialized data on stop 
and searches and police recruitment.
Another telling point of comparison relates directly to the process of categorization. 
Racial categories utilized across the British criminal justice system focus on broadly 
similar groups. These are termed ‘ethnic’ but usually relate chiefly to black, Asian (in a 
British context meaning people whose family origins are on the Indian subcontinent) 
and other groups historically seen as been of different appearance to the majority 
white population. However, allowing for that broad focus, there are significant 
differences in the categories used. The NDNAD utilizes the ‘PNC’ (Police National 
Computer) classification. This classification is well established for internal use within 
the police: it is used, for example, by the police to describe suspects in witness 
statements. The other examples use the ‘16+’ classification developed for the 2001 
national census and now frequently used in ‘ethnic monitoring’ across the public 
sector. The differing categories of the two systems are summarized in Table 2.1. 
As the table shows, category differences reflect more than variations in terminology 
or approaches to the consolidation of subsets into population groups. The PNC 
classifications of ‘Arab’ and ‘Dark Skinned European’ have no equivalents in other 
areas of U.K. policy practice. The PNC system also precludes the categorization of 
people as ‘mixed’.
These two forms of categorization (one emerging from internal police practice 
and the other from wider policy parameters) are not the only potential or actual 
approaches to the issue. One alternative comes from Black Police Associations (BPAs) 
in England and Wales. In the BPAs, what Holdaway and O’Neill (2006) term ‘police 
ethnicity’ rests on a distinct working experience that mark ‘black’ officers as different 
from ‘white’ officers. The U.K. National Black Police Association website defines 
‘black’ as follows: ‘The emphasis is on the common experience and determination of 
the people of African, African-Caribbean and Asian origin to oppose the effects of 
racism. Everyone within policing is eligible to join the NBPA (There is no barrier to 
membership).’
As the BPA example illustrates, there is variation not only between categories 
used but also in practices for placing people into categories. With the recording of 
DNA, people are categorized based on ‘the operational judgement of the arresting 
officer’. In contrast, many other categorization practices in the criminal justice system 
utilize ‘self-identification’, where the subject is asked to place herself or himself in one 
of a number of prescribed categories. Police recruits do this for ‘ethnic monitoring’ 
and, despite the potential difficulties and tensions, self-reporting is also utilized in the 
collection of stop and search data.
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I have discussed the operation of racialized categories and the use of racialized 
data in the criminal justice system in some detail because it frames the politics of racial 
categories and categorization and the NDNAD. Since 2006, privacy campaigners 
have used data on inequality of storage by ethnic group to highlight wider concerns 
about the operation and use of the database – that is, as evidence of the dangers of 
relying on and expanding the NDNAD in general (Anderson et al. 2009 for the 
Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust; Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007). Some other 
groups also began to articulate concerns specific to ethnic minorities (Genewatch 
* The +1 refers to information refused.
‘Ethnic Appearance’ Categories as 
used in Police National Computer 
(PNC) and Police National DNA 
Database (NDNAD)
16+1* (UK 2001 Census) Categories 
used by the government to describe the 
UK population. Also used within the 
criminal justice system to monitor the 
ethnic composition of, for example, 
the prison population, police service 
staff, and those formally stopped and 




Dark Skinned European 
Oriental
White Skinned European














White and Black Caribbean  
White and Black African  





Table 2.1. Contrasting Ethnic/Racial Categories in the British Criminal Justice System
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UK, Black Mental Health, Liberty, the Liberal Democrats, the Commission for 
Racial Equality and the Equality and Human Rights Commission). These concerns 
were also expressed on occasion by members of the Labour government that presided 
over the growth of the NDNAD since 1997 (replaced by a Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition in May 2010). During a parliamentary inquiry into ‘Young 
Black People and the Criminal Justice System’, Minister Baroness Scotland claimed 
that three-quarters of the young black male population would soon be on the DNA 
database:
The implications of this development must be explored openly by the 
Government. It means that young black people who have committed no 
crime are far more likely to be on the database than young white people. 
It also means that young white criminals who have never been arrested are 
more likely to get away with crimes because they are not on the database. 
It is hard to see how either outcome can be justified on grounds of equality 
or of public confidence in the criminal justice system. (Quoted in House of 
Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 2008: 81)
Whatever the concerns raised about racism and the NDNAD, it is open to question 
whether the routine use of categories in other areas of social policy helps desensitize 
in respect of this kind of categorization. While there were a range of voices raising 
misgivings about unequal representation on the NDNAD, there was far more 
uncertainty as to the implications of the estimates. For example, some contrary voices 
suggest that the unfairness should be addressed by recording the DNA of all British 
citizens. In September 2007 the then President of the Black Police Association argued 
that the system was ‘untenable’ and mooted a universal system where samples of the 
DNA of all British people were stored. This reprised an argument previously made in 
the U.S.A. (where patterns of racial inequality are also evident in the composition of 
current forensic databases). Kaye and Smith use ‘racial justice’ to make the case for 
a universal database. They suggest that expanding the database to all arrestees would 
decrease disparities and also encourage more public and professional consideration of 
the use and abuse of the database: ‘a population wide DNA database would serve as at 
least partial, much needed antidote for the racial distortions that plague the criminal 
justice systems. DNA evidence does not care about race’ (Kaye and Smith 2004: 271).
A further complication to note is that although often quoted, the provenance 
and accuracy of estimates of unequal representation in the NDNAD is questionable. 
These estimates use data supplied by the U.K. Home Office in response to written 
parliamentary questions (e.g., Hansard, 13 December 2006) compared against 
2001 census figures for the ethnic mix of the British population. The comparison 
methodology is limited – not least because of the different approaches to categorization 
used in the database and in the census, the increasing outdatedness of the snapshot of 
the U.K. population from the 2001 census given recent changes due to rapid inward 
migration and population growth, the complication that the database does not just 
hold the DNA of current U.K. residents and finally the debate as to whether minorities 
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are more likely than average to feature among the replicate samples. Thus, even the 
racialization of DNA does not allow precision or accuracy in the calculation of levels 
of inequality. While there is a broadbrush indication that the system disadvantages 
black people, the detail of the estimates is open to question and may exaggerate the 
exact extent of the inequality or obscure important details of how it operates.
The issue of race inequality has been discussed in the new fora that have recently 
been established as (post hoc) attempts to provide more transparent and rigorous 
governance of the NDNAD. In the annual reports and meeting minutes of the 
NDNAD Strategy Board and Ethics Advisory Group we can trace ongoing discussion 
of the issue of the disproportionate number of black people on the database and the 
‘risk to public confidence’ in the database that such disproportionally poses (numerous 
examples can be found in the Strategy Board minutes available at www.npia.police.
uk/en/14189.htm). Since 2007 the NDNAD has been subject to a series of Equality 
Impact Assessments (EIAs) – a public sector practice designed to review whether 
policies unintentionally disadvantage particular groups. Problems of categorization 
and the limits of the current system as a way of monitoring policing practice are 
recurring themes. The Equalities Impact Assessments (National Police Improvement 
Agency 2007, 2009a, 2009b) recommend that DNA should be categorized using the 
16+1 categories and self-identification in parallel with the use of the PNC categories. 
The EIAs also seeks racialized data on familial searching, deletions from the database, 
and replicates and records of those arrested but never charged.
As the reservations expressed in the EIA show, underlying the practice and debate 
of the DNA database are not just two systems of categories and categorization – one 
internal to policing and the other in the lingua franca of public policy – but two 
distinct motivations for the collection and use of racialized categories. The first of 
these is monitoring – that is, to measure the impact of a practice on particular groups 
as part of an equalities agenda and to highlight unfairness. The second is profiling – 
that is, to gain a better understanding of patterns of criminal behaviour. As the EIA 
points out, the current use of categories is far from a satisfactory monitoring tool 
(National Police Improvement Agency 2007: 8–9). In addition, if monitoring was the 
sole purpose, then race data could be taken and stored separately from genetic records.
The confusions and tensions between categories for profiling and monitoring 
are evident amongst opinion formers and campaigners who have focused on the 
racialization of the NDNAD. They express concern about both the disproportionate 
numbers of people from minorities whose DNA records are stored and the potential 
use of the database for ‘ethnic profiling’, but the implications for the use of categories 
are left open. Specifically, is the use of racial categories in this case a facilitator of or a 
protection against racism? Underlying the diffuse but nagging unease about race and 
the NDNAD are a number of different accounts of why racialization is a concern. 
Sometimes these are clearly defined, but often they are bundled together. However, 
Table 2.2 is an attempt to differentiate the range of positions (and their assumptions 
and implications) by outlining six ideal-type approaches to the ‘problem’ of the 
database. Tellingly, each approach models its stance on a pre-existing controversy 
and, as the table illustrates, can imply different positions on the collection and storage 
of DNA by race category.
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As Table 2.2 suggests, different ways of framing the NDNAD as a problem 
imply different approaches to the use of race categories. In some cases the use and 
discussion of data in racialized form is itself deemed problematic, while in others it 
allows for the monitoring of injustice in the operation of the database and the wider 
criminal justice system.
Whatever its merits, the collection and use of racialized monitoring data has 
happened alongside deepening race inequalities not just in the composition of the 
NDNAD but across the criminal justice system – for example, in the ethnic composition 
of the prison population. When data on, for example, the mass representation of 
young black men on the NDNAD is discussed, it is often in ways that avoid rather 
than address the fundamental dynamics underlying these inequalities and chiefly as 
part of a narrow discussion of the ‘fair’ administration of bureaucratic procedures. I 
have already discussed one dimension of this – a preoccupation with the limitations 
of the available data, the incommensurability of different official datasets and the 
inappropriateness of the current systems of categories and modes of categorization. 
In arenas such as the NDNAD Strategy Board and Ethics Advisory Group to date, 
consideration of inequality and systemic racism has largely been delayed in favour of 
The problem is … It is like/ part of another 
probem of …




abuse of police powers allows us to see that young 
black men are targeted by 
the police
state power over the citizen the database state illustrates the potential in 
the database for unfairness 
to individuals and invasion 
of personal privacy
criminalisation of minorities institutional racism reveals the dynamics of a 
process whereby minority 
groups are placed under 
‘genetic surveillance’
negative stereotyping of 
minorities by associating 
them with criminality
previous controversies about 
the selective reporting of 
racialised crime statistics
itself contributes to 
stereotyping when put into 
the public domain
the use of samples for 
research into group 
differences and ‘ethnic 
profiling’
scientific racism allows profiling to take place
samples are put to secondary 
use, e.g. in research into 
group differences and ethnic 
profiling without permission 
of the donor
biomedical ethics is problematic because 
donor has had no say in if/
how s/he is racialised or 
analysed
Table 2.2. The ‘Problem’ of a Racialized NDNAD
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discussions of the limitations of the current data (Ethics Group 2009). The call is for 
a consistent approach to categories across the criminal justice system (using the 16+1 
schema) and for the use of self-identification as the standard means of classification.
Thus, discussion of the racialization of the database is often postponed in favour 
of a discussion of inconsistent categories. There is a related preoccupation with 
potential inaccuracies in the estimates of black representation on the database that 
circulate in public debate. A Working Group established in 2007 by the Strategy 
Board to ‘take forward work on producing a more robust estimate of young black 
men on the NDNAD’ is yet to reach any conclusions (National Police Improvement 
Agency 2009b: 10).
Alternatively, spokespeople for the government and the NPIA have sought to 
move the focus on the NDNAD to a wider discussion of statistics on race and the 
criminal justice system. See, for example, this paper exchange between the government 
and the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee when it reported on 
‘Young Black People and the Criminal Justice System’ (2007):
Recommendation 66: That the Government should conduct a study to 
determine the implications of the presence of such a high proportion of the 
black male population on the National DNA  Database (para 319, Main 
Report; para 75, Conclusions and recommendations).
Response: The Government agrees. It also states:
‘… while data suggests that any bias in proportionality reflected in the 
criminal justice system as a whole and not because of inherent bias in 
National DNA Database processes, we must ensure that this is the case.’ 
(Secretary of State for Justice 2007: 40)
Once again, racialized data itself becomes the focus of discussion rather than the 
racism it reveals. While the NDNAD Strategy Board and Ethics Advisory Group 
seek consistency of categories, the Home Office and the NPIA seek consistency 
of unequal outcomes across policing, courts and prison data. This explains the 
importance attached to the comparison of the number of profiles on the NDNAD 
and racialized data on ‘arrest events’ as evidence that there is no ‘bias’ in the system 
(House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee 2009: 83). A similar approach 
allows the portrayal of the database as a neutral component of the criminal justice 
system: ‘The NDNAD has no ability in itself to be discriminatory as it is a repository 
for information supplied. Where there is disproportionate data, this is the result of 
criminal justice system and police processes that determine whose information is 
obtained for recording’ (National Police Improvement Agency 2009b: 11).
This is, however, an approach that could be applied to any pressure point in the 
criminal justice system without allowing analysis of institutional racism. In particular, 
it allows little consideration of how collection of DNA is itself a driver of inequality 
across the criminal justice system by stigmatizing minorities, placing minorities under 
greater surveillance and deepening the implications of existing disproportionate use 
of police powers against minorities.
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Discussion: Categories of Identity and Identification
The case of the NDNAD shows us that the development, use and contestation of 
formal systems of ethnic and racial categorization, and the ways in which these 
systems come up against, enrol and enrage the public are fruitful topics for analysis. 
Categorization tells us much about the context and consequences of new genetic 
accounts of human similarity and difference.
Crucial here are questions of when, how and why categories and conventions 
of categorization are established and maintained. Both genetics and race/ethnicity 
have global currency and local articulations. The case of the racialization of the 
NDNAD and the controversies it has prompted highlights the role of the nation 
state as a key frame for political debate. It reveals a politics of racialized knowledge 
that is inseparable from a wider, shifting constellation of representations, debates 
and policies about race, ethnicity and racism. The science of forensic testing, the 
management of databases and the notion that someone’s ethnicity can be revealed 
genetically are transnational but the biopolitics, the approach to collection and use of 
racialized data, and the terms of controversy belong very much to a particular social 
and political setting – Britain at the start of the twenty-first century.
While this sphere of the new genetics may be more prone to prioritizing national 
variations over international considerations, other supposedly universal, transnational 
forms of genomic science also reach accommodations with national regimes of 
categorization by, for example, routinely using national census categories to explore 
group differences (Martin et al. 2007). This compromise between local, national and 
transnational factors is not without its problems. Thus, for example, Suarez-Kurtz 
(2005) reports how differences between ‘white’ and ‘black’ drug responses identified 
by U.S. researchers have no equivalent in Brazil. However, as Martin et al. (2007) 
show, there are compelling reasons for genetic researchers to persevere with census 
categories:
The scientists who used the UK’s ‘official’ classifications of race/ethnicity 
valued these because they were felt to have proven practicability and 
portability – i.e., they had political legitimacy; they were acceptable to the 
public; they were easy to use; they permitted comparisons between studies; 
and they facilitated the translation of research findings into clinical practice. 
(Martin et al. 2007: 6)
These priorities can seem troubling because they seem to confound any clear 
distinction between the biological and the social (Skinner 2007). But much 
contemporary research on race/ethnicity and genetics avoids or actively objects to 
assertions that there is a biological reality to race. This mix of ‘socially constructed’ 
categories and genetics is highly pertinent in the case of the NDNAD. The debates 
about categories and the database have a particular character and urgency because 
they centre on genetic data, yet DNA is implicated in the politics of race, racism 
and criminal justice without there being any necessary presumption that criminal 
behaviour has a genetic basis. As we have also seen, it is difficult to disentangle the 
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collection and use of racialized data for operational or scientific purposes from the 
collection and use of racialized data for management and policy-making purposes: 
monitoring data is connected to profiling data and is by no means subservient to it.
Apparent slippages between discussion of race/ethnicity in social or biological 
terms are often characterized as the result of a lack of thought or care on the part of 
experts. Jonathan Kahn, for example, argues that in U.S. forensics, race categorization 
is deemed a common-sense process that requires no special expertise – ‘race is seen 
as easy and obvious; DNA is seen as difficult and complex’ (2009: 348). Others see 
in genetic research a process of bracketing off the complexities and contradictions 
of racial categorization – what Smart et al. (2008) in their discussion of biomedical 
genetics term an ‘ostrich tendency’– being aware of the problems with categories but 
persisting in using them anyway (see also Fullwiley 2007). But this is only part of the 
story: the NDNAD example reveals a lively politics of knowledge preoccupied with 
the heterogeneous, plastic and provisional character of categories. This involves both 
life science and social science expertise at a variety of different levels from the collection 
and interpretation of samples through to the contestation of policy and practice. 
Rather than a lack of care, we can witness a difficult renegotiation of relationships 
between natural science and social science, and also of relationships between experts, 
‘the public’ and policy makers. Expertise is required to align scientific and political 
projects, manage populations and enrol the public in knowledge production.
In practice, race categories can never be other than hybrid boundary objects 
encompassing or standing for a number of different qualities that defy easy distinctions 
between folk and expert, biology and society, science and policy, and the national and 
the universal. As such, they allow activity that spans the laboratory, the police station 
and the parliamentary committee. As I suggested at the start of the chapter, we can 
learn much by placing discussion of this issue in a wider analysis of information 
systems. Some of the disquiet over inconsistencies in the use of racial and ethnic 
categories seems misplaced since the problems highlighted are those endemic to the 
operation of categories in any large-scale information infrastructure. But while all 
systems must manage ‘heterogeneous definitions and goals’ (Bowker and Star 1999: 
148) through the interplay of the vernacular and the formal, the practical politics 
of race categories are continually exposed. There are particular, recursive issues of 
stabilization and standardization. The work put into sustaining these systems remains 
more provisional and visible than in other cases. Race categories certainly have not 
achieved what Bowker and Star term ‘infrastructural inversion’ (34) – running so 
smoothly that they become invisible and unquestionable.
Yet, for all this, a discussion of ‘race’ can apparently take place despite the 
transparent artifice involved in sorting people into groups and the incommensurability 
of different systems of categories and categorization. In the biopolitics of racialized 
data, the messy, disputed present is often contrasted with an ideal of the eventual 
convergence and stabilization of race category systems. However, as the NDNAD 
case study shows, this endpoint is unlikely to be reached. We are likely to continue to 
see the coexistence of different systems and these systems will continue to be disputed 
and debated. Experts, policy makers and laypeople will continue to use categories 
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while also doubting their validity and reliability. For all sides, categories can be at 
various points open to scrutiny or taken for granted, legitimate or illegitimate – at 
points categories matter or do not matter. But the supposed chronic ‘problems’ of 
race/ethnicity categories are integral to their operation.
As Tutton and Levitt rightly argue, while many accounts of the politics of the 
new genetics focus on the ways in which identities are freely expressed or reclaimed 
through DNA, consideration of forensic databases adds a different dimension to 
discussion of identification:
If we think of this as a form of ‘genetic citizenship’ or ‘biological citizenship’ 
then it clearly has very different features than the celebrated cases of the 
self-organizing citizens who form support and advocacy organizations, for 
whom biological knowledge is a source of their self-identification. This is 
not about self-definition but definition by the state; a social sorting into the 
suspect and non-suspect for the operational purposes of policing. (2009: 14)
Tutton and Levitt connect the collection of forensic DNA to the control and 
management of populations. Citizenship here is about identification by (or the 
obligation to identify oneself to) the state. The ‘donors’ of DNA in this case have a 
different relationship to their samples, records and the categories in which they are 
placed than, for example, donors to medical biobanks or users of genetic ancestry 
testing services. Forensic DNA samples are typically taken and used without the 
conventions, permissions and safeguards that surround other forms of donation. The 
U.K. is one of a number of European jurisdictions to stipulate that donor permission 
is not required when taking samples from people convicted or suspected of a crime. 
Other countries (such as Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, the Republic of Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) do claim some form of informed consent is needed for samples 
to be collected, but it is open to question how ‘informed’ or ‘voluntary’ consent can 
be in these circumstances (Machado and Silva 2009: 337).
The distinction between freely giving consenting DNA and having no choice 
but to provide it is important. In this area, however, even ‘volunteering’ DNA is 
not without constraint or compulsion. In September 2009 the UK Border Agency 
announced a pilot scheme to use genetic testing and isotope analysis to confirm the 
origins of people claiming political asylum. The systematic taking of samples of the 
tissue of people seeking the right of settlement in the country clearly took notions 
of biocitizenship in new directions and immediately provoked a hostile political and 
scientific response. But we should also acknowledge that a far more established and 
commonplace practice is for applicants for residence (often following legal advice) to 
‘choose’ to send their DNA to commercial ancestry and/or paternity testing services 
to support their identity and relationship claims.
Similar ambiguities lurk in the discussion of how DNA is racialized. For some 
critics of the NDNAD, the current arrangement of police officers deciding in which 
ethnic category to place a donor’s sample is taken as primary evidence of the ways in 
which the system bears down on the individual. A move to the 16+1 categories and 
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self-identification is seen as providing greater reliability (by allowing comparison with 
other racialized datasets), greater validity (as more meaningful measure of ethnicity) 
and is deemed intrinsically more ethical. It is, however, open to question whether 
giving donors the right (or obligation) to categorize themselves equates with a lack 
of constraint. Any move by those managing the database towards self-identification 
will, on its own, do nothing to tackle the structural inequalities in its operation.
There is a general point here. Self-identification seems a poor substitute for 
voluntary donation and/or rights over the way in which our data is used once it is on 
the database. Self-identification categories suggest a benign version of biocitizenship 
in which identities are freely expressed or reclaimed. However, this does not 
adequately consider the extent to which lay understandings and categorizations are 
themselves constrained and managed. Categories do not just reflect existing identities, 
they reproduce and reinforce them. When categories and categorization have become 
part of mundane organizational practice and everyday experience, as they have in 
contemporary Britain, people may have little choice but to choose to place themselves 
in a category. The messy, micro and expressive dimensions of categorization facilitate 
rather than frustrate the management of information and people. As Star wrote 
early in her exploration of information systems, ‘the contingencies of action always 
shape even the most abstractly represented tasks’ but also ‘tasks that appear to be the 
product of individual minds are in fact distributed and collective’ (Star 1992: 396).
For some of its supporters, a move towards self-identification places race/
ethnicity firmly in the social realm and removes any links between genetics and race. 
But here too there is a paradox. The self-identification technique of racial and ethnic 
classification is now common across the new genomics, notably amongst medical 
researchers and pharmacogeneticists who consider racial groups to have distinct, 
genetically-based characteristics. This move to self-identification is driven in part 
by the evident unreliability of other techniques of categorization. As some forensic 
researchers have already argued, citizens’ self-identification may be a better guide to 
‘true genetic ancestry’ than the classificatory judgments of police officers (Lowe et 
al. 2001).
Identity is a continually ambiguous term used to make sense of external labelling 
and subjective experience, and a sense of social location plays a pivotal role in the 
biopolitics of race and genetics (Skinner 2006). These ambiguities can make ‘identity’ 
a powerful tool to reconcile (apparently plastic) personal biographies and (apparently 
fixed) official and scientific categories of group difference. Changing political 
priorities mean that for the state, self-identification is not only a means to assemble 
racialized data but often the primary research objective (Tutton 2007). In a situation 
where the recursive problems of information systems cannot just be confined to the 
technical realm, ‘identity’ also becomes a way of glossing the contradictions of (and 
managing the politics of) racialized data.
The NDNAD is a case in which the classification of DNA by race features in 
ways that seem to confound simple positions for or against racialization. Neither a 
refusal to collect racialized data nor the existence of that data seems on their own to 
address the normalized, systemic racism at the heart of the system. Certainly, the 
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rights to the expression of cultural identity and to bureaucratic transparency seem 
easier concessions for the state to grant than the right to equal treatment by the 
criminal justice system.
Also of significance here are the roles that the discussion of racialized data and the 
inevitable accompanying discussion of the limitations of categories and categorization 
play in politics and policy making. Despite awareness of patterns of racial/ethnic 
membership of the NDNAD, discussion of racialized official data can also allow race 
inequality and racism to be hidden in plain sight. There is merit in borrowing here 
from David Gillborn’s analysis of racism in the British education system (2008). 
Gillborn has very effectively considered how and why government and other public 
institutions collect and use racialized data for reasons other than a commitment 
to combat racism. He convincingly argues that the collection and use of data on 
educational attainment can obscure rather than reveal the realities of continuing 
structured racial disadvantage. For example, he critiques the preoccupation of 
academics and policy makers with differences in aggregate educational performance 
between various minority groups and small changes over time between groups in 
their educational outcomes. This ‘gap talk’ ‘fails to recognise the scale of the present 
inequality and how relatively insignificant the fluctuations are’ (2008: 65). Gillborn 
argues that this approach allows business as usual within the educational system 
and precludes consideration of historically institutionalized inequalities. At the very 
least, this analysis might lead us to ask what does racial/ethnic monitoring of the 
collection and use of forensic DNA records achieve? Is this about the elimination of 
what Gillborn (2008: 64), using Roithmayr’s phrase, terms ‘locked-in inequality’ or 
the management or justification of that inequality?
Notes
1. I would like to thank Adam Bostanci, Greg Elmer, Stephan Feuchtwang, Richard 
Rottenburg, Vincenzo Scalia, Katharina Schramm, Julia Selman-Ayetey and an 
anonymous reader for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter. I would also 
like to acknowledge the work of Julia Bailey whose contribution to the policy research 
discussed in this chapter was funded by the Anglia Ruskin University Undergraduate 
Researcher Scheme.
2. Interesting in this respect is the Innocence Project (www.innocenceproject.org), a non-
profit legal organization in the U.S.A. dedicated to exonerating wrongly convicted people 
through the use of DNA evidence. The Innocence Project has, however, also highlighted 
miscarriages of justice based on ‘unvalidated or improper forensic science’.
3. Established in 1998, the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CORDIS) competes for 
the title of the largest database. However, the NDNAD undoubtedly covers the largest 
proportion of its population of any national forensic database.
4. The campaigning group NO2ID is in terms of membership and active support probably 
the most successful new social movement in the U.K. in recent times.
5. As Lazer (2004) outlines, U.S. forensic DNA databases are growing rapidly. The criteria 
for taking and storage of DNA varies between states (Lazer and Meyer 2004), but many 
now keep DNA records of people arrested and not just convicted of felonies.
6. That they consistently fail to meet.
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In this chapter I explore the changing connections between ‘race’ and ‘kinship’.1 Both are realms in which identities, individual and collective, are constituted. Both 
are realms where ideas about genetics (and ‘blood’) have been and continue to be 
central. I argue that a key relationship between race and kinship, evident especially 
but not only in the Western world, is based on what I call race-kinship congruity. 
This is the idea that people who are related by consanguineous kinship should also 
have a ‘racial’ appearance that is congruent with – explicable in terms of – their 
kinship connections. The idea is based on longstanding notions of shared ‘substance’ 
(blood, genes) that are common to racialized and kinship thinking in many areas of 
the world. Race-kinship congruity has recently been unsettled by new technologies 
of reproduction, including the biotechnology of assisted reproduction and the 
bureaucratic technology of transnational adoption: both have the potential to undo 
the assumption that the ‘substances’ underlying racialized appearance and kinship 
should flow in parallel along genealogical routes. But, I argue, this unsettling does 
not have predictable or unidirectional consequences: the way is opened both for more 
deterministic reckonings of identity, based on simple notions of biology and genes, 
and for more flexible reckonings of identity, themselves deriving in part from the 
unsettling of the meaning of ‘biology’ and ‘genes’.
Race-kinship congruity has been a variable construct, historically and 
geographically; it has offered different possibilities for thinking about human 
relatedness and racial identity. While new technologies of reproduction tend to 
focus attention on genetic connections, they represent a new assemblage which 
reshapes existing ideas about race and kinship, rather than a radical departure from 
them. While it is legitimate to say that we have entered an era of biologization, 
geneticization, biosociality and biological citizenship (Franklin 2001; Gibel Azoulay 
2006; Lippman 1991; Rabinow 1992; Rose 2007), and perhaps also to fear that 
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this leads to greater biological determinism in reckoning kinship, race, identity and 
personhood (Lippman 1991; Nelkin and Lindee 1995), it is also helpful to mark 
the continuities with previous modes of thinking and to recognize the persistent 
coexistence of determinist with less determinist modes of thinking.
People appropriate and deploy scientific knowledge in varied ways that are more 
and less deterministic. Biology, while being subject to representation as the underlying 
key to everything, is now also potentially understandable as less determinate and more 
‘cultural’, due precisely to the technological manipulations to which it is subject and 
to the increasing perception, by Western publics at least, that science is not outside 
society (Franklin 2000, 2003; Pálsson 2008; Strathern 1992; Wade 2002, 2007).
Race and Kinship
Racial thinking is based on a complex and shifting set of ideas about certain aspects 
of physical appearance, linked to descent and the inheritance of ‘natural’ and 
‘cultural’ traits. These ideas have developed within a specific history of originally 
European and then global colonialism – as opposed to the ideas being simply one 
mode among a universal set of human ways of thinking about difference. Racial 
thinking is thinking about appearance, inherited substance and behaviour in relation 
to specific categories which emerge out of colonialism. Racial categories are the 
product of historical, political and economic contexts – they are social constructs in 
the usual terminology. These categories have shown remarkable historical resilience 
and, with multiple variations, have divided people into a small number of groups – 
roughly, Africans, Europeans, Native Americans, Asians and perhaps Australasians. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the categories correspond broadly to the division (originally 
by Europeans) of the world into continents. When I talk about race, I refer to this 
complex of ideas and categories. I am talking about ideas about human difference, 
not about ‘real’ biological differences, although I am aware that recent debates in 
genomics and human variation have re-awakened the idea that continental geography 
corresponds to human genetic variation in ways that some refer to as ‘racial’ (see 
Koenig, Lee and Richardson 2008).
Racial thinking has strong links to Euro-American (and probably other) styles of 
thinking about kinship that are based on notions of ‘blood’ and the transmission of 
‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ traits. If the key (although not the only) mode of establishing 
kinship connections is thought to be via substances, such as blood, passed on through 
sexual reproduction, then it is clear that race, as defined above, is deeply implicated 
in kinship and vice versa (Haraway 1997: 309, n. 1; Nelson 2008; Palmié 2007; 
Williams 1995). Kinship is important in order to understand race because racial 
identities imply notions of inheritance, both ‘natural’ and ‘cultural’, for which the 
most crucial means of transmission is the family, at least in Euro-American kinship 
(Wade 2002: Chapter 4).
In explaining mechanisms of heredity, Aristotle said that ‘in nature, like 
produces like’. This underlying principle of continuity, which linked appearance (but 
also character) to sexual reproduction and kinship, was, for Aristotle, patrilineal and 
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connected father to child. It could be modified by other factors (maternal blood in 
the womb, diet, climate), which also impinged on the process of (re)production and 
explained why a child was not identical to his or her father (Wade 2002: 47). The 
basic idea that offspring should resemble their parents, while they may also differ 
from them, has been extremely durable in Western culture (Strathern 1992: 11–
30) and indeed more widely (Astuti, Solomon and Carey 2004). Indeed, Herzfeld’s 
comment that ‘the idea that physical resemblance (the semiotic property of iconicity) 
reveals the presence of common blood predated the popularization of DNA-based 
metaphors and is likely to have facilitated that process’ (2007: 319) barely hints at 
the historical depth of this idea.
In Latin America, the concept is recognized in such sayings as ‘de tal palo, tal 
astilla’ (from such a tree, such a splinter) and ‘hijo de tigre sale pintado’ (the son of a 
tiger comes out striped). In English, it is revealed in the phrase ‘like father, like son’ 
and in reference to a child as ‘a chip off the old block’. The simplicity of such stock 
phrases hides the coexistence of both similarity and difference. No child looks exactly 
like a parent, so particular perceived resemblances are picked out in order to build 
relationships and for strategic purposes (Marre and Bestard 2009).
These ideas about family resemblance are independent of race, but when race is a 
factor in reckoning identity for a person and assigning value in a society, kinship can 
become racialized. This is especially the case when sexual relationships are mediated 
by racial hierarchy, as they have been all over the Americas (Hodes 1999; Wade 
2009) and elsewhere, such that sexual reproduction that crosses the racial boundaries 
of a given society becomes highly charged with meanings. People then become 
very interested in the racialized appearance of a child in relation to its parents. The 
underlying assumption is that the racialized phenotype of the child can ultimately be 
explained by its parentage – i.e., race-kinship congruity. But the same parents can 
give birth to siblings who are quite varied in terms of racialized appearance, so this is 
not a mechanical process of reckoning.
In addition, the link between appearance and social identity is a profoundly 
cultural and historical one. Fields, for example, comments on ‘the well-known 
anomaly of American racial convention that considers a white woman capable of 
giving birth to a black child but denies that a black woman can give birth to a white 
child’ (Fields 1982: 149). For reasons linked to the particular character of the North 
American colonial system and the subsequent emergence of the U.S. nation, children 
who are the product of unions between parents assigned to different ‘races’ are 
allocated to the subordinate racial category. This creates a clear boundary between 
‘black’ and ‘white’ and maintains a system of race-kinship congruity in which it is 
deemed ‘that “black” people ought to have “black” ancestors and “white” people have 
“white” ones’ (Palmié 2007: 213). This is a version of race-kinship congruity that 
assumes strict lineality.
In Latin America ‘mixed-race’ people are not necessarily assigned to the racial 
class of the socially subordinate parent: mixedness, or being mestizo, is a recognized 
or even predominant identity. Race-kinship congruity takes a more flexible form 
in that a straightforward continuity of racial identity between parents and child is 
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not assumed. While two parents who are ‘black’ (whether by self-identification or 
ascribed identity) would expect and be expected to have a child that is also ‘black’, 
parents who are ‘mestizo’ by some reckoning (and there are lots of possibilities of 
identity and appearance within that broad category) could give birth to children 
who looked more or less ‘moreno’ (brown) or ‘claro’ (light) or, to use the Mexican 
term, ‘güero’ (white, blond). Within a sibling set, one child might be the ‘negro’ 
(black) or ‘moreno’ of the family and another the ‘blanco’. In Colombia I found that 
a darker skinned child might be nicknamed ‘el negro’: children of different families 
with this same nickname might look very different from each other, but they were 
all the darker skinned child of the family (Wade 1993). Differences in skin tone and 
racialized appearance make marked differences to how people feel they were treated 
in their families, as Moreno Figueroa (2008) shows in detail for Mexican women.
Within this variability, race-kinship congruity operates in a specific way: the 
racialized appearance of children, while variable, is still held to be explicable in terms 
of a child’s immediate parentage and its deeper genealogy. People are highly sensitive 
to racialized ancestry as perceived in appearance. Relatives of a newborn are interested 
to see cómo salió el bebé (how did the baby come out; i.e., what it looked like in racial 
terms, especially how dark- or light-skinned it was). In Hispanic America the well-
known phrase ‘¿y tu abuela dónde está?’ (‘And your grandmother, where is she?’) is 
used to deflate the pretensions of a person whose appearance is perceived (to the local 
eye) to indicate some indigenous or black ancestry, yet who is denying such ancestry 
or perhaps deriding indigenous or black people. Interestingly, as in the U.S. case, it is 
the (grand)mother who is seen to pass on the traces of blackness or indigeneity. This 
gestures to the common American theme of sexual relations (or abuses) occurring, 
or having occurred in the past, most commonly between white men and black or 
indigenous women. Race-kinship congruity in the Americas has regional variants – 
more and less deterministic – which share common traits.
Changing Connections between Race and Kinship
The changing terrain of connections between race and kinship demonstrates that 
race-kinship congruity is not an ahistorical construct but varies according to context, 
as we have already seen for different regional contexts in the Americas.
In the late nineteenth century, when race was defined by European and North 
American scientists in terms of biological ‘types’, there was a strict relationship between 
race and kinship. For this era, Banton (1987) identifies a shift away from older notions 
of race as lineage, when a racial group was conceived as the descendants of a founding 
ancestor, who may have been phenotypically varied. The key idea was common 
ancestry. By the nineteenth century, says Banton, concepts of race had shifted towards 
the idea of racial type, in which certain aspects of physical appearance and other 
biological characteristics were the key. Yet there is a clear continuity across this shift 
in the sense that these racialized phenotypical features were seen as being transmitted 
through descent, albeit that, by the very late nineteenth century, descent itself was 
beginning to be seen in more limited biological terms of a ‘germ plasm’, a determining 
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essence transmitted by sexual reproduction (Wade 2002: 59). Still, descent could be 
deduced from appearance; phenotype was a clue to inherited racial essence.
Racial type entailed ideals of purity. Individuals of a given ‘race’ should intermarry 
and procreate with others of their type. Some scientists at this time treated racial 
type as equivalent to biological species, despite abundant evidence that interracial sex 
produced fertile offspring. Sidestepping this evidence, it was said that ‘miscegenation’ 
in the long run led to degeneration and weakness. In terms of kinship, then, 
families of one racial type should produce offspring of the same racial type. Race-
kinship congruity was a strict norm and was understood in terms of the boundaries 
established by the concept of racial type. Eugenic policies could improve racial type 
by encouraging beneficial matches (and hygienic environments), but mate selection 
should operate within the boundaries of racial type (Kevles 1995). Departure from 
this congruity of race and kinship – resulting in ‘mixed-race’ individuals – provoked 
moral disapprobation and anxiety (Stoler 1992).
The historically specific character of constructs of race-kinship congruity 
is revealed in Stoler’s work. She shows how in the Dutch East Indies colonial 
administrators and governors were concerned not just with sexual relations between 
whites and natives, which they saw as contaminating for the whites and productive 
of problematic offspring, but also with other relations of intimacy, such as white 
children’s native nursemaids, who might also breastfeed their mistresses’ babies. 
The quasifamilial closeness of the native women and the ingestion of their milk by 
white children were seen as potentially threatening and contaminating. ‘Mixture’ 
could occur through other channels than sex. Kinship embraced varied forms of 
substantial connectedness (Carsten 2001) and race-kinship congruity thus involved 
policing several dimensions of ‘cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 2007). In short, there 
were a number of modes of reckoning race through kinship. In Lamarckian style, 
biology itself was shaped, in part, by behaviour (by leading morally ‘proper’ lives, 
white people could pass on physical purity to their children) and this gave a less 
deterministic quality to biology than we might assume from our current perspective.
In Latin America in the same period, race-kinship congruity took a particular 
form. Elites generally practised a close correspondence between race and kinship, 
maintaining their own purity, as they had long done. Yet ideas about race, purveyed 
by intellectuals in the context of pondering on the fate of the nation, tended to avoid 
the biological determinism of scientific racism and ventured into a more cultural 
conception of race, developing the Lamarckian tendencies that also existed in Euro-
American science (Stepan 1991). Perceived differences within national populations – 
between indigenous, white, black and mixed people – might be talked about in terms 
of culture, ‘spirit’, ‘soul’, history and tradition (De la Cadena 2000). Faced with the 
undeniably mixed character of their national populations, these intellectuals tried to 
dissociate kinship from race by talking about the latter in terms of cultural heritage. 
Their nations’ departures from the scientific racial norm of race-kinship congruity 
could thus be cast in a more benign light. However, ‘culture’ in this idiom could 
retain a quasi-natural aspect, especially when phrased as a ‘spirit’ or ‘soul’ that was 
seen as virtually innate.
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Nevertheless, race and kinship remained closely linked. In Mexico and some 
Andean countries, national icons were made of the figure of the mestizo or the cholo or 
chola (a term indicating a person of indigenous and European descent). The kinship 
that nationalism so frequently invokes as a unifying trope was phrased in terms of 
racial mixture (Appelbaum, Macpherson and Rosemblatt 2003). Meanwhile, as 
Caulfield (2000) shows for early twentieth-century Brazil, the ‘honour’ of white 
women was in practice protected by white men (for example, in the courts), who 
were hostile to the fracturing of a straightforward version of race-kinship congruity 
that race mixture threatened.
During the twentieth century, and especially after the Second World War, this 
Latin American move away from understanding race as a biological reality towards 
seeing it as a cultural reality became standard, in the West at least. Overt reference 
to biology and even to the term ‘race’, which carried connotations of previous 
scientific racial typologies, tended to be replaced by reference to ‘ethnicity’ and 
cultural difference – although, in fact, the concept of race retained a significant 
place in the life sciences as a description of human biological variation (Lieberman 
and Reynolds 1996; Reardon 2005: Chapter 2). Meanwhile, culture could become 
quasi-naturalized and essentialist and could still be deployed to discriminate against 
the same populations once defined in biologically racial terms (Balibar 1991; Gilroy 
1987; Stolcke 1995). In this shift towards ‘cultural racism’, the congruence of race 
and kinship has apparently been undone. If difference and belonging are to be defined 
in terms of cultural features, then it should not matter what one’s procreative partner 
or one’s offspring look like ‘racially’ or where that appearance derives from in terms 
of ideas about ancestry. Yet it is readily evident that such things continue to matter 
to many people. Ideas about ‘racial’ ancestry and appearance – and the way these are 
conjugated in relations of kinship and family – continue to be very important, as 
many ‘mixed-race’ people attest (Olumide 2002; Parker and Song 2001).
In addition, culture cannot be separated so easily from ideas about biology or, 
more generally, ‘human nature’ (a phrase which nicely equivocates between the 
biological and the cultural). Concepts of race have never been only about biology, 
least of all during the era of scientific racism. If, in the eighteenth century, Linnaeus 
produced descriptions of races that indiscriminately included what we would now 
call biological and cultural features (Wade 2002: 55), it is also true that in the late 
nineteenth-century era of anthropometrical descriptions of racial types, there was 
much attention paid to the moral qualities of the ‘races’. During the twentieth 
century, biology and culture became increasingly separated as analytic concepts, as 
anthropologists and others began to challenge scientific racism and its biological 
determinism, and to see human biological difference as relatively unimportant 
compared to cultural differences. Yet biology and culture continue to be entangled 
in everyday life, in large part through the medium of the family, where biological 
and cultural connections are forged together and where distinctions between 
what a person is through birth and what he or she is through upbringing become 
blurred (Edwards 2000). As Hall says of the current concepts of ethnicity which are 
apparently only about ‘culture’, the ‘articulation of difference with Nature (biology 
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and the genetic) is present, but displaced though kinship and intermarriage’ (2000: 
223, emphasis in original).
In the last few decades, ‘nature’, ‘biology’ and ‘kinship’ have all been undergoing 
changes, prompted by biotechnological advances in the fields of genetics and assisted 
reproduction, and new forms of family arrangements such as transnational adoption 
and gay and lesbian families.2 This raises the question of whether patterns of race-
kinship congruity change as a result. The impact of DNA sequencing on scientific 
and popular concepts of race (and on the relationship between scientific and lay 
concepts) has been hotly debated (Brodwin 2002; Koenig, Lee and Richardson 
2008; Pálsson 2007: Chapter 7) and there is uncertainty about the long-term effects 
of genomic technologies. When we come to look at other technologies – assisted 
conception and transnational adoption – the same uncertainty prevails. There seem 
to be ways in which these new modes of kinship reckoning serve as arenas in which 
existing popular ideas about race are not only reiterated but also renaturalized, and in 
which these ideas about race shape and constrain kinship connections. But there also 
seem to be ways in which existing ideas about race are challenged, destabilized and 
even denaturalized, and in which ideas about kinship are also reshaped.
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs)
Much of the data on social contexts in which ideas about race intersect with practices 
of assisted conception seems to show that the underlying logic of race-kinship 
congruity is reinforced in these contexts. Thompson (2003) notes generally that 
‘phenotypic and other descriptors of race and ethnicity are one of the few things that 
form a common differentiating, kinship-conferring and legitimising organisational 
principle for the world’s egg, sperm and embryo markets’. Campbell (2007) found 
evidence of donor-recipient matching practices for assisted conception in Spain, the 
U.K. and Norway, which used commonsense categories of race as a criterion.
In Spain, for example, the phenotypes of egg donors and receivers are classified 
and matched in terms of skin colour, eye colour, facial features, hair colour and 
texture, body size and blood group (Bestard 2002). This is to accord with Spanish 
law (Law 35/1988, Article 6, paragraph 5), which states that ‘Donors should have 
the maximum phenotypic and immunological similarities and the maximum 
possibilities of compatibility with the receiver and her family environment’ (cited 
in Bestard 2002). For at least some time, the IVF clinic under study by Bestard and 
his colleagues used a commonsense threefold racial classification of black, white and 
yellow, although this was adapted as demand grew. National legislation in Spain 
establishes the data that are to be collected on donors and users of ARTs, and these 
include physical data such as skin colour (pale or brown) and ‘race’.3
In the U.K. too, racial matching was for a time officially advised, although the 
language used slipped between ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’. In October 2002 the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) amended section 3.18 of the fifth 
edition of its Code of Practice to read as follows:
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Where treatment is provided for a man and woman together, centres should 
strive as far as possible to match the physical characteristics and ethnic 
background of the donor [of gametes] to those of the infertile partner (or in 
the case of embryo donation, to both partners) unless there are good reasons 
for departing from this … For example, those seeking treatment should not 
be treated with gametes provided by a donor of a different racial origin 
unless there are compelling reasons for doing so.4
In the sixth edition of the Code (2003), the word ‘racial’ was dropped, while in 
the seventh edition (2007), all reference to ethnicity and race was removed, leaving 
an injunction to avoid any harm, ‘physical, psychological or medical’, to either the 
recipient or child.5 These changes suggest a desire to publicly avoid policies that 
might smack of eugenics. Nevertheless, donors are advised that the information form 
they are required to fill in may ask for their ‘ethnic group’ as well as their ‘physical 
characteristics’.6
This uneven tendency to match reproducers with gamete donors according to 
perceived or self-identified racial categories is not always the case. Sometimes, there are 
clear strategies of whitening involved, which suggest a desire to transform racialized 
identities towards an aesthetic norm of whiteness, as in longstanding practices of 
‘passing’ in the U.S.A. and whitening in Latin America. Nahman’s study of an Israeli 
IVF clinic shows that female clients often expressed a preference for light-skinned egg 
donors and ones without physical traits thought to be ‘too Jewish’ (Nahman 2006). 
This contrasts only in part with Kahn’s (2000: 133) finding that the ideal egg donor 
was thought to be an unmarried Jewish woman. Teman found that some Israeli 
couples using surrogate mothers voiced doubts about dark-skinned surrogates who, 
they feared, might physically darken the baby in the process of gestation (Teman 
2000; Wade 2002: 106–7). In the U.K. too, clinics reported in 2003 that some Asian 
and Middle Eastern women, whether living in or visiting the U.K., requested eggs 
from ‘white’ women and were able to receive them, despite the HFEA’s guideline 
at the time that a ‘compelling reason’ was needed to depart from ethnic matching 
(Sunday Times, 16 November 2003: 7). In such cases, couples can have a child that 
might, from an abstract, objective perspective, be classified as ‘mixed race’, without 
there being a ‘mixed race’ sexual or social relationship between the parents. It is also 
worth noting that these women requested white women’s eggs, whereas the same 
effect – from a mathematical point of view – could be achieved by requesting white 
men’s sperm. Gendered aspects of ART usage – linked to ideas about the need for 
secure paternity – doubtless cross-cut calculations about racialized appearance.7
Both racial matching and racial whitening (or purposive mismatching) occur: 
there is not ‘a consistent or paradigmatic operation for understanding contemporary 
racialisation in the context of assisted conception’ (Wiegman 2003: 315). Instead 
there appears to be a process of what Thompson (2005: 145) calls ‘strategic 
naturalisation’ (and, I would add, strategic culturalization) as people seek to build 
their own networks of kin and narratives about family and kin. This leads to uneven 
effects. On the one hand, notions of strict race-kinship congruity appear in almost 
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nineteenth-century form, requiring generational continuity of racial identity between 
parents and children. This is often phrased in terms of avoiding harm to the child: 
the assumption is that ‘racial mismatching’ within the family could lead to trauma. 
On the other hand, people are disrupting such strict genealogical lineality with a 
consumerist logic of individual choice (Faubion and Hamilton 2007). Race-kinship 
congruity appears in much more flexible – one might say Latin American – form, 
with a family containing people of varying racialized appearance. Even the underlying 
principle of race-kinship congruity is unsettled to some extent, because the racialized 
appearance of the child is, potentially, not readily explicable in terms of its assumed 
parentage – two dark-skinned parents may have a light-skinned child – although 
it is always possible to make recourse to ideas about the unexpected ways children 
come out. Of course, even these disruptions of congruity end up reinforcing racial 
hierarchies, as they reiterate the value of whiteness. As Herzfeld (2007: 316) says, 
‘kinship around the world remains entangled with the aftershocks of colonialism’. If 
white parents were to request gametes from black donors, that would be a different 
matter …
Such eventualities do occur, but they tend to be seen as cases of IVF that ‘go 
wrong’. They also reveal the unpredictable effects of ARTs on notions of kinship 
and race. Tyler looks at an IVF mixup that resulted in ‘black’ twins being born 
to a white mother in July 2002 in the U.K. In this case the mixup was due to a 
black man’s sperm being mistakenly used to fertilize the white woman’s ovum (Tyler 
2007). Newspaper coverage of the event was ambivalent. Some papers emphasized 
the ‘shock’ and ‘horror’ of the mixup and one expert was cited to the effect that the 
mother might have a case for suing the National Health Service for negligence and 
‘battery’ (i.e., an assault against her bodily integrity). Here the disjuncture between 
the racial identities of the mother and the children (identified as black, even though 
they could have been seen as ‘mixed race’) was emphasized in ways that obeyed a 
strictly lineal logic of race-kinship congruity. Other papers sympathized with the 
white mother’s reported attachment to the two babies that she had nurtured in her 
womb, also citing the fact that the legal mother is the woman who actually gives birth 
to a child. (This was before it had been established that the children had a genetic 
connection to the mother.) In this case the difference in racial identity was not seen as 
a block to creating some kind of family feeling, although this was always tempered by 
phrases to the effect that the mother loved the babies ‘even though’ they were black. 
In the end, the legal process decided that the legal mother was the white woman and 
the legal father was the black man. However, it was recommended that the white 
woman’s husband adopt the children and become the legal father. In the end, then, 
race-kinship congruity was fractured by the white woman’s genetic and gestational 
connection with the children: two white parents ended up with ‘black’ or perhaps 
‘mixed race’ children.
Tyler also collected data on the reactions to the mixup by local people in the city 
where she was doing fieldwork. She found that several of them – Asians, white British 
and mixed-race individuals – made recourse to ideas about ‘throwbacks’ and about 
how light-skinned parents could give birth to unexpectedly dark-skinned children. 
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This reaction shows people stretching the logic of race-kinship congruity to explain 
unexpected occurrences by reaching further up the putative genealogical tree for 
(hidden) evidence of blackness, but still explaining racialized appearance in terms of 
descent, and then using that logic to think about (if not explain) ‘accidents’ produced 
by new biotechnologies of reproduction which create very different modes of descent.
Transnational Adoption
In the U.K. and the U.S.A., at least, ethnic and racial matching in adoption has been 
the de facto if not the de jure position (Hollingsworth 1998; Macey 1995; Swize 
2002).8 The arguments defending this position usually cite the ‘best interests of the 
child’, asserting that nonwhite children (including those defined as ‘mixed race’ or 
‘dual heritage’) need a nonwhite family environment in order to cope successfully 
with a society such as the U.K., where racism is a problem. Twine found that many 
black people in the U.K. city of Leicester basically agreed with this position, arguing 
that black mothers empathized better with their black or mixed-race children than 
white mothers who had mixed-race children (Twine 2000).
Transnational adoption tends to break with this convention. A fast-growing 
trend, especially in the last three decades, the procedure generally places children 
from Asia (e.g., China and Korea) and Latin America into European and U.S. 
households. Such placements usually create a family which is ‘transracial’ in some 
sense. In the 1990s Russia and Eastern European countries emerged as major places 
of origin for international adoptees (Marre 2007; Selman 2002), creating families 
which are not usually ‘transracial’.
Transnational adoption that places nonwhite children with white parents 
breaks with the logic of race-kinship congruity: two white parents have a child that 
is nonwhite. Mixed-race unions challenge a strictly lineal version of race-kinship 
congruity, but they do so in predictable ways that reinforce the basic principle: the 
children are seen as having something – indeed, an equal share – from each parent 
inside them, in accordance with Western logics of cognatic kinship (Porqueres i Gené 
2001, 2007; Schneider 1980). The children’s racialized appearance still makes sense 
in terms of their parentage, even if they are often classified as ‘black’ in societies such 
as the U.K. and the U.S.A., thus creating a rupture between the social identity of the 
children and that of the nonblack parent (a rupture that is being challenged by the 
growing mixed-race movements in the U.K. and the U.S.A.). Transnational adoptive 
families create a still more challenging scenario.
Howell’s work on transnational adoption in Norway shows how adoptive 
families deal with this. On the one hand, the word ‘race’ and issues of racialized 
physical appearance and difference of origins are not mentioned: families work hard, 
through a process of ‘kinning’, to assimilate the children and turn them into fully-
fledged Norwegians who speak and act like Norwegians (Howell 2001). Howell 
argues that the children undergo a process of ‘transubstantiation’ in which their 
inner essence is changed, while only their appearance remains, which is often hardly 
commented on. ‘Unlike transformation, which changes the form as well as possible 
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content, transubstantiation effects a fundamental change while the appearance 
remains simultaneously unaltered. In the case of transnationally adopted children, 
their incorporation into their parents’ kin transcends the constraints of the blood 
tie, while the outward appearance remains unchanged’ (Howell 2003: 470). Any 
reference to race is denied within the family, as it is in general in Norwegian society, 
where reference is made to, for example, the ‘cultural differences’ of nonwhite 
immigrants, although some recognition is given to the existence of racism (Howell 
and Melhuus 2007). In adoptive families too, cultural change is seen as crucial. The 
apparent break with the logic of race-kinship congruity is denied, in some sense, 
by silencing race (understood as the clues physical appearance is seen to give about 
origin and possible character), privileging culture and making the latter congruent 
with kinship.
Attitudes towards these adoptive children are rather different from those 
towards immigrants and their children (even the Norwegian-born ones) (Howell and 
Melhuus 2007). These are seen as culturally different, but race-kinship congruity 
works in a different way here, as the condition of immigrant is inherited by ‘second-
generation immigrants’ and, despite evident cultural transformation for the locally-
born children of immigrants, these children are seen as being like their parents in the 
key sense of not being properly and fully Norwegian. Culture is thus naturalized and, 
I would say, racialized.
On the other hand, the physical difference of the adoptive children from their 
parents, and everything this might suggest in terms of the absence of ‘real’ kinship, 
remains ineradicable at some level and is reflected in parents’ concern with the 
‘original culture’ of their adoptive children (Volkman 2005). Children are seen as 
arriving with a ‘backpack’ of genes and experiences (Howell 2003: 477), and parents 
strive to deal with this baggage. ‘Adoptive families gather at annual social get-
togethers of the India Association, the Columbia [sic] Association, and so on. They 
eat food and decorate the venue with artefacts from the children’s country of origin; 
they may also dress the children in costumes from their birth country’ (Howell 2003: 
473). Parents may also undertake ‘motherland’ or ‘roots’ tours, travelling with their 
children to the country of origin so that the children have some sense of their dual 
sources of identity. Howell argues that these tours ultimately confirm the children’s 
sense of identity as Norwegians, as they identify more with Norway than with their 
country of origin.
Yet these practices also implicitly recognize racial difference, albeit naturalized 
as cultural difference. These children are adopted as small infants, so their ‘cultural 
background’ in some sense is extremely shallow and thin, yet their racialized 
difference is being acknowledged by referring to ‘cultural origins’ in ways that suggest 
that culture is inherited with the genes. Marre also found this phenomenon among 
Spanish transnational adoptive parents. She cites one mother, featured in a 2003 
Spanish television documentary, who wanted her Chinese child, adopted soon after 
birth, ‘to learn her [the child’s] language and maintain her culture’ (Marre 2007: 73). 
Here, then, the logic of race-kinship congruity is reappearing in a more traditional 
form: at one level, these children are in effect seen as dual heritage. They have ‘a bit 
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of both sides’ in them – as do all children in cognatic kinship systems. This duality 
is not easily conceived in terms of the mere biology of appearance (Chinese) versus 
the deep formations of culture (Norwegian or Spanish), because the ‘mere’ biology 
is perceived – as always in racial discourse – to suggest some cultural connection. At 
the very least, children have to understand why they look the way they do and that 
knowledge, it seems, is insufficient if phrased simply in terms of biology; it has to 
be culturalized through dressing up in national costume, eating national food and 
visiting one’s national roots. This seems to be motivated by the idea that adopted 
children should come to terms with their origins and understand themselves as 
persons, rather than by a desire to strengthen a child’s self-esteem in the face of 
racism: Howell (2003) does not mention this as a motive. Parents do not generally 
see racism as a threat to their adopted children as such, although there are some 
fears that they might be mistaken for immigrants and suffer racism by accident, as 
it were (Howell and Melhuus 2007: 64). This indicates that parents recognize the 
possibility that racial difference enters into the heart of their families. But, above 
all, these practices of recognizing the differences that are indexed by ineradicable 
racialized physical difference are related to the parents’ ways of coping with a race-
kinship incongruity that profoundly intensifies the kinds of tensions that many 
adoptive families experience.
Conclusion
New modes of thinking about and enacting kinship, such as ARTs and transnational 
adoption, can be terrains of practice and thought on which existing ideas about the 
relationship between racial and kinship relatedness are reiterated and renaturalized, 
but also terrains on which those ideas are unsettled and challenged. ARTs are often 
based on ethnic and racial matching, but they may be manipulated to allow racial 
whitening in a way that allows a ‘mixed-race’ baby to appear from a nonmixed couple; 
they may also denaturalize the race-kinship logic by foregrounding the affective links 
that are thought to connect and indeed create kin. Transnational adoption likewise 
creates the possibility of nonwhite children belonging to white parents and upsets 
notions of what constitutes a ‘normal’ family. On the other hand, ideas about race-
kinship congruity reappear in the form of naturalized cultural roots. As Franklin and 
McKinnon (2001a: 21) say, ‘boundaries – of nations, cultures, species, races, persons, 
bodies, cells – have been breached’ and thus unsettled, but at the same time there are 
ways in which ‘such ruptures become occasions to re-establish and reinforce familiar 
normative categories’. There is an increase in options for reckoning, imagining and 
talking about belonging, connection, genealogy and thus also kinship and race. 
Race-kinship congruity has long been a variable construct, changing over time and 
space, as I argued in the first sections of this chapter. Its variability is increased in the 
context of new technologies.
The reckonings and imaginings around kinship and race always take place within 
the constraints established by the political, economic and social context – belonging 
to a given racialized category or a particular family or kin network will always be 
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a practice shaped very powerfully by that context. So what are the implications of 
the changing connections between race and kinship for the politics of identity and 
differences? It is clear that genetic technologies can open the way to biologically 
determinist and essentialist claims to identity – for example, in the use of ancestry 
testing discussed in several chapters of this book, although these tests also have 
contradictory effects that do not always reinforce essentialisms. However, the overall 
effect of ARTs and transnational adoption seems to me to undermine an essentialist 
and determinist politics of identity. Despite the injunctions of systems of governance 
that – in ‘the best interests of the child’ – push towards the racial-ethnic matching 
of parents with children in the area of assisted reproduction and adoption, people 
produce families that counter these trends. As we saw from the successive changes to 
the U.K. Code of Practice on gamete donation, governance policies may follow this 
lead, drawing back from racial matching as the default option. The increasing rate of 
mixed unions and the emergence of mixed-race movements in countries such as the 
U.K. and the U.S.A. certainly challenge simple race-kinship congruity and simple 
binary categorizations, but they still fall within the underlying logic of race-kinship 
congruity. In addition, mixedness alone, while it complicates classifications, does not 
undermine racism or racial hierarchy, as we know from Latin America.
But ARTs and transnational adoption open different avenues because they have 
the potential to create families that do undermine race-kinship congruity in more 
radical ways, and the existence of these families disrupts the racial classifications and 
racial thinking that racism depends on. As I have shown, these practices also provide 
terrains on which the racialized thinking that links race and kinship in predictable 
ways can be reproduced, so it is by no means all one-way traffic. But new choices 
also become available. The language of choice is apposite because, to some extent, 
there is a quasimarket in the domains of ARTs and adoption. Although both areas 
are regulated by the state and ethical guidelines, they are also partially privatized. As 
such, people can use money to access sources of both gametes and adoptive children. 
Indeed, in Spain there was initially a perception that some people adopted children 
from Africa or Asia in order to tap into a sense of being cosmopolitan and cool (Marre 
2007: 81). In pursuing these choices, then, people may create families the existence 
of which challenges the racialized status quo of the societies in which they live. That 
status quo may also be reiterated within the same families and in people’s perceptions 
of them, but it may be that the unsettling they cause is not entirely encompassed and 
evacuated by the reiteration. ARTs and transnational adoption are minority trends, 
to be sure, but as the Jamaican proverb tells us, a big tree may be felled by a small axe.
Notes
1.  I would like to thank Katharina Schramm for inviting me to the workshop at which I 
presented the paper which forms the basis of this chapter. Some of the material in this 
chapter draws on the collaborative project, directed by Jeanette Edwards, called ‘Public 
Understanding of Genetics: A Cross-cultural and Ethnographic Study of the “New 
Genetics” and Social Identity’ (funded by the EU, contract QLG7-CT-2001-01668); 
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for more details, see http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/pug/about.htm, date 
accessed 23 February 2011. I also draw on my Introduction to an edited volume that 
arose from this project (Wade 2007).
2.  There is a large literature on these changes. See, for example, Carsten (2000), Edwards and 
Salazar (2009), Finkler (2001), Franklin and McKinnon (2001b) and Strathern (1992). 
On transnational adoption, see Howell (2007) and Volkman (2005). On gay and lesbian 
families, see Hayden (1995) and Weston (1991).
3.  See Real Decreto 412/1996 (http://www.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/rd412-1996.
html, date accessed 23 February 2011). I am grateful to Ben Campbell for drawing my 
attention to this legislation.
4.  See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1606.html, date accessed 23 February 2011.
5.  For all the Codes, see http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1682.html, date accessed 23 February 
2011.
6.  See http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1974.html, date accessed 23 February 2011.
7.  In many varieties of Islamic religious thinking, sperm donation is forbidden (more so 
than egg donation, which can be allowed some Shia Islam areas), as it implies the threat 
of adultery (Inhorn 2003).
8.  The law may not countenance same-race adoption policies – e.g., the U.S.A.’s Multiethnic 
Placement Act of 1994 (1995) prevented adoption agencies in receipt of federal funds 
from delaying the adoption of a child because of race – but in practice adoption agencies 
and social workers often prefer same-race placements. The same law allows race to be 
taken into account in the best interests of the child.
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Identity, DNA and the 
State in Post-Dictatorship 
Argentina
Noa Vaisman
What role can and should the state play in shaping an individual’s identity? How has the discovery of DNA as a tool for identity verification fashioned 
the relationship between individuals and the state? And what is the social power 
and political limits of the statement ‘you are your DNA’? These questions guide my 
analysis in the present chapter, where I examine the case of the ‘living disappeared’ 
– individuals who were forcibly kidnapped as infants by the military dictatorship
that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983. These individuals, now adults in their
early thirties, were raised, in many cases, by the perpetrators of the crime or their
accomplices. After their biological identities and familial relations were erased by their
appropriators, they were given new names and brought into new kinship relations.
The majority of them are still living today with no knowledge about their past or
their biological families. My aim in examining the case of the ‘living disappeared’
and the various approaches that the Argentine state has taken to resolving this
very complex situation is double: first, to better understand the relations between
individual identity and DNA in this particular historical and political context; and,
second, to examine the impact of new technologies, particularly advancements in
DNA identity testing, on citizen–state relations in Argentina.
As others in this volume show, and as I discuss further below, the use of DNA to 
verify genealogical relations is not new, nor is the use of DNA to identify individuals 
and tie them to specific places and events (see, for example, Aronson 2007). This said, 
the case of the ‘living disappeared’ raises different questions and conundrums that I 
believe can be illuminating for a broader discussion of identity after DNA. Specifically, 
the case brings into view the complex ways in which DNA is being used today to 
shape notions of selfhood and identity, and to refashion state–subject relations. In 
the context of a volume that explores identity politics after DNA, my use of the term 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
‘identity’ should be clarified. By ‘identity’ I mean not only the external and internal 
manifestations of an individual’s biological makeup (see Skinner 2006) but also the 
socially constructed and historically formed ways in which a person understands 
him- or herself to be. In this formulation both the social and the biological and 
their intertwining are politically charged and individually and collectively negotiated. 
The rift that was created between the genetic (biological) and the social (the lived 
experience of the person as him- or herself) in the case of the ‘living disappeared’ is 
the focus of this chapter.
During the last military rule in Argentina the forced disappearance of infants 
implied in many cases the active production of new selves for the very young. This 
was done, as I elaborate below, within the confines of the state when it was ruled 
by the Armed Forces – specifically, through the falsification of state documents and 
the creation of social worlds that supported the lies and sustained the fabricated kin 
ties. Under the re-established democratic government, the work of recuperating the 
identity of these individuals has taken place through investigations into their personal 
histories and through the use of genetic tests to uncover and verify their genealogical 
relations. In this chapter I present the process of identification and restitution,1 and 
point to the complexities of the situation and the role of DNA in shaping what is 
considered – the ‘truth’ of identity.2
The chapter is divided into three parts: I begin with a description of the historical 
circumstances that created the conditions for the forced disappearance of infants 
and their subsequent raising by the perpetrators of the crime. In the second part 
I offer a history of the identification methods and their development in the case 
of the ‘living disappeared’. In this section I examine the ongoing controversy over 
obligatory DNA identity tests and the solutions the Argentine state has come up 
with when dealing with cases where individuals have refused to undergo such a test. I 
end with an emblematic story of a ‘living disappeared’ and her process of restitution. 
The story allows me to explore the power of DNA for current understandings of 
individual identity and to demonstrate some of the complexities raised by the case of 
the ‘living disappeared’.
The Military Dictatorship and the Forced Disappearance of Infants
The 1960s and early 1970s were a time of turmoil and change in Argentina. As 
happened in other parts of Latin America, the period was characterized by great social 
and political tensions and grand ideological struggles. At the time, partly in response 
to the recurring cycles of dictatorial and semi-dictatorial rules, a massive social and 
political movement developed. Although not restricted to armed struggle, some of the 
movements resorted to violence in their attempts to foment a revolution. However, 
their aspirations were cut short by a massive repressive apparatus that was first led by 
a paramilitary organization – the Triple A (the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance) 
– and later by the Armed Forces (Rock 1993: 223).
The Armed Forces condemned the rise of what they considered ‘subversive’ 
behaviour. They viewed the tremulous political situation as a symptom of a much 
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larger process of social and political world-takeover by Marxist forces. It was their 
mission, they believed, to preserve the national culture and Western moral values 
of Argentines, and to help the country by leading it back towards the road to 
modernization and civilization (Robben 2005). Unlike earlier dictatorial rules, this 
last one, which began with a coup d’état on 24 March 1976, attempted to completely 
change and redirect Argentine society and its future. The regime no longer saw its 
mission – as earlier dictatorial regimes in the country did – as solely marking a short 
passage towards a more stable democracy; rather, the Armed Forces envisioned itself 
responsible for the reorganization of the country as a whole (Novaro and Palermo 
2003: 19).
The ideological pillars of the dictatorial rule can be traced back to the early 1960s, 
when the Argentine Armed Forces adopted the Doctrine of National Security (Rock 
1993: 194–237). According to Rock (1993: 195), the Doctrine had three theses: first, 
that a world communist conspiracy against the West existed and that all ‘subversive’ 
forces which struggled to disseminate communism by infiltrating Argentine society 
and its political institutions were the hidden enemy that had to be discovered and 
eliminated; second, that national security and economic developments were linked in 
a way that one could not be achieved without the other; and, third, that the Armed 
Forces had the right to test the ability and standards of every democratic government 
and, if found faulty, to overthrow it.
After taking power, the leaders of the Armed Forces declared their objectives: 
to reinstate Christian values and national traditions and to salvage and reclaim 
the dignity of all Argentines. To do so they had to ensure national security and 
to eradicate all subversion and all elements that aided in its existence (Novaro and 
Palermo 2003: 20). This struggle against subversion had to be done, according to 
their doctrine, in secrecy, and it included the forced disappearance of individuals, 
their torturing in clandestine camps, and finally their assassination. It also involved a 
large repression apparatus that engulfed the whole of Argentine society through street 
and media campaigns that invited the population to participate in identifying and 
reporting on any ‘subversive’ behaviour.
The Plan for National Reorganization (Plan de Reorganización Nacional) was 
implemented across the country immediately after the coup and resulted in thousands 
of disappearances, thousands of political prisoners, and innumerable individuals and 
families who went into exile. Together with this planned repression, another plan 
had gone into effect: the forced disappearance of close to 500 infants. According 
to numerous human rights organizations (HROs) in Argentina, the Armed Forces 
had a clear plan to kidnap the infants (the children of the adult disappeared) and 
raise them in an environment that was more conducive to their ideological position. 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo), an HRO, has argued 
repeatedly that the abduction of infants during the dictatorship and the altering of 
their identity was part of a systematic plan to annihilate the enemy (Arditti 1999; 
Abuelas website). The children were forcibly disappeared in one of three ways. 
They were either taken with their parents by members of the ‘task forces’ and later 
separated from them and given up for adoption, or illegally appropriated by military 
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and police personnel and their relatives. Alternatively, they were born in clandestine 
camps to women who had been held captive after being abducted; children of captive 
parents were usually taken from their biological mothers hours or, at most, days 
after their birth. The third form of disappearance took place in the event that the 
biological parents were abducted from the streets or from another public space, 
leaving their children without a guardian. In those cases, someone would find the 
child and hand him or her over to the authorities that, in many cases, did not look 
for the biological family but instead gave the child up for adoption (for an analysis 
of some of these cases and the question of illegal appropriation and adoption, see 
Villalta 2010; Regueiro 2010). 
Abuelas and the Search for the Disappeared Children
First under the dictatorship and subsequently during democracy, the fight against 
human rights violations has been led by the families of the victims. Abuelas de Plaza 
de Mayo is one of a number of HROs that emerged under dictatorial rule. Founded 
in 1978 by women whose adult children and their children had been disappeared, 
this HRO focuses on finding the ‘living disappeared’, that is, their grandchildren, and 
‘restoring’ their identity. The work of Abuelas is anchored in the idea – established 
within human rights legal instruments – that each individual has a right to his 
or her own identity.3 This identity was altered (or ‘stolen’) when the infants were 
forcibly abducted by the military regime and provided with new names, new identity 
documents and placed in new families. By searching for these individuals, identifying 
them, and providing them with information about their biological families, the 
organization claims that it is giving them an opportunity to reconstruct their identity 
based on both knowledge and truth. The grandmothers argue that instead of the lies 
and half-truths they had grown up with, the individuals who have been found can 
now construct, with the knowledge they have, a ‘true’ and solid identity.
However, the road to the identification and restitution of the ‘living disappeared’ 
was never smooth. With the return to democratic rule in 1983, Abuelas approached 
the state for support; the response the organization received varied between the 
different administrations. Below I point to three achievements in Abuelas’s attempts 
to rectify their political plight: the creation of the National Bank of Genetic Data, the 
creation of the National Commission for the Right of Identity (CONADI) and the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Although these institutional 
achievements are great, the act of restitution is much more complex and involves a 
legal process as well as a DNA test. Because cases of restitution must pass through 
the courts, Abuelas’s approach to the process has been shaped by key legal decisions. 
Therefore, following a discussion of the methods used for identification, I address a 
few key legal decisions and elaborate on their political and social ramifications.
The National Bank of Genetic Data
Following their plight to identify the children who were located through anonymous 
tips and rigorous searches, Abuelas approached Raúl Alfonsín, the first democratically 
elected president after the dictatorship, with a project: to create a National Bank of 
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Genetic Data. Abuelas, a number of governmental organizations and the immunology 
service in the Duran Hospital proposed the project that was ultimately passed as a law 
in May 1987. Today the Bank holds the genetic information of members of families 
of the ‘living disappeared’ who are looking for one or more of the disappeared 
children (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo 2008; Avery 2004). Although there is genetic 
information from many families in the Bank, information is still being collected today 
from families that did not provide their testimony on previous occasions, or in more 
recent cases where pregnancies, which were not known about, are discovered through 
the crossing of information from various survivors’ testimonies. The information in 
the Bank, according to the law, will be safeguarded until at least 2050. Moreover, the 
law stipulates that all genetic testing for identity will be free for the families of the 
disappeared; separately it was also stated that in cases of individuals whose identity 
is in question, the presiding judge can send for genetic testing in the Bank (Abuleas 
de Plaza de Mayo 2008: 72). According to María Belén Rodríquez Cordozo, who 
heads the Bank, when a person arrives for a blood test, his or her identity paper is 
revised, and fingerprints, a photo and a blood sample is taken (Abuleas de Plaza de 
Mayo 2008: 114).
CONADI and the Spontaneous Search for Identity
Following the request of Abuelas, the government created the National Commission 
for the Right to Identity (CONADI). This institution is a hybrid between a 
nongovernmental organization and a state structure that is responsible for the 
advancement of the search for the ‘living disappeared’ and other individuals 
whose identity or biological origins are unknown. The Commission works closely 
with Abuelas and is unique in its mandate to issue DNA tests without having to 
initiate a legal process before the results are known. Since its founding in 1992, the 
Commission has become a place where many individuals who have doubts about 
their identity have come to get help and investigate their biogenetic ties. In some 
cases, the Commission is viewed by potential seekers as a safer place to approach than 
Abuelas or even H.I.J.O.S.4 because it does not have the same political profile that 
both HROs have. Thus, as I was told by the head of CONADI, individuals who had 
been taught by their appropriators to hate and fear the HROs – particularly Abuelas 
of the Plaza de Mayo and Madres of the Plaza de Mayo – find approaching CONADI 
with their doubts a little simpler.
In recent years, the spontaneous presentation (presentación espontánea) of 
individuals in both CONADI and Abuelas is becoming more widespread. In fact, the 
majority of individuals located in recent years have sought out one of the organizations 
rather than having been located through detailed searches. This is particularly true 
since the ‘living disappeared’ have become adults and are exposed to the numerous 
media campaigns that Abuelas organize. These campaigns include many festivals and 
art exhibits, as well as an annual cycle of short plays that are performed for free in 
many of the central theatres in Buenos Aires and in other major cities in Argentina. 
In 2005 I was told by members of Theatre for Identity’s (Teatro por la Identidad) 
organizing committee that at least three individuals had approached Abuelas and 
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CONADI after watching a play in that year’s cycle. All three were looking for more 
information about their biogenetic ties.
The International Convention on the Rights of the Child
The fight for the restitution of the disappeared infants within the Argentine setting 
also generated an international appeal. In the mid-1980s Argentina became involved 
in the drafting of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
was adopted in November 1989 by the United Nations General Assembly. Abuelas 
played a significant role in the formulation and development of three articles in the 
Convention. Article 7 states that the child will be registered right after the birth, will 
be given a name and will be cared for by his or her parents. Article 8 states that the 
child has the right to preserve his or her identity, including nationality, name and 
family relations. States will also provide assistance and ensure the re-establishment of 
these rights if the child has been illegally deprived of some or all elements of his or 
her identity.5 Article 11 indicates that the state will take measures to combat the illicit 
trade of children and their transfer abroad. Ratifying the Convention was significant 
both as a statement by the democratic government about violations of human rights 
and as a position that could be adopted in legal deliberations. In 1991 and again in 
an appeal in 1992 using the right to identity as the judicial argument, the first case 
of full adoption was annulled. This case, the Ximena Vicario case, is complicated6 
and important because full adoption in Argentina is irrevocable; however, with the 
recognition of the right to identity and the exposure of the falsified documents, the 
adoption was nullified and the law was changed (Jaroslavsky 2004: 105; Oren 2001: 
165–169).
The three achievements described above have been stepping stones on the road 
to locating and identifying the ‘living disappeared’, but they have left much to be 
desired. Specifically, finding the ‘living disappeared’ is still contingent upon either 
a search conducted by the HROs based on anonymous tip or the spontaneous 
appearance of individuals who have doubts about their identity in one of the 
institutions that work towards their localization and identification. In other words, 
the state has not done much to help locate these individuals by, for example, requiring 
the military to provide information about possible births in clandestine camps during 
the dictatorship. Moreover, as I describe below, the process of identification is long 
and complicated and takes place in a system which still employs judges and lawyers 
which supported the military rule. The extensive history of the struggle to locate and 
identify these individuals and its various turning points is a testimony to Abuelas’s 
fight to find and recover their kin. 
Finding and Identifying the ‘Living Disappeared’ 
A number of paths can lead to the localization and identification of an individual 
as one of the ‘living disappeared’. One path, which was particularly important until 
a few years ago, is the investigations that the HRO Abuelas conducted following 
anonymous tips. The investigations include, for example, research into the history 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Identity, DNA and the State in Post-Dictatorship Argentina  103
of the family, the possible location of the birth, and any ties that the family had or 
continues to have with police or Armed Forces personnel who were on active duty 
during the dictatorial rule. A second successful path was developed when Abuelas 
realized that once the children had grown older, they were themselves capable of 
conducting a search for their biological families. The aim then became to persuade 
individuals, who were born between 1975 and 1980 and who have doubts about 
their possible biological identity, to initiate a search. To accomplish this goal, 
Abuelas created numerous artistic campaigns, organized festivals and produced 
public advertisements where the forced disappearance of infants was depicted. These 
campaigns used phrases such as: ‘if you were born between 1975 and 1980 and you 
have doubts about your origin contact Abuelas’ or ‘to be able to choose one must 
know the truth’. These phrases reflect the position of the organization regarding the 
disappearance of infants and the implications of the crime for Argentine society more 
generally. More specifically, for the organization the fact that there are hundreds of 
individuals who are living with altered identities amongst the Argentine population 
means that anyone can be a ‘living disappeared’ and no one’s identity is certain. This 
is particularly true for a whole generation – those born just before or during the 
dictatorship – which was targeted for disappearance and alteration of identity.7
The methods used to identify individuals also changed over the years. While 
still under dictatorial rule, the ‘living disappeared’ who were found by Abuelas 
were relatively easily identified by sight, that is, by finding visually palpable familial 
resemblances. However, this form of identification was not legally sufficient to 
determine familial ties, and Abuelas had to find other means to establish the children’s 
identity. Moreover, in some cases the children were never seen by a living biological 
relative, making identification by sight impossible. As the ‘living disappeared’ 
grew older, identification became even more complex, requiring a long process of 
verification. To solve the problem Abuelas turned to scientists for help. In fact, since 
the early years of the organization’s work, scientists and scientific methods have been 
used to establish the identity of the ‘living disappeared’ and to compensate for the 
lack of information about genetic ties which was caused by the disappearance and 
subsequent assassination of the biological parents (Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo 2008: 
29–101).
In the early years during and directly after the dictatorship, the central method of 
identification was blood tests. However, until Abuelas presented their case to scientist 
in the U.S.A. and Europe, most blood tests and statistical measures for paternity were 
based on the possible ties between biological parents and their children. The case of 
the ‘living disappeared’ was different because there was no genetic information from 
the biological parents, only genetic information that could be collected from the 
grandparents and family members who survived. Thus, there was a need to develop a 
new method to measure the probability of genetic connections between individuals 
and family members. In the early 1980s a statistical solution was created and named 
‘grandpaternity testing’ (Penchaszadeh 1992: 296). It was based on the common 
paternity blood tests (the comparison of different red blood cell antigens such as 
ABO, Rh, Kelley and white cell HLA antigens) with the modification of the statistical 
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formula to account for the missing information from the progenitors. By comparing 
a large number of genetic markers between the ‘living disappeared’, grandparents and 
other family members, it is possible to exclude paternity in a high percentage and 
subsequently assign a probability of inclusion in a specific biological family (Arditti 
1999; Penchaszadeh 1992).
With the creation of the National Bank of Genetic Data, the process of 
identification evolved and improved. Thus, when a potential ‘living disappeared’ is 
‘located’, genetic markers on his or her DNA are compared with the DNA material 
of all the families in the Bank. In cases where the individual has been found to be 
included with a very high probability (over 98 percent) in a particular family, his 
or her identity is officially recognized. However, in some cases there is no statistical 
evidence for inclusion. One reason for this is the lack of genetic information available 
for comparison because some biological families did not deposit their genetic material 
in the Bank. Another reason is that as a response to the repression, some families 
withdrew from the public sphere and closed off to outside and even state-initiated 
retribution. Other reasons are lack of knowledge; in particular, there are some cases 
where the families of abducted adults did not know about the pregnancy and thus 
never initiated a search. With the slow collection of information from survivors and 
the crossing of data from other sources, some clandestine pregnancies have been 
uncovered and the families have been contacted.8
Today the methods of identification are based on a number of different elements: 
microsatellite markers on chromosomes as well as on the X sex chromosome and, if 
applicable, the Y sex chromosome, and mitochondrial DNA. By using a large number 
of markers it is possible to ‘obtain kinship probabilities that are high enough to 
confirm biological links’ (Abuelas website).9 This means that it is possible to exclude 
a person with a very high degree of probability. If no exclusion can be determined 
it is considered a high inclusion case. The probability of inclusion is based on the 
frequency of the markers in the population; therefore, if a person was not excluded 
from a genetic group, there is a high probability (over 98 per cent) that he or she is 
part of that familial group (Lynch 2003; Penchaszadeh 1992).
DNA and Identity: A Complex Picture
Many of the chapters in this volume centre on the search for identity and ancestry 
through DNA tests (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). They examine the complex relations 
between the scientific methods used to demonstrate links and connections between 
people across space and time, and describe people’s use of this information for the 
purpose of constructing or re-evaluating their personal lives and collective affinities. 
These chapters depict the search as an outcome of, in most cases, individual curiosity, 
a desire to belong or a personal need to reconstruct a lost history (e.g., a group or 
familial history lost as a result of slavery; for other examples see Nelson 2008; Pálsson 
2007; and TallBear 2007). And, although this search requires the participation 
of many people and sometimes whole groups (not only through Internet-based 
networks but also in the production of DNA databases large enough to allow viable 
comparisons), it is at its core a personal project.
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While the cases mentioned above raise questions about individuals’ desire to 
belong and the role of scientific methods in the production of identity politics today, 
the case of the ‘living disappeared’ presents us with both similar and additional 
conundrums. Although in some instances individuals suspected of being ‘living 
disappeared’ have come to Abuelas or to CONADI asking to learn about their 
genetic ties, in numerous other cases they have demonstrated a clear disinterest in 
learning of their biogenetic origins. Instead they have been either approached by the 
organization or required by the courts to undergo a DNA test. This second scenario, 
where an individual is reluctant or even refuses to learn her or his identity but is 
obligated to do so, produces a complex set of tensions and conflicts. Whose rights 
should prevail, those of the individual over her or his biogenetic information, or 
those of the state over that same genetic material? Is the individual’s right to privacy 
more important than the right of the family to find out about a possible family 
member? It is important to note that one of the particularities of the cases of the 
‘living disappeared’ is that the state is involved in producing the personal history of 
each individual. In other words, it helps in rearticulating ties which, when governed 
by the military, it intentionally destroyed. The state’s involvement in the production 
of an individual’s identity is not straightforward and, as I show below, over the years 
there have been various turning points and dramatic shifts in this relationship. 
The Reaction of the ‘Living Disappeared’ to the Identity Tests
In most cases the identification of a ‘living disappeared’ is a long and difficult process 
which begins either with a search conducted by one of the organizations (Abuelas 
or H.I.J.O.S.) based on anonymous tips or with an individual approaching Abuelas 
because he has doubts about his real origin and questions about his biogenetic ties. 
Aside from scrutinizing the historical data registered in official state documents, 
revisiting familial history and using testimonies of witnesses to verify information 
about the individual’s early life, part of the identification process includes the ordering 
of blood tests. The blood is used to extract DNA which is then compared with the 
DNA of families which have deposited their genetic material in the National Bank 
of Genetic Data. The legal demand for a blood test in the case of those suspected 
of being one of the ‘living disappeared’ has produced mixed results: some of the 
individuals resisted by simply not appearing for the blood test or appearing for the 
appointed test but refusing to give blood. Others have resisted by appealing the 
courts’ orders, reaching in some cases the highest instances of the legal system – the 
Supreme Court of Argentina.
Key Cases in the Supreme Court
In 2003 the Supreme Court of Argentina ruled in a case of a ‘living disappeared’ who 
refused to undergo a blood test which was to be used for a DNA identity test. The 
Court stated clearly that the state could not force an adult to give blood or to search 
for her own identity if that individual was not interested in learning about her past 
and biogenetic ties (see Vaisman n.d.[a]). Since that verdict was passed, a new method 
of identification and verification of identity has been put in place – identity tests 
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based on DNA found in biological material that is naturally detached from the body 
and left in the environment (on clothes and other surfaces). In 2005 a judge sitting 
in one of the cases of a possible ‘living disappeared’ found out that DNA identity 
tests can be carried out not only on blood but also on other bodily substances. The 
judge ordered house searches in the homes of a few individuals whose identity was in 
question. In those raids, personal objects such as used clothes, toothbrushes, a comb 
and used linen were collected. All these objects can contain old skin and hence may 
be a good source of DNA material. This method eliminated the need to extract blood 
and has allowed the courts to bypass the difficult problem of using the body of the 
individual against his or her will (see Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo 2008; Lyon 2001).
Since this tactic was first implemented, material evidence from the homes of at 
least nine individuals who had refused to undergo a blood test was used to ascertain 
their genetic identity as ‘living disappeared’ (Abuelas website). The juridical reasoning 
behind these house raids has been that the crimes of disappearance and alteration of 
identity are ongoing and it is the obligation of the state, through its judicial system, 
to stop them.
In August 2009 another key case reached the Supreme Court. This time an 
individual who was suspected of being a ‘living disappeared’ and whose house was 
raided in a search for DNA material contested the search and the state’s right to 
uncover his biogenetic ties. In that case, the Court ruled that although the state cannot 
force the individual to provide blood for a DNA test (based on the 2003 ruling), 
it has the right to uncover an individual’s identity using alternative means, i.e. to 
conduct a test based on other biological material which is collected from the homes 
of individuals suspected of being ‘living disappeared’. Two of the presiding judges 
also suggested in their ruling that although the state has a right to find out whether 
an individual is a ‘living disappeared’, it does not have to impose that information 
on the individual in question. That is, if the individual is not interested in learning of 
his biogenetic ties, the state can keep that information from him and only notify the 
biological family, which has been searching for him since his disappearance (Vaisman 
n.d.[b]).
From Supreme Court Decisions to an Amendment of the Law
Soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in August 2009, an amendment of the 
federal code of criminal procedure – law number 26549 – was enacted. According 
to the new amendment,10 which was passed in late November 2009, the state has the 
right to carry out a DNA test for the purpose of verifying an individual’s identity, 
even against his or her wishes. In each case where the identity of an individual is in 
question, the state must first use all available alternative means before attempting to 
carry out a blood test. In other words, although the amendment allows for ‘minimal 
extraction of blood, saliva, skin, hair or other biological samples’, it also states that 
these tests should be carried out with minimum interference and injurious effects 
to the person and ‘without affecting his modesty, considering especially his gender 
and other particular circumstances’.11 Moreover, ‘if the judge considers it advisable, 
and always when it is possible to reach the same level of certainty with the results of 
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the method used, [the judge] can order the collection of DNA using means other 
than corporeal inspection, such as the confiscation of objects that contain cells which 
are already separated from the body’. The decision on the methods used must be 
based on the particular circumstances of the individual; that is, the judge must take 
into account the conditions of the individual and ‘avoid his re-victimization and 
protect the specific rights that he has’. In effect, the amendment supports the use of 
all methods – including blood tests – to verify the identity of an individual. However, 
it also recognizes that alternative means of DNA identity test can and should be used 
prior to any corporeal inspection.
The amendment is interesting for a number of reasons: first, unlike the 2003 
Supreme Court decision, the amendment states that blood tests can be carried out 
in cases where other means of identity verification using DNA material have been 
exhausted. Second, the law does not distinguish between the individual’s wishes 
and the need to clarify ‘circumstances of importance to the investigation’. In other 
words, the aim of the DNA identity test is not only to identify the individual but 
also to elucidation the crime (in the case of the ‘living disappeared’, this implies 
the forced disappearance and appropriation of the individual in question). This 
is a subtle but important point: in the 2003 Supreme Court decision, the Court 
ruled that the individual’s intimacy and privacy were more important than the 
final and absolute clarification of the crime in question (in that case the final 
resolution meant providing the presumed biological family information about their 
possible biogenetic ties to the individual in question); in the new amendment the 
crime is positioned on a par with the identification of the individual. Thus, the 
elucidation of the crime is as important as the identification of the individual in 
question. Third, the law does not indicate exactly what rights the individual has 
over the information that is gathered from his DNA. In the 2009 Supreme Court’s 
ruling, two of the judges stated that the courts can provide information about the 
biogenetic identity of the individual to the families who are searching while keeping 
it from the person himself. While in the words of the new amendment it is unclear 
how that information should be treated – must an individual learn of his biogenetic 
identity even if acquiring that information goes against his own wishes? Or, can the 
information be used to help in the investigation of the case without imposing that 
knowledge on the individual?
For the present discussion, the important point of this legal formulation is the 
vision it presents for state–citizen relations. According to the new amendment the 
state has a right over the individual’s DNA – whether that DNA is extracted from 
the body or from artefacts containing biological material that was detached from the 
body by natural means (e.g., old skin left on used clothes and linen). It also has a right 
over the information that this DNA contains; that is, it has a right over an individual’s 
identity. It is important to note here that the term ‘identity’ in fact implies a sense 
of self and belonging, a person’s experience of his being and his connections to the 
world. Thus, the amendment articulates a very intimate relationship between the 
subject and the state. The use of DNA in this way raises various questions about the 
limits of the state’s reach and the role of the collective (in this case both the family 
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that is searching and Argentine society more generally) in shaping an individual’s 
sense of self and social world.
While the relationship between the state and the individual is defined through 
and by means of DNA, the use of DNA for identification is not unique to this case. 
In fact, for many years now, states have been collecting and using individuals’ DNA 
for criminal identification (see Lynch et al. 2008). However, the case of the ‘living 
disappeared’ is different for a number of reasons. First, DNA is used here not only 
for the incrimination of the perpetrators of the crime but also, and most importantly, 
for the identification of the victim. Second, identification in the case of the ‘living 
disappeared’ does not imply a match between an individual’s DNA and his own 
DNA taken at a different moment in time; rather, identification here means the 
repositioning of the individual within the social world. The individual is only fully 
identified when he or she is found to ‘belong’ to a particular familial group and when 
he or she is located within a partially unknown (hidden) history (the history of the 
forced disappearance). Third, identification also involves the reordering and the re-
location of the individual within a collective narrative of repression and mass human 
rights violations. The recovered individual becomes one of the now 104 individuals 
who have been identified and informed that they were forcibly abducted as infants 
by the military regime.
Apart from the individual difficulties and complex psychological processes, 
becoming one of the ‘living disappeared’ can carry with it enormous social weight 
as well as dramatic political consequences. Although many of the individuals 
found by Abuelas do not appear in public and do not tell their story, others have 
– particularly in the past few years – made it a point of making their story known 
through interviews in major newspapers, books, documentary films, radio shows 
and public events. Concurrently, Argentine society has been an avid consumer of 
these stories and has followed closely the life histories of these individuals and their 
transformation following the discovery of their biogenetic kinship ties. To illustrate 
some of the processes I have discussed so far, I now turn to the story of Victoria 
Donda. Victoria’s discovery of her biogenetic identity reflects the difficult process of 
identification and restitution in Argentina today and illustrates the complexities of 
the relations between DNA and identity.
A Complicated Family History
Victoria Donda is the youngest woman to become a Member of Parliament in 
Argentina; her political rise coincided with her discovery of her real biogenetic 
identity. She was born in the Navy Mechanics School, the ESMA (Escuela Mecánica 
de la Armada), sometime between August and October 1977. According to the 
testimony of a survivor from that camp, Cori, her biological mother, had named her 
Victoria and had passed a blue thread through her earlobe so she could be identified. 
Fifteen days after her birth, Victoria was separated from Cori and was given to a 
couple, Juan Antonio Azic and his wife Esther Abrego.12 Once separated from her 
biological mother, Victoria was renamed Analía, she was given a new birth date, two 
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years younger than her real date of birth; and was registered as the biological daughter 
of Juan Antonio Azic – at the time, the Main Assistant Officer of the Argentine Coast 
Guard and a member of the task force 3.3.213 – and his wife.
In her book My Name is Victoria, published in 2009, Victoria narrates her life 
story, growing up in a normal middle-class Argentine family in the years following the 
period of dictatorial rule. In telling her story she recounts her loves and friendships, 
the people who had most influenced her thinking and her political inclinations, and 
her awakening to political activism, which began very early in her teenage years. 
Throughout the narrative she weaves together her personal story of growth with the 
historical events that were simultaneously taking place in Argentina. One of the 
interesting things about the book apart from the story she tells is Victoria’s decision 
to protect some of those closest to her. For example, the appropriating couple that 
raised her are called by fictitious names – Raúl and Graciela – and her sister, who 
is also a ‘living disappeared’, is only mentioned sporadically. Regarding her sister, 
Victoria explains that each one has to find her own path to the truth. Thus, out of 
respect for her sister and the path she had chosen, Victoria keeps out of the book any 
information that would identify her sister or expose her struggles with her biogenetic 
identity.
Victoria was first approached by members of the committee Herman@s 
(brothers/sisters) from the HRO H.I.J.O.S. in 2002. They were conducting a secret 
investigation into her possible origins and needed to see her up-close for possible 
preliminary visual identification. At the time they did not tell her the reason for 
their visit. A short while after the encounter, of which Victoria did not think much, 
another event took place that completely changed things. During July 2003 the Judge 
Baltasar Garzón, a world renowned Spanish investigating judge at the time, initiated 
the legal prosecution of Argentine police and army officers who had committed 
crimes against Spanish citizens during the military rule.14 Judge Garzón sent a list of 
names for extradition and among those mentioned was Victoria’s father. Raúl found 
out about the extradition request and attempted to commit suicide before the list of 
names became public. He tried to shoot himself in the mouth but succeeded only in 
destroying his face. Victoria, who had first learned of the attempt an hour or so after 
it happened, rushed to the hospital and spent the night at his bedside. As she was 
walking out of the room where Raúl was laying unconscious, she turned her head to 
the TV screen and saw the list of perpetrators called for extradition and immediately 
recognized her father’s name among them. Devastated by this new information, 
she did not know how to react – her father was one of the criminals she had been 
fighting, through her political activism, to put behind bars.
During that period and as part of her political work, she had been collaborating 
with the HRO Abuelas. When she learned of her father’s past she was unable to 
contain her suffering and contacted the organization. As she explains, ‘I needed to 
ask for forgiveness because I had discovered that my father was a torturer, I needed 
from the very bottom of my heart, that someone would tell me that I had the right to 
continue my political activism, that my genetic inheritance would not stop me from 
continuing to fight for what I had always fought for’ (Donda 2009: 186).15 On the 
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other end of the line, the president of the organization told her what she needed to 
hear. What Victoria did not know at the time was that the organization had called 
for an emergency meeting with members of H.I.J.O.S. They had spent a great deal of 
time investigating the case and carefully building it, and were not ready to see it all 
go to waste or to hurt Victoria in any way.
In that meeting, the representatives of the different organizations and a few of 
her friends and acquaintances decided it would be best to tell Victoria the whole 
truth, instead of letting her believe that her father was a torturer. Thus, three days 
after her father’s attempted suicide, Victoria met with a friend and a well-known 
political figure in a small café-bar in the city. He explained the suspicions the HROs 
had regarding her possible appropriation and suggested that they move to another 
café-bar where members of H.I.J.O.S. were waiting. They, he stated, would be able 
to tell her everything in more detail (Donda 2009: 14–17, 187). In presenting their 
suspicions and investigations regarding her identity and biogenetic origins, the 
members of H.I.J.O.S. and Abuelas were careful not to reveal who they suspected was 
her real biological family. In fact, both HROs have made it a strict rule to wait until 
the DNA test is conducted to verify and confirm biogenetic relations (Donda 2009). 
The reason for this is quite simple: although the investigation based on anonymous 
tips can point to a particular family, until the DNA test is carried out there is no 
certainty that this is the correct match. In effect, there had been a few cases in the past 
where a mistaken match was corrected using DNA identity tests, sometimes at the 
cost of great suffering for both the families and individuals in question. Victoria did 
not immediately go through with the DNA test. In her book she explains that she was 
afraid of the consequences, specifically the possible use of the test against Raúl and 
Graciela. She did not want to cause them more suffering and pain.16 When describing 
the home she was raised in she states numerous times that because her father had 
retired early, she did not know of his participation in the repression, nor was she 
aware of his activities during the dictatorial rule. She describes Raúl as a strict but 
loving father and herself as the rebel in the household. While she turned increasingly 
towards political activism in areas and with groups that stood in complete contrast to 
her father’s strong convictions, she depicts him as a supporting paternal figure who 
was willing to help her in all of her activities. The picture that emerges from her story 
is a complicated one, which shows all the contradictions and incommensurability of 
the situation she is in. Although, as she writes, she recognizes Raúl’s involvement in 
her appropriation, she explains in very plain terms that the strong feelings she had 
towards her parents and the history of shared relations, particularly in a family as 
tight as her own, are not easily changed.
However, choosing not to go through with the DNA test also meant remaining 
in a state of uncertainty regarding her identity and sense of belonging. About a year 
later, in March 2004, she finally decided to undergo the test. In her narrative of 
her decision she explains that it happened on 24 March 2004 during a public event 
in commemoration of the last military dictatorship. That 24 March was especially 
important because the ESMA, where a large clandestine and torture camp functioned 
during the dictatorship, was transformed into a museum of memory (Museo de la 
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Memoria) or ‘Space for Memory and for the Promotion and Defence of Human 
Rights’ (Espacio para la Memoria y para la promoción y defensa de los Derechos 
Humanos). This was the same place where Victoria was born. On stage during the 
ceremony, another individual, Juan Cambandié, who was himself born in the camp, 
told the very large crowds that gathered outside the gates of the notorious place 
his story of restitution. He had discovered his biogenetic identity only two months 
prior to the event. Victoria, seeing Juan directly following his speech standing by the 
stage shaking, said to him: ‘at least you know who your parents are’. A short while 
later, as the doors of the main building opened, Victoria, together with members 
of H.I.J.O.S. walked into the dreaded space. Inside, she writes, walking in the hall 
where torturers had walked and where her own mother had suffered and had given 
birth, she realized that if her mother had the courage to have her there in that terrible 
camp, then she must have the courage to undergo the blood test.17
Victoria went through with the blood test and found out who her biological 
parents were. She also learned more about the complicated history of her biological 
family, specifically that her uncle was a known torturer in the ESMA while her father, 
his younger brother, was abducted and tortured in that camp. She further learned 
that she has an older biological sister who had been raised since childhood by her 
uncle. The sister, as Victoria describes it in her book, had been raised to hate her 
biological parents, and to this day she maintains a very right-wing radical political 
position. So far, the sisters have not been able to create a steady relationship.
Towards the end of book, when Victoria narrates the work she has done since 
discovering her biogenetic identity, she says: ‘Victoria and Analía were in the end 
the same person. And that person was me’ (2009: 236). She clarifies that the process 
that brought her to this realization was long and did not lead to a single solution: ‘I 
had to learn bit by bit to incorporate a new history, a new family, a new origin … 
I am a product of the dictatorship in the same way that I am a product of the love 
that Raúl and Graciela knew how to give me, and I recognize myself in them as I do 
in Cori and el Cabo [her biological parents], to whom I feel love as much as one can 
love those whom she never knew … I am not less Analía than Victoria’ (2009: 240). 
With this statement and the numerous stories of her encounter with her biological 
family and her biological parents’ various friends and companions, Victoria brings 
the complexity of the situation to light.
Conclusion
Victoria’s story, although unique, shares a number of elements with many other 
stories of restituted individuals. Specifically for the current discussion of DNA and 
identity, her statement that she is both Analía and Victoria at the same time is perhaps 
most significant. For her, as for many other restituted individuals, her identity is a 
product of both her DNA and the history and world she created while she was raised 
by her appropriators. Her DNA not only draws out a new familial structure that she 
is, at least genetically, a part of, but also shows her to be the particular person she is. 
For example, throughout the book Victoria describes herself as a rebel who fights for 
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her beliefs and political convictions. She then states in numerous places that from 
what she could construct based on testimonies, she is just like her biological mother. 
At the same time, the person she is, she makes it clear, is also a product of the life 
she has led so far, the family she was raised in and the love and relationships that she 
constructed until she discovered her biogenetic identity. In this way it is not only the 
DNA nor only her personal history and social relations that make her who she is; 
rather, as she notes, she is Analía and Victoria at the same time.
Victoria’s story of recovering her identity allows the reader to see the complexity 
of the situation and the dilemmas she was facing when she had to decide whether 
or not to undergo the DNA identity test. Her political position has also allowed 
her to relay her experience to others. On one such occasion she gave a statement in 
Parliament when the amendment to the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure was 
debated, She explained that the crimes of forced disappearance and appropriation 
were committed by the terrorist State (i.e., the state when it was ruled by the Armed 
Forces), and these crimes are still being committed today.18 The amendment to the 
law would allow the state to combat the crime, she stressed. She then quoted from the 
letter written by numerous ‘living disappeared’ who were found and their siblings, 
which repositions the state at the centre of the search for identity. They write that 
‘the right to identity is a human right and as such it is inalienable. It is as important 
as the right to life, to liberty and physical integrity. No one has to decide [or has to 
face the decision of] whether or not to exercise that right because it is the State that 
is responsible to guarantee and preserve it’.19 In effect, the passing of the amendment 
repositioned the Argentine state so it can now shape, decide and influence its citizens’ 
identities through their own DNA.
Notes
1. Appropriation, identification, localization and restitution are all terms used in the mass 
media and by human rights organizations in Argentina to describe the process of locating 
an individual who is suspected of being one of the ‘living disappeared’, identifying and 
genetically verifying his biogenetic origins and providing him, along with information 
about his biogenetic history, with the opportunity to reconstitute his or her identity and 
build new kinship relations based on the information revealed through DNA tests.
2. My use of the term ‘truth’ is deliberate: in the search for the ‘living disappeared’, while 
the identity of the individual as she knows herself to be is considered to be fabricated, her 
genetic identity is repeatedly defined by both human rights organizations and the popular 
media as her genuine and authentic identity. 
3. See the right to identity in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, specifically, Articles 
7, 8 and 11.
4. H.I.J.O.S., Hijos por la Identidad y La Justicia contra el Olvido y el Silencio (Sons and 
Daughters for Identity and Justice against Forgetfulness and Silence) is a HRO originally 
made up of the children of the disappeared. This HRO has a number of commissions, 
each focusing on a different aspect of the struggle for human rights in Argentina today. 
Herman@s (brother/sisters), created in 1998, is the commission that focuses on the 
search for the ‘living disappeared’. Members of the commission collaborate with both 
Abuelas and CONADI in actively looking for the ‘living disappeared’, sometimes their 
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own siblings. They believe it might be easier for individuals doubting their identity and 
biological origin to approach people their own age rather than the elderly grandmothers. 
This commission was actively involved in the restitution of Victoria Donda, whose story I 
will discuss in the third part of this chapter. For more information about the organization 
and the commission, see: http://www.hijos-capital.org.ar/index.php?option=com_conten
t&view=article&id=144&Itemid=412.
5. This article is used in legal cases in Argentina to argue for the right to identity. Like other 
human rights documents, the Convention as a whole received full legal standing with the 
reform of the constitution in 1994. Its articles are now as binding as any other article of 
the constitution.
6. Ximena Vicario arrived at an orphanage at the age of nine months after she was forcibly 
abducted with her biological mother who, to this day, remains disappeared. Although her 
adoptive mother was not associated with the military or police, it was established that she 
was aware of the child’s origins and chose to conceal the information from her. Once the 
child was located, the adoptive mother did not cooperate with members of Abuelas and 
pursued a long legal battle to gain custody of the child after that custody was revoked by 
the courts.
7. The commission Herman@s web page states that the search for identity is not only a 
search for one person; it ‘implies a search for [the] identity of a whole generation … 
because as long as there is even one altered identity a whole generation can have doubts 
about his origins’ (http://www.hijos-capital.org.ar/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=144&Itemid=412).
8. With the constitution of CONADI many cases of individuals whose origins are unknown 
were discovered. These cases include, for example, individuals whose date of birth or 
circumstances of adoption do not fit the profile of the ‘living disappeared’ (e.g., they 
were either born before 1975 or after 1980) but who are driven by a need to discover 
their biogenetic origins. In all likelihood, many of these cases are the result of trafficking 
in children and the lenient mechanisms of adoption at the time. Because of the way 
adoption was carried out in Argentina, these individuals have no way of ascertaining their 
biological origin. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that they are not included in 
one of the numerous families who have deposited their DNA in the Bank.
9. All translations from Spanish are my own.
10. For the full text, see http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/0-4999/383/
texact.htm#8. The mendment modifies Article 218B in the Federal Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Código Procesal Penal).
11. Translations from the Spanish legal text are my own.
12. For information on Juan Antonio Azic, see http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/
sociedad/3-128106-2009-07-12.html and http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/tort/
marina/azic/.
13. For more on the ESMA and the task force 3.3.2, see http://juicioalaesma.org.ar/
spip.php?article3 and http://www.cels.org.ar/esma/responsables.html. The task force 
functioned in the ESMA and was responsible for forced disappearances, torture and 
murder of prisoners.
14. A large percentage of Argentine citizens have their roots in Spain, and some have managed 
to maintain their Spanish citizenship. This created a loophole in the justice system that 
allowed Justice Garzón to initiate the prosecutions of members of the Argentine Armed 
Forces who committed human rights crimes.
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15. ‘Necesitaba disculparme porque había descubierto que mi padre era un torturador, 
necesitaba en el fondo que alguien me dijese que tenía el derecho de seguir militando, 
que mi herencia genética no me prohibía continuar luchando por lo que siempre había 
luchado.’
16. This is a common argument made by individuals suspected of being one of the ‘living 
disappeared’ against the blood tests. The close ties they have with the family that raised 
them create a great conflict between their need to find out their true biogenetic identity 
and their desire to protect their appropriators.
17. She adds: ‘I had to understand that all of this was not about Raúl or Graciela, nor was 
it about doing justice, or putting on trial those responsible for the dictatorship. It was 
about me, my identity, my past and my possibilities for a future’ (2009: 192). At the 
time, following the 2003 Supreme Court ruling, it was difficult to demand a blood test; 
moreover, both Abuelas and H.I.J.O.S. believe that individuals should be given time so 
that they can decide themselves whether to undergo the test, instead of it being imposed 
on them.
18. This is an argument commonly heard when the case of the ‘living disappeared’ is discussed. 
The crime is continually committed because the identity was altered and the individual 
does not know about his or her genetic origins. Once the truth is uncovered and made 
known, the crime ceases.
19. Victoria Donda posted her statement to the Parliament on her Facebook profile – for 
further details, see http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=174382355705.
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‘Do You Have Celtic, 
Jewish or Germanic Roots?’
Applied Swiss History before and after DNA
Marianne Sommer
Since the project for sequencing the human genome has been launched, actual and potential applications of medical genetics and gene technology, such as 
preimplantation diagnostics, embryo selection, cloning, genetic modification of 
organisms and personalized medicine, have prompted euphoric as well as alarmist 
assessments regarding their societal impact. Scholars in cultural studies see a new 
genetic determinism and racism at work, and have warned against the possibility 
of a new eugenics and of discrimination on the basis of genetic traits (for example, 
Duster 2003 [1990]; Kevles 1997). On the other hand, the transformative force of 
the new biosciences has also been worked out, such as in the implosion of traditional 
notions of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ and the transcending of conventional ideas of 
kinship (for example, Franklin 2001: 303–25; Haraway 1991, 1992, 1995; Rabinow 
1996 [1992]). As a shorthand, these differences may be reduced to an emphasis on 
either ‘the old’ or ‘the new’: are individual and collective identities, such as races, 
ethnicities or nations, (re)biologized and are we faced with the nightmare of the 
progressive feasibility of eugenics? Or do the specificities of the current political and 
economic context of genetics and genomics render such fears about the (re)animation 
of the demons of the past pointless? Hardly anyone takes a position at either of the 
extreme ends of what is actually a spectrum of estimates. Neither is there a simple 
continuation of ‘old’ biological categories such as types and races, nor has there been 
a complete break away from the ‘old’ triangle of biology, (national) territory and 
quality in a context of globalized, market- and media-driven, neoliberal societies. 
Most importantly, recent scholarship has made clear that the different life sciences 
interact in complex and diverse ways with different contexts of application, resulting 
in a diversity of actual formations along the ‘old/new continuum’ (Sommer 2008a, 
2010, forthcoming).
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In this chapter, I engage with a particular application of a specific genetic 
science mostly in a restricted cultural context: the commercialization of human 
population genetics in a so-called genetic ancestry tracing company that is located 
in Switzerland. Despite a considerable overlap in interests, practices, technologies, 
personae and corporate bodies/institutions, human population genetics (also referred 
to as anthropological genetics or genetic anthropology) differs from medical genetics 
and genomics in important ways, the most obvious being its backwards-orientedness. 
Scientists who are involved in population-genetic projects tend to emphasize that 
(in contrast to medical projects) they produce purely anthropological knowledge, 
by which they mean politically neutral, historical knowledge, without practical/
commercial intent. However, as genetic anthropology is always already involved 
in identity politics of individuals and groups – its goal is the establishment of 
phylogenies and evolutionary histories – this distinction is naïve. It is not that human 
population genetics, in contrast to medical genetics, is not applied; rather, it is the 
specific kinds of application that differ from medical genetics. If we are interested in 
the changes brought about in ‘identity politics’ by the introduction of population-
genetic techniques, we must look at these contexts of application ‘before and after 
DNA’. As indicated by the term ‘genetic history’ often used by practitioners, we are 
dealing with applied kinds of history and historically founded identities (Sommer 
2008a, 2010, forthcoming).
In order to see how the commercial DNA services for the determination of 
one’s kinship and history relate to previous practices of biological and humanistic 
applied history in my case study, I take a brief look at identity-political uses of 
the past in Switzerland. I then move on to the ways in which the genetic ancestry 
tracing company under concern enters this cultural space. I analyse appearances 
and representations of the company (mainly) in the Swiss media, and some of the 
ways in which (mainly) Swiss customers appropriate personalized genetic history 
and identity. As we will see, the forms of implementing, engaging with or rejecting 
genetic knowledge differ between customer groups. In the end, I return to some 
aspects of the question about ‘old versus new identity politics after DNA’ in relation 
to my particular case study.
Applied Swiss History before DNA: Ur-folk, Helvetians and Homo alpinus
Guy Marchal (2006) has studied historical culture and the politics of history in 
Switzerland. More precisely, he introduces the term Gebrauchsgeschichte, which refers 
to the temporary conversion of history into an article of everyday use; it designates a 
history serviceable to a particular (identity political) goal in a given cultural context. It 
conceptualizes what I mean by the English term ‘applied history’. Marchal shows that 
as early as the fifteenth century, the Swiss believed themselves to be a chosen people 
in analogy to the Israelites. They built a myth of themselves as an Ur-folk (Urvolk), an 
indigenous people with the right to self-government. This notion served to counter 
the accusation that the peasant uprising (Bauernaufstand) was a sin against a God-
given social order. Because the legitimation of the claim for freedom against the 
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entitlement of the nobility and princes was founded on an origin as an independent 
rural folk, the peasant became the figure of identity for the Swiss Confederation. 
While in the course of the seventeenth century, it was displaced by the invention of the 
virgin Helvetia, the peasant, specified as an alpine shepherd, was revived as a central 
trope during the Enlightenment. The stereotypical character of the Swiss people as 
for example marked by incorruptibility – so famously sung about in Albrecht von 
Haller’s poem of the Alps (Die Alpen, 1729) – became inextricably linked with the 
mountainous country. Coupled with ideas from natural right philosophy, the claim 
of originally free and frugal primitives served the causes of both political reform and 
moral education.
With the foundation of the nation state in 1848, the story of the autochthon 
mountain people turned into a national myth. By the end of the century, this myth 
stood in opposition to a critical history written by a modern scholarly discipline, 
but it had important political work to do. Switzerland was surrounded by nations 
that increasingly founded their identity on a common race and language. The Swiss 
therefore felt pressed to justify the existence of a plurilingual and ethnically diverse 
state of the size of Switzerland in the midst of much larger and more homogeneous 
nations. The response was a national discourse that based the ‘oldest republic on 
earth’ not on racial unity but on a common history marked by democracy and 
independence. The Swiss national identity was therefore not primarily sought in a 
common biology; rather, it was rationalized by means of a shared history and beliefs 
that gave unity to racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity. However, this is 
not to say that there were no attempts to apply the Aryan theory to Switzerland (for 
example by Paul Lang of the National Front) or to define the nation biologically (see 
Kreis 1992).
A relatively harmless but popular example of the latter approach is the attempt 
of the archeologist Karl Keller-Tarnuzzer (1936) to provide the Swiss with a deep 
history and longstanding identity through such channels as the newspaper of the 
canton Thurgau (Thurgauer Zeitung). He built two pillars for Swiss identity to rest 
on, which he drove as deep as possible into the archaeological layers. The first pillar 
was the antique tribes of the Rhaetians (Räter) and the Helvetians. As was common at 
the time, Keller-Tarnuzzer thought that the Rhaetians had descended from Veneto-
Illyrer, who immigrated into the eastern part of today’s Switzerland around 400 
bc (a theory that has been increasingly discarded since the 1950s). The Helvetians 
belonged to the Indo-Germanic people of the Celts and Gauls, who inhabited the 
country between Lake Geneva and the Rhine. There were additional Celtic tribes 
such as the Rauriker in the area of today’s cantons of Basle and Berne, the Allobroger 
in the canton of Geneva, the poeninischen tribes in the canton of Wallis and the 
Lepontier in the south. To make matters worse, there were also successive invasions 
into the area of Switzerland. Besides the Romans (15 bc), Germanic tribes entered 
these regions from the fourth century onwards; these were mostly Alemanni in today’s 
German-speaking part, Burgundians in the French-speaking part and Langobards 
in the Italian-speaking part. Confronted with what could easily indicate historical 
discontinuity and ethnic diversity, Keller-Tarnuzzer chose to concentrate on the 
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Rhaetians and Helvetians, and to emphasize how they had stubbornly maintained 
their own tradition during Roman rule and in the face of the invasion of Germanic 
tribes.
Keller-Tarnuzzer described these Helvetian Celts after Poseidonius as tall, blond 
warriors with scrubby manes hardened by soap and with moustaches covering their 
mouths. Once upon a time, they wore long trousers and sleevecoats under plaid-
collar jackets and were amply decorated with golden rings and necklaces. Their minds 
were sharp, their words as quick-witted as their weapons were fast. Constantly thirsty 
and cantankerous, they sat on the bare ground in their round huts, roistering and 
boasting, pleasing themselves in tragic poses, then suddenly falling into bloody strife. 
In battle, they wore man-sized shields, long swords and lances, and helmets adorned 
with horns or animal figures; their war cries were as fearsome as their defiance of 
death.
Keller-Tarnuzzer’s second pillar was the lake dwellers. Their role for Swiss 
identity becomes most obvious in the last chapter of the offprint Die Herkunft des 
Schweizervolkes (The Origin of the Swiss Folk/Nation/People), headed ‘Swiss Blood’ 
(‘Schweizerblut’). Here, one recognizes the motivation for his search of Swiss biological 
origins in the fear of an appropriation of Switzerland – at least of its Alemanni – 
by the Third Reich. His strategy was to distinguish between visible or superficial 
cultural difference and hidden or essential biological unity: even though culturally 
and linguistically the Swiss might seem a conglomerate of Germans, French and 
Italians, biohistory proved the Helvetian unity. This is where the lake dwellers came 
in. These original inhabitants, who once populated the area of today’s Switzerland 
quite densely, had not been displaced by the later immigrants into the territory; 
rather, their blood blended with that of the incoming Celtic and Germanic tribes. 
It was through this biological heritage reaching back in time to the Stone Age that 
Keller-Tarnuzzer defined the unity of the contemporary Swiss and their difference 
from the northern neighbour: ‘There can be no doubt that the blood of the lake 
dwellers lives on in today’s Swiss, and not to a small degree’ (1936: 32, translation 
mine). In his instrumentalization of the lake dwellers at this moment of crisis, Keller-
Tarnuzzer could draw on a living and applied history that had revived ‘the ancestors 
of the Swiss’ at world exhibitions, in theatres, as motifs in the fine arts, as themes in 
pageants, etc., since the first discoveries in the middle of the previous century. Not 
only did different segments of the Swiss populace in the second half of the nineteenth 
century imagine and engage with the legacy of the lake dwellers differently, they 
could also both serve to illustrate cultural progress from humble beginnings to the 
present state of industrialization and at the same time – towards the end of the 
century – warn against the corrupting effects of too much civilization and the decay 
of bourgeois virtues (Kaeser 2009; Kauz 2000).
Another biohistorical trope from applied Swiss history is Homo alpinus – the 
biologization of the Swiss alpine peasant myth. As early as the opening decades of 
the eighteenth century, the Ur-Swiss (Urschweizer) were described in Johann Jakob 
Scheuchzer’s natural history as alpine dairymen (Senn) and hunters (Gemsjäger), 
similar to the first people on earth. In accordance with the environmental theory of 
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the day, he thought the Swiss – their physical, mental and moral nature – had been 
moulded by the rough life in the Alps. Scheuchzer was therefore instrumental for the 
construction of Homo alpinus (helveticus), a strong, healthy, hardworking, patient, 
perseverant, good-natured but autonomous human type. According to Scheuchzer, 
the type’s prudence, courage, piety and moderation suited him well for the arts, the 
sciences and in particular for warfare. Scheuchzer’s understanding was also illustrative 
of the melding of the belief in an originally free Swiss – in his case biocultural – type 
with demands for democratic rights grounded in natural law (Scheuchzer 1746; see 
also Marchal 2006: 68–69; Kempe 2003: Chapter 9).
In the second half of the nineteenth century – again following general trends 
in the history of anthropology – Homo alpinus was defined more rigorously in 
biological terms by Karl Ernst von Bear. Von Bear conferred this species name to the 
Rhaetians, drawing on their description by Anders Adolf Retzius as a brachycephalic, 
that is broad- and short-headed, pre-Celtic Ur-race of the Swiss Alps. Like the Swiss 
peasant, shepherd, dairyman or hunter, the brachycephals in general were regarded 
as indigenous people of Europe, but in contrast to the international philhelvetian 
image of the Swiss alpine primitives predominant during the Enlightenment, the 
brachycephals’ capacity for culture was considered to be limited (Schmutz 2006).
In the maelstrom of the growing measurement-craze in physical anthropology, 
attempts were made to fix the fluid figures of the lake dwellers, the Helvetians and 
Homo alpinus in bone. The paleontologist Ludwig Rütimeyer and the physician and 
anatomist Wilhelm His (1864) analysed towards 200 ‘Swiss’ crania to determine 
the typological composition of Switzerland. In the historical crania, they identified 
the remains of ‘our Celtic ancestors’, the Helvetians, as well as of the Romans and 
Burgundians – types that they also discerned in pure and mixed states in the present 
populace. They ascribed the prehistoric skulls of the lake dwellers they had at their 
disposal to the same tribe as the Helvetians. However, the largest part of today’s 
Swiss, about three-quarters, were attributable to a type named Homo alpinus by 
von Bear, which Rütimeyer and His speculated might have had the same origin 
as the Alemanni who later entered the territory of today’s Switzerland. But rather 
than following the traditional interpretation of the ‘small’ brachycephalic skulls 
as deficient, they questioned the association between cranial and mental capacity 
(Rütimeyer and His 1864).
The analysis of the biological types of the Swiss was brought to its empirical 
apex at the chair for anthropology installed at the University of Zurich under Rudolf 
Martin. By 1932, Martin’s successor, Otto Schlaginhaufen, who had earlier tried the 
tools of his trade on lake-dweller remains, had measured 35,000 recruits. However, 
in the attempt that was now clearly driven by the institute’s interest in (Swiss) race 
hygiene, Homo alpinus dissolved, with only about two per cent of the population 
attributable to what he considered the pure Swiss type (Schlaginhaufen 1946 and 
1959; see also Chaoui 2004; Keller 2006).
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Applied Swiss History after DNA: iGenea
Nowadays, we may react to the historical attempts to find the Swiss biological type 
of Homo alpinus, and to establish the Swiss bloodline linking lake dwellers with the 
Celtic Helvetians and other antique tribes who inhabited the territory of today’s 
Switzerland, with bemusement, or with incomprehension where they were situated 
in a context of racial hygiene and race science. Who would be interested in the 
biological composition of the Swiss populace from Ur- and antique folks (Urvölker)? 
Those who share this attitude might be surprised to encounter the question ‘Do you 
have Celtic, Jewish or Germanic roots?’ on the website of iGenea, a service package 
of the Swiss company Gentest.ch.1 Even more surprising might be the method of 
settling this question for the individual customer. iGenea invites to ‘discover your 
history’ from your DNA. Two years ago, the directors of Gentest.ch (which became 
a limited liability company in 2002) – one is a biologist – suspected that there was 
a European market for the genetic determination of ancestry and history. The Swiss 
company set out to enrich the range of their DNA products of paternity, relatedness 
and forensic tests with iGenea, a genetic ‘origins and ancestors’ product line with its 
own website.2
Customers may choose how many markers their Y-chromosome and/or 
mitochondrial DNA should be tested for, and they can combine tests, so that the 
prices currently range from about 200 to about 500 CHF. The DNA analyses are 
said to provide information on the customer’s haplogroup, antic/indigenous people 
(Urvolk, antiquity, 900 bc to ad 900) and country of origin (Ursprungsland, Middle 
Ages, eleventh to thirteenth century). The haplogroup test leads back to the Stone 
Age. Haplogroups are described as the branches of the human family tree that 
has its roots in our molecular first parents in Africa. Human population genetics 
has reconstructed and is still reconstructing the relationships between and the 
migration patterns and current geographical distribution of these groups by means of 
comparative DNA analyses. While the haplogroup test is widely offered by genetic 
genealogy companies and potentially directed towards customers from all over the 
world, Gentest.ch has developed the genetic identification of one’s ‘antic/indigenous 
people’ particularly for the European market. This test assigns the customer’s 
maternal and/or paternal genetic line to the Celts, Germanic tribes, Illyrians, Slavs, 
Vikings, Iberians, Scythians, Arabians, Berbers, Persians, Turkish peoples, Finno-
Ugric peoples, Baltic peoples, Huns, Gepids, Alans and Vandals, among others. 
These are variously called Urvölker in German and ‘antic’ or ‘indigenous people’ and 
‘primitive tribes’ in English.3
In order to be able to determine a customer’s ‘antic/indigenous people’, the 
company must have a so-called genetic profile of these tribes. Reminiscent of ideas 
such as those held by Keller-Tarnuzzer, Rütimeyer and His, the Ur-folks are thus 
understood not primarily in cultural terms but in biological terms:
iGENEA has specialized in the genetic origins of Europeans and can now 
genetically define numerous historical antic peoples. By antic peoples, we 
refer here to people groups from Antiquity who are defined not only by 
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their own language, culture and history but also by their own DNA-profile. 
What is important is not the common linguistic ancestry or the historical-
anthropological categorization, but the individual genetic characteristics of 
a people.4
Again comparable to cranial types, the genetic profiles of ‘indigenous/antic peoples’ 
make it possible to also make statements with regard to national constituencies. 
For example, the company has published statistics indicating that the populace of 
today’s Switzerland represents the following percentages of Urvölker: 55 per cent 
Celts, 30 per cent Teutons, 10 per cent Jews and 5 per cent Slavs.5 So, according to 
Gentest.ch/iGenea, the Swiss are a nation of mixed ancestry with a strong Celtic and 
Germanic influence. No big surprises here. Rather than being a revolution in Swiss 
identity, what used to be put in terms of ‘Swiss blood or bone’ is now referred to in 
terms of genes. But the notion of a certain biological heritage no longer comes along 
with the stereotyping of a people’s temperament or potential – or does it? The term 
‘profile’ must be misleading in this context. After all, as human population geneticists 
emphasize, in contrast to (the metaphor of) blood, the profile of the physiognomist, 
and the cranial shape of the phrenologist and racial anthropologist, the epistemic 
object of their science says nothing about capacity or character – not even about 
looks. The areas of DNA studied in the genetic analysis are (mostly) presumed to be 
without function and are referred to as noncoding or, more colloquially, junk DNA. 
In other words, the new method of reconstructing biological identity, kinship and 
history involves pieces of DNA that are believed to be unconnected to the phenotype. 
From this supposed phenotypic neutrality of the epistemic object, it is often inferred 
that the science and the knowledge it creates are also neutral (see Sommer 2008b, 
2010; on epistemic objects, see Rheinberger 1997).
However, when Gentest.ch tapped into intra-Swiss issues of identity, the notion 
of the Ur-Swiss, the true Helvetians, (re)emerged – and it came with traits. The Swiss 
public TV series Einstein broadcast a show about the genetic difference between the 
inhabitants of the towns of Basle and Zurich. The goal was to find out whether the 
legendary rivalry between the two towns had a genetic basis. To this purpose, the 
programme had Gentest.ch/iGenea test nine men with a pedigree firmly based in 
each of the towns (five generations in Basle and Zurich respectively, Y-chromosomal 
and mtDNA analyses). The ‘Ur-Baslesians’ (Urbasler) turned out to belong mainly 
to haplogroup R who had entered Europe from Siberia some 25,000 years ago. The 
following ancestral percentages were established: 49 per cent Rauriker (Celts), 22 
per cent Germanic tribes, 11 per cent Slavs and 6 per cent for each of the categories 
of Vikings, Jews and Phoenicians. In contrast, the ‘Ur-Zurichians’ (Urzürcher) were 
largely defined as descendants of haplogroup I who had entered Europe from the 
Arabic peninsula. Their DNA (or the fragments that were analysed) was made up 
of 50 per cent Helvetian (Celts), 33 per cent Germanic, 11 per cent Viking and 
6 per cent Slav ancestry. These results were not only interpreted as documenting 
that the Baslesians and Zurichians indeed have very different origins. Because of the 
Helvetian ancestry, the (then) Managing Director of iGenea called the inhabitants 
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of Zurich the original or indigenous Swiss (Urschweizer). This did more than fulfil 
the expectations these ‘true’ Zurichians had in the test. Despite its obviously bogus 
character (research questions, very small sample size, similar percentage of Celtic 
origin), the DNA test seemed to lend support to the mutual stereotypes as voiced by 
the men on the show: the people from Basle are among other things self-opinionated 
and those from Zurich are arrogant and without humor. Most importantly, the 
DNA show revived the myth of the Helvetian Celts as biologically distinct and as the 
indigenous Swiss people (Schweizer Urvolk).6
Gentest.ch/iGenea has dared to proceed even further with DNA testing as 
divinatory practice, to follow Stephan Palmié’s (2007) interpretation. The media 
reported the company’s claim that the heated nature of the soccer matches between 
Basle and Zurich could be explained by the Viking and Germanic genes – and it did 
not stop here:
These militant genes can explain … ‘the fighting spirit’ in soccer. The 
Zurichians, on their part, have more Helvetian ancestors, who were engaged 
in trade early on – and thus laid the basis for the trading town of Zurich. 
According to the SF-experts, the greater Celtic share also allows an inference 
on why cutting-edge medicine is located in Zurich. The Celts are well 
known for their Druids, ‘the top-physicians of old’. (‘Die Gene sind an 
allem Schuld’ 2008, www.heute-online.ch;7 see also Rafi 2008)
Obviously, some of these ‘biotribal attributes’ are older than television. In fact, Keller-
Tarnuzzer already identified the medical vocation as one of the – if general – Swiss 
characteristics, and it is interesting to compare the old descriptions of the Helvetian 
Celts as fearsome warriors who like to wear plaid with the somewhat comical 
image provided by Gentest.ch on the iGenea website (see http://www.igenea.ch/
index.php?c=42&lp=66). Accordingly, Palmié’s observation with regard to genetic 
anthropology also seems to be applicable to the pre-DNA history of the physical-
temperamental determination of the Swiss: ‘Genomics, like divination, gives material 
shape to, and thereby reproduces as social reality, the ideologies of invisible essences 
and agencies on which they are based’ (2007: 207).
Although in these instances ‘junk DNA’ is far from unrelated to the phenotype, 
Gentest.ch/iGenea’s genetic divination is most likely meant and understood 
as a practical joke. In case it would be taken seriously (possibly by a humourless 
Zurichian), Gentest.ch/iGenea, like other genetic ancestry companies, could point 
to the many places where it disclaimed racial, ethnic or national essences. In this 
respect, the article on Gentest.ch/iGenea in the magazine of the Swiss retailer Migros 
is telling. Under the again somewhat Keller-Tarnuzzerian motto of ‘the blood that 
pulsates through our veins’ (‘welches Blut in unseren Adern pulsiert’), we are informed 
of the diverse ancestries Gentest.ch/iGenea has genetically established for the Swiss. 
The meaning of this on the individual level is illustrated by the figure of Renzo 
Blumenthal, an ex-Mr Switzerland. Blumenthal embodies the myth of the Swiss as a 
people of pristine peasants, shepherds or dairymen whose character is part and parcel 
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of their way of life in the mountainous country. The ex-Mr Switzerland speaks the 
old language of Rhaeto-Romanic still found in parts of his alpine home region, the 
Grisons (Vella im Val Lumnezia), where he lives with his cows of the Swiss Brown 
breed. The Swiss tourism agency used the image of Blumenthal as a Homo alpinus 
to lure German women into Switzerland during the World Cup of 2006 that took 
place in Germany. The slogan ‘Switzerland’s most handsome man Renzo Blumenthal 
grins after milking a satisfied-looking cow’ on Spiegel online is accompanied by a 
photograph of Blumenthal as pure ‘Swissness’ (retrieved 1 March 2011 from http://
www.spiegel.de/fotostrecke/fotostrecke-13416-3.html). But iGenea has made out a 
Scottish ancestry (eleventh and twelfth centuries) for this essence of ‘Swissness’. The 
myth of an original Swiss people à la Homo alpinus is here only evoked to be refuted. 
The subversion is wonderfully visualized in a photograph showing Blumenthal in a 
kilt and with pipes (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore, despite the DNA test, Blumenthal 
is a Scot by choice, because his maternal ancestry has been traced to German-
speaking Europe for the same time period (Bieler 2007). That Blumenthal chooses 
to appropriate the Scottish identity must be attributed to the current Scottish ethno-
hype as it is celebrated in films, at festivals, by music bands and in computer games 
(see Hesse 2008) rather than to a biological determinism associated with DNA 
testing.
Figure 5.1. Ex-Mr Switzerland Renzo 
Blumenthal Celebrates his ‘Scottish 
Genes’. Photo © René Ruis, used with 
permission.
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A similarly flexible and open engagement with genetic roots is for example evidenced 
by Philippe Welti, who was portrayed in the media as someone who had been 
convinced of a Latino ancestry, only to find out through iGenea DNA tests that his 
Y-chromosome is from Sweden and belongs to the Ur-folk of the Vikings, while his 
mtDNA makes it possible to trace him to Germany and to Germanic tribes. The most 
serious concern arising from this new identity is for Welti to decide whether he should 
now favour the Swedes and Germans at the European soccer games (Welti 2008).
With Welti and Blumenthal we have entered the sphere of personal genetic 
history and identity, which lie at the heart of the iGenea commercial services – even if 
these are never independent from the genetic profiles of groups such as ‘indigenous/
antic peoples’. The reactions of the two men to the unexpected test results seem 
quite representative of the average iGenea customer of which there are only several 
thousand in Switzerland. While Welti was disappointed in his attempt to find the 
genetic basis of his love for a warm climate, the sea, Italian cuisine and French wine, he 
was quick to link his haplogroup result to his interest in Islam and the Arabic world. 
Blumenthal, on his part, considered acquiring a couple of Scottish highland cows. 
Other statements from Swiss iGenea customers regarding the genetic determination 
of ‘their indigenous people’ are in a similar vein:
To my great surprise, we learned through a DNA-Test that we are descended 
from the sea-faring Phoenicians. Moreover, we learned that our ancestors 
came from the modern-day Lebanon/Syria with their city states such as Tyre 
and Carthage, sailing to Italy, and must have migrated to Switzerland from 
there. It is really fascinating to find out that genes can tell us so much. 
It also seems personally fascinating to me that I always felt drawn to the 
Mediterranean as a child. Maybe there’s more passed on in our genes than 
we think.8
Many thanks for your rich answers and for my ‘desired result’. It is somehow 
strange. Since I have been about 20 (now 38) I have been drawn to the 
North … my interest were growing more strongly towards the Vikings. 
Bought a lot of literature and somehow a curious familiarity arose at old 
Scandinavian sites. Perhaps the genes store more than we know.9
Like many other customers, these have internalized the metaphor of a historical 
narrative written into our DNA and have entangled the genetic identity and history 
with their autobiographical memory. The gene is here a mystical object, through 
which an individual can inscribe himself or herself into a fantastically present past 
(see Sommer 2008a, 2008b). Again, the flexibility and ease with which personal 
memories and information derived from DNA analysis are mutually accommodated 
suggest that there is nothing particularly unsettling about genetic history. Nor is it 
associated with the search for a Swiss biological essence – other than in an obviously 
humourous way. Rather, as the above quotes indicate, people combine ancestry 
tracing by DNA with other products from a genealogy and living history industry 
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such as historical exhibitions, books and TV documentaries about history, historical 
novels, mythos films, historical (re)enactments and history parks. iGenea customers 
exchange information on such sources to provide the names of their ‘indigenous 
peoples’ with stories and to put faces on their DNA sequences.
For the same reason – i.e., the production of meaning and the tapping into the 
cultural/national memory – iGenea plays on the old myth of the original Helvetians, 
and the media ransacks the junk room of Swiss Gebrauchsgeschichte. They thus spice 
up the genetically derived numbers with bits and pieces of well-known stereotypes, 
such as the Helvetian Celts and the Swiss peasants and mountain people. But at the 
same time, the lake dwellers experience a new hype without the help of genetics. 
For example, in 2007, ten Swiss selected by Swiss public television withdrew to a 
reconstructed village of lake dwellers (Gemeinde Pfyn, Thurgau, thirty-eighth century 
bc) to try their hand at Neolithic sustenance. For four weeks, they engaged in a living 
science experiment under the close scrutiny of the TV viewers at home.10 To give 
another example, the open-space museum Laténium on the shore of Lake Neuchâtel 
offers visitors an experiential and experimental grand tour through our history, from 
the Neanderthals via the Celts to the lifeworld of people in the Middle Ages. Here 
too, the lake dwellers play a special role. A temporary exhibition has recently been 
devoted to them and was reported in the Swiss media as news about ‘our ancestors’ 
(Büchi 2009). The exhibit and the accompanying catalogue introduce the curious 
into the magical world of their symbolic uses in Swiss history (Kaeser 2009).
Like Gentest.ch/iGenea’s indigenous peoples, the lake dwellers – the history of 
the archaeological interpretation of whom actually shows a strong reliance on images 
of indigenous peoples from colonial settings (Kauz 2000) – are (re)enacted at the 
interface between past and present and science and public typical of a particular genre 
of the multimediated and commercially driven histotainment culture. While this 
kind of national and regional living history is currently booming in Switzerland, it is 
a far cry from a nationalist and racialist search for a ‘Swiss biology’.11 Indeed, for some 
people, including myself and a journalist of the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger, the 
genetically attributed identity remains without any meaning and consequence at all:
So far, so good. But what does it mean for my future life? Does it help me 
cope with a possible midlife crisis? To whom do I have to feel connected, 
the Syrians or the Israelis? And on whose side should I stand in the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict, according to my genes? Such questions are of course 
nonsensical. Their meaninglessness indicates of how little actual use DNA-
ancestry tracing is to the individual. It does not constitute any reason for 
changing of one’s life. (Zedi 2009, translation mine)
If taken too seriously, if applied to real personal problems rather than the shaping 
of avatars, if linked to the complexity of history rather than the simplicity of myth, 
if connected to questions of war rather than sports, the DNA game does not work.
Accordingly, the iGenea genetic tests are regarded as funny Christmas and 
birthday presents, as yet another cyberspace hype in the times of Facebook, where 
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the company advertises in the following ways: chat with your genetic cousins 
found through the company’s databank, exchange information on your genealogy 
and expertise of human population genetics with your virtual friends and enhance 
your genetic data with living history. In other words, the findings so far support 
assessments of the new genetics more generally along the lines of those of Nikolas 
Rose. Rather than a genetic naturalization of individual and collective essences, we find 
a personalized, flexible identity politics at work. Genetic identity and history here are 
not destiny – if anything, they are commodity and project (on genetic genealogy, see 
Rose 2007: 176–79; see also Rose and Rabinow 2006). This is also in agreement with 
the self-image of Gentest.ch, which regards iGenea as services to a lifestyle society in 
which the younger generations are no longer willing to spend time in libraries, not 
to mention archives. The line provides ready-made products that address the living 
history boom – a customized exciting past spiced up by means of DNA technology. 
The company explains its success on the basis of a hunger for individual roots and 
history which, although an anthropological universal, is aggravated in ‘a world of 
nearly unlimited interconnectedness of persons, of globalization, of cosmopolitans’ 
(Apter 2008, translation mine).
Despite the lightheartedness with which the tests are commonly greeted, a few 
voices in the Swiss media have been more critical. These have even induced a member 
of the Swiss Council of States, Luc Recordon of the Green Party, to submit an 
interpellation to the federal executive (‘Verwendung von DNA-Tests für rassistische 
Zwecke’/‘Usage of DNA Tests for Racist Aims’, 3 March 2008). Recordon was 
particularly alarmed by the iGenea service for the genetic determination of Jewish 
ancestry. He challenged the scientific basis of the test, but especially pointed to the 
danger of empowering a meaningless racial term to the degree that people would be 
judged on its basis. However, the Swiss Federal Council did not feel alarmed. It did 
not want to prohibit genealogy tests and argued that ancestry determination by DNA 
is subject to existing legislation on the genetic analysis of humans in general. These 
regulations protect against any kind of discrimination on the basis of genotypes.12
Recordon’s concerns regarding the Jewish ancestry test seem to represent a 
minority opinion. In Switzerland, the only really negative reaction came from the 
low-quality daily 20 Minuten (its name, 20 Minutes, is a fair indicator of its civic 
value). On its pages, the iGenea DNA analysis was referred to as Judentest and 
Johanne Gurfinkiel, general secretary of the Intercommunity coordination against 
anti-Semitism and defamation (CICAD), compared it to the practices of the 
Ariernachweise in National Socialist Germany (Melillo 2008). As soon as this news 
appeared on the online forum SideEffects, Gentest.ch intervened and claimed that 
the Jewish community was not alarmed. It is true that Gentest.ch had no negative 
publicity in the Jewish media such as Tachles and Hagalil; it might not be unimportant 
that one of the company’s founders is Ashkenazi.13
The issue over the iGenea tests for Jewish ancestry already arose after a media 
report on the statistical contribution of different ‘indigenous peoples’ to the current 
German population provided by Gentest.ch. It first appeared in Bild am Sonntag and 
was widely taken up from there. The main topic of the Bild article was made obvious 
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in its title: ‘Deutsche Frauen sind deutscher als deutsche Männer’ (‘German Women 
are More German than German Men’). The fact that this reads like a tautology is 
because there is no differentiation between the diverse uses of ‘German’. In one case 
the term refers to current citizenship and in the other case to a genetic profile that 
has been associated with Germanic tribes. The ways in which the two meanings are 
used suggest that there is a true essence of ‘Germanness’ that rests on a biohistorical 
connectedness to a particular ancient people who inhabited the territory of today’s 
Germany. However unconsciously or naïvely, notions of purity and otherness are 
here transported. Despite the fact that the ten per cent of Jewish ancestry found 
in the ‘German samples’ was interpreted as illustrating the entangled histories, one 
could easily interpret the article as saying that anyone who has German citizenship, 
but whose ancestry cannot be traced back to Germanic tribes, is not a real German. 
Here is a remark of an iGenea produced ‘Germanic-descendant’: ‘I have received 
my result a few days ago. I would have been pleased by any result, Celt or Viking 
or whatever. But to have Germanic roots and thus to feel like an original inhabitant 
[Ureinwohnerin] is also appealing.’14
This problem lies at the heart of genetic ancestry tracing, the discourses 
surrounding which tend to emphasize the genetic insights into the diversity of 
today’s nations/ethnicities and the complex genetic ancestries of living individuals, 
while there are also always instances where this ‘old news’ is simultaneously being 
subverted, even if only to produce a catchy media title. If one of the now genetically 
profiled ‘indigenous peoples’ who is shown to be part of the genetic makeup of a 
nation has historically been more closely associated with that nation’s identity than 
others, the carriers of that profile might come to be seen as particularly representative 
of that nation. Furthermore, by only including in such studies DNA samples of 
people who give the country under concern as their place of origin, the percentages 
arrived at do not represent the actual current population of, let us say, Germany, 
but a utopian German nation cleared from more recent immigrations. Both points 
obviously also hold true for the statistics of the ‘indigenous peoples of Switzerland’ 
and the identification of the Helvetian Celts as the original Swiss people (for this 
problem in British genetic history and identity, see Sommer 2008a).
We therefore find replicated on a European scale what has been observed on a 
global scale. In the reconstruction of the history of humankind, human population 
genetics relies on indigenous peoples in the more common sense. Geneticists regard 
the gene pools of current societies whom they consider as historically isolated and 
little mixed, i.e., the aboriginal and insular peoples, and ethnic minorities, as more 
informative than those of industrialized and strongly admixed societies. A similar 
method is applied when in the attempt to arrive at the statistical composition of 
current European nations from antic peoples, biologists analyse those individuals 
they suspect of having a long pedigree in that country. However, when moving down 
the scale from a global to a European national, an interesting value reversal takes 
place. Cultural and social analysts have shown that the reconstruction of the family 
tree and history of all humankind goes along with a notion of the indigenous peoples, 
by means of whose DNA this knowledge is produced, as ‘fossilized’ – as if they 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Applied Swiss History before and after DNA  129
were relics from past advanced civilizations (Reardon 2005). This long-established 
disparity between the people whose history is being reconstructed and the people 
who are the sources of this reconstruction shows some correlation with the north-
south distribution of power and wealth (Sleebom-Faulkner 2007). Conversely, 
my discussion of Gentest.ch/iGenea and my work on other countries suggest 
that in Britain (Sommer 2008a), Switzerland and Germany, and as we will see in 
other states as well, ‘indigenous’ is the thing to be. At the same time, in the last 
Gentest.ch/iGenea example I now turn to, it becomes obvious that this kind of 
‘European (national) indigenousness’ can be associated with territorial and political 
claims not unlike those of native tribes/indigenous peoples/ethnic minorities 
elsewhere (see, for example, TallBear 2008 for the case of Native American tribes; for 
an overview, see Sommer 2010).
My last example concerns young people with links to the Balkan nations, who 
make up a large part of Gentest.ch/iGenea’s customers. Information about the 
genetics of these nations (percentage constitution of ‘antic/indigenous peoples’) and 
of such individuals created and provided by the company continues to provoke heated 
discussions on the respective iGenea-forums, so much so that entire threads have been 
closed. One particularly controversial piece of genetic information are the percentages 
of ‘antic/indigenous peoples’ of the (former Yugoslavian) Republic of Macedonia 
that Gentest.ch/iGenea put on the web platform. It indicates that today’s inhabitants 
of the Republic of Macedonia have the ancient Makedonians as their main genetic 
ancestors. This was interpreted by some discussants as establishing the right of the 
EU candidate to the name ‘Macedonia’, a right that is called into question by Greece, 
which regards itself as the heir of the Makedonian history and contains a region of 
that name. However, according to Gentest.ch/iGenea, the current Greek population 
has only five per cent of antic Makedonian ancestry. Customers of Greek origin with 
connections to the Republic of Macedonia directed many questions to iGenea in 
an attempt to have genetics on their side in the issue of ‘the real Macedonians’. In a 
similar way to the notion that today’s inhabitants of Zurich are the Ur-Swiss because 
of a supposedly higher percentage of Helvetian origin, or that those Germans with 
Germanic roots are somehow more German than others, the allegedly considerable 
Makedonian contribution to the present population of the Republic of Macedonia 
became the defining element. In other words, even though according to the rhetoric 
of Gentest.ch/iGenea, genetics proves that there are no pure nations or races, it is at 
times one particular Ur-folk (Urvolk) that becomes identified with a populace. In one 
instance even the iGenea spokesperson wrote: ‘Yes, a Macedonian can say that he [sic] 
is Makedonian originally … Only a DNA-analysis can provide us with an absolutely 
certain answer.’15
Although in the quote identity is individualized, the assumption remains that 
one genetic line of descent determines who a person is, or even who he or she is 
entitled to claim to be. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the discussions 
on the forums escalated at times and included mutual accusations of racism (one 
customer even referred to the Swiss anti-racism legislation). Instead of demonstrating 
an awareness that the genetic information provided by the company was being 
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implicated in an ongoing identity-political controversy, the iGenea representative 
repeatedly warned the discussants (on this forum and elsewhere) not to engage in 
propaganda. Messages were/are censored on the grounds that iGenea, and genetics 
more generally, are apolitical! Exacerbated, one forum discussant pleads: ‘Dear 
IGENEA, the issue is very serious and I beg for your cooperation. Will it or not 
the matter IS political and is being used thus.’16 Indeed, the news about the genetic 
statistics and even the statement of the iGenea spokesperson quoted above have 
travelled beyond the iGenea sites to Macedonian webpages, where they are used as 
arguments for the legitimacy of the state, its name and its position in Europe.17
Obviously, the politicization of the genetic information does not begin with 
its commercial application through Gentest.ch/iGenea, it starts with the scientific 
study. The various statistics on the genetic makeup of current nations provided by 
iGenea are averages derived from published scientific sources. Even though in the 
case of Macedonia, iGenea refers to studies that compared the genetics of present-day 
Macedonians from mountainous regions and Makedonian finds from antiquity on 
its website and forums, when asking for the sources of the Macedonian data, I was 
mainly referred to Arnaiz-Villena et al. (2001) (something that also happened to other 
costumers asking the same question). This is a study carried out by the Department of 
Immunology and Molecular Biology of the Universidad Complutense, Madrid, and 
of the Tissue Typing Laboratory, Institute of Blood Transfusion, Skopje, Republic of 
Macedonia. They allegedly found that Macedonians belong to the older substratum 
of Mediterraneans (Iberians, North Africans, Italians, French, Cretans, Jews, 
Lebanese, Turks, Armenians and Iranians) and are not related to the geographically 
close Greeks, who, on the contrary, do not belong to this old stratum but show 
genetic affinity to Ethiopians (sub-Saharan Africans). The scientists concluded that:
[t]his supports the theory that Macedonians are one of the most ancient 
peoples existing in the Balkan peninsula, probably long before arrival of 
the Mycaenian Greeks (10) about 2000 B.C. … Thus, it is hypothesized 
that there could have been a migration from southern Sahara which mixed 
with ancient Greeks to give rise to a part of the present day Greek genetic 
background … Indeed, ancient Greeks believed that their religion and 
culture came from Egypt. (ibid 2001: 125–26)
While this study belongs to the common sort that tries to prove that one Southeastern 
European country is more ‘European than another’ rather than constituting the source 
for the iGenea-statistics, it has incited further mutual insults on the forums. Some 
read it to say that ‘Greeks are Africans and Macedonians Europeans’. It is significant 
that the historical scholarship the arguments draw on consists of encyclopaedias and 
compendia of languages and peoples as well as Penguin historical atlases.18
Despite all this, Gentest.ch/iGenea continues to distance itself from actual 
cultural and political contexts. But while the fact that iGenea sells a genetic kind of 
history may be of little impact for a customer such as Blumenthal, i.e., Mr Switzerland, 
the specific authority of a genetic definition can become a central factor in the 
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assigning of a historically founded identity to oneself and/or others. This is certainly 
true for the (young) Southeastern European nations where history is more politicized 
(Schörken 1995: 107). Of course, Swiss national identity is not unproblematic either. 
On the contrary, we have been experiencing a controversy about what it means to 
be Swiss, particularly with regard to the politics of naturalization, immigration and 
asylum, that among other things revolved around offensive placard campaigns by 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – the party with the majority of seats in Parliament – 
beginning in the 1990s. The party used visual symbols such as skin colours and the 
Swiss passport to fuel anxieties about what they present as foreign infiltration and its 
consequences. More recently, the party has focused on animal symbolism. There were 
campaigns showing rats, a lion, a bear and lately black-and-white sheep and crows. 
The 2008 ‘sheep’ campaign called for foreigners who have repeatedly been convicted 
of violent crimes to be deported after serving their sentences – hence the white sheep 
kicking the black sheep from the Swiss flag. The sheep motive has been taken up 
by far-right parties in other European countries, while the campaign has provoked 
shocked reactions in the national as well as international press, and the UN (United 
Nations Organization) correspondent for racism demanded the withdrawal of the 
campaign at the UN Human Rights Council (see, for example, Brauchbar 2007; 
Sciolino 2007; Vonplon 2008).
The 2009 ‘crow’ campaign was directed against the ratification of the expansion 
of the freedom of movement and residence to the new EU members Romania and 
Bulgaria. It showed vicious crows picking at the territory of Switzerland rendered in 
the colours of the flag. Not surprisingly, it offended Bulgarians and Romanians, and 
prompted people from these countries living in Switzerland to send a letter of protest 
to the government. Such bad taste has lately fallen on fertile ground when the SVP 
initiative for a ban on mosque building has been accepted by the Swiss voters. Again, 
a visual hate campaign was part of the strategy, with minarets piercing the Swiss 
flag. To return to Gentest.ch/iGenea, even though, in contrast to Eastern European 
countries, individual and national ‘Swiss identity’ is not such an issue on the iGenea 
forums, the national statistics about genetic ancestry and the individual genetic tests 
relate to this political culture. In a political climate where crows come to symbolize 
immigrants living on and at the same time destroying the Swiss flag and territory – 
which in turn stands for ‘Swiss values’ and the socio-economic environment the ‘real 
Swiss’ have laboured for – the notions conveyed by some of the media coverage about 
Gentest.ch/iGenea and by the company itself cannot be entirely innocent.19
Everything is therefore not innocent play and many scholars interpret the 
situation less optimistically than Rose where the more general picture of the new 
genetics is concerned (see Squier 2007 for the critique of downplaying power 
relations structured along the lines of race, class and gender). Not only do they 
point to the uneven power relations between scientists and subjects of scientific 
research often at work in human population genetics, and to the fact that the 
different social positions tend to correlate with global north and south, they also see a 
(re)biologization of individual and collective identities at work. The scientific search 
for genetic profiles of populations is understood as a return to, or a modification of, an 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
132  Identity Politics and the New Genetics 
earlier – intermittently discredited – notion of human groups as biologically defined 
races (Ellison et al. 2008; Reardon 2008; for a general discussion of these issues, see 
Sommer 2010); one would obviously have to add to this nations, ethnicities, tribes, 
peoples, etc. That understandings of identity and kinship may in certain cases become 
more rigid through the introduction of genetics seems further corroborated by the so-
called surname projects that are offered by many genetic ancestry-tracing companies:
In a surname project men with the same or similar surnames are tested for 
biological kinship. In the course of time or migration, surnames may change 
considerably, so that common descent is no longer visible: for example, 
Howery and Hauri [a typical Swiss surname] … Vice versa, you can exclude 
persons with the same surname as not being part of your family.20
‘Family’ is here reduced to genetic markers linking male lines of descent. In this 
understanding of kinship, an exact match is fantasized between the social and the 
biological, achieved through a trimming of the (male part of the) family tree by 
means of DNA tests (see also Nash 2006).
Concluding Thoughts: What is New about Applied (Swiss) History after DNA?
Peter Weingart (2001) among others has described how the interconnections between 
scientific research, mass media and consumer groups have become increasingly 
more complex, with the ties to industries and politics being intensified. These 
fundamental institutional and epistemic transformations have been subsumed under 
‘the scientification of society’ and ‘the socialization of science’ (or ‘the scientizing 
of politics, economics and the media’ and ‘the politicizing, economizing and 
medializing of science’). While from the Renaissance onwards, patronage connected 
science with public concerns, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
state support of and control over the sciences vastly expanded. Conversely, political 
decisions have increasingly become informed by scientific expertise. This is especially 
the case for post-Second World War big science, for which an intertwining of basic 
research, located at universities, and applied research, driven by industry, has also 
been observed. These interdependencies have tightened the link between scientific 
innovations and contexts of social application (Weingart 2005; similar shifts have 
been identified as a change from Mode 1 to Mode 2 science by Gibbons et al. 1994).
Such trends can certainly be made out for human population genetics that 
is inherently entwined with questions of group and individual identity politics 
and has become commercialized in genetic ancestry tracing. And as the science is 
‘socialized’, identity politics and identity markets are ‘scientized’. In popular self-
representations and advertisement, human population genetics tends to foreground 
the search for truth by means of hard, scientific methods. A notion of mechanical 
objectivity is betrayed by the emphasis on quantitative, technology-driven knowledge 
generation and on (‘junk’) DNA as the fundamental epistemic object (on the concept 
of mechanical objectivity, see Daston 2001; Daston and Galison 2007). DNA 
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(often used interchangeably with the gene) is presented as the most authentic and 
informative historical document. In contrast to written documents, it is not mediated 
by the human mind. In this perception, the history in the gene has been written into 
the body by nature itself. As the most fundamental level of the organism, the DNA 
is seen to be closest to the transmission of a purely evolutionary history – even more 
so if the DNA has no cellular function (Sommer 2008b).
On the iGenea website, the instruction for sampling one’s DNA is accompanied 
by an explanation of the method of analysis and by images of the lab apparatus, and 
the ‘team of experts’ is explicitly referred to in order to underline the professional, 
technology-driven scientific process.21 Furthermore, Gentest.ch assumes that the 
European customers want to be able to retrace the scientific knowledge informing the 
commercialized DNA tests (an assumption that is confirmed by customers’ enquiries 
on the forum). To this end, a bibliography of articles published mainly in the American 
Journal for Human Genetics is provided, on which the company draws for the genetic 
profiles of ‘indigenous/antic peoples’ and thus the genetic assignment of customers 
to one of these groups. The academic research with the highest quality control is 
therefore twice exploited: once in the DNA services and again in their marketing. 
Conversely, Gentest.ch estimates that the commercialization of this scientific 
knowledge from the public realm through institutions such as iGenea encourages 
further studies of the European genetic history and present, and the implementation 
of human population genetics within the European education system. Finally, the 
commercial sector is seen as offering novel career paths to geneticists.
Gentest.ch also makes use of the discourse of the gene as the most authoritative 
historical document: ‘Techniques now available in the science of genetics enable us 
to re-examine these [historical] sources and test their veracity. Our genes contain 
information about our ancestors which, in contrast to that from the other sources, 
is error-free.’22 In this understanding of historical genetics as ‘molecular revisionism’ 
(Palmié 2007: 208–10), the genetic approach may make it possible to verify or falsify 
a historical hypothesis, but genetic knowledge stands above and is independent 
from other expert areas: ‘The result is absolutely reliable and correct and needs no 
interpretation from a historian or archivist’ (Apter 2008, translation mine). The 
genetic approach is indeed perceived by some of its practitioners as a scientization of 
history and anthropology.
Such claims of truth and superiority can be questioned in many respects. In the 
case of the iGenea services, it is essential to keep in mind that the determination of 
the so-called indigenous peoples or Urvölker is problematic. Besides the fact that 
they may not have understood themselves in these terms historically and that the 
linkage between past peoples and cultures is often controversial within archaeology 
and history, a genetic profile can only be determined following the archaeological 
or anthropological definition. In other words, despite the claim that for the iGenea 
services, Urvölker are understood as genetic rather than historical-anthropological 
identities, there is a certain circularity involved. A genetic profile of an Ur-folk is 
arrived at by the analysis of ancient DNA from finds that have been archaeologically 
determined (or of living people supposed to represent the ancient group because of 
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their relative isolation, language and other cultural parameters). However, once a 
genetic profile exists, it is seen as more fundamental than other kinds of information, 
so that a genetic analysis can from then on verify or falsify the archaeological 
determination of a grave as Celtic, for example.
The novelty in the ways in which science, politics and economy intersect is also 
linked to tendencies of globalization driven by communication and information 
technologies (see, for example, Thacker 2005). As we have seen, it is not sufficient 
to see Gentest.ch/iGenea as a Swiss company. The iGenea services are tailored to 
European customers, addressing people’s interest in their country of origin more 
than in their country of present citizenship or residence. Furthermore, as a small 
company, Gentest.ch does not have millions of Swiss francs at its disposal to carry 
out research. As discussed above, the solution lies in the analysis and evaluation of 
genetic knowledge on European ‘indigenous tribes’ or Urvölker produced elsewhere, 
knowledge that is easily accessible because it is in the public domain and globally 
distributed (through online and print journals). Finally, the services of iGenea 
are not only restricted to one country but are aimed at the ‘European market’. 
Gentest.ch has also secured the cooperation of the American company Family Tree 
DNA. Through this cooperation, iGenea gains access to the largest DNA database 
for genetic genealogy.
Family Tree DNA represents the commercial part of the Genographic Project 
initiated in 2005. This forty-million-dollar project, which is supported by the National 
Geographic Society, IBM and the Waitt Family Foundation, is carried out at different 
universities globally on the basis of geographical foci. It aims at reconstructing the 
complete history of humankind on the basis of the analysis of the genetic variability 
between indigenous and isolated peoples worldwide. The commercial part – realized 
by Family Tree DNA – on the other hand advertises its genetic services to information 
societies, the members of which are called upon to participate in the Genographic 
Project by having their DNA analysed for money. As another commercial link, the 
Harvard Professor for African and African American Studies, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 
has cofounded the company AfricanDNA.com with Family Tree DNA to specifically 
cater to African-American customers.23 AfricanDNA.com, Family Tree DNA and 
Gentest.ch/iGenea are thus part of a global network, while their products are tailored 
to a specific cultural context and historical background. This glocalized structure 
is grouped, one might say, around the digital genetic databank and is connected 
by virtual paths through the internet. But there are also paths of wetware in this 
bioeconomic exchange, because the samples from iGenea customers are sent to 
Family Tree DNA to be analysed in the U.S.A. (Sommer 2010). This last observation 
may also point to an omission in Weingart’s areas of traffic: legislation. In fact, there 
has been an investigation by the senior public prosecutor into Gentest.ch’s practices 
with regard to the privacy of data. When the substance (cheek swabs) travels from 
Switzerland to the U.S.A., is it accompanied by personal data? Gentest.ch denies this. 
It claims that even while in America, the samples and the genetic data are treated 
according to the more prohibitive Swiss law, and the authorities are satisfied.24
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I have pointed to the diverse settings of application in which Gentest.ch/iGenea, 
AfricanDNA.com and Family Tree DNA are active; as we have seen, even within the 
narrower context of customers from Switzerland and Germany, there are people who 
perceive the genetic analysis as a new tool for self-(re)fashioning, and there are those 
whose (national) histories are controversial and for whom the genetic determination 
of origins and history becomes a serious arbiter in identity politics. Let me be clear: 
Gentest.ch does not attempt to find a Swiss (or German, Macedonian, etc.) genetic 
marker. It is not in search of the genetic essence of the Swiss or any other nationality. 
There is no genetic lake dweller or Homo alpinus test (or not yet?) that would identify 
a customer as (originally) Swiss. Rather, Gentest.ch, like human population genetics 
in general, emphasizes that genetics undermines the notion that there are pure 
peoples, nations or ethnicities. These are all historically grown, hybrid and open-
ended entities. Paradoxically, however, a DNA test result for personal ancestry will 
nonetheless link a customer to one (maternal and/or paternal) ancient people such 
as the Celts or the Germanic tribes without reservation. The certificate the customer 
receives for his or her money does not state his or her haplogroup, indigenous people 
and country of origin in terms of probability, nor is it stated that only one particular 
line has been established. Furthermore, the company provides statistics indicating the 
makeup of twenty-first-century nations in terms of tribes from antiquity that already 
come with a considerable baggage of living history and mythology. And some of these 
are more closely tied to national identity than others.
Knowledge gained in human population genetics may play a special role in 
identity politics because of its claim on truth. In this respect, genetic history often 
demands prerogative over anthropology, archaeology, history, oral history and 
personal historical consciousness, even if this authority is not granted, as in the case 
of iGenea customers of Greek ancestry who fight the genetic knowledge about their 
personal origins and about the Greek and Macedonian populations. At the same 
time, the historical narratives and images that are provided with the genetic data or 
that are collected by customers to make sense of their results come from nongenetic 
knowledge funds. They are borrowings rather than the products of the independent 
aesthetic means of genetics, although the newest historical scholarship is hardly the 
source. The geneticization of history and identity goes along with a mythologization 
– a kind of biohistory kitsch that draws on an existing tradition of applied history 
(Gebrauchsgeschichte): we already have our myth about the Helvetians and the Celts 
more generally, and about the Vikings and other Germanic tribes.
Notes
1. Although the question is still on the website, it has become less prominent and has partly 
been modified to ‘Do you have Celtic, Teuton, Inka or Jewish ancestry?’ (for the main 
sites, see http://www.gentest.ch, http://www.igenea.ch and http://www.igenea.com, date 
accessed 3 March 2011; the original question can still be found at https://www.igenea.
com/index.php?c=21&lp=16, date accessed 3 March 2011). This article is an elaboration 
of the shorter German text Sommer 2010b.
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2. My analysis of iGenea is informed by an open interview with the then managing director 
of the iGenea product line carried out on 10 October 2008, the analysis of the ways in 
which the company represents itself and is represented by others in the media, as well as by 
cyberethnography (analysis of blogs, chatrooms, forums, news commentaries, etc.). In order 
to have access to the online databank and the biosocialities forming on its basis, I have also 
become a customer of iGenea (including email exchanges in the analysis).
3. The designation ‘indigenous people’ has initially been primarily used, but has been replaced 
– if again not consistently – by ‘antic people’.
4. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?content=49a&id=30, date accessed 3 March 2011. 
5. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?content=49a&id=30, date accessed 3 March 2011.
6. Einstein, 2008, SF 1, 1 May, 9 p.m. The documentary can be downloaded from http://www.
sf.tv/sf1/einstein/sendung.php?docid=20080501, retrieved 3 March 2011.
7. Tuesday 29 April. Retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://www.igenea.ch/index.
php?c=61&lp=48, translation mine.
8. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?c=04, date accessed 3 March 2011.
9. iGenea-Forum ‘Vikings’, posted 17 June 2008, http://www.igenea.ch/index.
php?content=132&st=147, date accessed 3 March 2011, translation mine.
10. ‘Leben wie in der Steinzeit’/‘Life in the Stone Age’ 2007, SF 1, July/August 2007. See http://
www.sf.tv/suche.php?&q=pfahlbauer&filter=1&start=10, retrieved 3 March 2011.
11. See also http://www.pfahlbauervonpfyn.tg.ch/xml_102/internet/de/intro.cfm, date 
accessed 3 March 2011. The big-brother genre in particular has gained popularity as a 
means of experiencing the Swiss past. Besides the lake dwellers, Swiss public television has 
choreographed a (re)enactment of life in the times of the Swiss author Jeremias Gotthelf and 
during the Second World War in a Swiss alpine bunker (Engelhard and Lichtensteiger 2009).
12. See http://www.parlament.ch/d/suche/seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20083641, date 
accessed 3 March 2011; Gut 2009.
13. See Apter 2008; the advert about iGenea, ‘Herkunftsanalyse mittels DNA’, on haGalil.com 
has not attracted any comments; see http://www.igenea.com/docs/hagalil/hagalil.htm, date 
accessed 3 March 2011; see also ‘Deutsche Gene entschlüsselt. Eine Studie von Zürcher 
Gen-Analytikern zeigt: Jeder zehnte Deutsche hat jüdische Vorfahren’, Die Gemeinde 613, 
offizielles Organ der israelitischen Kultusgemeinde Wien, January 2008. According to 
Gentest.ch, the test for Jewish ancestry was introduced after several customers had enquired 
about it.
14. http://209.85.135.132/search?q=cache:VqJpuAP4We0J:dev.igenea.com/index. The study 
carried out be Gentest.ch/iGenea shows that the DNA samples of women who self-
identified as being of German origin can more often be connected to Germanic tribes 
than those of men (fifty per cent versus six per cent; unpublished study based on 19,457 
German samples from the iGenea database). The statistics on the constitution of the 
German population published in the same article indicates that ten per cent of Germans 
are of Jewish ancestry. In the Bild report, Salomon Korn, Vice-President of the German 
Central Council of Jews, explains the great contribution of haplogroup J, to which it is 
estimated that forty per cent of today’s Jews belong, to 1,700 years of Jewish presence in 
‘Germany’ (Böger 2007; see also Mischke 2008). Online commentaries about this article 
show the ability of people to see the nonsense in the claim about ‘German men and women’. 
They also document indignation about the ‘Jewish genetics’ and the fear of a resurgence 
of race theory, the biologization of ethnicity or the stigmatization of the Jews (see, for 
example, http://www.igenea.com/docs/welt_1107.html, date accessed 3 March 2011; 
http://altesitte.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/nur-wenige-deutsche-sind-echte-germanen, 
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date accessed 3 March 2011). This is not the place to do justice to the very complex and 
diverse issues surrounding the population genetic research on the Jewish diaspora and its 
commercialization. The reader is referred to Kahn 2005; Olson 2002: 106–19; Parfitt and 
Egorova (2006); and Abu El-Haj (unpublished manuscript).
15. ‘Ex-Jugoslawien/Mazedonien/Serbien/Kroatien/Albanien/Montenegro/Bosnien’ online 
forum, posted 15 February 2008, retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://www.igenea.ch/index.
php?content=132&st=25, translation mine.
16. ‘Macedonia’ online forum, posted 27 October 2008, retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://
www.igenea.ch/index.php?content=132&st=273.
17. See, for example, ‘Gentests bestätigen Verwandtschaft zu antiken Makedonen’, News 
from Macedonia, http://www.pelagon.de/?p=306; http://www.canka.de/links/links.html; 
Fussballverein Makedonien, http://www.fvmakedonien.com/fvm/?p=95; http://www.
readers-edition.de/2009/04/13/wie-griechisch-waren-die-antiken-makedonen, all accessed 
3 March 2011. For a counter-reaction, see, for example, the film on YouTube, http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=oHn7M3BAD44, date accessed 3 March 2011. iGenea is also a 
topic and guest on the Balkan and Mazedonian forum, http://www.balkanforum.info/f45/
bosnier-illyrer-32489, http://www.mazedonien-forum.de/thema.php?id=72194, all accessed 
3 March 2011 (for more information, google ‘iGenea Mazedonien’ or similar combinations).
18. The study is based on the Human Leukocyte Antigens (HLA) system (histocompatibility). 
The Macedonian samples numbered 172.
19. For an interview with the Swiss Federal President touching on the ‘sheep issue’, see http://
www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/dfa/head/iviews/interv/interv15.html; for more media 
coverage, see, for example, http://www.20min.ch/print/story/11309737, http://www.nzz.
ch/nachrichten/schweiz/aktuell/uno-rassismus-berichterstatter_fordert_rueckzug_von_svp-
plakat_1.555199.html, http://www.rhetorik.ch/Aktuell/07/07_16/index.html; for a blog on 
the placard-campaigns, see http://plakat.svp-politik.ch, all accessed 3 March 2011.
20. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?c=13&lp=69, date accessed 3 March 2011.
21. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?c=903&lp=21, http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?c=12& 
lp=2, date accessed 3 March 2011.
22. http://www.igenea.ch/index.php?c=48, date accessed 3 March 2011.
23. http://www.africandna.com/history.aspx, date accessed 3 March 2011.
24. Other issues are involved here. For example, according to Swiss legislation regarding genetic 
analyses of humans, samples have to be taken by physicians and the identity of the person 
sampled has to be verified. iGenea customers take their samples themselves in the privacy 
of their own homes. But Gentest.ch has mainly been accused of not rendering the genetic 
samples and data anonymous and handing both on to the U.S. company without consent 
of the customer, where it enters the Family Tree databank, again without the consent of the 
customer. This would be a breach of the privacy of data protection. Gentest.ch has reacted by 
having customers send their data directly to Houston. (Hostetter 2009, 2009b, 2010).
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Irish DNA
Making Connections and Making 




In January 2006 a new research paper on the human population genetics of Ireland was widely reported on in newspapers in Ireland and the U.S.A. The headline of 
the feature in the New York Times – ‘If New York’s Irish Claim Nobility, Science 
May Back Up the Blarney’ – was based on the claims that ‘about one in 50 New 
Yorkers of European Origin – including men with names like O’Connor, Flynn, 
Egan, Hynes, O’Reilly and Quinn – carry the genetic signature’ (Wade 2006) linked 
to a fifth-century Irish high king, Niall of the Nine Hostages, whose large number 
of descendants are thought to be evident in the high proportion of men with this 
‘signature’ in northwest Ireland. The authors of the research paper, published in 
the American Journal of Human Genetics, argued that a ‘previously unnoted modal 
haplotype that peaks in frequency in the north-western part of the island … shows 
a significant association with surnames purported to have descended from the most 
important and enduring dynasty of early medieval Ireland, the Uí Néill’ (Moore et al. 
2006: 334) – a dynasty that included Niall of the Nine Hostages.
The research also reached a more specialized audience. Members of the online 
discussion list IRISH-DNA, an email forum for discussing the use of genetics in 
genealogy and, in particular, in research on Irish ancestry, hosted by RootsWeb.
com, alerted other members to the findings.1 The research also quickly featured on 
the website of the U.S.-based company, Family Tree DNA, one of the largest and 
most successful commercial providers of genetics tests for genealogy, which heavily 
promotes the use of Y-chromosome tests in surname studies including, but not 
limited to, those focusing on Irish surnames. Potential customers are encouraged to 
order a test to see if they ‘match the profile’ of the Uí Néill signature. The U.K.-based 
company Oxford Ancestors has similarly used the results of the research paper to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
142  Identity Politics and the New Genetics 
offer a Y-chromosome test that will explore whether a male customer is descended 
from the ‘High Kings of Ireland’.
This case strikingly demonstrates the close relationships between research 
in human population genetics and the relatively recent but rapidly expanding 
commercial sector of genetic genealogy whose discourses and commodities bring 
together the domains of ‘science, profit and kinship’ (Marks 2007: 233). Since 2000 
a growing number of companies in the U.S.A. and the U.K. sell direct-to-consumer 
genetics tests for use in personal ancestry tracing via their company websites. Like the 
increasingly digital domain of conventional genealogy, in which genealogical sources 
and contacts can be accessed online, these companies use these new information 
technologies as well as the technologies, methods and research findings of human 
population genetics as they seek to build on the popularity of reconstructing family 
trees and family histories. They appeal especially to those whose genealogical searches 
are for knowledge of where their ancestors originated in Europe, or in Africa for African 
Americans and Black British people whose ancestors were enslaved. Many genetic 
genealogy companies were initially established by enterprising human population 
geneticists who saw the potential commercial application of new technologies, 
databases of information on patterns of human genetic variation and interpretative 
techniques. New products are rapidly developed in response to the publication of 
new research, such as those tests for particular Y-chromosome haplotypes that have 
been linked to well-known historical figures. Oxford Ancestors, for example, has 
also made use of recent research on Y-chromosome genetic variation in central Asia 
(Zerjal et al. 2003) to offer a test to explore whether a male customer has a genetic 
profile that suggests his descent from Genghis Khan.
Genetic surname projects, which compare the Y-chromosomes of men sharing 
surnames, have developed as a commercial application of recent work in human 
population genetics in which the correspondence between traditionally patrilineal 
inheritance of surnames in much of Europe and in European settler societies, and the 
direct inheritance of the Y-chromosome from father to sons is a focus of investigation 
in itself or used a sampling device. This is a particular strand of wider research on 
human genetic variation through Y-chromosome haplotype mapping, whose applied 
use in exploring the genetic relatedness of men sharing surnames and of establishing 
the Y-chromosome haplotypes of specific surnames has been framed by claims about 
its usefulness in criminal investigations as well as family history research (Jobling 
2001; Jobling and Tyler-Smith 1995; Sykes and Irven 2000). It has been taken up 
enthusiastically by those already interested in genealogical projects focused on single 
surnames alone and by genetic genealogy companies both encouraging and serving 
this interest. These links between research laboratories and commercial testing services 
are part of the online and transnational geography of genetic genealogy, which for 
many consumers in North America is centred on finding roots in distant places of 
origin and on making connections with others on the basis of shared ancestry across 
geographical distance.
But the flow of influence is not one-way. Studies of geographical patterns of human 
genetic variation are part of, and are often framed by, wider interests in questions of 
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personal and collective origins. Many human population geneticists pursue research 
that they suspect may capture the popular imagination and enhance their academic as 
well as their popular reputation through its wide dissemination beyond the academy. 
But their work is shaped by wider sociocultural interests and ideologies at a deeper 
level. This means that studies of human genetic variation, difference and origins 
have a close, if not uncontested, correspondence with historically and geographically 
specific, but naturalized interests in human difference and differentiated, as well as 
collective, human origins that are entangled with ideas of nation, ethnicity and race.
This chapter considers the nature and implications of genetic surname studies 
through the specific case of collective projects to use Y-chromosome tests to explore 
degrees of relatedness among group participants sharing Irish surnames and the 
geography of ancient Gaelic clan groups. Despite the media attention to the case 
of Niall of the Nine Hostages, this is not the strand of genetic genealogy that has 
received the most publicity or critical interest. These genetic surname studies are 
less culturally and politically loaded than the prominent television features and 
newspaper accounts of African Americans or Black British people being given the 
results of genetic tests which suggest ancestral connections to particular ethnic groups 
and ancestral homelands in Africa, with all the emotive and potent resonances of the 
restitution of knowledge destroyed by the enslavement of their ancestors (see Chapter 
7 by Schramm in this volume).2 In contrast to the suggestions that the results of 
genetic tests can at least partially assuage the erasure of culture, language, home and 
name through enslavement for those with slave ancestors, Y-chromosome surname 
projects start with a known name and usually some knowledge of a European country 
of paternal origin. 
Yet genetic surname studies are a significant dimension of genetic genealogy 
as a business and personal pursuit. At the time of writing, the website of Family 
Tree DNA states that they support 5,223 Y-chromosome group projects.3 One 
of the main popular guidebooks on the use of genetic tests in genealogy suggests 
that surname projects are the most common application of these tests (Smolenyak 
Smolenyak and Turner 2004: 57). They also deserve attention because they are an 
aspect of the sector and practice that appears to be relatively distant from the direct 
deployment of ideas of genetically identifiable racial or ethnic ancestry or origins, but 
whose reckoning of relatedness via genetics intersects with the wider problematics of 
constructing collective identities – national, ethnic, racial or diasporic – via genetic 
similarity and difference. Focusing on what are less likely subjects of critique and 
exploring how their apparently uncontroversial nature actually underscores their 
significance in generating, as I will argue, problematic ideas of national and diasporic 
genetic communities of descent extends the growing critical engagement with genetic 
genealogy (Bolnick et al. 2007; Nash 2005, 2006a, 2007; Palmié 2007). The starting 
point of these projects are patrilineally inherited surnames rather than a potentially 
genetically identified ancestral or ethnic origin, but, as I will argue, they often appeal 
because of their promise to deliver knowledge of ancestral origins in specific places, 
as well as senses of collective identity in newly geneticized communities of descent. 
Though they are a distinctive dimension of genetic genealogy, they also need to be 
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understood in relation to the ways in which genetic genealogy companies frame their 
services in terms of individual self-knowledge, collective identity and relatedness, 
ethnicity, gender and ancestral origins more widely.
Genetic Genealogy: Comparing and Connecting
The questions of ‘Who you are?’ and ‘Where do you come from?’ that are used to 
promote and naturalize genetic genealogy evoke ideas of personal and collective 
identity and self-knowledge. The marketing of genetic tests for ancestral knowledge 
relies heavily on the positive associations of popular genealogy as a personally 
significant, restorative and rewarding exploration of the past, on wider discourses of 
the value of a historical consciousness and on individual responsibility to understand 
oneself psychologically, emotionally, medically and, increasingly, genetically (Novas 
and Rose 2000; Rose 2001). Not knowing the information that genetic tests can 
offer is presented as a new form of lack or ‘genetic ignorance’ that needs to be filled 
or addressed through these new services. In the world of genetic genealogy, knowing 
your genetic profile (at least in the very partial sense of these tests) is presented 
both as a natural component and technologically enhanced form of individual self-
knowledge. New genetic knowledges and the geneticization of ideas of personal 
and collective identities are thus cloaked in the generally progressive associations of 
popular historical knowledge and the cultures of self-exploration and self-help, as 
well as the authority of science.
But these commodities are also framed by one potent narrative of loss and 
recovery. Tests that offer to answer questions of specific places of origin in Africa 
for the descendants of enslaved Africans are framed by the intensely political and 
personal significance of restored ancestral knowledge and recovered sense of origin 
and connection (see Schramm, Chapter 7 this volume). The marketing of genetic 
genealogy more widely draws on this specific history of violent displacement, 
traumatic loss and recovered knowledge to generate a more general condition of lack 
and incompleteness in those whose ancestors were not enslaved African people. New 
or intensified desires for genetically verified accounts of origin and ancestry can be 
promoted by implying that knowing something of where you ancestors came from 
is not enough, and that a new but natural desire for knowledge of ‘deep ancestry’ 
can never be fulfilled by conventional genealogy. Historically and culturally specific 
narratives of loss are used to extend ideas of genetic ignorance and naturalize ideas of 
genetic self-knowledge, which are simultaneously given more meaning through ideas 
of ethnicity – of shared ancestry, origins and relatedness.
Family Tree DNA offers tests that are not directly linked to any category of 
collective identity beyond the familial, but that can be used to prove or disprove 
the supposed but unverified relatedness of individuals within a conventional 
genealogical project, at least in cases of direct maternal or paternal descent. 
However, like other genetic genealogy companies, they also offer a range of ways in 
which the alpha-numerical, and on their own meaningless, results of an individual’s 
test, can be made more meaningful. Concepts of race, ethnicity and a particular 
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historical and geographical imagination of human migration and origins are central 
to this. While the work of human population geneticists on the prehistoric and 
historical geographies of human migration encompasses the earliest movements 
and subsequent spread of humans from Africa, and while genetic diversity is 
widely recognized as geographically graded, their work often also evokes a model 
of the world in which human groups had settled in relatively genetically discrete 
homelands until the migrations of the last four centuries muddled the patchwork 
geography of genetically differentiated human groups. So, while within the logic of 
genetic descent, Africa is ultimately the place of origin of every individual, genetic 
genealogy plays on the popular idea of an old world of places and groups as relatively 
neat packages of genetic distinctiveness. Companies evoke an idea of global genetic 
unity – and this works to position them on the side of liberal anti-racism – and 
the idea of differentiated origins. Thus, Family Tree DNA, for example, invites 
potential customers to explore their African, Native American or Jewish ancestry. 
Like other companies involved, Family Tree DNA invokes a direct correspondence 
between the pattern of markers on particular segments of Y-chromosomes and 
mitochrondrial DNA and ethnicity by offering tests for specific ancestral heritages. 
As other critics and commentators have argued (Elliot and Brodwin 2002; TallBear 
2008), linking genetics to ethnicity in geneticized genealogy both corresponds to 
popular understandings of ethnic groups as shared communities of descent as 
well as culture, and problematically reinforces ideas of the significance of genetic 
similarity, and the genetic basis of ethnic or racial categories in contrast to more 
flexible and inclusive understandings of collective identity.
But Family Tree DNA also encourages those who do not suspect or seek genetic 
confirmation of Jewish, African or Native American ancestry to use the tests to 
explore their ancestral or geographical origins themselves and to use them as ways of 
discovering meaningful connections with those who share similar results. They invite 
customers to contact others with similar results, with whom they can work together 
to attach ethnicity or geographical origins to the numbers and letters that constitute 
test results. They can do so by joining online databases of ‘genetic cousins’, by looking 
at the locations named as places of ancestral origin by other people with similar 
results, or by corresponding with those who are ‘genetic matches’. While companies 
like Family Tree DNA claim to identify specifically named ancestral groups for some 
customers, and this is undoubtedly a commercially effective way to encode the alpha-
numerical individual test results with meaning, they also invite others for whom 
African, Native American or Jewish ancestry tests are of no use or interest and who 
are thus not otherwise constituted as part of the company’s customer base, to come 
to similar conclusions about the results of their tests but by themselves, or at least 
by themselves in interpretive alliances with other customers. Even if not directly 
framed by ideas of race or ethnicity, geneticized genealogy foregrounds genetic 
relatedness as central to personal and collective identity, and genetic similarity as the 
basis of senses of empathy and connection. Much is made of the supposed senses of 
meaningful connection between people who discover they are genetically similar and 
the satisfactions and rewards that these new relations bring. This does not depend 
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on ideas of race or ethnicity but does suggest that genetic or biological similarity and 
dissimilarity is the basis of empathy and antipathy between people.
Genetic surname projects are one aspect of this guided but customer-led 
production of personal and collective meaning from comparisons of Y-chromosome 
test results among men sharing surnames and thus suspecting some degree of paternal 
relatedness. By encouraging people to join or establish surname projects using 
Y-chromosome tests, the company’s customer base can be considerably expanded to 
include all the many potential consumers among the many in the U.S.A. and Canada 
already exploring their genealogical links back to different parts of Europe. Alone 
their results mean very little, and for those who already know the general country 
of origin of their emigrant ancestry, they add little to existing knowledge of where 
their ancestors came from. Using his results alone, a man, for example, may be told 
his paternal origins are broadly European. Group projects are ways of selling tests on 
the basis of the potential of collective results to say much more. Linking particular 
Y-chromosome profiles to named historical figures suggests that Y-chromosome 
surname projects could also offer customers more specific, distinctive and special 
ancestral connections.
Emphasizing the parallel between the direct transmission of the Y-chromosome 
between fathers and sons and patrilineal surname patterns is one way in which these 
companies draw on existing cultural tropes or traditions to naturalize what are quite 
particular modes of understanding ancestry and relatedness. Most genetic genealogy 
companies offer two types of test, one based on the direct paternal inheritance of 
distinctive forms of the Y-chromosome from fathers to sons and only applicable to 
men, and mtDNA tests that are also based on direct inheritance and that establish 
direct maternal lineages that can be undertaken by men and women. Both focus on 
a very limited portion of any individual’s ancestry, and their selectivity and partiality 
runs counter to many people’s contemporary genealogical interests in both maternal 
and paternal ‘sides’ and not just in direct lines of ancestry. The selectivity and partiality 
of both models of ancestry is also elided in claims that it is the ability to trace direct 
maternal or paternal lineages that makes it possible to establish a link to ‘deep ancestry’ 
and to specific places and ethnic groups. It is their very selectivity which makes them 
effective. Yet, while ideas of ethnic or geographic origins are undoubtedly central to 
attempts to construct these commodities and the knowledge they produce as desirable 
and even necessarily fundamental to selfhood and identity, the idea that descent and 
identity can be traced through direct maternal lines if you are a woman or through 
direct maternal lines and paternal lines if you are a man still has to be made obvious, 
natural, ordinary. Despite the development of autosomal tests, genetic genealogy 
remains dominated by mtDNA and Y-chromosome tests, and central to these services 
is a simply gendered differentiation. Men can undertake the two sorts, while women 
can only undertake one sort. And central to the marketing of these tests is the effort 
to make a genealogical tree composed of a single maternal line for a woman and 
two lines – maternal and paternal – for men appear as a taken-for-granted model of 
ancestry and descent, in contrast to the conventional thicket of lineage in ordinary 
documented, partially documented or imagined and endlessly ramifying family trees.
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In the case of the Y-chromosome, a single paternal lineage is naturalized in many 
accounts by its correspondence to the convention of paternally inherited surnames 
and all the assumed natural significance of bonds between fathers and sons, and in 
the case of mtDNA by invoking a similarity naturalized and universalized version 
of the mother-child relationship (Nash 2004). Maternal lineage can be invested 
with more specific symbolism in the context of the use of mtDNA tests to identify 
specific ancestral locations in Africa for African Americans and other members of 
the Black diaspora. As Katharina Schramm discusses in Chapter 7 in this volume, 
the focus on maternal descent is framed by the company African Ancestry and by 
consumers by the idea of loss of a mother as a metaphor for the violent severing of 
social and kinship ties through enslavement. Yet, despite the symbolic potency of the 
ideas of a mother-child bond torn apart and remade, for some the particular value of 
Y-chromosome tests in surname studies is that they allow an additional selectivity. 
This is because they not only avoid the problem of the infinitude of ancestors that can 
never be known by focusing on direct paternal descent alone, but they also overcome 
the infinitude of possible comparisons of test results with other genetic profiles that 
might give them meaning by identifying men with the same patrilineally inherited 
surnames as the members of a pool of potential comparisons and connections.
Companies like Family Tree DNA encourage customers to identify with those 
who share their mtDNA profile by inviting them to submit their results to and contact 
other ‘matches’ on the company mtDNA searchable customer database mitosearch, 
and in the case of Oxford Ancestors, to identify with mythologized maternal clans. 
This mirrors the service Family Tree DNA provides for men with Y-chromosome 
results – ysearch – with one significant difference: ysearch is searchable by surname as 
well as Y-chromosome result.4 Not all Y-chromosome matches will share surnames, 
but sharing a surname means the possibility of identifying those who can collectively 
compare their Y-chromosomes and use them to work out degrees of connection and 
then reconstruct accounts of the origin and spread of their surname. For Chris Pomery 
(2007), author of one prominent popular guide to genetic genealogy published by the 
British National Archives, this makes Y-chromosome surname studies by far the most 
effective use of genetics in family history. While companies like African Ancestry 
describe an individual’s mtDNA result in terms of an ethnic group and location by 
comparing it to samples in their databases based on surveys of genetic diversity in 
Africa, mtDNA ‘matches’ among Family Tree DNA’s customers are not linked by 
pre-existing assumption of relatedness via a shared patrilineal surname. While much 
more could be said about the gendering of genetic genealogy and gendered discourses 
of human population genetics (Nash forthcoming), I am particularly interested in 
exploring how Y-chromosome genetic tests shape understandings of connection and 
difference within groups formed around shared interests in a particular surname 
and its historical and cultural associations, and within groups that are being 
newly established to undertake genetic surname projects. The parallel between the 
transfer of patrilineal surnames and Y-chromosomes also means that these projects 
are often focused on the relatively recent period since surnames were established, 
rather than the more temporally distant and generalized historical geographies of 
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broader descriptions of Y-chromosome and mtDNA haplogroups. The regeneration 
of the significance of patrilineage via ideas of direct Y-chromosome descent, as I will 
argue, makes a particularly masculinist version of ancestry also an exclusive model of 
ethnicity, national and diasporic belonging.
Among the ‘success stories’ of Y-chromosome projects that Pomery (2007: 184–
89) features, is his account of ‘The Irish Clans’, a research project not in this instance 
organized by amateur enthusiasts, but by the geneticists from Trinity College Dublin 
whose work reached the public through the Niall of the Nine Hostages story. But 
this research was shaped by wider interests in surnames in Ireland and in the Irish 
diaspora, and is being made use of in new and existing genetic surname projects. This 
chapter focuses on this case of the traffic between academic research and commercial 
laboratories, between scientific journals and online collectives of enthusiasts, and a 
geography of genetic genealogy in which Ireland is a central node in a diasporic 
imagination of connection and shared descent. Using online discussion boards and 
project websites as sources, as well as selected interviews with scientists, enthusiasts 
and participants, it explores the models and more specific accounts of origins and 
relatedness adopted in and produced through these projects and their implications 
for wider understandings of difference and connection, nation and diaspora. It is 
this question of consumption, of what people make of these new sources of personal 
and collective genetic information, that is central to the arguments of those who 
foreground the active ways in which people engage with new forms of biological 
knowledge and respond to new developments in the biosciences that are disrupting 
the stability of foundational categories like nature and culture (Skinner 2006, 
2007), and caution against interpreting the development of this sector in terms of 
its reductive and potentially divisive discourses of geneticized relatedness (Wade 
2007) and question the authority of academic critics to decide in advance on the 
social or political implications of their popular use (Brodwin 2002). Here I consider 
how one particular category of ethnic identity is reconfigured through the practices 
of making connections and making distinctions in Irish genetic surname projects. 
Doing so involves considering these practices of categorization and differentiation 
in relation to historical and contemporary forms of collective identity and difference 
based on ideas of shared ancestry and origins in Ireland, Northern Ireland and the 
Irish diaspora. In the rest of this chapter I consider these practices in relation to the 
production of new forms of knowledge and relatedness for project participants, and 
then address the wider implications of their focus on direct paternal Gaelic ancestry 
for the politics of Irish identity and belonging.
Diasporic Distinctions
Genetic Irish surname projects represent one particular strand of geneticized 
genealogy and a particular aspect of the culture of Irish diasporic genealogy. They 
are constituted through a network of individuals, transnational associations, research 
institutions and commercial laboratories, through which scientific and popular 
knowledges are produced and consumed. The flow of knowledge is not simply 
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outwards from the domain of science to society. In the case of genetic Irish surname 
project, this is apparent in specific relationships and connections as well as the 
embeddedness of science in society more deeply. The Smurfit Institute of Genetics 
in Trinity College Dublin does not provide commercial genetic testing services but, 
as the case of the Uí Néill paper illustrates, their research findings have been utilized 
by Family Tree DNA in encouraging a market for these tests, and by individuals and 
groups involved in Irish genetic surname studies. Key individuals have also played 
a role in the development of this strand of Irish genealogy. Patrick Guinness, of 
the Guinness brewing family in Ireland, has been a central figure in supporting the 
work of the Smurfit Institute, encouraging interest in their work and informally 
advising other enthusiasts. Having already explored the origins of the Guinness 
family through conventional documentary genealogy, he contacted Daniel Bradley 
after the publication of a research paper on the human population genetics of Ireland 
using surnames and Y-chromosome analysis published in Nature in 2000 (Hill et al. 
2000) prompted his interest in the wider potential of the new genetic techniques. 
He subsequently funded the doctoral research of Brian McEvoy on the genetics of 
Irish clan groups because of his interest in the Guinness family origins and in the 
genealogical relationships between Gaelic Irish clans more widely.5 It is this work 
that Chris Pomery celebrates as an example of genetic genealogy using surnames and 
Y-chromosome tests. Patrick Guinness has also been active in the Irish government-
funded organization Clans of Ireland Ltd., an association that grants official status to 
Irish clan societies and supports their activities in helping others begin and conduct 
Irish surname projects. Similar to Scottish clan societies, most Irish clan societies are 
focused on specific Gaelic clans linked to a specific region in Ireland and a specific 
surname, such as O’Brien or O’Neill, now widely held but originally linked to 
the clan’s nobility. They function as networks of enthusiasts linked by newsletters, 
websites and periodic clan reunions in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Most members 
either bear the clan surname or have a close ancestor who did so and identify with 
an Irish clan as descendants of Irish emigrants for whom the clan is one dimension 
of their sense of Irish ancestral affinity in the culture of Irish diasporic identity in 
the U.S.A., Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Clans of Ireland Ltd. currently 
lists twenty-eight ‘yDNA Projects’ being undertaken by registered Irish clans. But 
many other Irish surname projects are being undertaken by new groups formed for 
the purpose of the project who largely communicate via email and are represented 
through project websites.
The family trees of the descendants of nineteenth-century and earlier Irish 
emigrants reflect generations of intermarriage between Irish and other migrant 
groups that could suggest multiple ethnic origins for those that now identify as being 
of Irish descent. In contrast to these entangled family trees and multiple ancestral 
places of origin, genetic projects focusing on patrilineage seem to offer a precise point 
of origin and single lineage. For members of Irish clan societies, this interest in using 
genetic tests of this sort to explore Irish origins and descent is framed by the attractive 
associations of Irishness in general but also the appeal of genetically establishing 
distinctive descent from particular named and often noble, ancient Irish families. 
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Genetic genealogy, like genealogy in its conventional forms, is always simultaneously 
a practice of making connections and making distinctions – differentiation as much 
as collective identification. In avowedly multicultural societies such as the U.S.A., 
genealogy can be a way of making distinctions between groups based on group origins 
and descent, and thus marking a collective ethnic difference and identity, such as Irish-
American. But it also often entails establishing special sorts of distinctive diasporic 
connections that differentiate within that community of shared descent. Being able 
to claim descent from an ancient noble Gaelic lineage may be more appealing for 
some than just sharing Irish origins. For some, these new genetic surname projects 
promise a scientific verification of this distinction, though in practice these projects 
do not necessarily confirm noble descent in this uncomplicated sense. So what do 
they involve and what sorts of accounts of origins and relatedness do they produce?
While many Irish genetic surname projects are framed by the prospect of having 
a scientifically proven connection to an ancient noble Gaelic lineage that reflects 
both the appeal of Irish ancestry and the appeal of having a distinctive ancestry 
within the broad category of diasporic Irishness, these projects also involve making 
distinctions within groups who are linked by their sense of connection to a specific 
lineage. One fundamental distinction is between men and women. Only men can 
be involved as tested participants, since the projects are based on Y-chromosome 
tests and a considerable number of the exchanges in online discussion lists are 
devoted to explaining to women who are interested in the new techniques that the 
tests and the studies focus on male genetic lineages alone. So, while the Irish clan 
associations are usually open to women as well as men, women cannot be directly 
involved as participants in Y-chromosome genetic surname studies which effectively 
render clan descent and, by extension, Irish diasporic descent as fundamentally 
patrilineal. In contrast to recent efforts to challenge the marginalization of Irish 
women’s experiences of emigration and address the ways in which ideas of mobility 
and staying put have been conventionally gendered (Gray 2004; Walter 2001), 
Y-chromosome genetics endorse a system of ordering relatedness in which women are 
fundamentally subsidiary. Companies and project coordinators encourage women 
interested in the projects to have a brother, father or paternal uncle tested and many 
women are involved in projects in this way. Chris Pomery’s (2007: 16) view that the 
impossibility of women’s direct involvement is simply a biotechnical fact rather than 
being underscored by any more problematic version of ancestry is representative of 
the way this issue is usually commented upon. Yet the recent greater inclusion of 
women in clan associations is undermined when, for example, a woman elected as 
honorary chief is overlooked in attempts by population geneticists pursuing surname-
based studies to gather genetic samples at clan rallies. The use of the Y-chromosome 
may accord with old conventions of patrilineage but out of step with the much more 
contested dynamics of gendered social relations.
However, these studies also differentiate between men. They involve comparing 
the Y-chromosomes of men who share surnames in order to fulfil the project’s aims 
to establish a genetic profile for a surname or clan group and for known or newly 
discovered distinctive subgroups or branches, and to genetically confirm, revise or 
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refine existing maps of the regional distributions of Gaelic surnames in Ireland. 
Some projects seek to establish the genetic profile that corresponds to direct descent 
from a specific noble Gaelic lineage and degrees of closeness to that lineage among 
participants. Yet the projects are mostly framed by their usefulness in providing 
knowledge of specific regional places of origin in Ireland rather than simple proof or 
disproof of noble descent. A new genetic ‘atlas of Ireland’ would allow a man with an 
Irish name, and thus assumed paternal Irish ancestry, but with no knowledge of where 
in Ireland his ancestor came from, to locate a place of origin in Ireland. This place of 
origin is not the place an ancestor left behind but the regional home of a clan in a more 
ancient sense. The projects are thus much less about partially knowable individuals 
and places of origin, which are the focus of conventional genealogical projects, and 
much more about a ‘deep ancestry’ that is presented as more fundamental. Echoing 
the idea of uncertainty of origins in accounts of the African diaspora, the McMahon 
Surname DNA study introduces the project in this way:
Many of us whose ancestors emigrated from Ireland are uncertain where 
we came from – either County Monaghan or County Clare, the two places 
in Ireland where the MacMahon surname arose. But our ancestors have 
sometimes come from Dublin, or Scotland or perhaps emigrated elsewhere, 
to Europe or Australia. There are also two or more separate septs of Mahon 
who originate in Ireland and may now be known as McMahon in the US 
or elsewhere and there are variations of the McMahon name … We have on 
our site the MacMahon Genealogy for the Monaghan MacMahons from 
the time of the Collas up to the 1640s and in some cases have been able to 
construct additional family lineages beyond that decade. But due to many 
events pertaining to turmoil in our homeland there are essentially no records 
between the 1640s and the early 1800s, leaving us with a nearly 200 year gap 
to fill. This is often impossible to accomplish.
Many descendants of émigrés then do not know whether their roots are with 
the Ulster sept of MacMahons in County Monaghan or with the Clare sept 
of one of the Mahon septs.6
These new techniques are thus seen to offer ways of linking modern and medieval 
genealogies and of clarifying the geography of origins beyond more recent histories 
of mobility before the ancestor arrived in the ‘New World’. Project website 
introductions explain that the studies may enable the group to genetically distinguish 
between different branches of the clan that are associated with particular regions, as 
well as to explore the connections between clans that are thought to be historically 
linked by genealogy and geography. The goal then is not simply to find a single origin 
place for the ancient clan but to provide a differentiated geography of origins within 
which diasporic descendants can be precisely located. However, being able to do so 
involves quite complex processes of interpretation that are often openly provisional.
Most of these projects are coordinated by a ‘group administrator’, often based 
in the U.S.A., who encourages members of existing clan associations or recruits to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
152  Identity Politics 
newly established groups to buy tests directly usually through Family Tree DNA, and 
who communicates and, with some help from the company advisors, interprets the 
results for those who have participated and for other interested members. Genetic 
surname project coordinators encourage potential participants and existing project 
members who have not yet done so to take the more expensive but more informative 
Y-chromosome tests. The twelve marker tests explore too few markers to do more than 
locate the individuals within the broad Y-chromosome haplogroups that population 
geneticists have identified and named for different regions of the world. A twelve 
marker test would thus only ascertain the direct paternal European descent of men 
interested in their Irish origins. Tests that include more markers – the twenty-five, 
thirty-seven or the most expensive sixty-seven marker tests – are those that are used to 
explore relatedness and origins within the same surname groups. The men involved 
in genetic surname projects receive their results in the form of a set of numbers that 
correspond to the number of repeated sets of the four bases counted at particular 
segments or markers of the Y-chromosome (known by the prefix DYS). The results 
of surname group projects that usually take the form of tables of the DYS results of 
each of the project participants, who are sometimes identified by name as well as 
testkit number, are presented and explained on the society or association websites as 
well as on individual project webpages on the Family Tree DNA site. Until recently, 
most were publicly accessible. However, the results are not simply listed but are 
grouped according to degrees of difference and similarity, and it is the identification, 
interpretation and ordering of these groups that are central to these projects.
The results are ordered usually by their degree of closeness to what is established 
as a characteristic haplotype for the group. There are two techniques for establishing 
this haplotype, one based on numerical frequency and the other on verified genealogy 
and in some cases geographical location. The O’Shea DNA Project, for example, 
adopts the first approach, the ‘Ancestral Modal method’. As the project administrator 
makes clear in explaining the results, in this case the alleles for each of the thirty-
seven markers that are found most commonly among participants are taken as the 
Ancestral Modal, the ‘Haplotype of the unidentified hypothetical common ancestor 
of all O’Sheas’. Nonetheless, as the explanation also makes clear, this is not a fixed or 
static ‘genetic signature’: ‘The Ancestral Modal is recalculated every time a new result 
is processed and thus the figures presented may change with new issues of this article. 
The relatively small number of results at hand to date may currently be giving an 
unrepresentative Ancestral Modal, but hopefully the addition of further results will 
correct this.’7 The groups that result from comparison of the participants with this 
Ancestral Modal are thus continuously subject to revision and are both dependent 
on the size of the sample and the genetic profiles of those who get involved. A 
different set of O’Sheas could produce a different modal haplotype and thus different 
calibrations of similarity and difference. So, although the genetics seems to offer a 
precision and exactitude that can assuage the usual unknowability of several centuries 
of paternal lineage to ancient origins, the results are qualified from the start. Group 
administrators are more or less explicit about the degree of difficulty in making 
sense of the results, as well as their provisional nature, but most acknowledge that 
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the results are the best current interpretations and may be revised. Following the 
epistemology of ‘good science’, participants are given results that carry the promise 
of scientific truth but are advised that these results are current truths subject to the 
normal process of scientific progress. These warnings of their contingency do not, 
however, frame the promotion of the tests by commercial companies or enthusiasts. 
Nor do the cautious interpretations of, at least most, project coordinators accompany 
the wider announcement of the results in media reports.
The O’Shea DNA Project is also ‘actively seeking more Irish based participants 
with proven ancient family histories, particularly in Co Kerry, that can be used 
as bench marks’ and so is also interested in making use of the second method of 
establishing the ‘baseline’ haplotype. This involves taking the Y-chromosome profile 
of participants who have a verified genealogy that links them to an area and an 
established noble lineage in Ireland. Sometimes these genetic reference points may 
simply be men that are defined as ordinary sources of genetic samples of unbroken 
descent and domicile in the surname’s heartland who are encouraged to participate 
by project members. In other cases they are significant for being considered to be of 
noble descent. Some men who are recognized as the most direct descendant of the 
last clan leader before the breakup of the Gaelic clan system in the early modern 
period, who are known as Chiefs of the Name, are being invited to have their DNA 
tested as part of genetic clan projects. Family Tree DNA encourages groups to set 
up funds based on the donations of project members to pay for the testing of key 
individuals. Those participating in the Driscoll of Cork DNA Project, for example, 
are invited to ‘Contribute to our General Funds which is used to purchase kits for 
non-genealogically originated DRISCOLL whose lineage is of interest to the group as 
a whole because they come from a historically interesting family key to our origins’.8 
However, men in Ireland who are potential ‘benchmarks’ for these diasporic genetic 
studies may have little enthusiasm for donating cheek cells to aid other people’s 
search for origins. For them, the question of proving origins is much less compelling 
than it is for those who idealize a sense of ancient ancestry and origins at a distance. 
This reluctance of ‘natives’ to be used as sources of genetic information is paralleled 
by similar resistance to the sampling efforts of human population geneticists in 
other contexts. In this case the author of the summary of the O’Shea project results 
reports that: ‘Voluntary participants have also been scarce on the ground within 
Ireland and the few recent additions have been due to pestering by and financial 
support of, the committee members of the Clan Society.’9 The practice of trying to 
genetically establish a connection between the ‘rooted’ and ‘diasporic’ can undermine 
assumptions that shared ancestry is the basis of mutual interest and affinity. Instead it 
points to the different dynamics of identity and belonging between ‘homeland’ and 
diaspora. But realizations of difference within the broad community of Irish descent 
are also paralleled by practices of differentiation within clan associations.
In some cases genetic tests for paternal ancestry are being used to create formal 
distinctions within clan organizations based on being able to establish genetic 
connection to ancient Gaelic ‘bloodlines’. The O’Donoghue Society has established 
a Royal Order exclusive to those who have the genetic profile deemed to represent a 
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specific Gaelic noble lineage. But distinguishing between participants is fundamental 
to all these projects even if the effect of the production of categories of belonging 
and relatedness within them are less formal and are often handled with more 
circumspection. The grouping of individuals can suggest that some men have chiefly 
descent in some cases and that some men are not even distantly related to the clan 
group in others. When those interpreting the results do so in relation to established 
clan histories derived from the histories, mythologies and genealogies of early Gaelic 
society, some project participants can be informed of their likely connections to 
specific historical figures and specific places. In contrast, other members are located 
in a provisional limbo awaiting classification. In other cases, those men whose results 
do not place them within the main subgroups are defined as outlier groups with the 
explanation that, they may be reclassified, or these outlier groups may become more 
significant as more men participate and more results arrive from Family Tree DNA. 
Sometimes these groups are groups of one. Instead of simply being told they are not 
related, when possible, individual men may be described as a ‘group’ among the 
range of groups, even if they do not fall within the groups taken to be, or taken to be 
closest to, the Ancestral Modal Haplotype.
However, those men whose Y-chromosome markers bear no relation to those 
that are established as typical for the surname or clan group cannot be grouped in this 
way. Participants thus always face the prospect that their tests will reveal that what 
may be their long and deeply held attachment to a name, ancestry, Gaelic heritage, 
culture, place and origin does not match their genes (or at least their Y-chromosome 
genetic patrilineage). The promise of affirmation of ancestral identity has to have as its 
corollary the threat of refutation. Some involved are simply matter of fact about this. 
Others suggest that a discovery that one’s surname does not match the established 
haplotype for that name is fortunate since it prevents someone wasting more time on 
researching the mistaken lineage. Men who are interested in a particular project but 
do not bear the particular surname being studied through direct paternal descent are 
often encouraged to find another group or to begin one themselves. The implication is 
that discovering nonbelonging in one group opens up the possibilities of discovering 
true belonging in another, so no one is left completely outside a genetic collective.
At the same time, the criteria of membership with a clan or surname association 
shifts, at least symbolically. Clan membership, which is often open to those with 
interests in the name because of its presence within their family trees but who do not 
necessarily bear it as their own name, is implicitly tightened to those whose genetic 
results support their direct male line descent. The senses of collective descent that 
suffuse these societies could potentially withstand these new genetic distinctions, but 
the significance that is afforded to shared ancestry within them, and even more so 
when it is genetically verified, can fracture previously untested senses of affinity and 
affiliation. Those involved often talk of a strong sense of affinity with those that match 
genetically, even if these matches are fairly distant and explain this affinity through 
a positive or at least benign sense of family ties. Sometimes this is a matter of online 
sociality; in other cases, trips are made to meet those newly established relatives that 
entail all the negotiations of desire for connection and recognition of difference that 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Irish DNA: Making Connections and Making Distinctions  155
occur in conventional genealogical tourism.10 But the claim that participating in a 
DNA surname project provides ‘a sense of camaraderie with all who participate in the 
Family Project, which is particularly strong for those who share a genetic ancestry’ 
suggests by extension that those who do not share ‘genetic ancestry’ have no ‘natural’ 
basis for senses of connection and commonality.
The responses of men who discover that their surname does not correspond to 
the Y-chromosome patterns that have been ascribed to the name are largely absent 
from the online domain of genetic Irish surname studies. Group administrators 
report on the email communication that stops abruptly after results of this kind. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no place for the expression of loss, disappointment or even 
scepticism when the public forum of online discussion groups is defined through 
being part of and invested in and not outside the shared community of descent. This 
silence is unsurprising too, given that failing to match is not just a matter of fractured 
senses of fraternity but of suspected illegitimacy in the recent or distant past that 
caused men not to inherit the surname of their biological father.
Origins and Relatedness at Different Resolutions
However, the meaning of genetic similarity is not straightforward even for those 
who are judged to fall within the groups based on genetic similarity and nearness 
to the ‘benchmark’ haplotype. Interpretations of relatedness between individual 
men and their place within the overall findings are based on complex comparisons 
that involve describing and analysing the significance of genetic matches, genetic 
difference and current accounts of the rates of genetic mutation in general and the 
rates of mutation of specific markers. Family Tree DNA has developed a system of 
estimating the number of generations or time to the most recent common paternal 
ancestor (TMRCA) of any two men. But the results are described not in a language of 
certainties but of estimates and statistical probabilities. This extract from the Driscoll 
project is typical:
David Dean and Edward Joseph Driscoll match 22 of 25 markers. The 
implication is that they share a common ancestor but too long ago to be 
found in the paper records. Specifically, the probability that they share a 
common ancestor within:
200 years is 10%
400 years is 45%
600 years is 74%
On the other hand, David Dean and Richard Driscoll are definitely related. 
They match 34 of 37 markers. The probability that they share a common 
ancestor within:
8 generations or about 200 years is 48%
16 generations or about 400 years is 91%
24 generations or about 600 years is 99%.11
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It is hard to know to whether these sorts of statistical probabilities are satisfying 
or frustrating results. Email discussion lists at least suggest the demands of trying 
to understand them and relate them to personal genealogies and clan histories. 
These lists are dominated by appeals for guidance, speculative interpretation, advice, 
clarifications, corrections of misunderstandings and explanations of the most basic 
basis of the tests and the most complicated analytical approaches. But it is clear that 
these probabilities and the different temporalities of ancestry and spatialities of origin 
within project reports do not always supply simple answers to quests for origins. 
Many of the results suggest instead different orders of origins and different registers 
of relatedness. At one level of analysis, the results may be interpreted as regionally 
rooting the clan, sept or surname group in Ireland. At another, they suggest a much 
more temporally distant and geographically generalized original place. References to 
early Irish history appear alongside accounts of prehistoric population movements 
in project reports. A ‘close knit relationship’ between a geographically bounded 
group is juxtaposed to the much larger scale and broad sense of relatedness, as in the 
explanation of Group 1 of the MacCurtain study:
Group 1 is the largest group with 23 out of 42 people tested so far. Every 
one in the main portion of Group 1 show complete matches, or no genetic 
differences at this level of testing. Since they all are from the same region, 
the area where Counties Clare, Cork, and Kerry join this should not be 
surprising. Most of this region is mountainous, and has many isolated 
valleys and towns, leading to a close knit relationship over the years. The one 
surprising finding is the Haplogroup J2 … This Haplogroup did not expand 
out of the Middle East until about 3000 to 5000 years ago.
The Haplogroup J is found primarily in Middle Eastern and North 
African populations. This group was carried by the Middle Eastern 
traders into Europe, central Asia, India, and Pakistan. It also contains 
the Cohen modal lineage. This is the line of the Jewish priesthood. The 
J2 sub clade originated in the Northern portion of the Fertile Crescent 
where it spread throughout the Mediterranean area, Central Asia, and 
India. One member has had the J2 Haplogroup tested and confirmed. 
This sub clade is indicative of a Neolithic farmer origin. (A map of Europe 
showing where people who have tested for Haplogroup J2 can be found at 
http://www.ysearch.org/haplomap_europe.asp?haplo=,J2)
Group 1 shows that at 200 years (8 generations) they have a 55% probability 
of a common ancestor, and at 400 years (16 generations) the probability 
increases to 80%.12
Group 1 are thus bound together by their degree of Y-chromosome genetic matching 
(even if probabilities of common ancestors remain probabilities) that is thought to 
reflect the topography of their shared locality in Ireland. But at the same time one 
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member is found to have a haplogroup that is both shared with millions of others, 
including, supposedly, Jewish priestly men, and ‘found primarily in Middle Eastern 
and North African populations’. Similarly, the results of the MacTighernan study at 
one order of analysis suggests genetic diversity among the MacTighernan men and at 
another points to a very extended sense of genetic relatedness:
With the tests completed so far we 29 MacTighernans fall into nine separate 
unrelated and different DNA groups … Based on what I have read there 
are 153 distinct genetic population haplogroups in the world, with all of 
us falling in the R1b haplogroup as well as 70% of all those tested at the 
FamilytreeDNA lab. Most or a large part of western Europe’s population is 
also in the R1b haplogroup.13
This combination of differentiation at one scale of analysis and generalized connection 
at another is a striking feature of genetic genealogy.
Project reports often describe those involved both in terms of broad haplogroups 
and more refined groups of haplotypes specific to the project members. This means 
that the projects often produce different sorts of relatedness and different origins at 
different degrees of resolution. The result of comparing the Y-chromosome markers 
of the men involved in the MacCurtain study to the current population genetics 
of prehistoric human migration, for example, suggests that the MacCurtains have 
‘three different origins’ that relate to three different broad haplogroups named and 
mapped by geneticists. This genetic reckoning of origin and relatedness does not 
seem to provide an image of indigenous rootedness in Ireland but diverse origins 
and extended temporalities of migration. Though the idea of a primordial homeland 
is often a part of traditional Irish diasporic imaginations, these investigations of 
ancestral origins highlight forms of mobility that challenge the image of an ancient 
and pure point of origin.
Genetic surname studies are thus not only demanding in their scientific basis 
and statistical complexity. Those who try to relate the results of the genetic studies 
to their prior sense of ancestry, origin and descent have to not only cope with the 
coexistence of these different registers of relatedness, some specific and some very 
general, different timescales and different geographies, they also have to cope with 
the incommensurability of genetic and genealogical time. Though clan mythologies 
and genealogical origin stories stretch back into prehistory, most personal family 
trees are not complete or even partially complete beyond four or five generations. 
Genetic mutation rates that allow for differentiation between lineages as well as 
estimates of most common recent ancestors usually calibrate connections within 
much longer timespans, up to and more than 600 years ago. Prehistoric migration 
pathways that are derived from the mapping of broad Y-chromosome haplogroups 
are described in terms of tens of thousands of years. For some participants, these 
awkward incommensurabilities between ordinary genealogy and its geneticized forms, 
like the degrees of speculation and qualification involved in interpreting results, are 
ignored, overlooked or deemed to be irrelevant in light of the promise of scientific 
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confirmation of clan ancestry and origins. However, sometimes those most committed 
to the projects and most close to the interpretative work they require are those most 
vexed by the unresolved questions that are overlooked by others. The personal effects 
of these studies will depend on the degree to which participants’ senses of ancestral 
affiliation are playful, important or fundamental to their sense of themselves and 
their ethnicity, and the relative significance of shared ancestry within their patterns of 
sociability, online and offline. Yet, even if the projects do not simply supply the proofs 
of lineage and precise origin places that they seem to offer, they are, nevertheless, 
part of an emerging public discourse of geneticized distinction between different sorts 
of ancestry and places of origin that do have a direct bearing on understandings of 
ethnicity, identity and difference in Ireland, Northern Ireland and the Irish diaspora.
Y-Chromosomes and ‘Native Names’
The focus on direct paternal descent both in Irish genetic surname studies and 
in research in human population genetics focusing on the Y-chromosome and 
using surnames as proxies for paternal lineage evokes an imaginative geography of 
premodern indigeneity and an ancient Gaelic past that is a potent but contested 
account of the Irish national and diasporic community of shared descent. Though 
interest in using genetic tests in genealogical research reflects the patterns of ethnicity 
and interests in original homelands shaped by European emigration, the research 
in human population genetics, upon which genetic genealogy depends, focuses on 
reconstructing patterns of human genetic variation before modern migration. New 
maps of human genetic variation are maps which are meant to capture patterns of 
genetic variation that precede the effects of more recent centuries of ‘gene flow’ 
through human mobility. Thousands of years of continuous human mobility seem to 
be stilled in the images of stable and genetically distinctive human groups occupying 
world regions that population geneticists seek to reconstruct. This means that 
geneticists who focus on prehistoric patterns of human genetic diversity routinely 
deploy sampling strategies that screen out those whose genetic profiles are deemed 
to derive from medieval or modern patterns of migration rather than descent from 
‘indigenous’ populations. There is a basic logic to this. Geneticists can only study 
ancient population patterns by selecting donors of genetic material who they can be 
reasonably sure descend from ancient residents. In many cases this is by the criteria 
that all four grandparents also came from the area in which the donor lives. In recent 
research in Britain and Ireland, surnames are also being used as sampling devices, 
sources of evidence and the focus of research.
In the case of the research paper on the prehistoric population genetics of Ireland 
published in Nature in 2000 (Hill et al. 2000), which prompted Patrick Guinness to 
fund further research on Irish clan genealogies and which has in turn fed back into the 
world of genetic genealogy via Family Tree DNA and online discussion lists, Daniel 
Bradley and his team in Dublin used the surnames of the men whose Y-chromosomes 
were analysed to differentiate between the haplotypes they identified on the basis of 
their recent or ancient presence in Ireland. They used the correspondence between 
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the direct inheritance of the Y-chromosome and patrilineal traditions of surnames 
to categorize their samples on the basis that men with Gaelic names are direct 
descendants of the ancient Gaelic population of Ireland and that the genetics of those 
with English, Scottish and Norman/Norse names derive from later settlers. Screening 
out the ‘non-native’ genetic material allows the authors to study an ‘older geography’ 
of Y-chromosome variation.
In a context in which surnames both have particular popular appeal as symbols 
of ancient and heroic precolonial Gaelic social order and culture, and are used as clues 
to differentiate the ‘two communities’ in Northern Ireland, and in which questions 
of the place of the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ in Ireland have long been deeply contested, 
this paper and its reporting entered a fraught terrain. It did not go uncontested. In 
response to criticisms that this approach implies that these old categories of ‘native’ 
and ‘settler’ can be genetically distinguished and that ethnic differences correspond 
to genetic differences (Cooney 2000a, 2000b), those involved insisted that they did 
not and had no intention of linking genetic diversity and ethnicity (Bradley and 
Hill 2000). However, even if inadvertently, their work can resurrect the idea of a 
pure original Gaelic population. It suggests that despite centuries of intermixing 
and complex migration flows, it is possible to differentiate men in Ireland today 
on the basis of whether or not their genetic profile indicates direct paternal descent 
from this ancient original population. By arguing that surnames are quite reliable 
indicators of a man’s ancestral origins and that this is proven in Y-chromosome 
genetic studies, their work suggested that men either have ancient genetic origins 
in Ireland or elsewhere. This is regardless of the centuries of intermarriage that 
complicate an assumption that names that originally derived from specific migrant 
groups reflect simple and singular descent from one of them. Despite the recent 
emergence and historic fluidity of surnames, they are taken to be reliable guides to 
‘native’ or ‘non-native’ lineages. Focusing of the Y-chromosome alone means that all 
other sources of genetic inheritance, from both parents, all four grandparents, eight 
great-grandparents and so on are overlooked. For the geneticists, this is its value; 
the combination of Y-chromosome genetics and patrinlineal surname inheritance 
makes it possible, they argue, to extract the history of ancient genetic patterns from 
the genetic muddle that is the product of centuries of human migration and mixing.
But it is these centuries of migration and mixing that have been central to 
recent attempts to reconsider traditional Irish nationalist narratives of purity of 
culture and descent because of the divisiveness of their definitions of a pure Gaelic 
nation and differentiation between ‘native’ and ‘settler’. By the late nineteenth 
century, categories of identity and difference between the Gaelic nation and the 
colonial power, as well as between Catholics and Protestants in Ulster, were being 
constructed through ideas of distinctive ancestry and separate origins (Bardon 
1992: 400–1; Comerford 2003: 51–84). These became categories of culture and 
descent whose purity must be preserved and policed. Recent academic and popular 
accounts of ‘the people of Ireland’ that challenge ideas of an ancient isolated purity 
and the figuring of historical periods of settlement as alien incursions, represent the 
history of the island in terms of complex and continuous migrant flows between 
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the two islands on the edge of continental Europe and further afield, as well as 
distinctive waves of settlement (Loughrey 1988). In some cases these arguments 
addressed ideas of biological or racial purity directly by proposing ‘that we are 
all happily mongrelised, interdependent, impure, mixed up’ (Kearney 1997: 188) 
as a constructive counter-discourse to the categories of antagonistic difference in 
Ireland and especially in Northern Ireland, where categories of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ 
are deeply entangled in the collective identities of both ‘communities’.
In contrast to the use of surnames to categorize the Y-chromosomes of 
men (and by implication their ancestral heritage) in terms of whether it derives 
from ‘native’ or ‘exotic’, both popular and scholarly accounts of Ulster’s history 
have used surnames as evidence of intermarriage and intermixing to challenge 
the notion of two absolutely separate and ethnically distinct cultural groups in 
Northern Ireland. The variety of surnames in any one individual’s family tree is 
highlighted as evidence for the impossibility of categorizing people on the basis 
of one surname alone and for the genealogical interconnections between what are 
imagined as separate communities of descent – Catholic and Irish and Protestant 
and British. In contrast to these efforts to reconsider old categories of identity and 
belonging in Ireland and Northern Ireland, recent work on the human population 
genetics of Ireland evokes an old geography of native Irishness and can be used to 
differentiate between contemporary men in Ireland and in the diaspora in terms 
of whether or not they are direct patrilineal descendants of ancient Gaelic clan 
groups (see Nash 2006b). While the geneticists involved maintained that they did 
not suggest any connection between genetics and ethnicity, their research now 
makes it possible to create new distinctions between those who can and cannot 
truly claim membership in a version of collective national community based on 
direct paternal Gaelic descent. By implication, if not by intention, they produce a 
genetic distinction between those of ‘native’ descent and those ‘of ultimate origin 
outside Ireland’.
In the studies that followed the work using surnames and the Y-chromosome 
in the Nature paper on Irish origins, McEvoy and Bradley argue that their research 
‘demonstrates for the first time that surnames collectively are markers of shared recent 
patrilineal kinship. The extent of this varies depending on the specific name and the 
nature of its foundation. Some names have numerous early origins, while others 
have a defined and focused early genesis. In either case, it is clear that subsequent 
events of the 1,000-year-long history of Irish surnames have been a substantial 
force in shaping the genetic diversity of a modern surname population’ (McEvoy 
and Bradley 2006: 217). They found that none of their Gaelic surnames ‘showed 
more than about half of current bearers still descend from one original founder’ 
(2006: 212). The implications of this for their idea of surnames as strong indicators of 
shared ancestry or for the complex history of ‘mixing’ that radically complicates the 
earlier categorization of the ‘native’ and ‘non-native’, are underplayed. The idea of 
genetically distinctive native Gaelic surnames seems resistant to revision and the focus 
on the paternal descent alone even if a technical artefact of the science, continues to 
elide the entangled genealogies shaped by the complex history of migration between 
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Ireland, Britain and beyond. In a contradictory fashion, Y-chromosome research is 
used to trace some of those migrations but in doing so often reinforces the idea of 
genetically identifiable ethnic groups and can only do so by constructing a genetically 
identifiable ‘indigenous’ population.
The use of the Y-chromosome and surnames in Irish genetic surname projects 
extends this possibility of genetic differentiation between those of ‘native’ or ‘non-
native’ descent to the imaginative community of those of Irish descent outside 
Ireland. It similarly runs counter to recent efforts to reimagine the diaspora as a 
community based on shared attachments but encompassing cultural plurality. In the 
1990s the relatively well-established counter-argument that Irish history, culture and 
collective identity have been shaped by complex patterns of settlement that challenge 
the idea of native purity and alien presence was extended by new efforts to enlist Irish 
emigration as well as histories of immigration in an effort to construct ideas of Irish 
collective identity in terms of cultural plurality and hybridity. Accounts of diasporic 
Irishness pointed to cultural diversity within the collective global community – 
forms of Irishness shaped by different emigrant contexts – and argued for ways of 
reimagining Irishness in Ireland in terms of plurality rather than purity or antagonistic 
difference. National and diasporic Irishness were simultaneously refigured in terms of 
an inclusive pluralism as a counterpoint to divisive categories of difference (see Nash 
2008: 26–39).
In contrast, according to the logics of Y-chromosome surname studies, men in 
Ireland as well as men in the diaspora who identify themselves as Irish or as of Irish 
descent but do not have Gaelic names and the corresponding haplotypes, or have 
Gaelic surnames but not the associated haplotype, are deemed to have genetic origins 
somewhere else. It is only conventionally Gaelic surnames that are being studied 
in Irish genetic surname projects, since according to the logic of direct and native 
ancestry, all the other surnames in Ireland are linked to lines of paternal descent that 
originate outside of Ireland. The deep ancestral origins of a man in Ireland or in the 
Irish diaspora who does not have a Gaelic name are ultimately elsewhere. Unlike 
the possible understandings of interconnection opened up by conventional family 
history, the genealogical imaginary of Y-chromosome genetics is not one of mixing, 
which renders those old categories of pure native and settler descent nonsensical 
in the present, but one of single direct ancestral lines and old clan groups. Genetic 
Irish surname projects involve reckoning degrees of genetic similarity and difference 
between men, and using the resulting genetic groupings within clan and surname 
groups to establish the premodern tribal geographies of lineage and location. In 
doing so, they refigure both nation and diaspora as fundamentally communities of 
masculine, patrilineal and Gaelic descent. An extremely partial account of genetic 
variations and ancestry can be used to differentiate between the ‘native’ and ‘non-
native’ in Ireland, and between those in the diaspora who have or do not have direct 
paternal origins in Ireland.
New genetic versions of Irish descent are not framed as a valorization of 
undiluted inheritance. This is because the focus on direct male-line descent is 
already exclusive. All the other ancestries that could offer an image of entangled 
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roots or hybridity are simply rendered irrelevant in a direct paternal model of 
identity and descent. The focus on direct paternal descent alone effectively means 
that a language of ethnic fractions or mixing is unnecessary since the focus on 
direct paternal descent is itself a form of purification. When this is coupled with an 
imaginative geography of an ancient stable world of human genetic variation – of 
genes and people in their ancient ancestral homelands – an individual man can 
have only one place of ancient origin, either in Gaelic Ireland before the arrival of 
‘non-native’ genes or outside Ireland where those ‘non-native’ genes originated. 
While an individual man may understand himself in terms of a mixed ancestry 
and multiple origins, the discourse of direct paternal descent is one of a singular 
origin and single ethnicity. As such, being of Gaelic descent becomes a property 
you either have or do not have and a property that can be scientifically tested. 
Even if in practice the project points to lineages that extend backwards in time and 
away from Ireland, the dominant discourse is of a single ancestral place. Against 
the grain of recent configurations of national and diasporic Irishness as plural and 
hybrid, genetic surname projects and the human genetic research with which they 
are entangled, conjure up a geography of the nation and a genealogy of Irishness 
as fundamentally Gaelic. Ancestry is reduced to patrilineage, and the nation and 
diaspora become communities of shared paternal descent from Gaelic forebears 
rather than hybrid and ‘mongrel’ collectives. While Y-chromosome surname studies 
do not necessarily produce the genetic proofs of origins and clan descent they seem 
to promise, they are based on versions of ancestry and origins that run against the 
grain of recent efforts to reimagine belonging and identity in Ireland, Northern 
Ireland and the diaspora in terms of cultural plurality and hybridity. A real claim 
to shared ancestry must be a genetically verifiable one and authentic Irish origins 
mean Gaelic Irish origins. Yet, at another level, being able to say that your ancestors 
came from Ireland is no longer enough, since these projects generate new senses of 
lack and ignorance. An ever more precisely differentiated location and place in a 
genetic tree of Gaelic clan groups and even within specific surname groups becomes 
a newly required form of genetic and genealogical self-knowledge. Irish ancestry is 
defined genetically and via direct paternal descent, but knowledge of origins and 
ancestry depends on making further and finer distinctions among members of a 
newly geneticized community of shared descent.
Conclusion
One broad conclusion of this exploration of the consumption of genetic genealogy 
in Y-chromosome surname studies might be that the results of these new tests do 
more to undermine and complicate than reinforce the ways in which ideas of origins 
and relatedness are linked to geneticized versions of ancestry in the promotion of 
these commodities. It is clear from these projects that the answers that they offer to 
questions of origins are often more provisional and complicated than they seem to 
promise. Categories of relatedness within groups can shift as new members are tested 
and the location of ancient origin and categories of genetic similarity can shift at 
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different scales of analysis. Men can be told that their Y-chromosome corresponds to 
a broad haplotype that locates their ancestral origins via direct paternal descent in a 
particular region of the world and can be informed that they shared a direct paternal 
descent from a named Gaelic clan member. These shifting scales of relatedness suggest 
very broad categories of genetic similarity at some levels and more specific subgroups 
at others. As in conventional genealogy, expectations of affinity between men who 
are assumed to be linked via shared descent across the geography of homeland and 
diaspora are tempered by realizations that diasporic interests in ancestral connections 
may not be shared by men in Ireland who are deemed to embody genetic source 
material about an ancient clan group.
All this might suggest that in practice, rather than crudely linking genetics 
and ethnicity, these new commodities may unsettle conventional categories and 
understandings of origins and relatedness. This would echo recent arguments that 
challenge claims that these new commodities simply regenerate old ideas of the 
biological or genetic basis of ethnicity or race. One strand of these arguments centres 
on the question of the ways in which people make sense of these new forms of genetic 
knowledge in relation to the complex and shifting roles and relations between ideas 
of the social and biological in understandings of kinship and relatedness (Wade 
2007). This emphasis on consumption suggests that people will not simply accept 
geneticized versions of origins or ancestry but will incorporate them into complex, 
dynamic and fluid versions of their biosocial identity. This idea of the longstanding 
imbrication of the biological and social in Euro-American ideas of identity and kinship 
is paralleled by the wider and more recent destabilization of the categories of nature 
and culture, biology and society, which makes any claim to identify a straightforward 
geneticization or biologization of race an oversimplification (Skinner 2006, 2007). 
Together, these interconnected perspectives demand that a critical engagement with 
genetic genealogy is alert to these complexities.
Yet, rather than only focus on the ambiguities and complexities of genetic 
genealogy for those who use these tests, a critical engagement with genetic genealogy 
also has to involve exploring its much less ambiguous and unequivocal rendering 
of genetic relatedness. Consumers of these tests undoubtedly understand them in 
relation to their existing senses of the significance of the social and biological, but the 
model of ancestry in genetic genealogy undermines anything but the most genetic 
model of kinship. In genetic genealogy, as in human population genetics from which 
it has emerged, kinship is only genetic. While other domains of technoscience are 
troubling distinctions between nature and culture, or biology and the social, genetic 
genealogy is one domain in which there is a clear distinction between genetic and 
other versions of relatedness. And while consumers of these tests do not necessarily 
accept this distinction and have much more complex and equivocal perspectives 
regarding the meaning or significance of these tests, this has so far done little to 
challenge the powerful and powerfully reductive rhetoric of genetic genealogy 
companies. The active interpretative work and diverse experiences of consumers does 
mean that the practice of genetic genealogy is much more complex and indeterminate 
than its marketing suggests. However, those which see genetic genealogy as part of a 
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democratization of historical knowledge (Hackstaff 2009) fail to recognize the degree 
to which the personal pursuit of ancestral knowledge is deeply constrained by its 
models of genetically meaningful ancestry. The accounts of surprising discoveries 
of genetic connections, hybridity and unexpected ancestral origins for individuals 
or groups, which often feature in media reports on genetic genealogy, should not 
simply be taken as cases which point to the ability of genetic genealogy to unsettle 
taken-for-granted accounts of identity, relatedness, belonging and difference. They 
may unsettle, but reading this as a productive unsettling means accepting the genetic 
model of identity, difference and relatedness that is at the heart of this form of applied 
science. Genetic genealogy is often framed by the companies and enthusiasts by the 
idea that by revealing ‘the relatedness of all human diversity around the world’, it can 
be a ‘potent force for promoting tolerance and peace’ (Panther-Yates and Caldwell 
Hirschman 2004: 697–98). Yet, as the case of Irish genetic surname projects has 
shown, it is as much about the making of divisive distinctions between people as it is 
about making connections.
Notes
1. IRISH-DNA is one of hundreds of general and specialized genealogy discussion lists 
hosted by RootsWeb.com and was founded in October 2004. List discussions are archived 
at: http://archiver.rootsweb.com/th/index/IRISH-DNA. Yahoo also hosts a similar list 
devoted to discussions of the use of genetic tests in tracing Irish roots, which is also called 
Irish-DNA: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Irish-DNA.
2. These programmes include the U.S. PBS series on the genetic ancestry of prominent 
African Americans, African American Lives, screened in February 2006, and the BBC 
television documentary on the genetic exploration of the ancestry of Black British people, 
Motherland: A Genetic Journey, shown in 2003. For more on the Motherland case, see 
Campbell 2007.
3. I use Family Tree DNA as an illustrative case in this introduction because it one of the 
larger companies that offers a representative cases and because of the prominence it gives 
to genetic surname projects as applications of its Y-chromosome tests. For an account of 
the other companies involved, see Greely 2008.
4. Available at http://www.mitosearch.org and http://www.ysearch.org.
5. Interview with Patrick Guinness, Furness, Co. Kildare, Ireland, 20 February 2006. Brian 
McEvoy’s thesis was completed in 2005: see McEvoy 2005.
6. http://mcmahonsofmonaghan.org/mcmachon_dna_project.html, date accessed 3 March 
2011.
7. O’Shea DNA Project, http://www2.smumn.edu/uasal/DNAWWW/overview.html, date 
accessed 7 June 2004.
8. http://www.odriscolls.me.uk/dna_project.htm, date accessed 3 March 2011.
9. O’Shea DNA Project, http:// www2.smumn.edu/uasal/DNAWWW/overview.html, date 
accessed 7 June 2004.
10. See Nash (2008) for a more detailed account of these practices of making relations in 
conventional as well as genetic genealogy. This chapter draws together some of this 
previous work.
11. http://www.odriscolls.me.uk/dna_project.htm, date accessed 3 March 2011.
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12. http://home.comcast.net/%7Enealcurtin/geneticgenealogy.htm, date accessed 3 March 
2011.
13. http://www.mctiernan.com/dnatest.htm, date accessed 3 March 2011.
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Genomics en Route
Ancestry, Heritage and the Politics of 
Identity across the Black Atlantic1
Katharina Schramm
Introduction
The making of identities and the construction of belonging involve multiple interactions between the spheres of history, politics, culture, law and economics. 
Moreover, these processes are profoundly shaped by developments in science and 
technology and vice versa (Jasanoff 2004). This constellation becomes particularly 
clear in the field of genealogy, where biological and cultural categories intersect to 
form unique and by no means static constellations of kinship, descent and inheritance 
(cf. Carsten 2000, 2004; Edwards 2000; Franklin 2007; Franklin and McKinnon 
2001; Strathern 2005). In recent years, genealogical research into family histories 
has gained enormous popularity, not least because of technological advances such 
as the internet, which has opened up new avenues of access and communication, be 
it via databases, chatrooms or online forums that provide the root-seekers with an 
unprecedented infrastructure to pursue their advance into the past (see Basu 2007; 
Nash 2008). Commercial genealogy companies have long recognized this trend and 
have begun to offer their services through the worldwide web. Increasingly, these 
services do involve genetic ancestry testing, which constitutes one of the avenues by 
which the science of the new genetics has entered the public realm.2
In these contexts, DNA and its scientific analysis have been regularly presented 
as a kind of truth machine that can reveal one’s past and future, if only one is able 
to read the signs.3 Individual and collective histories, from ancient migrations to 
more recent genealogical traces, appear to be inscribed onto our bodies, encoded in 
certain DNA frequencies. In a similar manner, individual futures are seemingly made 
accessible, for example, through disease susceptibility tests. A lot has been said and 
written about the inadequacy of such analogies4 and emphasis has been laid upon 
the creative uses to which genetic information is actually being put by the people 
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affected by it (see Rabinow 1996; Wade 2007). Nevertheless, the image of DNA as a 
repository of truth is still particularly effective in the domain of genetic testing, and 
it is this image that makes genetic testing for ancestry such an attractive option for 
which people are willing to pay quite substantial amounts of money.
Currently, up to twenty companies offer ancestry testing via the internet (Bolnick 
et al. 2007)5 and the phenomenon is being widely discussed in the anglophone press 
as well as in academic literature, with a strong bias towards the U.S.A.6 Despite a 
shared interest in an embodied past among test-takers of all backgrounds, there are, 
of course, different views with regard to the impact the testing is assumed to make 
on one’s life. Whereas some customers of recreational genomics7 may seek a genetic 
connection to famous historical figures such as Genghis Khan (available through 
Oxford Ancestors), thereby emphasizing the playful aspects of ancestry testing, the 
practice may take on a deeper personal meaning in diasporic contexts, where an 
emotionally-laden concept of an original homeland (i.e., ‘roots’) exists but knowledge 
about its concrete contours is limited. Especially for African Americans and other 
members of the black diaspora whose family histories are shaped and shattered by 
the violent disruptions of slavery and the slave trade, the new technology promises 
to reveal hitherto unavailable information and thereby indeed to operate as a kind of 
identity assurance on a molecular level.
Both the company advertisements and the mainstream media coverage put great 
emphasis on this revelatory component of the testing. In the following, I attempt 
to go beyond this initial rhetorical stance in order to discuss some of the processes 
through which meaning is created (and contested) in and through the practice of 
genetic ancestry testing. In other words, I will look at aspects of what Catherine 
Nash has termed the ‘cultural work of making genetic meaning’ (2004: 3). Drawing 
on my previous work on cultural politics and roots tourism, my ongoing research 
in Ghana as well as on interviews with service providers and customers of genetic 
ancestry testing, I will try to identify continuities and ruptures with other existing 
forms of Black identity production and the politics of memory and heritage. In order 
to achieve this, I will follow a relational approach that takes different and shifting 
positionalities into account, thereby highlighting the processuality of knowledge 
production and political practice.8
Through its combination of techniques of embodiment, purification, 
objectification and commodification, genetic ancestry testing constitutes a unique 
location where the changing dynamics of heritage formation in connection with 
individual and collective categorizations can be fruitfully explored. On the one hand, 
genetic ancestry testing is a highly personalized endeavour, placing an individual’s 
body, represented by a drop of saliva, on the centre stage of the interpretation of 
genetic data. On the other hand, it is firmly linked to collective classifications: first, in 
terms of the taxonomies underlying the construction of the database and the design 
of ‘populations’; and, secondly, in terms of the conclusions about a test person’s 
biological and/or social belonging to one group or the other. The diasporic ‘self-
fashioning’ (Nelson 2008a) that ancestry testing facilitates is thus deeply political in 
its foundations as well as its articulations.9
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Given the great popularity of genetic ancestry testing among African Americans 
in the U.S., I refer mainly to the situation of this particular group and to perceptions 
of their needs.10 I consider the practice of genetic ancestry testing as part of a wider 
Black Atlantic network (Gilroy 1993), a diasporic relationship that is at once 
historical, imaginary, economic, political, legal, cultural and touristic, and that 
involves complex connections and disjunctions between the African homeland and 
diaspora. My analysis of genetic heritage/politics will consequently focus on three 
interrelated aspects. The first one concerns the specifics of the African diasporic 
situation and the impact of slavery on notions of identity. The second one relates to 
the specificity of United States multiculturalism and the ethnicization of belonging. 
The third one is connected to the situation of African states, which are at the receiving 
end of the genealogical quest yet have been strikingly under-represented in previous 
discussions.11 Before I turn to those issues, I will describe how the tests work – both 
in terms of the underlying technology as well as their representation in public.
‘One Simple Test Can Identify Your Family’s Country of Origin’:12 Genetics, 
Genealogies, Populations
If the twentieth century has been the ‘century of the gene’ (Fox Keller 2000), which 
cumulated in the announcement of the ‘decoding’ of the human genome in the 
year 2000, the first decade of the twenty-first century has already been called the 
beginning age of ‘postgenomics’ (Abu El-Haj 2007). On the one hand, this refers to 
a shift away from gene determinism to the acknowledgement of systemic complexity, 
as evident in the research on gene-environment interaction in the fields of proteomics 
and epigenetics (Lock 2005; Zwart 2007). On the other hand, this term captures 
the growing emphasis on difference, as is evident in the Human Genome Diversity 
Project (see Reardon 2005) or the more recent HapMap Project (see Braun and 
Hammonds 2008), as well as the growing individualization of genomic information 
(Condit 1999, 2007).
Genetic ancestry testing is firmly placed in this discursive realm of inherited 
human variation (see Marks 2001). The scene for this enactment of diversity is the 
noncoding, non-recombinant parts of DNA on which statistically noticeable markers 
of genetic difference between groups of people, i.e., haplogroups, can be located. 
Those are mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA), which is exclusively inherited from mother 
to child, as well as Y-chromosomal DNA (NRY DNA), which is inherited from father 
to son only.13 Ancestry testing makes use of this genealogical order so as to trace 
maternal or paternal descent respectively.14 Individual markers are then run through 
a computer program which compares the sample to a database in which other DNA 
sequences are classified along the lines of known ‘populations’. As a technology, 
ancestry testing at the same time relies on established categories of race and ethnicity 
while also undermining them – a dynamics that will be analysed further down.
One of the most prominent proponents of the new gene/alogy among African 
Americans has been Henri Louis Gates, Jr., Harvard Professor of African American 
Studies and well-known public intellectual. He hosted the TV programme African 
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American Lives, where the family histories of celebrities like Whoopi Goldberg, 
Quincy Jones or Chris Tucker were tracked down by means of conventional genealogy 
as well as DNA testing.15 For this production, he relied heavily on the services of 
African Ancestry, which at that time was the only company that had specialized in 
African American consumers and to which I will turn below.16 Meanwhile, Gates has 
founded his own company African DNA, in collaboration with Family Tree DNA. 
On the homepage of this company, Gates’ advocacy for ancestry testing reads as 
follows:
With cells collected from the insides of our mouths, geneticists can analyze 
small sections of our genetic material that form distinctive sequences 
known as ‘haplotypes’, which can then be compared to DNA samples taken 
from people on the African continent. The process is a bit like matching 
fingerprints on CSI. A match between our DNA and the DNA from a 
person from Africa means that we have possibly found someone with whom 
we share a common ancestor, someone from our same ‘tribe’ – be it Igbo or 
Yoruba, Fulani or Mende. Such a match can reveal an ethnic identity that 
has been lost for centuries, since the dreadful Middle Passage. I would urge 
anyone who is interested to try and trace their family back to Africa, through 
genealogical research and DNA testing. There are several tests available, and 
each is surprisingly inexpensive, often less than a pair of designer sneakers. 
(Henri Louis Gates, Jr. on AfricanDNA.com)
This explanation reveals a lot about the representational dynamics of ancestry testing 
in general and its unique combination of science, history and consumption. Gates’ 
reference to the price of the tests (in the range between $100 and $350 per test) not only 
indicates the middle-class status of potential clients but also speaks to the desirability 
of ancestry testing as a ‘must-have’ consumer good, similar to a fashionable ‘pair of 
designer sneakers’. In an analogous way, the allusion to CSI, a globally successful TV 
programme in which the lab and the forensics practised therein feature as the main site 
of criminal investigation and the establishment of truth, firmly places ancestry testing 
within the realm of popular culture and consumerism.17 Like many other gene/alogy 
websites, the complex processes by which the genetic data are codified, compared and 
eventually interpreted get blackboxed and obscured from the public representation 
of the procedure: the only things left to consider are the easy cheek swab and the 
eventual revelation of the results in a certificate of descent. The probabilistic nature 
of ancestry testing (both in terms of the DNA analysis itself and the comparison 
with an existing database) is likewise withheld. Instead, the impression of an exact 
match (comparable to the uniqueness of a fingerprint, genetic or otherwise) is being 
created, despite the fact that such a one-to-one match hardly exists, given the clinal 
nature of genetic variation and the wide distribution of haplotypes across population 
boundaries.
The ambiguity of ancestry testing can be stressed even further if one takes into 
account the fact that the testing focuses exclusively on one singular (paternal or 
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maternal) line of biological descent. The further back one moves in time, the more 
complex the situation becomes, as a person’s direct ancestors multiply exponentially, 
yet the test would only refer to one of those.18 However, despite these severe 
limitations, the advertising for the tests evokes genetics as a proof not only of African 
origins but more specifically of ethnic belonging – ‘our same tribe’ – manifested in an 
individual’s body and supposedly kept intact over long periods of time by means of 
biological inheritance. History and identity are thus located in the DNA, creating the 
impression that genetic science can give direct access to the past and thereby resolve 
what is presented as the diasporic identity crisis.
African DNA does admit that ‘sometimes the tests yield multiple exact tribal 
matches’. Distancing itself from other companies, it offers an extra feature, namely 
cooperation with historians who help to interpret the results in order to arrive at the 
most plausible conclusion about the test-person’s ancestral belonging. This strategy 
was already employed in African American Lives, where, for example, John Thornton, 
a well-known expert on the transatlantic slave trade, was brought in to align the 
genetic data with historical knowledge. This reference to yet another scholarly 
expertise further increases the impression of the scientific nature of ancestry testing, 
which, as I argue, rhetorically constructs its revelatory power. Yet, as Henry T. Greely 
insists, this image of science is misleading, because:
the real science of genetic genealogy is riddled with qualifications and 
limitations; it deals with varying degrees of probability and not with 
anything close to certainty. It looks at precise questions, precisely defined, 
like a direct paternal or maternal line. Genetic genealogy skips the caveats 
and in doing so promotes a false perception of science; it invokes science’s 
power without accepting its limits. (2008: 231)
Moreover, the underlying mythologization of science goes along with a double 
reification of history – both in terms of the formation of diasporic identities 
as well as the idea of African ethnicity and the intrinsic connection between the 
two. Consequently, the reference to ‘tribal’ identity stands as the ultimate goal of 
ancestry testing. This idea of ethnic or ‘tribal’ descent plays on the convergence 
of cultural, territorial and biological boundaries in the definition of populations 
that is prevalent in many other heritage projects outside the sphere of recreational 
genomics. The company that has taken this ‘tribal’ identification furthest is probably 
the abovementioned company African Ancestry, to which I will now turn.
In the internet presence that African Ancestry displayed until a few years back, 
the parallel to commodified heritage presentations, as they dominate Afrocentric 
popular culture,19 was particularly evident. Pictures of African people in ‘traditional’ 
apparel, images of masks as well as straw-clad round huts were depicted next to the 
various product offers and explanatory texts. Any reference to contemporary Africa 
was carefully avoided, suggesting that the genetic test would open up a direct window 
to a past of ancient glory (not contemporary struggles). Here, genetic ‘roots seeking’ 
operates in the same discursive realm as conventional heritage tourism directed at a 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
172  Identity Politics and the New Genetics 
diasporan audience, where references to an imaginary homeland are at the heart of 
the advertising brochures and travel itineraries. On African Ancestry’s homepage, in 
addition to the images of masks and sculptures, the faces of an old man and an old 
woman were used to mark paternal and maternal descent respectively, suggesting 
cross-generational inheritance, ancient ancestral wisdom and access to a past 
associated with oral lore. However, it was never them whom one was supposed to ask 
in order to find out about one’s origin,20 but rather one’s own body – a self-referential 
repository of genetic information that only needed to be tapped and interpreted by 
the knowledgeable scientist.
Today, these images have been exchanged for different kind of representation, 
focusing more on the interaction with potential customers. The website is now 
animated and entails a number of videoclips and infomercials. The photographs 
of African people have been replaced by pictures of African American families as 
well as much more abstract images, such as that of a classical pedigree illustrating 
maternal or paternal genealogical lines which are to be traced through the testing.21 
This shift can be interpreted as a move towards a more ‘objectified’ outlook, using 
scientific imagery and contemporary African American faces in order to convey the 
company’s message. Nevertheless, like the stated goals of African DNA, the claim to 
ethnic specificity (and thus to a particular heritage discourse) still holds true, as in the 
section on ‘benefits’, where the ‘Certificates of Descent’ from other companies that 
are not specialized in an African American clientele are compared to that offered by 
African Ancestry. In contrast to the other certificates on display, where the genetic 
information is given without an explicit reference to contemporary cultural affiliations, 
African Ancestry dismisses this ‘generic haplogroup jargon’ and emphasizes symbolic 
peoplehood instead – a very important feature in the heritage discourse of African 
Americans. In the end, the results may read as follows: ‘African Ancestry hereby 
certifies that [so and so] shares Maternal Genetic Ancestry with the Fulani people in 
Guinea-Bissau and the Mende people in Sierra Leone’ (retrieved 3 March 2011 from 
http://www.africanancestry.com/benefits.html). On the ‘testimonies’ page, one gets 
an impression of how this particular information is interpreted by African Ancestry’s 
customers – who are often shown in tears or displaying similar emotionally-laden 
gestures. Sometimes, the announcement of genetic ancestry is framed in public 
conventions, which stress the ritual and revelatory component of the ancestry testing 
even further.22 On such occasions, representatives of African nations or ‘tribes’ 
may be present to symbolically embrace their newly identified ‘genetic relatives’23 
– thereby creating a strong and emotional moment of effervescence that could not 
have been generated by the test results alone. However, the effect of such ceremonial 
affiliation is often limited to the instant of the performance itself: similar moments 
are created in homecoming rituals, such as naming ceremonies, which are staged as 
part of the travel itineraries of diasporan heritage tourists on the African continent 
(see Schramm 2010). The BBC documentary Motherland: A Genetic Journey also 
facilitated such encounters for its protagonists, which at first enhanced the intensity of 
the felt connection. In later interviews the test-persons expressed their estrangement 
from the African communities they were said to be related to and emphasized their 
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diasporic identity instead. Again, this reaction is comparable to nongenetic-based 
homecoming experiences. Despite these limitations, the attractiveness of the tests is 
persistent.
African Ancestry claims to be able to announce genetic ancestry with such a 
degree of precision that a person’s ethnicity can be determined, because of its ‘largest 
African database’. Information on the specific setup of this database varies in the 
different reports that are available. Glaser (2003) speaks of a sample of 9,000 Africans 
from 82 ethnic groups; a TIME Magazine article (Hamilton 2005) gives the number 
of 20,000 DNA samples from 400 indigenous African groups, whereas Rees (2005) 
talks of 10,386 paternal and 11,170 maternal lineages from over 135 indigenous 
African populations. In 2005, Rick Kittles, scientific director and co-owner of 
African Ancestry, stated that the database they use consisted ‘of over 11,170 mtDNA 
haplotypes and 10,386 Y chromosome haplotypes from over 120 indigenous African 
populations’ (Winston and Kittles 2005: 214). Three years later, when the current 
homepage was launched, it was indicated that the database ‘includes lineages from 30 
countries and over 200 ethnic groups. Paternal lineages: 11,747 samples. Maternal 
lineages: 13,690 samples’ (retrieved 3 March 2011 from www.africanancestry.com/
database.html).24
Despite the fact that the database is constantly expanded, these differing 
(and at times contradictory) numbers, especially when concerning the category of 
‘population’, indicate the controversial issue of boundary determination on the part 
of the providers of genetic ancestry services. For example, in the case of Ghana, among 
the ethnicities that are listed are ‘Fante, Ashanti, Akan’, yet both Fante and Asante are 
subgroups of the Akan language family and thus the three terms are not on the same 
classificatory level. Moreover, this classification does not say much about the political 
constitutions which make ethnicity a meaningful category of belonging. Population 
geneticists, on whose findings the various databases of ancestry companies are drawn, 
often work with the presupposition ‘that ethnicity, language, and genetic inheritance 
are today shared characteristics of well-demarcated, easily defined human populations 
and that these characteristics generally covaried in the past as they are held to covary 
in the present’ (MacEachern 2000: 362). However, this conceptual unit that is here 
framed as ‘ethnic group’ or ‘tribe’ has a specific history in colonial administration and 
anthropology (see Braun and Hammonds 2008). It does not match the dynamism of 
human migrations, self-identifications and political affiliations, and has consequently 
been abandoned in (social) anthropological literature. Inasmuch as the notion of an 
unspoilt African cultural authenticity that has remained intact since the first Africans 
were taken away as slaves is ahistorical, the suggestion that all members of an ethnic 
group share a biological essence ignores the longstanding historical relationships, 
transformations, continuous movements and violent disruptions that have shaped 
African societies, just like any others.
In the genetic analysis, molecular time, which is already a controversial measure 
in itself (Sommer 2008), is collapsed with historical time, despite the fact that 
those categories operate on quite different levels (see MacEachern 2000). Ethnic 
differences are first taken for granted and only then are genetic maps produced 
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accordingly (see Marks 2001) – a highly problematic methodological issue. Even 
while ethnicity and biology may statistically correlate25 (as do other sets of criteria by 
which any groups can be distinguished from one another), this connection does not 
give a hint at cultural (or political) belonging. In order to arrive at conclusions about 
such an affiliation – in the sense of a personal identity as the revelation procedure 
suggests – interpretation has to come in. To facilitate this meaning-making, African 
Ancestry offers its customers guidance in the form of ‘Show Your Roots Items’ (such 
as T-shirts and caps displaying various ‘countries of origin’) as well as a ‘Historical 
reference guide for 21 West and Central African countries’. The latter presentation 
bears a resemblance to the glossy brochures of the heritage industry, which forms 
such an important conceptual framework for ancestry testing.
However, just as a root-seeker’s homecoming experience is not reducible to 
standardized tourist representations and reified heritage products, neither is a person’s 
response to the genetic information one-dimensional or necessarily deterministic.26 
On the contrary, as Alondra Nelson (2008a, 2008b) has demonstrated, people’s 
interpretations of the test results show a high degree of creativity and flexibility (even 
though it often rests on the illusion of clear biological distinctions between groups). 
Customers of genetic ancestry testing engage in processes of cultural authentification 
that are simultaneously influenced by aesthetic representations and sensual experience 
but that also draw significantly on historically shaped and socially performed (as well 
as continuously transformed) political subjectivities. In the following text, I am going 
to further investigate these interpretative frameworks, i.e., the conceptualization of 
diasporic identities, the specificity of U.S. multiculturalism and finally the response 
by receiving African states, as exemplified through the case of Ghana.
Rupture and Reconnection: Diaspora
Ever since the time of slavery, the rhetoric of African kinship and racial solidarity 
played an important role in African diaspora identity politics and its manifestations 
in the various homecoming movements to the African continent: from the 
foundation of the Liberian colony in the nineteenth century via Marcus Garvey’s 
rallying cry ‘Back to Africa’ and the pan-African solidarity wave of the 1950s and 
1960s to the more recent homecoming drive which is mainly articulated as heritage 
tourism but also, to a lesser yet by no means insignificant extent, as repatriation (see 
Schramm 2010). Especially since Alex Haley’s world-famous novel Roots (1976) and 
the accompanying TV series, genealogical research has become widely popularized 
among African Americans. Haley’s semifictitious discovery of his ancestor Kunta 
Kinte and Juffure as his ‘ancestral village’ (no matter how fabricated or factual it 
may have been) promised an opportunity to reach beyond the gap of the Middle 
Passage and to link up with an integral African past that had been denied through 
slavery. To some extent, this development went along with a culturalist turn in Black 
politics, where the idea of political solidarity that had dominated the Pan-Africanist 
and Black Power movements of the 1960s gave way to (or at least was complemented 
by) more personalized identity claims that were connected to the appropriation of 
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African ‘traditional culture’ in a commercialized heritage framework (cf. Diawara 
1992; Hernandez-Reguant 1999; Ross 1998). 
At the same time, Roots (like many genealogical projects) already anticipated 
the biological reasoning that is at the core of genetic ancestry testing by relying on a 
concept of natural kinship while giving priority to a singular source. As David Chioni 
Moore puts it, ‘the [very] force of these root images derives in large part from their 
biological or genetic claims about present identity’ (1994: 14). These claims are not 
self-evident; after all, Kunta Kinte (apart from his semifictitious character) is but one 
of many possible ancestors of Alex Haley, and Haley himself shares this particular 
ancestor with numerous contemporaries. The linear connection that is constructed 
between the two individuals derives its power and meaning not from biology alone 
but rather from a unique historical and political constellation, beginning from the 
particularities of the slave trade and stretching out to current racial politics in the 
diaspora (and the U.S.A. in particular), even if, as Moore speculates:
[a]s a matter of pure theory or strict bloodline genealogy, Alex Haley could 
have identified any of [his] non-African ancestors as his ‘root’, but as a 
matter of practice and American social mandate, that is hard to imagine … 
As a matter of day-to-day reality in the United States, the general dynamic 
of ethnic choice is divided very strictly by color. Though many ‘mixed’ 
whites … can choose to identify either as … Belgian or Italian … for the 
most part the so-called ‘one-drop’ rule identifies all Americans of any visible 
Africanness as Black … (1994: 15)27
However, such directed genealogy (in search of one’s Black forebears) also served 
(and continues to serve) as a means of empowerment for a generation of new middle-
class African Americans who have experienced the Civil Rights Movement, have 
partly benefited from it and yet are notwithstanding (or perhaps even more so) aware 
of ongoing racism and discrimination, as they are still prevalent in the U.S.A.28 This 
generation is also the group that can afford to travel to Africa or to take the genetic 
testing, and indeed, as Gina Paige, the business executive of the company African 
Ancestry, told me, the average age of their customers is fifty-four and most of them 
come from urban centres, such as Washington DC, Chicago, Atlanta or Los Angeles 
(personal communication, Washington DC, 18 March 2007).
To research into one’s family history indicates a way to document one’s own 
uplift and also provides a means of honouring the struggle of one’s forebears, often on 
behalf of African Americans in general. It gives a voice to those whose agency had been 
suppressed during slavery. Reconnecting with one’s African past and emphasizing an 
African identity through consumption, genealogy or travel also springs from a desire 
to counteract the stigma of slavery as ‘social death’ (Patterson 1982). The promise 
of genetic ancestry testing to concretize this African connection down to the level of 
community (as the idea of ‘tribe’ or ‘ethnicity’ suggests) therefore bears a strong social 
component, if only in a different sense from ethnicity as a political organizational 
form.
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According to Gina Paige, clients’ concrete motivations for taking the test vary, 
yet all are connected to the expectation of gaining a sense of certainty about oneself. 
She divided customers into four main groups: first, people wanting to confirm and 
replenish their conventional genealogical research; secondly, people wanting to adopt 
a child from Africa and aiming to make sure that they and their child would share 
the ‘same culture’; thirdly, people wanting to travel to Africa who want to make 
sure to get as close as possible to their ancestors’ possible point of departure; and, 
fourthly, people wanting to invest in Africa who intended to base their choice on 
a meaningful family connection. Whereas the first group thus views genetic testing 
as but one rather small component in a larger historical/memorial project, the other 
three motives seem much more loaded, as they take the genetic connection as the 
starting point to impact on one’s life decisions.
Of course, this interpretation is clearly articulated from the company’s point of 
view, whose advertising strategy plays exactly on this identity-formative potential 
of genetic testing. Given the intrinsic ambiguity of the results, people’s reactions 
may likewise be characterized by ambivalence. While all may share a moment of 
emotional excitement at the moment when the results are revealed,29 some may just 
forget about it, whereas it may indeed have profound consequences for others – and 
perhaps not in the way that is expected. Bolnick et al. (2007) have warned of the 
possibility of a negative psychological backlash if the test results do not correspond to 
people’s self-ascription. However, the power of ‘narrative identity’ (Baylis 2003; cf. 
TallBear 2003) that is shaped by lived experience does not automatically get lost in 
genetic testing for ancestry, as the example of Suleika30 shows.
Suleika was a young African American woman who worked as a biologist at the 
University of Chicago, in the genetic research lab of Rick Kittles, the cofounder of 
African Ancestry. I met her several times early in 2007 and we had long discussions 
on the African American experience, on academia and representation as well as on 
the epistemological differences and similarities between natural and social science 
approaches to their respective subjects of enquiry. She had not yet taken the test, but 
was looking forward to do so and finding out about her African origins, because she 
wanted to incorporate ‘something from that culture’ into her wedding ceremony. To 
her, the verification of a specific African ethnicity would enhance the symbolic power 
of the union with her husband-to-be; it would affirm their belonging together. The 
sociality that she sought in ancestry testing was limited to the intimacy of her private 
life. At the same time, her desire for such heritage-affirmation was firmly based in 
her notion of a diasporic identity. She prioritized Africanness, yet she also accounted 
for the ruptures and mixtures that are characteristic of diaspora. This awareness went 
hand in hand with an uneasiness that also extended to the possible impact of the 
genetic ancestry test on her sense of self. Suleika was wary that the results might 
confirm to her that she was only partially African: ‘I was in my African dance class 
the other day, and I couldn’t do the steps, so I was wondering – hm, perhaps this 
is my European genetic heritage that makes me less able to do these dance steps?’ 
(personal communication, Chicago, 4 April 2007). That self-ironic juxtaposition 
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mirrors her desire for cultural purity and reconnection, a desire that is nevertheless 
already saturated with the knowledge that such purity remains an illusion.
In accordance to her Afrocentric worldview, she expressed an idealized idea 
of African cultural stability, manifested in clearly bounded and thus genetically 
identifiable ethnic groups with distinct traditions. In his seminal study on the 
Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy (1993) has criticized such an essentialist notion of 
the African diaspora as Americocentrism – derived from the racial dynamics 
in the U.S.A. and grounded in its consumer culture and political conservatism. 
However, Suleika’s understanding of race and American identity as well as her own 
self-positioning in that discursive field was far more complex than that. Despite 
her rhetorical embracing of a genealogical (or roots-based) model of identity, she 
acknowledged the historical situatedness of present subject positions as well as the 
transformative role of politics. As Peter Wade has argued, ‘kinship, genealogy and 
related constructs of biology do not stand in a relation of opposition to rhizomic 
hybridity – as necessarily conservative, essentialist and linked to primordial 
identities, roots and belonging – but rather are structured by the same tension 
between being and becoming’ (2005: 607). Suleika’s awareness of that tension 
was also evident in her research on specific health problems of African Americans, 
where she considered genetics (that is, her field of specialization) alongside social 
and environmental factors, thus taking the complexities of racial formation into 
account.31 The fact that Suleika attributed positive connotations to her African 
heritage while associating European ancestry mainly with embarrassment needs to 
be put in relation to the history of slavery and race in the U.S.A. where the one-
drop rule created strict classificatory categories of Blackness and Whiteness which 
were framed in the dominant ideology of White supremacy. This is also reflected in 
the representation of the differences between Y-chromosomal and mtDNA analyses 
as they are put forth in the public representations of the tests: while mtDNA 
samples show many more matches in Africa, the Y-chromosomal DNA often hints 
at European descent.32 This is interpreted as evidence of the long history of sexual 
exploitation of female slaves by their European owners, a history that runs through 
many Black and White families (see Ball 1998). What is not addressed here is the 
problematic factor of probability and chance: only a tiny fraction of one’s ancestors 
shares one’s mtDNA or Y-chromosomal DNA. Moreover, ‘misperceptions about 
the relationship between biology and race, and group genetics in general, can make 
the interpretation of genetic data difficult’, as Sloan R. Williams has warned in his 
analysis of the debate about whether or not Thomas Jefferson fathered the children 
of his female slave Sally Hemmings (Williams 2005).
The individualized sense of self which is emphasized through genetic ancestry 
testing – or, to use a different term, personal genomic histories (PGH) – is always 
embedded in historically and politically determined collective ascriptions and 
identifications. Besides the historical period of the slave trade and slavery, what needs 
to be considered here are the contemporary situation in the U.S.A. and the multiple 
meanings of diaspora that act as a driving force behind genetic ancestry testing.
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Imagining Ethnicity, Creating Belonging: The U.S.A.
As we have seen, the ethnic specification of a test-taker’s descent is perhaps the 
most attractive feature of genetic ancestry testing for African Americans. Apart from 
the problematic construction of ethnicity as a bounded entity with clear biological 
demarcations, the specific relationship between the African American customer 
and a particular ethnic group remains a controversial issue. The suggestion that the 
one biologically traceable line that is singled out in ancestry testing (through either 
mitochondrial DNA or non-recombinant Y-chromosomal DNA) would be more 
meaningful than all the other possible genealogical connections needs to be scrutinized 
in order to understand the process of genetic meaning-making. Moreover, it needs to 
be taken into account that it is the maternal line that is privileged in African Ancestry 
testing, since it is believed to reveal the desired results (i.e., African origins) more 
reliably than its paternal counterpart.
When I asked Gina Paige about the problem that the test declared descent on 
the basis of only a tiny fraction of a person’s multitude of forebears, she gave the 
following answer:
Yes, but it is an important lineage – your maternal lineage – from your 
mother to hers to hers etc. … If you were adopted –wouldn’t you want to 
know who your mother is? And isn’t it more satisfying to at least know one 
lineage, instead of none? You are German, your parents were German – so 
for you it is easy. Even if you do not do it, you could do it. In general, the 
criticism comes from those people who do not share the experience of that 
huge gap caused by the slave trade. But it is important to know that you did 
not just step off the boat, but that you are from somewhere, that you have 
a base.
Other geneticists who are involved in ancestry testing, such as Fatimah Jackson, who 
featured as an expert in both the BBC Motherland production and the PBS series 
African American Lives, have warned against too strong a reliance on genetics and the 
emphasis on a single line of ancestry in forging one’s personal identity:
If you give up your identity to the geneticist … who is going to take a piece 
of you, stick it in the machine and from that deduce where one … or two of 
your ancestors, out of the millions of ancestors that are yours, that you can 
claim … [came from] and you are gonna settle for that as your ancestry … 
you’ve given up! Self-definition is the root of self-empowerment.
Despite this caution, she also drew attention to the specific sense of disconnection, 
dislocation and abandonment that finds its expression in the spiritual ‘Sometimes I 
Feel Like a Motherless Child’ and is shared by many African Americans. To her, the 
new genetic technology has a potential to address some of that sense of separation 
and establish a linkage with one’s (African) origins.
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In my conversation with Gina Paige, which was very much in line with the 
company’s official doctrine and public appearance, she distinguished the situation 
of African Americans from that of other groups, whose systems of kinship were not 
violently disrupted by slavery. In her argumentation, she chose to employ a rhetorical 
strategy that made use of the symbolic power of a straight line of ancestry and of 
motherhood in particular. This rhetorical stance is not unique when it comes to the 
interpretation of genetic ancestry testing on the part of its proponents. For example, 
geneticist Bryan Sykes has also ascribed superior meaning to the mitochondrial 
connection between an individual and his or her particular ‘ancestral mother’ in his 
thesis about ‘The Seven Daughters of Eve’ (2001) to which all present-day Europeans 
could trace their roots. His racialized definition of Europeaness is one critical issue; his 
claim for a strong intrinsic connection and emotional closeness among the members 
of each genetic ‘line’ is another. In Sykes’s description, it is the male geneticist who 
literally pulls the ropes and makes the hitherto passive female ancestors come to 
life. Catherine Nash (2004) has carefully criticized this representational strategy and 
demonstrated how it fits into dominant ideologies of kinship and male domination. 
Yet in the context of African American identity politics, the image of the mother 
takes on a special significance (quite different from the one attributed by Sykes). 
As the lines of the spiritual suggest and as Saidiya Hartman (2007) has recently 
emphasized, ‘to lose your mother’ is a central metaphor for the tearing apart of social 
ties during the era of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade. In the autobiographical 
account of her journey to Ghana of the same title, Hartman reflects on the desire to 
return and the ultimate impossibility of reconnection. She quotes a person who had 
done the DNA testing and on viewing the results remarked that ‘he felt more lost 
than before. Now he was estranged from an ancestral tribe as well as the country of 
his birth’ (2007: 90).
In spite of the fact that ‘homecoming’ in the sense of a family reunion may turn 
out to be an illusion (I will deal with this issue further below), the attractiveness of 
ethnicized belonging persists and therefore needs to be critically examined. While 
sticking to the discursive framework of diasporic identity claims, PGH are in many 
ways a move away from pan-Africanist projects of political solidarity and resistance, 
since they focus much more on the individual and his or her cultural affiliation.
Gina Paige herself gave a clue as to how the urge to know one’s individual roots 
was shaped in the U.S. context when she spoke about the disadvantage of African 
American children whenever their schools held events such as ‘International Day’ or 
‘Cultural Week’, during which students are asked to present their family’s cultural 
heritage. Whereas Italian-American, Polish-American or Irish-American children 
had access to such cultural resources, African Americans could not say where they 
were from. Africa was too broad a category and too differentiated in order to function 
as a linkage to an ‘Old World’ heritage.33
This dilemma has wider implications in terms of political subjectivity. In 
contrast to other minorities who came as immigrants to the U.S.A., the lack of 
ethnic affiliation (intrinsically linked to their slave status) contributed to the 
perception of African Americans in strictly ‘racial’ terms, ‘regarded for centuries as 
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inherently unassimilable … [and kept] from taking a full part in American society’ 
(Frederickson, quoted in Shain 1999: 84). This perception began to change with the 
Civil Rights Movement and the growing participation of African Americans in the 
U.S. public sphere and political establishment (i.e., through the Black Congressional 
Caucus).34 Genetic ancestry testing refers back to the prioritization of ethnicity 
in the U.S. multiculturalist setup. Some of the clients who were interviewed for 
promotional purposes by the company African Ancestry affirm this sentiment: ‘I 
never knew what to answer, when people asked me where I am from. But now I 
can say: Sierra Leone!’ (retrieved 3 March 2011 from http://www.africanancestry.
com/testimonials/index.html). Paradoxically, by emphasizing their origin elsewhere, 
customers ultimately affirm their belonging to U.S. civil society. In times of political 
and economic neoliberalism, where the individual is central, ethnicized gene/alogy 
apparently allows African Americans to stake their claim on what Henry Louis Gates, 
Jr. calls ‘the American tradition’ (2007: 164) of multiculturalism and the capitalist 
spirit of self-realization with greater vigour. In order to work in that manner, this 
middle-class identity needs to be framed in terms of a specific contribution to the 
American ‘success story’ of limitless opportunity.35
However, the effects of genetic ancestry testing are not limited to the U.S. 
sociopolitical setup. Because it represents ethnic and national units in Africa as the 
cornerstones of the conceptualization of genetic kinship, the reverberations of the 
practice across the Atlantic need to be analysed. A starting point for such an analysis 
is the debate over diasporic ‘homecoming’ that is currently advanced in some African 
settings.
The Game of Difference and Belonging in African States: The Case of 
Ghana
One of the prominent African Americans who featured in the aforementioned PBS 
series African American Lives was Oprah Winfrey, who had previously declared her 
strong affiliation with ‘the Zulu people’ in South Africa: ‘When I’m in Africa, I 
always feel that I look Zulu. I feel connected to the Zulu tribe’ (quoted in Gates 
2007: 151). The popular image of the Zulu is that of a nation of warriors who, under 
the leadership of the legendary figure of Shaka, built one of the strongest African 
military states in the nineteenth century and also resisted European colonialism. This 
focus provides a counter-image to the racist ideology of African primitivism and 
barbarity that for a long time has also affected African Americans. In Afrocentric 
heritage conceptions, the wealth and power of African empires (another prominent 
example would be the West African Asante) features prominently. Moreover, African 
Americans have vigorously fought the apartheid system and expressed their political 
solidarity with the black majority in South Africa. Oprah Winfrey’s fascination 
with the Zulu tradition is part of that diasporic (identity) politics. Her symbolic 
identification works independently of personal genealogy and it does not really 
matter whether or not any ‘Zulu’ could have been transported to the Americas during 
the transatlantic slave trade.
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When she received the results of the genetic ancestry testing in African American 
Lives, she was declared ‘Kpelle’, a group in present-day Liberia she did not know 
much about before. Nevertheless, she exclaimed: ‘That’s me … I’m Kpelle. I feel 
empowered by this.’36 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. concludes: ‘And no doubt the Kpelle 
will welcome Oprah as a long-lost sister, just as warmly as the Zulu have done’ (2007: 
164). This prognosis is probably right, given Oprah Winfrey’s generous financial 
commitment to various projects in South Africa. Winfrey’s reported reaction 
accentuates the identity-formative potential of the revelatory moment of genetic 
ancestry testing. However, the question remains over whether a test result that defines 
a person’s maternal line as ‘Akan’, ‘Yoruba’ or ‘Kpelle’ makes any difference in terms 
of how African Americans are perceived and treated when they come to Africa as 
travellers, pilgrims or repatriates. Gates’ comment indicates that this is not necessarily 
the case; rather, the test results are fitted into previously existing networks of relations 
and adjusted to mutual horizons of expectation.
In order to illustrate these dynamics, I will turn to the situation in Ghana, where 
genetic ancestry testing has been taken up as the latest feature in the public discourse 
on the ‘homecoming’ of the diaspora. For the past twenty years, the Ghanaian state 
has been very active in reaching out to African Americans, who are addressed in a 
language of kinship as long-lost brothers and sisters. On the one hand, this attention 
is expressed in heritage tourism that focuses on the commemoration of the slave 
trade. Here, the ‘return’ of the diaspora is celebrated in general terms in the form of 
specially designed festivals and pilgrimage tours along the slave route. On the other 
hand, African Americans are called upon to ‘come home and invest’ – and thereby 
to make a concrete commitment to Ghana. The recent ‘Joseph Project’, initiated by 
Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, who was between 2005 and 2007 Minister for Tourism and 
Diasporan Relations in the cabinet of President John Kufuor, included plans for the 
establishment of a so-called ‘gene map’.37 In the official statement that accompanied 
the launch of the Joseph Project, the necessity of such a genetic database was explained 
as follows:
To irrevocably establish the genetic link between our returnees/pilgrims 
and the homeland, we intend in the medium to long term to collect DNA 
samples from across the length and breadth of West and Central Africa. 
With this genetic database map we would hope to be able to establish for 
every returnee/pilgrim interested, a personal report on his/her antecedents: 
to be able to organise visits to the villages of the ancestors. (Jake Obetsebi-
Lamptey, Ghanaian Minister of Tourism and Diasporan Affairs. Retrieved 3 
March 2011 from http://www.ghanatourism.gov.gh)
Undoubtedly, this statement is framed within the logic of genetic identification that 
I have outlined above. It asserts (rather erroneously) that there is even a possibility 
to determine even the village from which one’s ancestors came. Similarly clear are 
the limits that are put on this connection: quite in accordance with the idea of 
recreational genomics, the reference to kinship remains firmly anchored within the 
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framework of tourism and investment that has dominated the discourse on African 
American homecoming even before the genetic ancestry testing became popularized. 
From the perspective of the Ghanaian tourism industry, genetic ancestry opens up 
yet another attractive business opportunity. Some private tour operators already 
cooperate with companies in the U.S.A. in order to facilitate ‘genetic journeys’. That 
means that, even if a database of its own, as envisioned in the Joseph Project, may 
not materialize due to financial and other constrains, the announcement speaks of 
African actors’ awareness of the needs of Diasporans and also of the latest trends in 
the homecoming business. By promoting gene mapping and genetic ancestry tracing, 
the Ghanaian state aims to maintain its leading position in the competition over the 
tourism and investment potential of African Americans.
If the newly created genetic identities were as powerful as the company 
advertisements claim, the test results, next to affirming the symbolic attachment 
expressed in homecoming, might also challenge Ghana’s status as a prominent 
destination in quite unforeseeable ways. In the statistics of African Ancestry, Ghana 
features only as a minor player, with apparently less than ten per cent of clients 
showing a corresponding match – so the promotion of genetic ancestry testing could 
eventually lead to unintended consequences, as African Americans could begin to 
prefer other destinations due to their test results.38 So far, this does not seem to be the 
case, as genetic ancestry is not the only factor that determines notions of belonging 
and modes of self-definition. Other aspects include practicability or previously 
established relations (Oprah Winfrey has not simply abandoned her South African 
projects after receiving her latest test results).
For example, Gina Paige told me of one of her company’s customers who 
was very emotional about the testing and its significance for his sense of self. His 
results apparently pointed towards Nigeria. However, because Nigeria does not have 
the reputation of a recommended tourist destination, he decided to join a tour to 
Ghana that has been organized by a woman whose results pointed in that direction. 
Similarly, one of my African American interlocutors in Ghana was quite enthusiastic 
about the availability of the new technology. She and her son had done the testing 
with different companies – her own was with the Genographic Project (https://
genographic.nationalgeographic.com/genographic/journey.html), while her son did 
his with African Ancestry. On the impact of the results, she said:
it was interesting to see that we shared the same markers. But mine was less 
precise than his – mine just said West African while his said Sierra Leone. 
So we might not have any roots in Ghana here. But when I got my results, 
I was a bit disappointed, because it did not tell me anything new … Well, 
mine was also much cheaper, I paid only $100 while he paid close to $300. 
So I guess that they have a better database and you also pay for that. But 
Sierra Leone, this is more precise; it gives you at least an idea. For me as 
an African American woman, this is an important starting point. (Personal 
conversation, Elmina, 1 August 2007)
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The fact that these tests did not indicate any gene/alogical linkage with Ghana did 
not hinder her from continuing to travel there. After all, Ghana was the first African 
country she had visited and it had made a strong and lasting impression on her. 
The symbolic significance of genetic ancestry did not erase the importance of other 
emblematic points of connection, be it the tangible evidence of the slave trade in 
form of Elmina Castle and Dungeons or the concrete personal experiences that made 
her want to come back to Ghana after her initial trip. Thus, different users of the 
testing service are highly flexible in terms of what they make of their results. They 
could either fit it into already-existing imaginations of belonging or come up with 
new constructions of their senses of self.
Consequently, the impact of the tests on those communities ‘defined as ancestors’ 
(Rotimi 2003: 158) also varies. In the BBC Motherland programme, the British-
Caribbean protagonists were taken to African villages whose inhabitants embraced 
them enthusiastically. Yet this welcoming gesture went along with clear expectations 
of support that emphasized the status of the ‘genetic cousins’ as Westerners. This is 
similar to previous homecoming moves in Ghana, where African Americans have been 
granted land and symbolic titles by local authorities who expect a significant effect 
on community development in exchange. Once the affirmation of African ancestry 
leaves the realm of symbolic kinship and enters the sphere of political affiliation, 
the situation gets even more complicated. A case in point are the demands for dual 
citizenship, as they have been expressed for quite some time now by a growing faction 
of Diasporan homecomers in Ghana (and elsewhere). During the festivities of the 
Joseph Project, Ghanaian politicians were once again confronted with such demands, 
when Diasporans repeatedly called for the restoration of their ‘African citizenship’ 
(Imakhüs Nzinga Okofo during the Reverential Night in Cape Coast Castle, 31 July 
2007).
Jake Obetsebi-Lamptey, who initiated the Joseph Project and the gene map, 
clearly distanced himself from the possibility that any claim of political belonging 
could be deduced from the genetic testing:
The state does not come in at all; it is an individual project of finding one’s 
roots. There is no such thing as automatic citizenship. Perhaps there will be 
ethnic citizenship, since it is on the level of ethnicity, it has nothing to do 
with the state – it cannot be a government thing, because it predates the 
government of Ghana. (Interview, 6 August 2007)
However, even if in the case of Ghana nobody has based a claim for national 
citizenship on his or her test results, political implications are beginning to emerge – a 
case in point is the proliferation of a recent chieftaincy dispute through the impact of 
a group of African Americans who sided with one fraction of the dispute on the basis 
of their genetic linkage (Delpino forthcoming). And Israel has also been confronted 
with demands for citizenship on the part of some South African Lemba, who base 
their identity claim as one of the lost tribes on genetic testing (cf. Azoulay 2003).
Obetsebi-Lamptey’s statement therefore indicates some of the challenges of 
genetic identity politics at the interface between individual identification and 
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collective categorizations: ‘natural belonging’ is at once evoked and called into 
question; and the seeming stability of communal boundaries gets dismantled.
Genetic ancestry testing can thus be said to add a new dimension to the notion 
of biological citizenship, as it has been advanced by Nicolas Rose and Carlos Novas 
(2005). To these authors, biological citizenship denotes all those ‘citizenship 
projects that have linked their conceptions of citizens to beliefs about the biological 
existence of human beings, as individuals, as families and lineages, as communities, 
as populations and races, and as a species’ (2005: 440). Given its reliance on the 
linkage between DNA, history and identity, facilitated through the science of 
genetics, genetic ancestry testing can be regarded as one such project, which indeed 
represents a reterritorialization of biological citizenship, occurring ‘along national, 
local, and transnational dimensions’ (ibid.). While the rhetoric is heavily saturated 
with references to roots, land and territory, suggesting the boundedness of identity, 
the practice of genetic ancestry testing entails many dimensions that defy any such 
confinement but rather speak to the flexibility of identity arrangements in the new 
constellation.
Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the interface between notions of symbolic and biological 
kinship in the highly charged field of African /American identity politics. Genetic 
ancestry testing can be considered a continuation of older identity projects with 
other means, as it relies on mystified notions of origin, ancestry and belonging that 
have shaped popular Afrocentrism in the diaspora as well as the discourse of cultural 
nationalism in postcolonial states such as Ghana. Moreover, it does not always 
supersede previous identifications, but rather follows certain genealogical lines while 
leaving others aside.
At the same time, genetic ancestry testing forms part of a new biosociality 
(Rabinow 1996), where individuals establish novel social arrangements on the 
grounds of various biological constitutions – in the case of ancestry testing, these are 
the haplogroups that are aligned to certain ethnicities.
In order to grasp this latter aspect, Bob Simpson (2000) has come up with the 
suggestive term of ‘imagined genetic communities’, hereby playing on Benedict 
Anderson’s (1983) influential ‘reflections on the origin and spread of the nation-
state’. Simpson is interested in the transformation of existing categories such as race 
or ethnicity on the grounds of genetic knowledge. He makes the point that ‘the raw 
data of human sameness and difference (what might be called the fatality of human 
genetic diversity) … begin to inform the notion of ethnicity or what it is to be “just 
like us”’ (2000: 3). Yet the dynamics of genetic ancestry testing involves more than 
that, as it plays on the multiple cords of sameness and difference. On the one hand, it 
is about being ‘just like them’, i.e., identifying with an imaginary African authenticity 
presented as ‘ancient tradition’. On the other hand, genetic ancestry testing is clearly 
about the affirmation of a diasporic African American self.
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Genetic ancestry testing (as a technology and an embodied political practice 
as well as a consumer product) criss-crosses the Atlantic in many ways: from the 
historical diaspora-constellation to the collection of genetic data; from the specific 
context of U.S. multiculturalism and its insistence on ethnic belonging up to the 
charged encounter between a test-person and the representatives of a genetically 
defined culture of origin. The very interplay between cultural heritage projects and 
biologically framed lines of inheritance that becomes evident here is a powerful 
indicator of the close entanglement between history, science, culture and politics in 
the ‘new age’ of genetics.
Notes
1. Acknowledgements: fieldwork for this chapter was sponsored by the Graduate School 
Cultures and Societies in Motion at the Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg. The 
School also made possible a research stay at the Department of Anthropology at the 
University of Chicago. Thanks to Stephan Palmié for hosting me there. I would like to 
thank Patsy Fletcher for her great hospitality in Washington DC. She also facilitated a 
meeting with Gina Paige, to whom I am grateful for sharing her thoughts. Moreover, I 
would like to thank Rick Kittles and Peter Forster as well as my various interlocutors in 
Ghana and the U.S.A. for their willingness to talk to me. David Skinner and Richard 
Rottenburg have offered very helpful and constructive criticisms.
2. On the emerging conversation between anthropology and the new genetics, see Pálsson 
(2007). Other important areas where the new genetics are discussed in public are health, 
including reproductive medicine and forensics (cf. Rabinow 1999; Rapp 2000; Lazar 
2004).
3. See Michael Lynch et al. (2008), who use the notion of ‘truth machine’ to discuss the 
production of forensic evidence through DNA fingerprinting. My own understanding 
here is broader, referring to an idea of objectivity and definitude in representations of the 
new genetics.
4. For critical analyses of such representations, see Almond and Parker (2003); Goodman, 
Heath and Lindee (2003); Hubbard and Wald (1993); McKinnon (2005); van Dijck 
(1998).
5. For a comparison of company profiles, see ‘Ethnic Origins DNA Testing Company 
Comparison’, http://www.isogg.org/eochart.htm (retrieved 3 March 2011). For a critical 
discussion of several homepages of companies offering genetic ancestry services, see Greely 
(2008).
6. For the latter, see, among others, Bolnick et al. (2007); Brodwin (2002); Brown (2002); 
Faubion and Hamilton (2007); Palmié (2007); Nelson (2008a, 2008b); TallBear (2008).
7. This term has been widely used with regard to commercial genetic testing services, be it 
for ancestry or medical diagnostics, as envisioned by companies such as 23andMe. For a 
critical approach towards the latter, see Hunter, Khoury and Drazer (2008); van Ommen 
and Cornell (2008).
8. Other authors have emphasised the inextricable connectedness of social and scientific 
worlds as a form of coproduction (cf. Fleck 1935; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Collins and Pinch 
1993; Lösch 2001; Jasanoff 2004; Reardon 2005). In other contexts, such as Brazil, 
genetic ancestry testing is very much part of the rewriting or confirmation of bigger stories 
about collective histories and identities, impacting more directly on the imagination of 
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the nation rather than the individual self (see Santos and Maio 2004). The complex 
relationship between individual and collective identities in the new genetics also becomes 
evident in the case of biobanks, e.g., the well-known example of deCode Genetics and the 
Icelandic database (Pálsson 2007; Fortun 2008).
9. Of course, there are also other contexts in which genetic ancestry testing plays a vital role, 
for example, in the Irish diaspora (Nash 2008) or among British Caribbeans (Skinner 
2006), as well as in countries like Lithuania (Dauksas 2007).
10. For an exception, see Rotimi (2003).
11. Advertising slogan of African Ancestry (retrieved 3 March 2011 from www.africanancestry.
com).
12. On the multiple constructions of the Anderson sequence, the reference genome on which 
all mtDNA-based comparisons are founded, cf. M’Charek (2005). On the gendered 
ideology underlying the determination of descent through mtDNA or Y-chromosomes, 
cf. Nash (2004).
13. Another form of testing is the so-called admixture test, which claims to determine 
percentages of a test-person’s European, African, Asian or Native American ancestry 
through an analysis of so-called ancestry informative markers (AIMs) in nuclear DNA. 
14. The U.K. equivalent to the PBS series has been Motherland: A Genetic Journey, which drew 
considerable public attention towards genetic ancestry testing. Here, the focus was instead 
on ‘ordinary’ black British citizens. The entanglement of notions of citizenship, belonging 
and heritage underlying this particular programme deserves critical attention of its own: 
see Campbell (2007).
15. The other company that was involved in the testing was Roots for Real in the U.K. In 
contrast to African Ancestry, their customer base is much wider. Their homepage features 
three faces that correspond to the common-sense racial classifications ‘African’, ‘Asian’ 
and ‘European’, and they proudly announce to use ‘what is considered to be the largest 
available global geographic database of human mtDNA’. They also put an emphasis on 
ancient migration history, ‘thousands of years into the distant past, when Europe and 
other continents were settled by prehistoric tribes and peoples’ (retrieved 3 March 2011 
from www.rootsforreal.com).
16. For an analysis of the representational strategies of CSI with regard to the production of 
truth claims, cf. Cole and Dioso-Villa (2007); Lynch et al. (2008: ix–xiii).
17. A person could have a maximum of 16,384 direct ancestors only 14 generations or 350 
years back (Shriver and Kittles 2004: 615).
18. My use of terminology is not strictly centred on the academic programme of Afrocentricity 
as it is advanced by Molefi Kete Asante and others (cf. Asante 1987); rather, I refer to a 
broader heritage framework which is shared by many African Americans who claim a 
connection to African culture.
19. This is in contrast to African DNA’s explicit reference to conventional genealogy, where 
the interviewing of one’s (elder) relatives always plays an important role.
20. The only place where the old imagery is still prevalent is the section of the website 
containing details on the company (see http://www.africanancestry.com/about-aa.html, 
date accessed 3 March 2011).
21. See Palmié (2007 and Chapter 8, this volume), who elaborates on the divinatory 
dimension of genetic ancestry testing.
22. See ‘Susan Kidd African Ancestry Reveal’ on YouTube (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bb_
NkNZYw-Y&feature=related, date accessed 3 March 2011).
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23. Another epistemological (as well as ethical) difficulty in the construction of the comparative 
databases of African Ancestry and other companies such as Roots for Real arises from the 
fact that to a large extent these databases were initially produced for medical purposes 
(i.e., cancer research) and only later commercially exploited for the ends to which they 
are now put. Thus, while customers are assured that none of their genetic material will be 
stored or passed on to third parties, the same standard does not hold true for the samples 
that constitute the database.
24. Cf. Bolnick (2008) on the use of the ‘Structure’ computer program in the analysis of 
DNA material and the imprecise conclusions about genetic differences along the lines of 
‘race’ that are often drawn from the statistical exercise. For a detailed discussion on the 
meaning of statistics in conceptualizing ‘race’, see Hacking (2005).
25. See the outcome of the EU-funded PUG (Public Understanding of Genetics) project, 
which looked at the impact of the new genetics on the formation and articulation of social 
identities; cf. Wade (2007).
26. On the dynamics of racial classification in the U.S.A., see Fields (1990); on the power of 
classification in general, see Bowker and Star (2000); Skinner (Chapter 2, this volume).
27. See the heated debates over racial discrimination after the devastating destructions of 
Hurricane Katrina (Hartman and Squires 2006).
28. See the interviews with African Ancestry customers conducted by Geertje Couwenbergh 
(2006).
29. The names of non-public figures have been anonymized.
30. Fatimah Jackson (2001) also argues for the specific needs of African American patients. 
On the ongoing explanatory power and relevance of racial classifications in medical 
research and practice, see Hacking (2005). For a critical view on the new trend of 
racialized medicine, see Duster (2006); Fullwiley (2007); Wald (2006). 
31. Note that in its initial online presentation, African Ancestry visually brushed over this 
(otherwise acknowledged) reality by displaying the features of very dark and thereby 
stereotypically marked ‘African’ man.
32. On the powerful adoption of such heritage discourse among Scottish-Americans, see Basu 
(2007); among the Irish, see Nash (2008).
33. On the alternative notion of a black public sphere, see Baker (1994); Squires (2002).
34. Another important case in point is the debate over ‘Native American DNA’ and the 
racialization of ethnicity connected to it (see TallBear 2008). This has also affected African 
Americans who can claim historical linkages with Native American groups, but have 
recently been excluded from tribal membership and benefits (cf. Johnston 2003; TallBear 
2003).
35. Apparently, her Zulu identification was also backed up by a genetic test – which shows 
that the conclusions from the genetic data are arbitrary at best. Tests taken with different 
companies may lead to different results, depending on the composition of their databases 
as much as on the interpretation of the results.
36. On the broader dimensions of the Joseph Project, see Schramm (2008).
37. According to Gina Paige, most of the clients’ DNA samples point to Nigeria, followed 
by Cameroon and Sierra Leone. The high percentage of ‘Nigerian matches’ could also be 
due to the fact that Rick Kittles spend a long period of research for his cancer project in 
Nigeria, where he collected lots of DNA samples.
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Biotechnological Cults  
of Affliction?
Race, Rationality and Enchantment in 
Personal Genomic Histories
Stephan Palmié
My contribution to this volume is somewhat of a postscript to a forum essay that I published in the American Ethnologist a few years ago (Palmié 2007). 
A good deal of my argument in that article revolved around what even some of my 
most sympathetic critics took to be a purely polemic analogy between the rationality 
of divination as described in classic ethnographies and that of present-day genomic 
analyses, particularly the genomically enhanced ancestry searches known as ‘personal 
genomic histories’ (PGH). The present occasion gives me a welcome opportunity to 
address these concerns. In what follows, I will only briefly restate my arguments for 
why I think this was not only not an analogy, but an attempt at suggesting possibilities 
for establishing what Bruno Latour (1993) might call an epistemological symmetry 
that makes short shrift of a supposedly science-driven disenchantment of the world.1 
And then I would like to make matters worse! I will do so by speculating about 
how public representations of consumer demand for, and consumer satisfaction with, 
PGH might be analysed in terms of another classical anthropological topos: that of 
initiatory cults of affliction.
Lest you might think that this now really is a frivolous exercise, let me add 
here that I take my point of departure from a theoretical stance akin to what the 
late Alfred Gell (1999), in his call for a nonreductive anthropology of art, called 
‘methodological philistinism’. Gell notes that social scientific analyses of religion 
have tended to cleave close to what Peter Berger once called ‘methodological atheism’ 
– that is, a principled and systematic bracketing of questions about whether religious
postulates might be ‘true’ in any literal sense. Recall here the famous closing lines of
Evans-Pritchard’s (1956: 322) Nuer Religion where, after more than 300 pages on
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Nuer practices and utterances concerning the divine, he throws up his hands and 
conceded that when it comes to the content of what one might call ‘Nuer religious 
experience’ (whatever that may be), the anthropologist has to cede terrain to the 
theologian. If so, asks Gell, what then of aesthetic experience? Why do we think 
we need to relegate the one to the theologians but assume that we can safely speak 
about aesthetics – as if the ‘truth’ of art or, in Gell’s terms, the effects of particular 
‘technologies of enchantment’ were as self-evident as the idea of ‘kwoth’ was to the 
Nuer in the 1930s – or, for that matter, as the Catholic Trinity appears to have 
become to Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, Victor Turner or Dame Mary Douglas after 
their conversion to Catholicism.
But Gell goes a bit further than merely positing agnosticism tout court, and this is 
where things become interesting for me. In particular, he notes that the ‘technologies of 
enchantment’ that produce aesthetic (or religious) experience among their consumers 
tend to rest on the prior ‘enchantment of technologies’: artistic practice in his case, 
ritual in many others. But of course, we need not stop here, for what this is ultimately 
about is an approach towards the creation and circulation of value in social life. And 
here I would like to focus Gell’s insights on the practice of recruitment of individuals 
and groups, through technologies of genealogical reckoning, into social identities 
and relations conceived both as storage points and conduits of value. Obviously, in 
most human societies (though, of course, in widely divergent elaborations) descent 
functions as a powerful technos of recruitment – evoking as it does, at least among 
Europeans and Americans, notions of unwilled, non-negotiable consubstantiality to 
a degree where the truth of identities becomes popularly pegged not just to where 
you’re at, but where you’re coming from. Given the deep roots of arboreal images 
in the Western ‘knowledge of begetting’ (genealogy) and given also its deep linkages 
with the vertical transmission in time of property and properties (i.e., not just estates 
but also membership in estates), this perhaps should not overly surprise us.2 Yet if 
what the French medievalist Marc Bloch (1949) once called ‘la hantise des origins’ 
continues to hold us in its thrall, and if, for some of us, biogenetic descent provides 
the key to its ineffable mysteries, then there is no reason as to why anthropologists 
(of all people) should bracket biotechnological means of genealogical past-making 
as beyond our epistemological ken, and abandon them to molecular biologists and 
genomic scientists telling people ‘who they really are’ Marks (2001) and therefore 
how they ought to relate to each other.
On the contrary, and irrespective of what STS can tell us about scientific praxis 
as such, perhaps we are better served by heeding Max Weber’s (1978: 506) point 
that the mystifications arising out of the increasing control over our lives of highly 
rationalized but ultimately occult (for the layperson, that is) expert knowledge call 
forth their own forms of reactive re-enchantment.3 Since we will be dealing with 
contemporary American society in the following text, I shall simply make a point 
akin to David Schneider’s (1980: 23) argument about how American notions of 
kinship as biogenetic relatedness rest on the belief that science will truthfully tell 
us what biogenetic relatedness (and so kinship) consists in. Hence, if theology and 
aesthetics ought not to serve as epistemological dumping grounds for anthropologists 
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concerned with religious experience or the consumption of works of art, then science 
shouldn’t be either for those of us interested in what one might call, with a nod to 
Appadurai (1986), the social life of the ‘knowledge goods’ that scientific praxis places 
at people’s disposal.
That said, let me briefly return to my American Ethnologist essay. Part of the 
question that originally motivated it was how a notionally cognatic kinship system 
could possibly support the maintenance and reproduction of what Americans call 
‘races’: that is, a structure of corporative descent groups in which, thanks to the so-
called principle of hypodescent, the politically dominant group reproduces itself by 
perpetually disenrolling people of supposedly ‘African’ (or perhaps better: ‘black’) 
descent from its genealogies. But of course, it works very well – if only because (contrary 
to widespread belief) membership in American racial collectives has in principle very 
little to do with bodily surfaces. Phenotypes do work as handy props for visualizing 
‘race’. So do various techniques of the body or other learned performative capacities. 
But, deep down, ‘race’ is a matter of invisible essences conceived of as heritable – 
though by no means in the kind of limitless bilateral fashion corresponding to most 
Americans’ basically folk-Mendelian views of heredity and relatedness in the abstract.
There is nothing particularly biological here, to be sure. This is a fact that was 
nicely driven home when genomic analyses appeared to reveal that none other than 
Nobel Prize winner and belatedly self-outed white supremacist James T. Watson 
possessed, as journalist Robert Verkaik (2007) put it in London’s The Independent, 
‘a DNA profile with up to 16 times more genes of black [sic] origin than the average 
white European’. Now bracketing the question of what in the world ‘genes of black 
origin’ might be,4 who, in this instance, cares what Jim Watson thinks he is or, 
for that matter, looks like? Clearly, as in the case of Franz Josef Gall, the famously 
pea-brained founder of phrenology (Gould 1981), poetic justice was at work here, 
one might say, for in a sense Watson’s disparaging pontifications concerning the 
intellectual endowments of people of African descent simply came home to roost. 
Although one would still want to ask why socially ‘black’ people of African descent 
are rarely accorded the same kind of attention when they spout off comparable views 
– the controversy over Leonard Jeffries’ ‘sun’ and ‘ice people’ comes to mind – one 
cannot help but note that the attraction of the Watson story involves a distinctly 
subcutaneous moment.
This also became clear in the struggle between the white and black descendants of 
Thomas Jefferson over burial rights in Monticello, which revolved around the moral 
implications of probabilistically ascertained molecularbiological correspondences in 
the Y-chromosomes of some of their members. What was at issue in this instance 
was the significance of the idea of shared biotic substance for the commitment to 
and maintenance of ancestry-based ‘racial’ identities, and the reshuffling of rights 
and obligations that the acknowledgment of kin relations across the conceptual 
boundaries of such identities might engender. Here the disappearance of transracial 
kin relations obeys a logic that anthropologists know quite well – if mostly in the 
context of unilineal kinship systems, where we have long been wont to regard the 
phenomenon of ‘structural amnesia’ as a key to the reproduction of such social orders. 
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But of course, it isn’t really hard to see that the reproduction of American ‘races’ – and 
so the enduring racialization of American social life – requires the production of no 
less systemically necessary dark zones of genealogical consciousness. As the Jefferson-
Hemings or Watson cases demonstrate, these can normally only be illuminated in 
individual instances, and even then only by the seemingly extrapolitical authority of 
an expert discourse capable of removing the source of such authority from the realm 
of the social – for example, by projecting it onto the ‘facts of nature’ it merely claims 
to render legible.
This, of course, immediately brings me to divination. Regardless of the scale of 
technology mobilized, if we can accept that inductive (as opposed to inspired, or 
‘mantic’, in the original sense) forms of divinatory revelation are based on principally 
rational procedures (‘technike’) aiming to uncover previously unknown facts about 
the world by putting known facts under novel descriptions allowable within a specific 
epistemic order, then there should be little reason to reject a priori comparing 
ethnographically known oracles with the modes of knowledge production that underlie 
contemporary forms of genomic identity arbitration in public consultational praxis.5 
But there is more to it than mere formal symmetry. No less than, say, the Zande 
poison oracle contemporary genomics cannot but import into its highly technical 
operations a set of assumptions about the world it aims to elucidate, as well as a code 
for translating the signs it produces – dead chicken in one case, allele frequencies in 
another – into a language that renders these ‘findings’ comprehensible in terms of 
the questions the knowledge-producing instrument is supposed to answer. This is 
so because contrary to, for example, Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) famously misguided 
bracketing of ‘science’ as a socially unconstrained idiom of thought in Witchcraft, 
Oracles and Magic, both the Zande poison oracle and contemporary molecular 
biology are first and foremost instruments of situated social praxis. As such, they 
both answer not just to abstract standards of internal logical consistency but to the 
thoroughly socialized concerns of their practitioners and clients. Thus, in disclosing 
the ‘hidden’ or ‘invisible’ agencies and essences that – again in the eyes of both clients 
and practitioners – appear to shape particular social arrangements and events, they 
stabilize and reproduce the cultural order which threw up the questions such oracular 
systems purport to answer in the first place.
No matter then how much practitioners of genomics may protest their nonbelief 
in the biological existence of ‘races’ and tend to define their samples in terms of 
‘biogeographical variation’ or ‘continental ancestries’, as soon as the findings thus 
produced are translated back into the language in which the question they are 
supposed to answer was originally formulated, we are back in the thoroughly racialized 
social worlds all of us – including molecular biologists and population geneticists – 
inhabit day in, day out.6 This is a world where ‘race’ is no less ‘real’, and just as 
embodied in the biotic substance of American citizens, as the witchcraft substance 
is in the bellies of otherwise seemingly normal and indeed potentially unsuspecting 
Zande kinsmen. Once we leave the realm of probabilistic reasoning and begin to 
identify, say, K2 Y-chromosome haplotypes as evidence of Arab or East African 
ancestry, we are back in the world where place begins to connote race. The latter 
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example is not arbitrary, for this is precisely how the results of a recent British study 
of Thomas Jefferson’s Y-STR haplotype (King et al. 2007) were immediately read by 
the American press (Wade 2007). Interestingly, however, interpretations drifted not 
towards East African (i.e., ‘black’) or Arab descent, but towards Jewishness – though 
all of these (biogeographically equally plausible) solutions would have effectively 
barred Thomas Jefferson himself from burial in Monticello only a half century ago. 
But such highly mediated genomic trivia are really only the tip of a rapidly emerging 
iceberg of genuine nastiness.
As we speak, vast sums of money are being poured into genomic investigations 
that proceed from sample populations defined by recourse to the conventional, 
census-based racial classifications, only to restate them in molecular biological 
language as, for example, medical risk distributions among named racial groups in the 
U.S.A.: a genuinely scientific and in itself eminently rational equivalent to the logic 
that, in the late 1990s, led to the statistical disaster that became known as ‘driving 
while black’.7 Harking back to a brilliant formulation by Karen E. Fields (2001), 
I call this moment ‘racecraft’ – a principle operative in various often entirely well 
meant and intentionally anti-racist endeavours that nonetheless work to underwrite 
the experiential, if not conceptual reality of ‘race’. They do so by suggesting that 
‘race’ (like value, capital or indeed witchcraft) has a substantive rather than relative 
ontological status; that it can be found in individual bodies and objects, rather than 
in the relations obtaining between them. Among the vectors of ‘racecraft’, I would 
argue, figure PGH – individualized genomic ancestry profiles that are nowadays 
offered by an increasingly large number of usually web-based commercial providers.
One of them, African Ancestry, Inc. is directed by my colleague Rick Kittles 
at the School of Medicine of the University of Chicago. I do not want to unduly 
focus on African Ancestry, Inc., but to give you an idea of the dimensions of the 
industry in genomic ancestry services, according to an interview Kittles gave to Black 
Enterprise in 2005, by then – only two years after the founding of African Ancestry, 
Inc. – the company’s revenue totalled approximately $300,000 (Gilbert 2005). And 
that was before Henry Louis Gates, Jr. propelled Kittles to national fame by hiring 
him for his PBS miniseries African American Lives and Finding Oprah’s Roots. In my 
American Ethnologist article, I go to considerable lengths in trying to unpack what 
may be wrong, epistemologically as well as politically, with the product companies 
like African Ancestry, Inc. are selling. What interests me here is the supposed ultility 
of their services. Beyond sheer curiosity value, what kinds of strategies of self-
enracination and identity management are they presumed to enable and direct?
Henry Greely (2008) has recently gone to some lengths in trying to answer 
that question from a systematic comparison of web-based information posted by 
commercial DNA service providers. Quite obviously, however, it can really only be 
answered ethnographically – and with significant exceptions such as Nelson (2008a, 
2008b) and Schramm (Chapter 7, this volume), to this day, properly ethnographic 
research on African American PGH consumption still remains to be done (or, at 
least, to be published). Nevertheless, on a level of public representation, what we 
know both about the nature of genealogies as legitimatory charters and about the 
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nature of American racism, public representations of genomically enhanced ancestry 
searches do seem to point beyond a more generalized North American obsession 
with genealogy that seems to have gained momentum in the last two decades of 
the twentieth century. Here, I think, lies an ample field for investigating how 
contemporary American norms of ‘cultural citizenship’ have come to be articulated 
with the projection of credible claims upon patrimonialized ‘heritages’, ‘cultures’ and 
‘pasts’ tied to notions of horizontally shared biological descent. As Nash (2004: 26) 
phrases it:
Genetic testing companies draw on the currency of cultural discourses 
of identity in which identity is both central to political discourses and 
depoliticised in the service of consumer capitalism. In offering genetic tests 
to establish genealogical facts, these enterprising ventures play on ideas 
of possessive individualism in which possession of knowledge constitutes 
identity. Our genetic identities, we are told, are already in our possession 
‘in every cell of our body’ but require technoscience to reveal them to us. 
Buying Y-chromosome or Mitochondrial DNA tests we buy back what 
is figured as already ours and what already constitutes us, but in a newly 
knowable and productive form.
Nash is concerned here with a generalized logic of commercialized PGH products – 
one that, as she points out in her contribution to this volume, actively bodies forth 
new forms of ‘genetic ignorance’ (figured as a lack of self-knowledge that one ought to 
possess) which the consumption of PGH services promises to redress. Indeed, as she 
argues, the African American case may well be modular for strategies of establishing 
the utility of genomic ancestry services by playing on narratives of displacement, loss 
and recovery even in targeting groups whose ancestors were not enslaved Africans. But 
this may be precisely the point. Obviously, the fact that genomic technologies allow 
black people in the U.S.A. to participate in an American ideology of ‘rootedness’ (by 
making it possible to bypass documentary obliteration by biotechnological means) 
does not make their investment in ‘Old World origins’ less American (cf. Schramm, 
Chapter 7, this volume) – or less ideological, for that matter.8 Nonetheless, what 
has already come to be called ‘recreational genomics’ may play a somewhat different 
role in the case of African Americans aspiring, and financially capacitated, to engage 
in the genomic discovery of their biotic Africanity than it does in, say, the case of 
socially white Americans eager to get their known ‘immigrant roots’ genomically 
ratified, or surmount gaps in the genealogical record.9
In part, this is so because while in the contemporary U.S.A., ‘Americanness’ 
has come to encompass and encourage the public expression of forms of ‘white’ 
ethnicity, the ‘mark one or more’ question in Census 2000 and Barak Obama’s 
electoral success notwithstanding, ‘nonwhite’ identities and statuses are far more 
ambiguously articulated with an ideology that nowadays renders, for example, 
Irishness or Italianness largely unremarkable, optative modifiers of white American 
national belonging. Thus, the same privilege is still decidedly not granted to those 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Race, Rationality and Enchantment in Personal Genomic Histories  199
whose social ‘blackness’ does not allow them to forget their descent from victims of 
a regime of slavery – a system that obliterated their ‘African roots’ to a degree where 
conventional means of documentary ancestry tracing will invariably run into the 
snag presented by a patronym inherted from a slaveholder or selected ad hoc upon 
emancipation. Malcolm Little’s famous gesture of substituting his last name by the 
mark of a deliberately willed absence speaks to this issue – an ‘X’ to be filled by the 
significance of future action undertaken on behalf of the ‘Lost-Found Nation of 
Islam in the Wilderness of North America’. There is no slaveholder isonymy here, to 
be sure. But Malcolm X’s was only one solution to the pervasive sense of an inability 
of being a ‘Negro’ and an ‘American’ at one and the same time that W.E.B. DuBois, 
more than a century ago, diagnosed as standing at the heart of a peculiarly African 
American dilemma: that of inhabiting a social identity that not only threatens to 
severely curtail your material life chances and aspirations but that also limits your 
chances of ever fully ‘belonging’ to the imagined community that is the U.S.A.
One might think here of the resolution historically afforded by revelatory practices 
of exploring what Marilyn Strathern (2005) calls systems of ‘coimplications’ within 
a given semiotic and epistemological system such as W.E.B. DuBois’s contemporary 
Noble Drew Ali’s refiguration of ‘the Negro’ as the ‘Afro-Asiatic’ or Marcus Garvey’s 
brilliant play on the trope of exodus and return to a Zionistic African ‘transnation’ of 
the future. But one might also think of the more recent ways in which the American 
Yoruba Movement’s divinatory ‘roots readings’ fashion a sense of ‘deterritorialized’ 
racial belonging that explicitly negates mundane citizenship (in the U.S.A. or Nigeria, 
for that matter [cf. Clarke 2004]). Based in the notionally infallible authority of the 
Ifa Oracle (though, of course, open to mistaken or interested interpretations on the 
part of its human operators), such ‘roots readings’ are perhaps the closest functional 
equivalent to PGH today – except that while genomic ancestry searches displace the 
sources of divinatory authority downwards from the realm of the social into that 
of the biotic, ‘roots readings’ do so by upwards allocation towards the realm of the 
divine.10 Yet even though the latter move deprives its users of much of the legitimacy 
that the American public tends to invest in forms of knowledge production that 
manage to sail under the flag of science (even when they concern matters such as 
‘intelligent design’), the logical mechanism involved here is uncannily similar. In 
both cases an essentially hermetic (if not outright esoteric, in Weber’s terms) technos 
is mobilized to reconfigure the painful experience of exclusion from the imagined 
community that is the U.S.-American nation into one of inclusion – religious in one 
case, genotypical in the other – in a community of reborn New World Yoruba or 
fellow bearers of, say, L-2 haplotypes.
My own fieldwork in the American Yoruba Movement’s spiritual headquarter, 
Oyotunji Village (a theocratic community in coastal South Carolina), dates back too 
long and was too spotty to enable me to effectively draw upon it here (Palmié 1995). 
But given the Cuban roots of the American Yoruba Movement, and the similarity 
of modes of knowledge production involved, let me extrapolate a bit from what I 
know of the function of oracular diagnostics in the Afro-Cuban religion regla de ocha. 
For here it is clear that – much as in the case at hand – divination can reveal that 
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persistent, otherwise inexplicable misery and suffering is grounded in the fact that 
one is entertaining wrong ideas about one’s identity. So goes the story repeated again 
and again by Cuban practitioners of regla de ocha: terrible things happen to you for 
no good reason. You exhaust every conventionally available mode of remedy. It only 
gets worse. Finally, someone says: why not consult a diviner? What the oracle reveals 
is that you have been hailed by an oricha (deity) and need to submit to initiatory rites 
that transform your body into a vessel of the divine and induct you into a new line 
of ritual kinship and descent. After some agonizing deliberations, you undergo the 
costly and time-consuming ceremony, and are reborn into a form of identity you 
should have been inhabiting all along: that of a child of a god – omo oricha or hijo de 
santo – which is one of the names given to initiated practitioners of regla de ocha. The 
deity now relents and will open the roads to good fortune – provided you will serve 
it in a series of lifelong sacrificial prestations.
This is what Afro-Cuban divination does: it opens the roads to the future 
by putting past and present under a new description – a moment that one of the 
commentators on my American Ethnologist essay, Stefan Helmreich (2007), quite 
brilliantly compared to Charles Sanders Peirce’s concept of abductive inference that 
reimagines the past in order to secure new future relations to it. It is indeed a fine 
example of the kind of recursive logic Peirce (in Buchler 1940: 151) outlines in the 
following way:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
In the absence of empirically convincing refutation (or prior knowledge to the 
contrary), this, Peirce says, ‘will include the preference for any one hypothesis over 
over others which equally explain the facts’ (ibid.).11 For him, abduction functions as 
a vital logical step in the operation of intuiting and adopting explanatory hypotheses 
(and so, in a sense, the potential generation of new, albeit fallible, insights).12 In our 
case, such reasoning which transforms current states of being by recursively providing 
them with a cause (and hence a potential course of action to be taken to change such 
states of being) potentially ‘abducts’ the reasoner into an epistemic order underwritten 
by the premise of A’s truthfulness.13 As John Janzen (1994: 167) puts it apropos 
African therapeutic institutions, in the divinatory processes preceding diagnosis the 
‘character and role of spirits [think Peirce’s ‘A’] is more like a hypothesis in which 
relationship to concrete events in individuals’ lives needs to be established’. Indeed, 
given the eliminative procedure involved in many divinatory systems, ‘guessing to 
the best hypothesis’ is very much what is involved here. Yet once acceptance for the 
oracle’s ‘assertive acts’ (Zempléni 1995) or ‘inventive definitions’ that reorder ‘the 
world’s furniture’ (Holbraad 2008: 101) has become – again in Peirce’s sense – the 
basis of further perceptual judgments, and a pragmatic ground for action, not only 
will ‘A’ turn into a likely baseline of explanations for surprising facts ‘D’, ‘E’, and ‘F’. 
Rather, once assimilated into what Peirce calls a habit of inference, oracular verdicts 
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may now also come to drive a wealth of future-oriented deductions premised on ‘A’ 
or, for that matter, sustain inductive inferences that confirm (the now ontologically 
transformed facts) as mere effects of ‘A’. Abductive recursivity, in other words, may 
(under certain circumstances) attain systemic proportions.
If this appears to be what is going on in the case at hand, it is because the remedy 
the Afro-Cuban oracle prescribes also binds you into a cycle of mutual affirmation: 
by submitting to the ‘rule of the oricha’ (whence the name ‘regla de ocha’), you make 
your sense of selfhood contingent upon the reality of the gods. This is, of course, the 
nature of ‘cults of affliction’ which indeed tend to operate in an ‘abductive’ mode: as 
in the case of Victor Turner’s Ndembu mukishi ancestor spirits that ‘catch’ and afflict 
those of their descendants who neglect or forget them, the ritual aiming to redress 
the resulting illness or misfortune both reaffirms the ancestor’s hold on the present 
(spirit and victim are, after all, kin) and opens up a path towards a future of novel 
social relations that take the form of cult associations composed of former sufferers 
whose vengeful ancestors chose to manifest in one of various specific ways, and that 
specialize in healing the resulting afflictions. Divination again is the ‘abductive’ key 
(in both the logical and social senses of the word) to such transformations. As Turner 
(1967: 10) put it, ‘One is punished [by mukishi] for neglect of their memory, but 
at the same time one is chosen or “elected” to be a go-between in future rituals that 
put the living in communication with the dead’ – thereby, I would add, reproducing 
the reality of one’s status as a Peircian ‘abductee’ (or alternatively ‘inductee’ into the 
cult group) along with that of the mystical being that controls, as it were, the entire 
process.
Much of this, I would argue, holds for the chains of relationships established 
through Afro-Cuban divination between humans and the oricha into whose cults 
some of them eventually become initiated, thus joining ritual kinship networks that 
are completely independent of mundane norms and practices of relatedness.14 But it 
also might hold for those whose experience of racist ‘deduction’ from ideologically 
normative forms of relationality in American society becomes reconfigured, by 
genomic means, into one of ‘induction’ into novel forms of consociation and diffuse, 
enduring solidarity among bearers of, say, L2 haplotypes. If initiation into the cult of 
an oricha links you with former fellow sufferers with whom you now share a ritually 
established degree of consubstantiality with a divine entity that (among other things) 
allows you to lend your body to its manifestation during possession trance, then 
genomic cults of affliction would seem to perform a rather similar kind of ‘cultural 
work’ – provided you invest the same kind of credence in the reality of genomic 
identities and relations as practitioners of regla de ocha normally invest in the reality 
of the oricha.
I do not know, of course, what Turner’s Ndembu might have thought about 
such matters, and we still have no clear ethnographic picture what consumers of 
PGH services actually ‘do with’ – i.e. how they imaginatively process and act upon 
– the genetic information that links them to demographic entities in Africa (be 
they ‘countries’ or ‘tribes’).15 Still, as Alondra Nelson’s (2008a,b) and Katharina 
Schramm’s (this volume) ongoing research indicates, we ought to reckon with a far 
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more sophistication, eclecticism, and not the least, skepticism in African American 
projects of what Nelson calls ‘affiliative self-fashioning’ than the purveyors of genetic 
test kits and the media would have us believe. ‘Away from the glare of the media’, 
Nelson writes, ‘test-takers can exercise latitude in determining the import of genetic 
ancestry analyses’ for their sense of selfhood and relatedness’ (2008a: 775); they 
‘come to genetic genealogy testing with particular questions to be answered, with 
mysteries to be solved, with personal and familial narratives to complete’ (2008a: 
767); they ‘are judicious not only about the types of genetic genealogy tests they 
purchase, but also about the significance of the test results’ (2008a: 767), some of 
which they may reject – not just because a low degree of spatiotemporal resolution 
may render them irrelevant to their projects but because more specific findings at 
times ‘may challenge … prior expectations’, conflict with ‘other evidentiary bases 
of self-perception and social coherence’ (2008a: 767) or induce what Nelson calls 
‘genealogical disorientation’ by failing to orient them towards meaningful relational 
possibilities with other people or collectivities. What is more, even when the results 
appear to match their expectations, African American PGH consumers do not simply 
convert to genomically ascertained ‘identities’ as if becoming reborn into a form of 
evangelical Christianity. For many of Nelson’s informants, ‘the receipt of genetic 
facts opened up new questions about identity and belonging, rather than settling 
them absolutely (2008a: 770), and so led to a ‘course of deliberate and strategic 
negotiations [between different resources for individual and collective identification] 
in an effort to create kinship orientation’.
No doubt, these are important and salutary findings.16 And they are echoed 
by David Skinner’s (2006: 482) conclusions in a well-balanced critique of hastily 
dyspeptic generalizations in social scientific assessments of the new genomics. ‘Users 
of this new genetic information,’ he writes:
seem to be able to manage the apparent contradiction between treating 
biology as a source of truth about ancestry and viewing themselves as 
active constructors of their own identities. There are important links 
here to changing values around consumption, personal development and 
individuality. Part of the appeal of these forms of genetic testing is the way 
that they appear to provide a means of reconciling increasingly individualised 
accounts of self-identity and the constitution of political communities in 
racialised form.
Yet neither Nelson’s ethnographic data nor Skinner’s call for a more nuanced 
understanding of the social uses of genomic technologies really contradict the 
oracular nature of the functioning of PGH in contemporary American society for 
which I have been arguing in my American Ethnologist essay. This is so not merely 
because most of the better ethnographic accounts of divination depict oracular clients 
not as credulous dupes (or ‘prelogical’ category mistake-makers), but as rationally-
minded, principled sceptics who expect what Evans-Pritchard called ‘experimental 
consistency’ from their encounter with a revelatory technology (see also Swancutt 
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2006).17 To point out as much would be trite. As trite, in fact, as when one of the 
critics of my American Ethnologist essay saw fit to pronounce that the ‘thousands who 
seek ancestry tests are not forced to do it, and geneticists are no more venal in trying 
to persuade them to part with their $200 than anyone else in our market-centered 
society’ (Weiss 2007: 243). For no doubt: as Nelson shows, African American PGH 
consumers aren’t simply credulous snake-oil buyers. ‘What if it’s true?’, one of her 
informants asks when pondering her genomically ascertained ancestry. And what, 
indeed, if it weren’t!
But of course, aside from the repertoire of ‘secondary rationalizations’ (or 
‘secondary elaborations of belief’ to use Evans-Pritchard’s more precise term) that 
can always be drawn upon to explain counterintuitive or otherwise unsatisfactory 
divinatory verdicts (‘the poison got polluted’, ‘the operator failed to obey taboos’ 
– ‘the database is patchy for certain regions’, ‘the AIM markers are too diffusely 
distributed’) or the fact that the answers to questions asked tend to be beyond 
experiential verification, there are two other fundamental factors at play in both 
instances.
The first is that, if I may be permitted to use a Winchian paraphrase of Evans-
Pritchard’s text, ‘Americans are only sceptical of particular DNA results and not of 
genomics in general, and their scepticism is always expressed in a scientific idiom 
that vouches for the validity of genomic testing as an institution’.18 This may be to 
overstate the case. Yet, as Nelson herself observes:
Genetic genealogy testing opens up ‘ethnic options’ … to blacks in the 
US and the UK that may have been previously unavailable. However, the 
affiliative self-fashioning it may spur is enacted from within what might be 
understood as the ‘iron cage’ of the genome. The testing promises to reveal 
elusive knowledge, yet the particular longings that root-seekers of African 
descent seem to feel when they resort to it are shaped by distinct histories of 
slavery and the continuing realities of racial oppression. Root-seekers’ sense 
of autonomy and empowerment may come at the cost of acquiescing to a 
classificatory logic of human types that compounds, rather than challenges, 
social inequality. (2008a: 776)
Their agency, she concludes, is of a ‘limited type, unfolding from within less mutable 
social structures’ and, I would add, must (if ‘in the last instance’) take recourse to the 
collective representations that these very structures place at the disposal of those who 
would seek to fashion identities that are not only morally plausible but socially viable 
(cf. Nash, Chapter 6, this volume).
In line with this, the second factor involved in both oracular systems on 
ethnographic record and PGH consumption relates to the fact that what Nelson calls 
‘affiliative self-fashioning’ and Faubion and Hamilton (2007) call ‘the consumption 
of identity’) can be cast, without much trouble, in terms quite akin to those Turner 
(1967, 1981) deploys to describe, for example, the protracted remaking of persons 
and social relationships in Ndembu cults of affliction. Here, too, such processes are 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
204  Identity Politics and the New Genetics
triggered by a divinatory revelation that an ancestral spirit is afflicting a member of 
the community, proceed to the ‘induction’ of the former sufferer into a therapeutic 
cult with whose members he or she will learn to identify and – in most instances – 
an ‘abductive’ reordering of the social field surrounding him or her. This is by no 
means a mechanical process. Nor are its results a foregone conclusion.19 And it would 
certainly not be otherwise in the case of Afro-Cuban religion where people tend to 
go through lengthy struggles with themselves (and significant others) over whether to 
‘heed the call of the oricha’ (some of them, in fact, never follow up on the divinatory 
revelation of a need to get initiated) or whether to drift back into the realm of some 
other source of potentially redemptive institution such as biomedicine or the law. 
What is more, they also experience the integration into new ritual kinship structures 
and sacrificial duties after initiation not as an instantaneous change of self-conception 
à la ‘I was lost but now I’m found’. Instead, for them, too, ‘abduction’ into the cult 
of a deity and the social networks it entails is a drawn-out process of reorganizing 
(and, as Kristina Wirtz (2007) has shown, renarrating) the self in its consubstantial 
relationships not only to the divine and the disciplines it enforces upon one’s body 
and will but towards the new constellations of sociality that initiation makes possible. 
In other words, what initiation into regla de ocha is ‘all about’, to me, looks a lot like 
what Nelson calls ‘affiliative self-fashioning’ through the consumption of genomic 
ancestry services.20
Still, and this is the point: in each instance, what remains beyond transformation 
is the categorical apparatus that, hinge-like, enables and organizes the efforts at 
overcoming an unsatisfactory state of affairs – be it pervasive misfortune or illness 
in the one case or those aspects of the workings of ‘racecraft’ that consign African 
Americans to a position where their social blackness inescapably indexes African 
origins, but where, by the same token, their shared history of slavery and racial 
oppression appears to bar them from full ‘cultural citizenship’ in a nation that has 
come to ideologically valorize ‘diversity’ expressed in reference to Old World origins. 
PGH may well allow sufferers from genealogical affliction some latitude in choosing 
and expressing how they personally would prefer to gyrate around this double hinge 
of Old World ancestry and its genomic ascertainment. But to cite Nelson’s (2008a: 
776) conclusion once more, ‘their sense of autonomy and empowerment may come 
at the cost of acquiescing to a classificatory logic of human types’ grounded in the 
thoroughly routinized categories of a society in which genomics ‘compound … rather 
than challenge … social inequality’.21
Here at least, practitioners of regla de ocha tend to be Durkheimians in the 
strong sense, in that they acknowledge that without receiving human attention, 
the oricha would simply curl up and die (though not, of course, without leaving 
the world in a shambles too). And so, it stands to argue that this says more about 
Cuban and (mutatis mutandis) U.S. society than it says about either the genome or 
the gods – both of whose reality is, of course, beyond empirical verification in the 
everyday worlds of those who avail themselves of the transformative powers of their 
interpreters. What is more, I might add that instances of spirit possession, when 
oricha speak to the faithful through the bodies of their initiated mediums, might 
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rather fruitfully be compared to cases where ‘race’ becomes ‘visible’ in the bodies of 
people whose phenotype fortuitously conforms to stereotypical ideas of what ‘white’ 
or ‘black’ people ‘ought to look like’. After all, the historical scandal of ‘racial passing’ 
– like that of ‘fake possession’ – always did much more to stabilize the idea of the 
reality of ‘race’ (or the gods for that matter) than to undermine it (Palmié 2004; 
Wirtz 2007). Again, you don’t normally (or even only easily) see these things, hence 
the need for divination – or PGH.
But rather than ramble on about such – I think utterly fascinating – 
correspondences and the analytical openings they seem to provide, let me close by 
re-emphasizing that the picture I have tried to paint here largely arises out of public 
representation of PGHs and not from close ethnographic studies of how genomic 
ancestry products are actually consumed. We can certainly say that PGH providers 
targeting African American consumers advertise their services as the divinatory entry 
into a cult of affliction that reduplicates, for believers in biotechnology, what Afro-
Cuban religions and the American Yoruba Movement have been offering long before 
polymerase chain reaction processing became commercially viable. Obviously, the 
technologies mobilized, as well as what Latour might call the scale of the resulting 
networks, differ dramatically (though the public revelation – in Sports Illustrated, no 
less – that Ozzie Guillen, head coach of the Chicago White Sox, is an initiated priest 
of the Ifa oracle, certainly made for some ‘elongation’). But in both cases, to call 
any (or all) of this ‘enchantment’ may already be to pull the wrong epistemological 
switch. The real question is not whether what results is rationality or enchantment 
– and I think Gell was right when he posited that technologies of enchantment are 
only mediate instrumentalities, be they works of art whose auratic impact on our 
experience remains inscrutable, rituals that transform our bodies and social states in 
largely ineffable ways, divinatory instruments that alter our relations to the world by 
uncovering otherwise unknowable levels of meaning and relationships or, indeed, 
polymerase sequencers that reveal our biotic ‘ancestry’ in the form of allele frequencies 
that are similarly occult – i.e., inaccessible to commonsense rationality. In Gell’s view, 
their efficacy, in each and every case, rests on the prior social ‘enchantment’ of the 
technology in question.22 Thus, the real question is whether, and to what degree, the 
knowledge produced by and through such technologies will become subject not just 
to social institutionalization but to experiential routinization as a ‘natural ground’ on 
which to base conceptions of selfhood and moral community.
This is a point that Durkheim, a long time ago, made very forcefully – and I think 
we would still do well to consider it in pondering not just the much-vaunted (and 
by now obvious) ‘geneticization of everyday life’ in general, but in ascertaining how 
exactly the consumption of the commercialized products of genomic science may 
enable (or constrain and foreclose) specific practices and strategies of ‘affiliative self-
fashioning’ and identity management among no less specific social constituencies. 
To do so will demand close empirical attention to how PGH users’ sumptuary 
epistemologies configure the ‘social life’ of the knowledge goods that genomic 
science sets into public circulation. To try and peek into the black box of science (or 
theology, aesthetics or economics for that matter) may be a necessary precondition 
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for such endeavours, if only to ascertain the import of doctrinal regimes of scientific 
orthopraxy on the shaping of the product (which was part of my goal in the original 
American Ethnologist essay). Still, ethnographies of its consumption will be the only 
way to accomplish the former goals. Notable exceptions notwithstanding, such work 
still remains to be done.
Notes
1. To forestall further potential misunderstandings, let me point out that my use of the 
term ‘divination’ is decidedly not figurative and so differs fundamentally from the way in 
which, for example, Margaret Lock (2005) uses it in her discussion of the destabilization 
of molecular biological genetic determinism under the impact of epigenetics in the case of 
probabilistic modeling of susceptibility for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease. Unlike her, I am 
not concerned with ruptures across domains of scientific knowledge but with potential 
forms of closure that the consumption of revelatory knowledge goods appears to promise 
to their users.
2. Cf. Klapisch-Zuber (1991) and Bouquet (1996) on the evolution and functioning of 
the ‘family tree’ imagery in such processes – from biblical and medieval antecedents to 
Darwin’s transposition of heredity from the social into the biological realm, and on to 
W.H.R. Rivers’ ‘genealogical method’. As Nash (2003: 181) so aptly puts it: ‘As a device 
that historically ordered the transfer of property, genealogy continues to be characterised 
by the language of ownership, possession and inheritance whether spoken about in 
terms of bodily substance (genes or blood) or memory, culture, heritage, or genealogical 
information itself.’
3. If, at times, only as a last-ditch effort to render the workings of the ‘dialectics of modernity’ 
morally comprehensible through forms of symbolic recoding of that which is otherwise 
too meaningless to bear.
4. Obviously, Verkaik could not possibly have meant genomic snippets that code for 
phenotype. If the good Dr Watson ‘looked black’, chances are that he would never have 
attained the education, in the U.S.A. of the 1940s and 1950s, that prepared him for 
his co-discovery of the double-helix. And, even if so, who would have cared about his 
genome?
5. I would like to once more emphasize that what I am concerned with in the following is the 
oracular production of personal knowledge, not the attempts to address complex ruptures 
across multiple scientific knowledge domains that Lock (2005) glosses as ‘divination’.
6. Part of what is at issue here is that while the inductive reasoning underlying genomic 
science may work perfectly well when it comes to assigning random samples of quantifiable 
units (individual DNA profiles) to classes (statistically ascertainable populations sharing 
certain genomic configurations), the problem – as Charles Sanders Peirce (in Buchler 
1940: 152f.) pointed out – is that once such findings are translated into what Peirce calls 
‘characters’ (i.e., complex properties not amenable to mensuration), induction loses its 
logical grip. As Peirce puts it in regard to the question of how to test the hypothesis that 
a man is a Catholic priest, that is, ‘has the characters common to Catholic priests and 
peculiar to them’, the problem is that ‘characters are not units, nor can they be counted, 
in such a sense that one count is right and every other wrong. Characters have to be 
estimated according to their significance’. So it is in the case at hand. Even if it were 
possible to come up with genomic unit features common to inhabitants of Sweden or 
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Zimbabwe and peculiar to them, what makes someone a Swede or a Zimbabwean, or a 
descendant of Swedes or Zimbabweans, is not a matter of molecularbiological mensuration 
but of social signification. In fact, Peirce’s example is highly felicitous for my purposes: 
while there certainly are people who descend from Catholic priests, such ancestry (while 
genomically provable, for example, through paternity tests) is irrelevant when it comes 
to the inheritance of the ‘characters that are common to Catholic priests and peculiar to 
them’.
7. It has its even more sinister equivalent in the mushrooming apprehension and sentencing 
rates for individuals allocated – somehow, we don’t quite know how – to the category 
‘African Americans’ (which, from a genetic point of view, ought to include a vast number 
of phenotypically and – even more importantly – socially ‘white’ people, among whom one 
could count James Watson, if one believed in that particular ‘technology of enchantment’ 
currently known as genomics).
8. As Nash’s (2003) work on Irish ancestry-seekers in New Zealand, Australia, Canada and 
the U.S.A. would seems to indicate, the irony in the U.S. case is that an ideology that 
seems to characterize settler-societies dominated by descendants of Europeans has become 
available to the descendants of those Africans whose violent uprooting, transcontinental 
abduction and exploitation under racial slavery played a considerable role in underwriting 
the emergence of the notion of a white settler commonwealth in the the U.S.A. in the 
nineteenth century (cf. DuBois 1935; Roediger 1993). It would surely be cynical to say 
that what DuBois once called the ‘wages of whiteness’ have been transformed into the 
‘wages of Americanness’ and so has become accessible to some (though certainly not the 
majority of ) African Americans. Still, to what extent this is an unqualified good or merely 
has opened a new market for the consumption of multicultural ‘identity goods’ (Faubion 
and Hamilton 2007) remains to be seen.
9. If anything, genomic ancestry projects appear to promise to fill the void created by the 
condition of ultimate social deracination – the brutal ‘anti-kinship’ of slavery – that to 
this day casts its shadow on the narratives of collective origin that U.S. public culture 
tends to prescribe for people recruited (by birth, appearance or, more recently, individual 
choice) into that nation’s ‘black minority’. Although one should not expect the websites of 
commercial PGH providers to post all the customer feedback they receive, even a cursory 
look at such fora gives a strong impression of the sense of satisfaction and relief African 
American PGH consumers express at being hailed by a set of allele frequencies into what 
North American racism long denied them: a rooted Old World identity underwritten by 
one of the most powerful expert discourses available today – and thus a collective ‘past’, 
the alleged absence of which Melville Herskovits once defined as one of the key ‘myths’ 
underwriting the exclusion of African Americans from what we, today, might call ‘cultural 
citizenship’. 
10. Perhaps not surprisingly at all, in both cases the mechanism that Zempléni (1995) 
identifies as the ‘human speaker’s evacuation as the subject of the (divinatory) enunciation’ 
is key to the credibility of the divinatory untertaking: in the first case, nature speaks 
through the allele frequencies ascertained by means of genomic sequencing, while in the 
second gods and the ancestors speak through the configurations of signs produced by the 
oracular instrument. See also Boyer (1990: 72–75) for an interpretation of the logic of 
divinatory truth-production as a pure form of indexicality implying an unmediated causal 
link between the state of affairs clients want to know about and the description of that 
state of affairs provided by the divinatory instrument.
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11. As, for example, in the case of the a priori forclosure of interpretations of the Jefferson L2 
haplotype as evidence for Arab or East African descent. 
12. ‘The abductive suggestion’, writes Peirce (Hartshorne and Weiss 1960: 113), ‘comes to us 
like a flash. It is an act of insight, although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the 
different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting 
together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which flashes the new 
suggestion before our contemplation.’
13. In what follows, I hope the reader will pardon my playing somewhat fast and loose with 
the resonances of logical categories such as ‘abduction’, ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’ with 
the rather different resonances these terms have in contemporary everyday English – 
instructive as I think they are. I will flag the more egregious instances of this practice by 
putting the phrase into quotation marks.
14. Including – and that is a key difference that I have explored elsewhere – mundane notions 
of ‘race’ as an ancestry-bound status (e.g., Palmié 2002). For practitioners of Afro-Cuban 
religions, there is nothing problematic or even only curious about a socially ‘white’ person 
becoming a consecrated priest of the cult of a notionally African deity. After all, it is 
the deity that ‘elects’ its future ‘children’ – according to some, before we are even born. 
Despite all other historical relations and shared theological concepts, this is a notion 
decidedly not shared by adherents of the American Yoruba Movement (Clarke 2004; 
Palmié 1995).
15. Despite his famous attention to symbolic detail, Turner notoriously falls silent on instances 
of what Holbraad (2008) calls ‘divination failure’ (i.e., the patent incongruity of oracular 
pronouncements with perceived states of affairs – cf. Swancutt 2006).
16. As are Nelson’s (2008b) considerations of the ‘authentic expertise’ that Rick Kittles 
commands as the socially black scientific director of African Ancestry, Inc. Nonetheless, 
given Gilroy’s (2000) and Jackson’s (2006) strictures against North American regimes of 
racial authentification, and Greely’s (2008) analysis of African Ancestry, Inc.’s marketing 
practices, Nelson’s conclusions in the latter essay will necessarily remain open to 
contestation.
17. Just like occasional inconsistencies or even cases of blatant ‘divinatory failure’ rarely damage 
oracular institutions beyond repair (metadivinatory practices – i.e., the testing of oracular 
outcomes by different kinds of oracles – are, after all, ethnographically not unknown, 
and indeed present in the Afro-Cuban case), so has, for example, the discreditation 
of lobotomy as a clinical praxis not led to the abandonment of neurosurgery. It is the 
‘hopeful’ (in Peirce’s sense) anticipation of truthful future knowledge that maintains the 
institutional framework (and its ‘utility’, from the consumer’s point of view).
18. My reference here is to Peter Winch’s (1970) rephrasing of a key passage of Witchcraft, 
Oracles and Magic where he systematically changes ‘mystical’ in Evans-Pritchard’s text to 
‘scientific’ in his. In my case, the original reads: ‘Azande are only skeptical of particular 
oracles and not of oracles in general, and their skepticism is always expressed in a mystical 
idiom that vouches for the validity of the poison oracle as an institution’ (Evans-Pritchard 
1937: 350).
19. As Turner’s (1967: 359–93, 1981: 156–98) case study of affliction by an Ihamba spirit 
clearly shows, they can be highly contingent. More generally, Janzen (1994: 168) writes 
‘whether or not [initiation] actually happens, there being many “drop-outs”, depends on 
the novice’s progress through the early stages of therapy and counseling, on the novice’s 
or kin’s means, and to the extent to which the cult is controlled by an elite that restricts 
access to its basic resources’. All of this, I would think, holds for the case at hand as well.
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20. And here I should add that it also costs a lot of money – more, in fact (even in Cuba – and 
in both absolute and relative terms) than a combined MatriclanTM and PatriclanTM test as 
currently offered by African Ancestry, Inc.
21. If the analogy with Turner’s Ndembu case holds any water here, then the picture would 
obviously be a rather disillusioning one: if we bought into Turner’s Mancunian brand of 
functionalism enhanced by conflict sociology, then all that undergoing divination (for 
this, read purchasing PGH products) achieves is to lay bare endemic social contradictions 
in individual cases of distress. Therapeutic cult associations (for this, read new modes of 
‘ethnic’ affiliation), in turn, do little more than patch up the social fabric (by providing 
‘palliative’ options for new relational practices among the initiates) until the next victim of 
the aggravations produced by a conflict-prone combination of matriliny with virilocality 
– and, one should add, colonialism! – (for this, read combination of ideologies of 
meritocratic equality with racist exclusion) succumbs to social and psychological pressure 
and consults a diviner (for this, read sends in a mouthswab).
22. The visual splendour of a Trobriand kula canoe (does it really make exchange partners 
more generous?), a painting attributed to Rembrandt (is it truly an ‘original’?), a Zande 
divination verdict (is the person ‘really’ a witch?), an ancestry certificate issued by African 
Ancestry, Inc. (is an L2 haplotype really evidence of, say, Timne, Zulu, Gikuyu or Hausa 
descent?) or the stunning revelations concerning James Watson’s ‘blackness’ (but what 
about his social ‘whiteness’ and professed racism?) are, ultimately, cut from the same cloth: 
we don’t exactly know how it works, but they affect our social relationships – not only 
to the object of knowledge in question but to each other. Beyond that point, it is neither 
‘theology’ nor ‘biology’ that takes over. It is folksy ‘commonsense’ in all its well-known 
institutional embeddedness and reificatory exuberance.
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